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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This study begins with a rather simple premise, nicely stated by a 
popular Italian author: 
Whatever has to do with Italy cannot be uninteresting. With all our 
(Italian) faults and weaknesses, it remains true that the modern 
world was born in Italy. It was born by means of the work of the 
Renaissance, that rethinking of the ancient world in philological, 
historical, and critical terms. We say that the world in which we 
live was invented by the Italians. America, inasmuch as it is the 
supreme expression of the modern world, must be interested in those 
things that have to do with Italy. 1 
As Bassani's words suggest, Italy is by no means the least among 
the nations that have made significant contributions to modern Western 
civilization. In classical times and in the Renaissance, the Italian 
peninsula was a center of intellectual activity and a place of ferment 
in human institutions. The genius of the Italians produced major devel-
opments in government, commerce, religion, education, and the various 
arts and sciences. Although warfare and political instability have 
sometimes robbed Italy of its unity and strength, the Italian people 
have shown an admirable resilience that sustains them in time of diffi-
culty and national challenge. 
lGiorgio Bassani, "L' italiese e il ghetto," Italia nostra 195-196 
(January-February 1981):4. 
1 
2 
In our own century, the Italians have passed through two world 
wars, two drastic changes in government, and decades of political 
strife. For all that, Italy enjoys the strongest economy in southern 
Europe and is a key member of the European community of nations, playing 
a key role in such organizations as the European Economic Community, the 
United Nations, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It should 
not be necessary to catalogue the historic accomplishments of Italian 
scholars or the contemporary involvements of the Italian public and 
private sectors in international affairs and the r~gional and world 
economy. It should be enough to say that, if one considers the area of 
Europe south of the Alps, Italy is there as a fact that exists, 
persists, and must not be ignored. 
While the achievements of Vittorino Da Feltre or Baldassare Casti-
glione may excite the Renaissance scholar or the historian of ideas, it 
is an injustice to the Italians to wave away the subsequent centuries of 
their cultural development, as is sometimes done. Certainly there are 
high points in their more recent history that are worthy of notice. The 
reflections of Italian enlightenment thinkers and the artistic outpour-
ing that accompanied the nineteenth century struggles for national inde-
pendence and unity bear mentioning. 
Early in our own century, American and northern European intellec-
tuals became aware of the pronouncements of the philosopher Benedetto 
Croce, whose prominence in English-speaking countries was aided by the 
translations and biographical material provided by R. G. Collingwood. 
3 
Nor were the Italians silent in education; the Gentile Reform of 1923 
attracted some attention among American educators, and several articles 
on that reform and related matters appeared in the 1920's and 1930's in 
the Yearbook of Teachers College, Columbia University. 2 
Unfortunately,those Italian educational efforts that attracted 
international attention in the 1920's and 1930's took place under the 
aegis of Fascism, and in retrospect they are tainted by association with 
that system. When World War II ended and the Fascists were defeated, 
America sent an expert on education to help rebuild the Italian system 
of schooling. Then the English-speaking world, it seems, forgot about 
Italy except as a place to spend vacations and a source of delightful 
music and cuisine. Few American or British university scholars followed 
the course of postwar Italy in terms of intellectual and educational 
developments. A few books and journal articles have appeared on Italian 
education in general, or on limited aspects of Italian education, but 
none has concentrated on the work of specific philosophers of education. 
Since 1945, only one doctoral dissertation has been completed in the 
United States concerning any aspect of philosophy of education in Italy: 
it is a dissertation filed in 1970 by Gari Lesnoff-Caravaglia on the 
educational implications of the philosophy of Nicola Abbagnano, an exis-
tentialist. 
2For example, see Ugo Spirito, "Italy," in I. L. Kandel, ed., The 
Educational Yearbook of the International Institute of Teachers College, 
Columbia University, 1924 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927), pp. 
331-352. 
4 
If it is judged to have no other value, the present study should 
demonstrate that Italian philosophy and philosophical pedagogy did not 
wither after the Second World War. There were definite cultural 
changes, to be sure; but the crucial enterprises of learning, thinking, 
and educating continued in a most vigorous way. 
The Cultural Aftermath of War 
If comparisons are dangerous, it is risky to compare pre-World War 
II Italy to prewar Germany, or to any other 11 ideological 11 dictatorship. 
Certainly, Mussolini and his followers attempted to mold Italy according 
to their liking, but their success was never complete. There was a 
peculiar ad hoc character to Italian Fascism, a tentativeness that 
resulted in the announcement of grandiose plans followed by a vacilla-
tion in their execution. Moreover, the element of theatrics in Fascist 
ideological posturing often contradicted the undertones of violence. 
The Italians, with their natural sense of irony and instinct for self-
protection, tolerated Mussolini but took him hardly more seriously than 
any other ruler who had appeared in recent times. That there was 
oppression under the Fascist regime is indubitable, but it was probably 
a less onerous oppression than that suffered under other totalitarian 
regimes. It is revealing to note that many Italians take a peculiar 
comfort in the knowledge that the worst atrocity of World War II in 
Italy, the slaughter of three hundred Jews and political dissidents in 
the Ardeatine caves outside of Rome, was committed not by Italians but 
---
5 
by occupying Germans. 3 
The insightful and entertaining historian and journalist, Giorgio 
Bocca, describes the Mussolini era in these words: 
Mussolini was an Italian and he modeled his government upon the 
tastes of Italians, on their inclination toward public goodness and 
secret or private wickedness, on magnanimous gestures from the 
podium and hidden blows. He was violent, but he did not behave 
cruelly toward his adversaries; he made revolution, but so that he 
could soon put on a morning coat and present himself at court. 
After the time of armed groups and violence . . . Fascism settled 
down into an easy police state: innocuous anti-Fascists were left 
in peace; workers hostile to the regime became "sleeping" enemies, 
even if only drowsing; even the state of prisons and house arrest 
was relatively tolerable, certainly better than the prisons that the 
democratic republic uses for terrorists.' 
Confirmations of Bocca 1 s opinion appear in the historical records of the 
period: Croce, for example, who in his later years was an open critic 
of the regime, was bothered by the Fascist police only once. 
For Italy, the end of World War II meant more than a mere cessa-
tion of hostilities. It was the end of the political system that had 
dominated Italian life for twenty years, sustained by the personality of 
a strong ruler and a widely publicized ideology. Mussolini 1 s last 
attempt at political survival, the Salo Republic, failed in April 1945, 
and few can forget the grisly tale of Mussolini 1 s corpse dangling upside 
3An example of the Fascists 1 restraint in matters of social policy 
may be drawn from the favorable references to Jews in the Enciclopedia 
Italiana, the encyclopedia created as a cultural project by the Fascist 
government. See Enciclopedia Italiana, 1st ed, s.v. "Ebrei," by Giorgio 
Levi Della Vida and Gioacchino Sera. In general, pressures to persecute 
minorities in wartime Italy originated in Germany and were part of the 
price of Mussolini 1 s alliance with Hitler. 
4Giorgio Bocca, In che cosa credono gli italiani? (Milan: Longanesi 
& c., 1982), p. 80. 
6 
down from a signpost at a Milan filling station. Although King Vittorio 
~ Emanuele III had remained nominally in power throughout the war, his 
gestures of dismissing Mussolini as prime minister and of approving the 
subsequent governments' rapprochement with the Allies were not suffi-
cient to guarantee the survival of the Italian monarchy. The referendum 
of June 1946 determined that Italy would become a republic. 5 With the 
Fascist party destroyed, new political parties came to the fore: the 
Italian Communist party, closely associated with the anti-Axis partisan 
movement; the Christian Democrats, linked to the church; two democratic 
socialist groups, and a number of smaller, non-Fascist parties of the 
center. Political changes, however, were only part of the upheaval that 
occurred in Italy as the aftermath of the war. 
Bocca writes of that turbulent time in this way: 
Twenty years of Fascism, and then twenty months of civil war, as 
well as full-scale warfare, fought in the cities and in the country-
side, with slow destruction of houses and factories, of railways and 
bridges, from Reggio Calabria and Taranto onward, throughout the 
peninsula traversed by the Anglo-Americans in cautious advance and 
the Germans in slow retreat. And then, in that April of 1945, the 
end of our war, the sudden realization of the actual condition of 
our country; of its destruction, and of its dualities, of that which 
had been borne in the belly for millennia and that which had just 
arrived in the wake of the conquering armies-- jeeps and nylons, 
democracy and consumer goods .... 6 
5For a lucid summary of the historical events, see H. Hearder and D. 
P. Waley, ~Short History of Italy (Cambridge, England: Cambridge 
University Press, 1963), pp. 232-235. 
6Giorgio Bocca, Storia della repubblica italians 
Editore, 1982), p. 5. 
(Milan: Rizzoli 
7 
Fascism had tried to create a totalitarian society that controlled 
every aspect of life, including economics, culture, education, and the 
press. In reality, the Fascists not only did not manage to control the 
Italians completely, but the Fascists themselves lacked the unity they 
would have imposed on their country. Still, many of the intelligentsia 
in the postwar era believed in the need for a purge of "Fascist 
elements" from those institutions that the party had touched. In 
effect, a cultural revolution was called for in those years. Part of 
the postwar reaction against Fascism was a reaction, among intellectu-
als, against the brand of philosophy that had serve~he Fascist state. 
Reordering the philosophies that were to be respectable in academic 
circles had inevitable consequences for education in its several 
aspects. 
The Enduring Italian Values 
Although the end of World War II brought about political and 
cultural changes within Italian society, it would be wrong to suppose 
that the postwar era saw cultural changes of such magnitude that all 
traditional values were swept away. In fact, history reveals no exam-
ples of such drastic events: even the revolutionary Russians and 
Chinese express fondness for some of their ancient ways. What the 
intellectuals demand and how the masses respond may well be two differ-
ent matters. 
The well-known author Luigi Barzini suggests that the failure of 
Fascism was due, to a large extent, to the Italians' ability to see 
-8 
through the sham and theatricality of the regime, something Mussolini 
himself was evidently unable to do. 7 Italians, Barzini suggests, are 
naturally skeptical of ideologies and political systems: 
They believe that all ideologies are equally right and wrong, 
that there is no abstract solution to their problems, that the world 
can somehow be made to function under whatever political institu-
tions seem easier to accept at the moment, because all of them will 
always function defectively in Italy, where they have all failed, at 
one time or another, and will all fail sooner or later.• 
As a correlate of this general skepticism regarding the state and its 
programs and laws, 11 all official institutions are weak and unsta-
ble in Italy: the law is flexible and unreliable, the state discredited 
and dominated by powerful persons or groups .... 119 
What keeps Italian society from disintegrating, Barzini suggests, 
are certain traditional concepts and a code of social rules. Early in 
life most Italians learn 11 • • • that life is fundamentally a merciless 
game; that man should find his protection in the warp and woof of soci-
ety; that curbs on man's instincts constitute the essence of civilized 
living. 1110 In that game, they learn that individual capacities and 
shrewdness are maJor sources of personal security. The shrewd (furbo) 
individual is usually admired by all, even by his enemies. But beyond 
individual genius lies a more important entity: the power of the 
7Luigi Barzini, The Italians (New York: Atheneum, 1965), chapter 5, 
passim. 
~arzini, The Italians, p. 220. 
9Darzini, The Italians, p. 181. 
1~arzini, The Italians, p. 180. 
9 
family. "The first source of power is the family," writes Barzini, 
" stronghold in a hostile land. " 11 Within the family, explains 
... a 
that author, the ancient ideals of the Italians are preserved and 
protected from contaminating alien influences. It is the duty of each 
individual to contribute to the well-being of the family, to defend it, 
to enrich it, and to make it feared and respected. This devotion to the 
welfare of the family is often the cause of what appears to be an !tal-
ian's political unreliability and opportunism. One forms alliances and 
changes them as circumstances dictate so that family members will not 
suffer. It is important to be part of one power group or another, but 
it is undesirable to be too conspicuous in any group: 
always leave open, doors behind one," advises Barzini. "This 
of the reasons why one should always try to have friends ong one's 
opponents." 12 
The discussion of families inevitably leads to the matt r of chil-
dren. Parenthood and particularly motherhood are still considered 
highly desirable states by the Italians; perhaps no other pe 'ple vener-
ate mothers as enthusiastically as the Italians, among whom mamma mia! 
and madonna! are common interjections in many situations, and senza 
~ ("motherless") is widely considered the worst conditi 
befall a person. As children represent the continuation of 
they are greatly valued by most Italians, often to the exte t of being 
1lsarzini, The Italians, p. 190. 
12sarzini, The Italians, p. 222. 
• 
10 
pampered and spoiled. Barzini remarks on the spectacle of a crowd 
gathering around a pretty baby. 13 Parents strive to make their children 
attractive: nowhere do the shops sell more elaborate children's clothes 
than in Italy. 
Children attend schools, of course. Schooling serves to advance 
family interests by allowing the young to ascend the social ladder if 
they are able, and parental pressure to succeed in school is often 
powerful. It is common for middle class parents to press their children 
to attend classical schools in preparation for professional study at the 
universities. 
The almost universal desire for the advancement of the younger 
generation keeps the matter of schooling topical in Italy. 1 ~ Ironically, 
most of the schools are state schools, which suffer from the same 
bureaucratic weaknesses as other government agencies; nevertheless, they 
are expected to perform efficiently and well, and the fact that too 
often they do not is the subject of much political debate. From the 
controversy arise frequent attempts to reform or reorganize the schools, 
attempts that are usually frustrated by necessary concessions to oppos-
ing power blocs in the Italian parliament. An example of this chronic 
problem is the ill-fated work of the Gonella commission, a group of 
13Barzini, The Italians, p. 193. 
14The investigator, riding on a Rome streetcar, once overheard two 
middle aged, middle class women discussing the state of schooling. They 
deplored youth's general lack of discipline and blamed it on the 
schools, which, they agreed, discipline the young insufficiently and 
demand too much of their time and attention. "The school ought to serve 
the family," both agreed, and not the converse . 
11 
parliamentarians involved from 1947 to 1949 in an effort to draft a 
proposal for restructuring Italian schools. 15 The result of this parlia-
mentary inquiry was the draft of a reform bill that attempted to please 
all groups and in the end was pleasing to none. A more modest reform 
program was enacted in 1955; the subsequent stormy legislative history 
of Italian schooling may be traced in various sources. 16 
One may conclude that the Italian school is perpetually in peril, 
caught between two conflicting values: the Italians' disdain for 
government and state organizations, and their love for the family and 
children. Thus the meaning of education and the ideal shape of school-
ing were and are controversial issues in Italy, and those matters have 
lent themselves to interpretation, research, and scholarship. 
Schools and Universities in Italy 
While most Italian philosophers of education hold that the terms 
"education" and "schooling" are not synonymous, it is nevertheless obvi-
ous that much of what those scholars say and write refers specifically 
to schooling and is intended to influence the practices of teachers and 
school administrators. Such persons, of course, constitute much of the 
clientele of those involved in the academic discipline of education. 
Schooling, the system of formal education, is therefore a vital matter 
lSA report on this group's activities is provided in Giorgio Canestri 
and Giuseppe Ricuperati, La scuola in Italia dalla legge Casati a oggi 
(Turin: Loescher Editore, 1976; 1981), pp. 234-239. 
1~or example, Canestri and Ricuperati provide a careful documenta-
tion of political initiatives regarding education. 
12 
to the philosopher of education. 
It may be useful at this point to summarize the essential features 
of the Italian school system, as these schools are mentioned in the 
literature of education that is either quoted or referred to in this 
study. 
At the beginning of a child's life is the possibility of attending 
a scuola materna or asilo nido, a preschool that may enroll children as 
young as two years and keep them until they are old enough to attend 
elementary school. Most of these schools are in the nonpublic sector; 
they are private or run by religious orders or special nonprofit groups. 
A few are controlled by local government bodies (the "communes"), while 
some kindergartens are attached to state teacher-training schools. 
Ordinarily, state schooling begins at the elementary level. Under 
the law of December 24, 1957, elementary schools enroll children at the 
age of six years or older. The period of elementary schooling is 
normally five years, divided into a three-year and a two-year term, each 
of which is followed by oral and written examinations. According to the 
school law of 1955, the curriculum of the elementary school must 
include: religion, civil and moral education, gymnastics, history, 
geography, natural history, penmanship, singing, and manual and practi-
cal training. The state attempts to provide special elementary schools 
for those children who do not meet the physical or mental standards of 
the ordinary elementary school. 
13 
The Italian Constitution guarantees private and religious organi-
zations the right to establish schools and educational institutes, but 
in order for their diplomas or certificates to be recognized, those 
schools must meet the standards for state schools as set by the Ministry 
of Public Instruction. 17 
Teachers for elementary schools are trained in teachers' insti-
tutes that operate at the upper secondary level. Additional information 
about those institutes is provided in the discussion of upper secondary 
schools. 
A law passed on December 31, 1962, established the single lower 
secondary school (scuola media unica), abolishing the older differenti-
ated schools. Lower secondary school classes extend over a period of 
three years, and attendance is compulsory. Tuition is free at state 
elementary and lower secondary schools, but not at private schools. The 
curriculum of the lower secondary schools includes religion, Italian 
language and literature, history, civics, geography, modern foreign 
languages, mathematics, natural science, art, technology and graphics, 
music, and physical education. Latin is an elective for third-year 
pupils who wish to attend classical high schools. Special classes are 
provided for slow learners. The state schools also provide an "after 
school" program of subsidiary studies and complementary activities, all 
of which are elective. Oral and written exams are administered at the 
17 Information about elementary schools 
Italy 2: The Elementary or Primary School 
ano di Cultura, 1969), p. 2. 
is drawn from Facts About 
(New York: Istituto Itali-
14 
end of the third year, and their outcomes determine the levels of upper 
secondary schooling to which pupils will be admitted. Teachers in the 
lower secondary schools must have academic degrees, and they are 
appointed to state secondary schools based on the results of competitive 
examinations. Teachers with five years' teaching service may take 
eligibility examinations for principalship. 11 
True differentiation along vocational lines appears in the upper 
secondary schools, of which there are five major types and a number of 
subtypes. The duration of upper secondary enrollment is generally four 
or five years depending on the type of school attended. For those who 
are planning to attend state universities to study liberal arts, medi-
cine, or law, the appropriate secondary training is a five-year course 
in the upper gymnasium and classical lyceum; as the names of the schools 
suggest, the studies provided there are heavily classical in nature. 
The scientific lyceum enrolls students for a five-year period and 
prepares them for university study in the sciences. Unlike the classi-
cal lyceum, it requires no preparation in ancient Greek. The normal 
school, or teacher-training institute, is a four-year secondary school 
that prepares teachers for elementary schools. A variety of technical 
and professional secondary schools exist, providing specialized instruc-
tion in such vocational fields as business, industrial arts, surveying, 
navigation, agriculture, viticulture, foreign languages, tourism, home 
18Information about lower secondary 
Italy 3: The Lower Secondary School 
Cultura, 1969). 
schools is drawn from Facts About 
(New York: Istituto Italiano di 
15 
economics, nursing, and social work. There are also various artistic 
schools and academies that provide secondary-level instruction, gener-
a four-year basis, to those interested in fine arts such as ally on 
drawing, painting, sculpture, architecture, music, drama, and dance. 
Teachers in upper secondary schools are usually persons with university 
degrees in the subjects they teach. 19 
Italian universities are divided into several facolta, which 
correspond roughly to the American university's "schools" or "divi-
sions." Within the facolt~ are various istituti (institutes) to take 
charge of particular courses of study or research, and they are subdi-
vided into cattedre ("chairs") representing the prescribed subjects of 
study within the istituti. There is a single degree, the laurea, the 
pursuit of which may require five or six years of study depending on the 
requirements of the facolt~. 
In Italian universities, the study of education (pedagogia) occurs 
both in the facolta di magistero (teacher-training division) and the 
facolta di lettere e filosofia (division of literature and philosophy). 
The facolta di magistero was originally intended to be an institution 
for preparing secondary school teachers, who must have university 
degrees and are entitled to be called professore. Frequently, the 
magistero is attended by elementary school teachers who have diplomas 
from licei magistrali (normal schools) and who wish to teach in secon-
19Information about upper secondary schools is drawn from Facts About 
Italy 9: The Upper Secondary School (New York: Istituto Italiano di 
Cultura, 1970). 
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dary schools. It also accepts students who do not intend to become 
teachers but who wish to take advantage of its modest admission stan-
dards while preparing to transfer to another division of the university. 
Preparation for secondary school teaching involves specialization in a 
subject and not in teaching per se. In fact, the aspiring teacher need 
not attend a magistero; any facolta will suffice as long as the degree 
earned is appropriate to the tea~her's specialization. Courses in the 
theoretical and practical aspects of teaching are offered in the 
magistero for those who elect them. There is no practicum involved at 
this level of teacher training, and selection for a position is by 
competitive examination following completion of the degree. 
Education at the most theoretical level, pedagogia, is considered 
a subdiscipline of philosophy and it is therefore usually taught by 
professors of philosophy in the facolta di lettere e filosofia, which 
may have its own istituto di pedagogia. Such courses do not actually 
compete with those offered by the magistero. Those who take them are 
usually not preparing to be teachers; they are philosophy students who 
wish to take examinations in pedagogy in order to qualify for chairs in 
pedagogy at state universities, either in a magistero or in another 
facolta di lettere e filosofia. 20 
20 Interview with Dr. Massimo Carlucci, Librarian, Division of Litera-
ture and Philosophy, University of Rome, 20 May 1982. 
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The Vocabulary of Education 
To understand the educational enterprise in any society, it is 
useful to know the meanings of terms that are used by that society's 
educators. One of the difficult tasks of translation is to find close 
equivalents in the reader's language to specialized words used in origi-
nal sources. The difficulty is so great that the reader often ends up 
quite confused; hence it is useful at some point to provide fuller 
explanations of the terms which will be encountered. 
What follows is an explanatory listing of some of the most common 
specialized words found in Italian sources on education. The first 
group consists of words for and about education and the activities of 
teaching. 
Educazione is, in its primary sense, " .. activity intentionally 
directed at promoting the development of the human person and his or her 
integration into the life of society. " 2 1 In educational discourse, the 
social sense of the word is usually emphasized. Another reference 
defines educazione in this way: 
... the transmission and learning of cultural techniques. . . of 
custom, production, and behavior, by means of which a human group is 
able to satisfy its needs, to protect itself against the hostility 
of the physical and biological environment, and to work and live 
together in a more or less orderly and peaceful way. 22 
21tfauro Laeng, Lessico pedagogico (Brescia: 
197 8)' p. 158. 
Editrice La Scuola, 
22Nicola Abbagnano, ed., Dizionario di filosofia, s.v. "educazione." 
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This source points out that in advanced civil societies, the transmis-
sion of culture is really focused on the individuals and it aims at 
their mastery of techniques, their character formation, their matura-
tion, and therefore the development of something called "individual 
culture." In common parlance, educazione is used in much the same sense 
as "individual culture" or "acceptable behavior," and its evidence is in 
the refinement and good taste of a person's comportment. A rude, ill-
behaved person is referred to as maleducato (literally, "badly 
educated"), whether or not the person in question is illiterate or a 
university graduate. Thus the common understanding of educazione is 
often far from anything having to do with schooling. This may be one of 
the reasons why educazione appears in writings on education less 
frequently than the term pedagogia. 
Pedagogia is the province of the scholar; it is the systematic 
study of education. Although such a phrase as "philosophy of education" 
is not unintelligible to the Italian scholar, the preferred term is 
pedagogia, and one who practices it is a pedagogista. In effect, all of 
the individuals who are included in the following chapters are pedago-
gisti, and not always, strictly speaking, "philosophers of education." 
P d . " e agog~a . . . presupposes an art of education, and upon this it 
carries out the reflections of philosophy and the sciences in order to 
expand upon it and to improve its practices. " 2 3 Abbagnano' s dictionary 
elaborates thus: 
23taeng, Lessico, p. 249. 
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This term that originally meant the practice or profession of the 
educator has come to mean theory of education in general: one under-
stands by theory not only an orderly and generalized elaboration of 
the modalities and possibilities of education, but also an. occa-
sional reflection on some of the presuppositions relevant to educa-
tional practice. 24 
Abbagnano points out that in classical antiquity, pedagogy was not 
considered autonomous but was either a part of ethics or politics; hence 
it is historically concerned with both ethical and social reflection. 
Didattica is the science and art of teaching, typically as applied 
in the classroom. It ". . . enters fully into pedagogy as the science 
and art of education, constituting a section or specific branch • of 
it." 25 Didattica is necessarily less philosophical and theoretical than 
pedagogia, from which it descends, and in turn it gives rise to specific 
practices. The term appears in a major philosophical encyclopedia as 
" ... a complex of conventions that arise from pedagogy and concern the 
practice of teaching (especially in schools) and its method; thus it is 
often considered the same as methodology. 26 
Insegnamento is either the act or the content of teaching, and it 
is the object of didattica. It is considered to be synonymous with 
istruzione ("instruction") and the relatively obsolete term dottrina, 
"teaching activity," although the latter term carries a connotation of 
authority that suggests "indoctrination" to some ears. Insegnamento is 
further elaborated as " ... the 'expressive' moment of teaching activ-
24nizionario di filosofia, s.v. "pedagogia." 
25taeng, Lessico, p. 134. 
26enciclopedia filosofica, 2d ed., s.v. "didattica". 
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ity. . where it is an extension and indication of the 1 sign 1 (~) 
and of its relation to the meaning. . . " of the sign in the mind of the 
27 learner. 
One who teaches (especially at the elementary level) is a maestro 
or maestra, derived from maggiorente, meaning one who is elder or 
greater (from the root mag from which also comes magnus). "The term," 
writes Laeng, "encompasses the two principal aspects of authority and 
competence: and as such it has been transferred to academics from 
ancient times. " 21 
Inasmuch as education is supposed, by its definition, to induce or 
transmit certain kinds of knowledge as well as socially acceptable 
behavior, it may also be useful to explain some of the psychological and 
epistemological terms that are employed by Italian scholars. 
Consapevolezza frequently appears in pedagogical writings. It 
evokes ". . . the possibility of paying attention to one 1 s own mode of 
being and one's own activities, and of expressing them in language."29 
It is similar to the English-language concept of awareness. It is 
considered to be the factual basis on which a higher philosophical 
notion, that of coscienza, is built. 
27Laeng, Lessico, p. 207. 
28Laeng, Lessico, p. 231. 
29Dizionario di filosofia, s.v. "consapevolezza." 
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Coscienza is an important term in the more abstractly philosophi-
cal literature. Although in common speech it is sometimes confused with 
consapevolezza, the philosopher tends to presuppose that ordinary mean-
ing and to add to it the notion of " . . a relation of the soul to 
itself, of an intrinsic relation of the 'interior' or 'spiritual' man, 
by which he can know himself in an immediate and privileged way and 
thus judge himself in a sure and infallible manner. " 3 0 The notion of 
judging suggests that the philosopher is dealing with the moral aspect 
of knowledge, which is seen as closely related to the possibility of 
self-knowledge. In the nonbanal sense, it is roughly equivalent to 
"conscience". Abbagnano discerns a contemporary decline in the impor-
tance attributed to coscienza. This decline he ascribes to the influ-
ence of empirical science, mistrust of private testimony, and a failing 
general belief in individual responsibility. 
Conoscenza, in ordinary usage, is similar to "acquaintance." For 
the philosopher, it means ". . . a technique for the ascertainment of 
any object whatsoever, or the possession or ability to use such a tech-
nique. " 31 Although it suggests a process of ascertainment or confirma-
tion, it may be used in a weak sense to mean familiarity with or factual 
knowledge about some object or state of affairs. 
3<bizionario di filosofia, s.v. "coscienza". 
3lnizionario di filosofia, s.v. "conoscenza." 
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Saggezza might be translated as "prudence" or "wisdom," and it 
refers to the rational conduct of human affairs. It is ". . . not 
knowledge of high or sublime things, remote from the human community, as 
is sapienza: it is the knowledge of human affairs and the best way to 
1132 
conduct them. 
Sapienza, rarely stated as a goal of education, is wisdom of the 
highest kind. Its object is that which is most sublime, as, for exam-
ple, the divine. "In modern philosophy the term has conserved its mean-
ing as perfect knowledge whether by means of its completeness or by the 
nature of its object." 33 
Mente is the usual psychologist's word for the mind. It is 
roughly equivalent to intellect or understanding. Less frequently, it 
is a synonym for spirito, mind conceived of as " ... the aggregate of 
the superior functions of the soul, intellect, and wil1." 34 
Intelletto is quite comparable to mente in its more empirical 
sense, signifying first of all the faculty of thinking in general, and 
more specifically a particular cognitive activity. 
Anima is generally translated as soul but need not be used in a 
purely metaphysical or supernatural sense. For the Italian, it is 
It the principle of life, of sensibility, and of spiritual activi-
ties (however understood and clarified), insofar as they constitute an 
32nizionario di filosofia, s.v. II II saggezza. 
33oizionario di filosofia, s.v. "sapienza." 
34nizio~ario di filosofia, s.v. II mente. II 
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entity by itself or a substance. " 35 It is considered to be the manifes-
tation of an irreducible autonomous (individual) principle, and thus it 
is comparable to the Greek psyche, which is perhaps more readily under-
stood by English-speaking readers. 
Spirito is the most difficult to translate of the "mental" terms, 
yet it is widely used, particularly by idealist and Christian spiritual-
ist philosophers. It is analogous to the French esprit and the German 
~· In its older Latin form it appeared in the writings of the 
Christian scholastic philosophers as the rational soul, a concept at 
once psychological and theological. Its ancient origin is recalled by 
its relation to the pneuma or animating breath in Stoic philosophy and 
its possible application to incorporeal entities such as angels, demons, 
or the souls of the dead. 36 There is no single word in English that 
conveys this dual sense of intellect and spirit; its very ambiguity has 
made it attractive to certain philosophers who may wish to imply either 
more or less than they are actually saying. In this study, the word has 
b t 1 t d • th II • d 11 II • • II d d • h een rans a e as e1 er m1n or sp1r1t epen 1ng upon t e context 
in which it is used and the probable intentions of the author. Spirit-
uale, its adjectival derivation, may be understood as mental or spirit-
ual, and if both senses are evidently intended, a clumsy but useful 
compromise is possible in translating the word as "psychospiritual." 
35oizionario di filosofia, s.v. "anima." 
36nizionario di filosofia, s.v. "spirito." 
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Designating Theoretical Orientations 
While it may be useful to understand the vocabulary of a nation's 
educators, in the Italian setting it is equally important to know the 
theoretical orientations of educators. One of the major purposes of 
this study is to identify Italian philosophers of education according to 
theoretical groupings. It is not an exercise in arbitrary pigeon-
holing. Each particular school of educational thought is based on 
common assumptions and, to some extent, on a specialized vocabulary. To 
know the orientation of a philosopher or educator is to know much about 
the assumptions that person shares with others in the field and how 
particular statements are intended or interpreted. Conversely, an exam-
ination of the distinctive vocabulary and manner of reasoning of a given 
educator may influence the reader's assignment of that person to a 
certain theoretical group. 
It is commonly said that in Italian social and political life 
there are only three orientations: Catholic, Marxist, and laic. Like 
many generalizations, this is an oversimplification. Although the Marx-
ist and Catholic groups were fairly discrete and identifiable in the 
1945-1965 period, the same was not true of the laics. They were divided 
into several schools of thought, including the idealist, historicist, 
problematicist, and Deweyan orientations. An example of these group-
ings, often called correnti (currents) or filoni (strands), makes up a 
considerable portion of this study. To better understand what will be 
encountered in the ensuing pages, some further definitions are presented 
here: 
25 
Laicismo (laicism) is defined by its defenders as tl ... the prin-
ciple of autonomy of human activity; that is, the necessity that such 
activity proceeds according to its own rules that may not be externally 
imposed, or by ends or interests different from those that inspire 
it. til 7 In particular, it stands for a principle of separation of church 
and state. Laics do not necessarily express antagonism toward religion; 
they may believe that it is in the interests of all to sustain laws and 
institutions that all can accept, free of sectarian influence. 
Laicism's critics claim that it is II rationalism, immanent ism, 
absolute humanism; 11 and that it engenders a belief that ". . . historic 
destiny can be actuated only by historic forces. till They tend to equate 
it with anticlericalism, an antagonistic struggle against organized 
religion that nevertheless claims to respect religious sentiment. 
The form of laic philosophy that pervaded the Mussolini era and 
gradually declined in the 1950's and 1960's was idealismo (idealism). 
Its definition, according to Kant, is tl. . . the theory that declares 
the existence of objects in space outside of oneself either simply 
doubtful and indemonstrable or false and impossible. 113 9 An absolutistic 
idealism derived by Italian scholars from Hegel declares that Mind or 
Spirit (spirito, corresponding to Hegel's Geist) is the single principle 
of history, outside of which nothing can exist. In Mussolini' s time, 
37Dizionario di filosofia, s.v. tllaicismo. 11 
38Enciclopedia filosofica, 2d ed., s.v. "laicismo." 
39Quoted in the Dizionario di filosofia, s.v. "idealismo." 
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that form of nee-Hegelian idealism was restated in terms of political 
immanentism, in which the state is conceived as a living absolute, the 
supreme determination of Mind in history. After World War II and the 
overthrow of Mussolini' s regime, those idealists who remained in the 
fold had to devise more widely acceptable interpretations of their 
philosophy. 
Storicismo, or historicism, also has a Hegelian origin but is less 
rigid about the all-importance of the state. Historicists conceive of 
education as ". . . the autonomous and progressive history of man's 
formation, whose educational institutions are only instruments; and 
pedagogy as the history of culture, in whose dialectic its (education's) 
problems are produced and resolved. " 40 Historicist educators tend to 
emphasize culture and the moral development of humanity. 
Problematicismo (problematicism) is a form of philosophical 
agnosticism that opposes absolutistic concepts of knowledge of any kind. 
Its partisans affirm that". the content of knowledge under consid-
eration is not a principle, but rather a problem. " 41 Problematicism is 
less a discrete school of philosophy than an attitude of "radical anti-
dogmatism" shared by certain philosophers. 
40 Santino Caramella, Pedagogia: Saggio di voci nuove (Rome: Armando 
Armando Editore, 1967), p. 110. 
41 Enciclopedia filosofica, 2d ed., s.v. "problematicismo," by E. 
Severino. 
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Attivismo, or activism, was a major presence in Italian pedagogy 
in the 1950's and 1960's. Although it is most often associated with 
Dewey, its sources are actually much broader, encompassing most of the 
experimental and progressive educators of nineteenth- and twentieth-cen-
tury Europe. Attivismo is defined in the Dizionario di filosofia as 
" . the attitude (sometimes rationalized in philosophical theory) 
that assumes as its principle that 9f subordinating all values, includ-
ing truth, to the requirements of action, or rather to the outcome or 
success of action. " 42 That definition of attivismo brings it close to 
the pragmatism of William James and the instrumentalism of John Dewey. 
In general, it is built upon the primacy of practical activity over 
speculation. It is opposed to abstract or mechanical schemes of educa-
tion and the passive absorption of instruction; it emphasizes educa-
tional activities that elicit the free and autonomous forces within 
learners. It ". . . exalts the creative activity of mind, the deed, 
from which every value takes meaning."43 
Marxismo (Marxism) as a political concept should be no novelty to 
the reader. As a philosophy it relies upon the writings of Marx, 
Engels, Lenin, and others, but to derive a theory of education from it 
has often required Marxist educators to interpolate heavily. Italian 
Marxists have a valuable source of pedagogical reflection in the works 
of Antonio Gramsci, an early and articulate Italian Communist leader. 
42 Dizionario di filosofia, s.v. "attivismo." 
43 Dizionario delle idee, 1977 ed., s.v. "attivismo." 
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Christian theories of education are generally collected under the 
heading of spiritualismo ("spiritualism"). Spiritualismo in any sense 
(not necessarily the Christian sense) is a doctrine that draws the data 
for philosophical or scientific research from human consciousness. It 
tends to negate the reality of the external world except as a locus for 
objects of consciousness. It reduces science to imperfect or false 
knowledge and finds sufficient data in consciousness to construct the 
world of nature and history. Usually, spiritualists find a divine prin-
ciple in consciousness which they equate to the Judeo-Christian God. 
They are also likely to find manifestations of that divine principle in 
the world of human institutions and traditions which they then defend in 
a vigorously conservative manner. Spiritualismo depends heavily on a 
theory of moral conscience as the interior reflection or introspection 
that guides experience and speculation. This philosophy posits 
II 
. the spirituality of the soul, liberty, responsibility for 
actions, moral obligations, unselfish virtue, the worthiness of justice, 
the beauty of charity;" and the existence of a transcendent God. 44 
Of Universities and Publishers 
Although it is not a matter of paramount significance, it is some-
times useful to be able to confirm an opinion as to a scholar's theoret-
ical orientation by other means than textual analysis or biographical 
research. It has been pointed out by Professor Nanni of the Pontifical 
Salesian University of Rome that philosophers of education of given 
44Dizionario di filosofia, s.v. "spiritualismo." 
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orientations have gathered at certain universities and have tended to be 
published by certain publishers." 5 Thus it is sometimes possible to 
deduce scholars' intellectual positions from their university affilia-
tions or even from publishers' imprints in their books. 
Before World War II, the nee-Hegelian idealists who were the offi-
cial philosophers and educators of the Fascist state had their first 
bastion at the University of Pisa; it was followed by strong positions 
at the universities of Florence and Rome, although of course the Musso-
lini regime attempted to establish sympathetic scholars at all universi-
ties. After the war, the University of Florence became the center of 
Deweyan doctrine, whence Deweyans dispersed to the universities of other 
major cities. A sizable group assembled at the University of Rome, 
where Deweyanism became a dominant force. 
The Catholic philosophers of education have been closely associ-
ated with the Sacred Heart University of Milan and various papal insti-
tutions, as might be expected; moreover, Catholic educators appeared in 
numbers in certain state universities, notably at the universities of 
Padua, Genoa, and Messina. 
As of 1965, neither Marxists nor problematicists had established 
redoubts in particular universities, although the quality of G. M. 
Bertin's (problematicist) work at the University of Bologna generated 
respect and a certain following in later years. 
4Srnterview with Fr. Carlo Nanni, Pontifical Salesian University, 
Rome, Italy, 1 April 1982. 
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It is no accident that most of the Deweyan scholars have published 
through La Nuova Italia Editrice of Florence with notable regularity. 
That house has had a long and close association with the Deweyan schol-
ars at the University of Florence, inasmuch as it was founded by Ernesto 
Codignola, who also had much to do with the establishment of the 
Deweyan-activist School of Florence. For Catholic educators, a major 
publishing house is La Scuola of Brescia, and two of the smaller exclu-
sively Catholic publishers that have issued educational books are Vita e 
Pensiero of Milan and A. V.E. of Rome. The Marxists have tended to 
publish through Editori Riuniti of Rome, a specifically Marxist-oriented 
concern. Material of a laic and critical or politically left-of-center 
sort, including the work of problematicists, has been published by 
Armando Armando of Rome, while similar material has come forth from G. 
C. Sansoni of Florence. 
The use of a specific publisher is not an infallible indication of 
an author's sympathies, nor is university affiliation; however, grouping 
tendencies are discernible. Such tendencies may be taken as evidence of 
the political nature of publishers and universities in Italy. 
Problems of Language and Translation 
Most of the published sources examined in the course of this 
investigation are available in the Italian language only. It was a 
principal task of the investigator to read them, paraphrase them, and 
translate appropriate selections. All quotations in the following chap-
ters are his own trans lations unless indicated otherwise in text or 
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footnotes. He alone is responsible for errors in translation or inter-
pretation, and he solicits comments and criticisms from those whose 
knowledge of Italian may be more extensive. 
Inasmuch as translation is rarely a simple matter, it may be well 
to point out for the reader what peculiar difficulties are encountered 
in preparing Italian material for English-speaking readers. 
Italian is a much more inflected language than is English. This 
fact explains certain notable characteristics of Italian academic prose 
style. All nouns, pronouns, and adjectives have both number and gender, 
. " " d and there 1s no neuter gen er. This lends a certain "sexist" appear-
ance to Italian prose. For example, such words as "student" and 
"professor" (lo studente and il professore) are masculine, and pronouns 
that refer to either word must also be masculine. Feminine forms of 
these words exist, but they are awkward (la studentessa and la 
professoressa) and are seldom used. To be faithful to the original 
sources, the translator must use the corresponding masculine pronouns 
(e. g., "he" or "him"), but the reader should understand that no contem-
porary Italian educator proposes that education be only for boys and 
men. 
The inflection of adjectives and relative pronouns allows a writer 
to introduce strings of adjectival phrases and relative clauses into the 
body of a sentence, each of which is headed by an adjective or a pronoun 
that refers to only one of the antecedent nouns. The result is clear 
enough in Italian, but it is unintelligible if rendered literally in 
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English. Such sentences require considerable revision in the course of 
translation. 
In general, inflection permits a looser, lengthier sentence struc-
ture, and the difficulty of comprehending such sentences is compounded 
by the fact that there is no rule in Italian against the comma splice. 
Independent clauses are often joined by commas only, and the translator 
must decide whether to change a comma to a semicolon, add a conjunction, 
or end the sentence and begin a new one. On the other hand, there is no 
rule against verbless sentences, and the translator must decide whether 
to let such sentence fragments stand or to supply them with likely 
verbs. 
Italian historical writing may be confusing at first because of 
the variety of tenses employed. The language has three past tenses 
(excluding special compounds), but the specifically "historical" past 
(the passato remota) is used most frequently in the South and is consid-
ered inelegant by some northern writers. Many historians prefer to 
write history in the present tense, probably for the sake of simplicity, 
while some affect the future tense as if they themselves were standing 
at some point in the past regarding what is yet to come. In such cases, 
the translator can only ask what the writer probably intended and what 
would be acceptable to English-speaking readers. 
The possibility of writing ambiguously is always present and 
attractive to Italian writers. Italian, it has been observed, lacks the 
clarity of French. Italian writers seem to enjoy exploiting the possi-
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bilities offered by the imprecision of their language. The ambiguity of 
such terms as coscienza and spirito has been commented upon in a previ-
ous section of this chapter. Similarly, in interpreting biographical 
material one may be confounded by the use of such terms as nipote and 
cugino, literally "nephew" and "cousin" but nipote may be used to mean 
"grandchild" or "great-grandchild" or almost any descendant, while 
cugino may apply to a broad range of relatives, including those who are 
technically in-laws. Parente, a false cognate of "parent," actually 
means any older family member such as an uncle or aunt. For the biogra-
pher, what appears to be important is that a person belongs to a certain 
family, but to investigate the relationship too closely may border on 
indelicacy. 
It is common among Italian writers to affect certain literary 
references and figures of speech. Extended metaphors are often present 
in scholarly writing, but a bit of analysis is usually sufficient to 
understand the origin and direction of such metaphors. What is some-
times disconcerting is the Italian habit of personifying abstract enti-
ties. This is particularly evident in material about intellectual move-
ments. A writer is likely to say, for example, that "personalism 
teaches thus-and-so," when it would be more accurate to say that 
"personalists teach thus-and-s?·" A possible explanation is that a 
movement is considered to be a collection of human minds, and it takes 
on a collective human identity; thus it teaches (or believes or denies) 
whatever its individual members teach (or believe or deny). Another 
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favorite rhetorical device of Italian writers is the synecdoche, by 
means of which a single example is understood to stand for an entire 
class of things. Instead of speaking of "schooling" or "the schools," a 
scholar may write about "the school" (la scuola), meaning any school and 
every school. Similarly, one may encounter references to "the univer-
• II s1ty, "the student," and so forth; this stylistic device is well-known 
enough in English to present no particular problem of interpretation, 
but alternate translations may be required to avoid unduly pretentious 
or awkward prose. 
Some words, such as names of persons and places, cannot be trans-
lated. Great care has been taken to respect individual names. Unlike 
some British scholars, who prefer to render Vittorio Emanuele III as 
"Victor Emmanuel III," the investigator holds that this practice leads 
to difficulties and absurdities, the least of which is that "Victor 
Emmanuel" simply was not the king's name. Although the investigator has 
seen Antonio Rosmini renamed Anthony Rosmini in an older English source, 
he will refrain from anglicizing Benedetto Croce and Ugo Spirito into 
Benedict Croce and Hugh Spirito, or worse still, Benedict Cross and Hugh 
Mind. Let Italians be Italians. 
In some cases, minor adjustments have been made in capitalization 
or punctuation of names. For instance, there are complex rules govern-
ing the capitalization of prepositional particles such as di, dei, and 
da, but in these chapters they have been capitalized uniformly in order 
to emphasize the fact that the particle is legitimately part of the 
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I person s name. In an Italian library or reference book, the name "di 
Laghi" appears under "D" rather than "L"; the investigator was shocked 
to find the name "de Bartolomeis" listed under "B" in the card catalog 
of the United States Library of Congress. To assist American scholars 
in locating such reference materials, those names are rendered in a 
capitalized style whether they are normally written that way or not. 
Similarly, double surnames have been rendered with hyphens, which are 
usually optional, to emphasize to American readers that they are in fact 
double surnames. For example, one should understand that Lucio Lombar-
do-Radice is not someone whose first name is "Lucio," middle name 
"Lombardo," and last name "Radice," even though he generally omits the 
hyphen from his surname. If the hyphen were left out, the hapless 
researcher might well seek his name under "R" rather than "L", where it 
belongs. 
In past centuries, European people developed the execrable habit 
of tampering with foreign place names. When the English and French 
visited Italy, they altered Milano to "Milan," Torino to "Turin," Padova 
to "Padua," Venezia to "Venice," Firenze to "Florence," Roma to "Rome," 
Napoli to "Naples," Genova to "Genoa," and (absurdity of absurdities!) 
Livorno to "Leghorn." Unfortunately, these altered forms are now stan-
dard in English-language atlases and dictionaries; thus they have been 
reluctantly retained in these chapters. The smaller towns seem to have 
escaped such linguistic destruction. 
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The titles of books and other publications indicated in text or 
footnotes are rendered in the original Italian bibliographic style. 
Normally, only first words and proper nouns are capitalized. 46 A few 
reference works such as the Enciclopedia Italiana receive upper-case 
treatment. In such cases, the name of the encyclopedia is the same as 
the name of the enterprise that produces it, just as, in this country, 
Encyclopedia Britannica is the name of a publishing company as well as 
the name of a set of books. 
The Plan of the Following Chapters 
Immediately following is a chapter of historical material for the 
general orientation of the reader. There are then six chapters of 
expository material, each devoted to an identifiable grouping of Italian 
philosophers of education in the 1945-1965 era. A chapter of addenda 
and general reflections concludes the study. 
46 This practice agrees with the recommendation of The Chicago Manual 
of Style, 13th ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), 
p. 251. 
CHAPTER II 
EDUCATION AND PHILOSOPHY 
IN MODERN ITALY 
Three Forms of Italian Education 
As in all societies, education in Italy is closely related to 
other social institutions, and the value-systems and ideologies that 
have nourished it are related to developments in the economic, social, 
political, 
social and 
and intellectual history of the country. 
intellectual history that has influenced 
Moreover, 
education 
the 
has 
several aspects because "education" is not strictly speaking one formal 
social institution, but rather a complex of several. It is often neces-
sary, for example, to separate the factors that have affected elementa-
ry-school education from those that have affected the preschool, the 
secondary school, or the university. 
In terms of origins, Italian education is much like that of other 
European countries in having two main historical sources: the church 
and the state. It is the habit of contemporary scholars in comparative 
education to devote their attention to the development of state (govern-
ment- sponsored) institutions of education--those variously called 
national or state, or in American usage, "public" schools--probably 
37 
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because those schools are unmistakable phenomena of modern times and 
have become matters of great public concern in most societies. Educa-
tional scholarship has had this focus even in Italy, although in that 
country the Roman Catholic Church is a strong force to be reckoned with, 
educationally and culturally. There is also a small "private" sector of 
education of which only a little needs to be said. 
In the following pages, there will be no particular effort to 
differentiate the history of "education" from that of "schooling." 
Although the terms are not always synonymous, most Italian educational 
thinkers have shown an interest in schools of one sort of another, while 
the existence of schools has inspired criticism and further educational 
thought. For convenience, and because of the abundance of published 
material regarding state schooling, the following discussion will begin 
with that aspect of Italian education before passing on to the others. 
Education in the History of the Italian State 
State education in Italy is closely linked in history to the 
struggles for the liberation and unification of Italy--the process 
referred to by the Italians as the Risorgimento --the "re-awakening." 
Even before the political events that shook Western society at the end 
of the eighteenth century, a sense of Italian nationality existed, espe-
cially in middle-class citizens of the Italian states, and among Italian 
intellectuals who had traveled abroad much. There existed " . the 
profound conviction that Italy was a category of history and thought, an 
ideal necessity, a 1 sleeping beauty 1 who had to be awakened from her 
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1 "1 H centuries-long s eep. owever, the Risorgimento had its most obvious 
roots in the Napoleonic conquest of Italy, an invasion that had profound 
consequences for Italian society and the mentality of the Italian 
people. 
The Legacy of Napoleon 
In the wake of Napoleon 1 s victories in the Italian peninsula in 
the final years of the eighteenth century, republican sentiment welled 
up, and by late 1798 the feudal states of Italy had been converted into 
a collection of republics. 2 Although these republics were short-lived, 
their establishment had sown an important seed among Italian intellectu-
als and men of politics. Another such seed was sown by the general 
disillusionment. that followed Napoleon 1 s first expulsion; the French, 
who had come as liberators, had proved themselves no less rapacious than 
other foreign conquerors. As a result of this experience, nationalistic 
secret societies 3 sprang up in Italy to oppose any form of foreign rule. 
Napoleon again fanned the coals of Italian nationalism by setting up a 
puppet "Kingdom of Italy" in the early years of the nineteenth century; 
this kingdom not only opened Italian eyes to the possibility of national 
unity, but it even gave the Italians an important symbol--the tricolor 
flag that is theirs today. 
1sergio Romano, Storia d 1 Italia dal risorgimento ai nostri giorni 
(Milan: Arnoldo Mondadori Editore, 1978), p. 14. 
2H. Hearder and D. P. Waley, A Short History of Italy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1963), p. 113. 
3Hearder and Waley, A Short History of Italy, p. 115. 
40 
The Napoleonic period had material as well as attitudinal conse-
quences for Italy. During their stay, the French constructed roads and 
bridges, public buildings, gardens, and schools; moreover, the French 
system of laws had benefited citizens of all social classes. 4 Thus, 
while Napoleon and his armies were despised as foreign conquerors, they 
were also admired in Italy for their practical achievements. 
A particular consequence of the Napoleonic conquest was the asso-
ciation of public education with unity and nationalism. The schools 
begun in the Napoleonic era were, of course, modeled after French 
schools. Those schools, in turn, had their origins in Enlightenment 
philosophy and their practical models in the German "normal" schools 
with the addition of instruction in "elements of republican morals." 
Their establishment was set forth in the law of 3 Brumaire IV (1796). 5 
That law had its Italian echo in a report on public education prepared 
by a commission of the northern Italian Cisalpine Republic (a Napoleonic 
puppet state) in 1797. Although the Napoleonic wars, political turmoil, 
and a chronic shortage of funds prevented most of the reforms from being 
carried out, the ideals of the French school became well-known to Ital-
ian intellectuals. In 1805, Napoleonic officials in northern Italy 
enacted a reorganization of public instruction that involved the 
creation of state secondary and boarding schools in population centers, 
and the development of major academic centers in Turin and Alessandria 
4Hearder and Waley, A Short History of Italy, p. 119. 
5 Enzo Robaud, Disegno storico della scuola italians 
Felice Le Monnier, 1961), p. 9. 
(Florence: 
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(later moved to Casale). 
An important feature of the French-inspired schools was their 
civic rather than religious orientation. The intention of the French 
laws was to exclude the clergy from any interference with the state 
program of education, but the religious tenacity of the Italians had to 
be taken into account by the new rulers, especially in the traditional-
ist South. There, in the Kingdom of Naples, ruled first by Joseph Bona-
parte and later by Murat, various legislation was aimed at creating 
state primary and secondary schools that nevertheless allowed instruc-
tion in Christian doctrine and accepted clergy and members of religious 
orders as teachers. 6 Naples also instituted a commission on public 
education, of which one member was the philosopher, Vincenzo Cuoco. The 
commission concluded that public education should be tuition-free 
(supported by the communes) and conducted effectively in all centers of 
population. In the South as well as in the North, limited resources and 
years of warfare prohibited a general realization of public education as 
idealized by laws and commissions. 
Napoleon, then, had given Italy an intimation of hope for a 
national re-awakening, a possibility of escape from foreign and feudal 
domination. The Congress of Vienna attempted to return all of Europe to 
roughly the same social and political conditions that had prevailed in 
the mid-eighteenth century; but as the events of the 1830's and 1840's 
later proved, something had changed in the European mind that even 
6Robaud, Disegno storico, p. 10. 
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Metternich and his collaborators could not eradicate. Although in the 
aftermath of Vienna, most of Italy was left to the mercies of the 
Austrians and Spaniards, the spirit of nationalism was kept alive by the 
secret societies, and the 1820's and 1830's were in fact decades of plot 
and conspiracy generally aimed at liberation of the country. 7 
Mazzini, Prophet of Unity 
One of the key nationalist figures who emerged in the 1830's and 
who was later quite influential in Italian national affairs and national 
education was Giuseppe Mazzini. He was born in Genoa in 1805 and died 
in Pis a in 1872. Mazzini was " . the prophet and apostle of the 
unity of the Italian people, a unity that he understood in a framework 
of cooperation and harmony among all the world's peoples. " 8 When he 
founded the Giovine Italia (Young Italy) movement while in exile in 
France in 1831, he chose a motto of "Thought and Action," which he 
understood to mean "Education and Rebellion."' Mazzini' s movement was 
aimed at persons under forty and exhorted them to high standards of 
individual conduct and national consciousness. His goal was an Italy 
that would be independent and united, enjoying a republican form of 
government. 
7 Robaud, Disegno storico, pp. 122-124. 
8Nicola Abbagnano and Aldo Visalberghi, Linee di storia della pedago-
gia, 3 vols. (Turin: G. B. Paravia & C., 1959), 3:117. 
9Hearder and Waley, A Short History of Italy, p. 129. 
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To achieve the status envisioned by Mazzini, the Italians would 
require education into awareness of their social duties, as well as 
practical education for life within the state. While Mazzini believed 
that freedom and equality were essential, he taught that the individual 
must not lose sight of the needs of the entire nation; the individual 
must overcome parochialism and individual egoism to accept the state as 
the incarnation of a religious principle: the transcendence of finite 
'd l't lD indiVJ. ua 1 Y · 
The ideals of humanity and progress, often expressed by nine-
teenth-century writers, were evident in Mazzini's work. Yet it was 
important to Mazzini to unite those ideal, theoretical concerns with 
practice. For him, education had to be not only patriotic (and there-
fore, by implication, ethical and spiritual), but also productive. 11 To 
the latter end he advocated a strong scientific emphasis in public 
education, aimed at the creation of engineers and artisans; this was to 
be accompanied by a shift away from the study of literature and dead 
languages. The practical bias in Mazzini was later seized upon by the 
"positivist" element that exerted much influence on post-unification 
schools. 
Nationalism in the early years of the Italian re-awakening was 
present not only in the writing and orations of statesmen and in the 
efforts of the secret societies, but also in the developing cultural 
10oizionario dei filosofi, 1976 ed., s.v. "Mazzini, Giuseppe." 
11Abbagnano and Visalberghi, Linee di storia, 3:118. 
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milieu. For example, Alessandro Manzoni' s classic novel I promessi 
sposi (The Betrothed) once again gave the Italian people a national 
literary language, while some early operas of Verdi contained subtle 
anti-foreign propaganda. 12 
The European Tradition 
Although philosophical and educational issues connected with 
national liberation and unification received considerable attention in 
early nineteenth-century Italy, nationality was certainly not the only 
concern of Italian thinkers in that period. Among philosophers and 
educators, the broad European intellectual movements had their represen-
tatives in Italy. 
Historicism, following the pioneering work of Giambattista Vico 
(1668-1744), and with a strong emphasis on the continuation of classical 
Greco-Roman culture, had a noteworthy advocate in the person of Vincenzo 
Cuoco (1770-1823), who came from the Molise, east of Naples. Cuoco 
published a pedagogical novel in 1806 called Platone in Italia (Plato in 
Italy), on the development of Greek philosophy in utopian academic 
communities. He saw a universal need for elementary education as a 
means of establishing communication among the various levels of society, 
and a need for secondary education accessible to all on a competitive 
basis for instruction in the arts and sciences but with a major emphasis 
on Latin and Greek. Only through the classics, he thought, could the 
studious Italian come to appreciate his language and the history of the 
12 . Hearder and Waley, A Short H1story of Italy, pp. 130-131. 
d h . 13 stones aroun 1m. 
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Illuminism also had its followers, and in its Italian form it is 
closely associated with historicism. Thus, Vico is considered both an 
illuminist and a historicist, and the same is said of his disciples. 
But illuminism in its purest form was an early eighteenth-century move-
ment, and gradually the eighteenth-century empiricism of Locke and Hume 
and the rationalism of Kant came to alter and supplant the basic illu-
minist doctrines of the infinite extension of human knowledge and the 
resulting perfectibility of man. 
One of the great Italian representatives of the empiricist/ration-
alist tradition was Giandomenico Romagnosi (1761-1835), of Milan. 
Romagnosi believed that a "logical sense" acts upon sensation, really a 
kind of sixth sense that informs the raw material of experience, and 
links sensations to one another by means of concepts of a rational char-
acter. Such concepts are objective rather than transcendent, and are 
formed through experience. In fact, he thought, the human mind and 
character are shaped by "dative" forces--the givens--that exist in expe-
rience, especially in the form of cultural, social, and political insti-
tutions. 14 Given this social emphasis, it is not surprising that Romag-
nosi' s life and teaching showed a great concern for the social and 
political aspects of experience. From 1802 to 1821 he was active in 
teaching politics and law as a university professor and later in schools 
13 Abbagnano and Visalberghi, Linee di storia, 3:102-103. 
14Mario Santagata, Storia della pedagogia, 3 vols. (Seregno, Milan: 
Editrice Ciranna e Ferrara, 1979), 3:70. 
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of his own creation; eventually, the Austrian authorities forbade him to 
teach because of his support for the nationalist cause. 
Although Romagnosi admired Rousseau and accepted the desirability 
of self-instruction and autonomy of the mind, his own approach to educa-
tion was more directive. He saw education as " ... the active direc-
tion of the powers of a living being, in order to cause him to acquire 
certain habits." 15 He proposed a disciplinary phase best conducted in an 
elementary school, free and open to all. After such basic formation, 
those with the means and inclinations for further study could attend 
secondary schools in a less authoritarian atmosphere where they would 
learn to think and appreciate, or rather, to develop their tastes. 16 
Rationalism of the Kantian variety was combined with a firm relig-
ious sense in the Neapolitan philosopher Pasquale Galluppi (1770-1846). 
His central interest in the history of philosophy had led him to study 
the great European philosophers, and especially those of the eighteenth 
century; however, the ultimate religious conclusion of his speculations 
brought him to a higher place among Catholic educators than among those 
favoring state-supervised, laic education. 
There are traces of romanticism in Galluppi 1 s and Romagnosi 1 s 
doctrines, but romanticism had stronger advocates in nineteenth- century 
Italy. Among them, one most notable is Gino Capponi of Florence 
(1792-1876), who was a political, social, and religious thinker with 
15Enciclopedia Biografica e Bibliografica "Italiana", Series 38, 
"Pedagogisti ed educatori", 1939 ed., s.v. 11Romagnosi, Giandomenico." 
16Abbagnano and Visalberghi, Linee di storia, 3:105. 
47 
interests that extended to education. As a young man, he traveled 
widely in Europe, at various times visiting the great educational inno-
vators, and he took an interest in educational experiments begun in 
Italy by Raffaele Lambruschini and Ferrante Aporti. He became blind in 
1840 but continued to write prolifically. Capponi's highly-regarded 
book of aphorisms on education, Pensieri sull' educazione (Thoughts on 
Education), appeared in 1845. 
For Capponi, the truest and most efficacious education exalts the 
creativity of the spirit and causes the child to internalize external 
stimuli (i.e., teaching) by force of sentiment (feelings or emotions), 
avoiding arid "systems" of education. While accepting the "primordial-
ity" of the Christian Gospel, Capponi opposes the rigid educational 
doctrines of the Jesuits as well as the suffocating sterility of the 
r~tionalists and illuminists. 17 He sees the child's creative capacity as 
expressive of a comprehensive illumination that reveals the child's 
divine part--It is the creative intellect that is spiritual, because God 
also creates. Capponi's mystical romanticism is tempered by social and 
cultural concerns, and he opposes Rousseau's artificial isolation of the 
child. In fact, he criticizes Rousseau for having created an impossible 
child in an impossible situation: Emile is not a person but a "well-fed 
calf." The creative intuition may express itself in poetry, but poetry 
is language, and language is a product of and an influence upon human 
society. Therefore, Capponi argues, education must be historical and 
17 ' Santagata, Storia della pedagogia, 3:84. 
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social as well as individual. The best education is one in which God 
reveals himself to the child first through a mother's love, and then 
through the love and affection of others. 11 In sum, education is part of 
the mystery of human affection. 
For Capponi, then, education is a social process, and it must be 
public and open to social influences. The government that provides it 
cannot hope to succeed in educating by despotic means, but must express 
the Christian principles of charity, equality, and universal associa-
tion. This was Capponi's hope for Italian education in the Risorgi-
~· and was one of his concerns when he served as a senator in the 
Italian parliament from 1860 until his death in 1876. 
The Formation of Schooling in the Italian State 
The hope for a national system of schooling as expressed by 
philosophers and political reformers of the early Risorgimento period 
eventually expressed itself in the political process and led to the 
establishment of state schools. 
outlines of that development. 
It may be useful to examine the 
In the eighteenth century, Piedmont was the most educationally 
advanced of the Italian states, for while state education did not exist 
there in the form in which it is known today, there had been decades of 
royal concern for literacy, the establishment of primary schools, and 
school attendance in general. At the end of the eighteenth century, 
Austrian-controlled Lombardy became a center of educational reform; the 
18
santagata, Storia della pedagogia, 3:86. 
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Austrians, having suppressed the Jesuits, set up their own system of 
state schools on the Prussian model, under a law of 1774; a decade 
later, this system was imported into Lombardy by collaborators with the 
Austrian 
. 19 reg~me. By 1810, Lombardy was moving toward universal, 
compulsory primary education. In the other states, and especially in 
the Kingdom of Naples, the general quality of education was pitifully 
low. 
When Napoleon's armies arrived, the existing schools were put to 
the service of the state. Church control was eliminated, public 
instruction was put under ~entral direction and given a civic ideology, 
and money was provided for school expenditures. 20 This development meant 
the imposition of an essentially French system of education in Italy. 
It was not the only instance of French influence on Italian educational 
matters. 
In 1815, most of the schools were returned to the control of the 
church, and there was a tendency of the once-exiled religious educators 
to support local rulers and to be suspicious of popular movements. With 
the reforms of Napoleon erased, students were subjected to old-fashioned 
methods and curricula, political orthodoxy, traditionalism, preferential 
treatment for the scions of "old families," and an emphasis on courtly 
behavior. 21 
19 Rosalba Graglia and Giuseppe Ricuperati, "Analfabetismo e scolariz-
zazione," Storia d' Italia (Turin: Giulio Einaudi Editore, 1972), 
6:756. 
20 Robaud, Disegno storico della scuola italiana, p. 10. 
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Notwithstanding the changes wrought by the Congress of Vienna, 
educational reform continued in the North. When the Veneto became 
Austrian territory, the Hapsburg system was introduced there. Lombardy 
continued to make progress, and in the 1830's clearly led the way in 
education south of the Alps; it was in fact a showcase where the hated 
Austrians could point out their achievements. In that territory, 
elementary education was free and compulsory, and technical schools were 
ahead of their counterparts anywhere else in Italy. In 1830 Lombardy 
had one child in thirteen attending school, 22 compared to much less 
favorable ratios in the other Italian states, and even in England. Nor 
was Piedmont entirely backward, for in 1822 a royal law created provin-
cial "reformers" of education, obligated the communes (townships) to 
open primary schools, made public elementary education free at the 
communes' expense, regulated curricula for all schools, and created 
qualifying examinations for teachers. That reform was only partly 
successful, however, because enforcement of the laws was difficult and 
no provision had been made to train the large numbers of teachers neces-
sary for such an enterprise. 23 
21 Giuseppe Galasso, "Le forme del potere, classi e gerarchie soci-
ali," Storia d' It alia (Einaudi), 1:526. 
22 Denis Mack Smith, Victor Emanuel, Cavour, and the Risorgimento 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 7. 
23 Robaud n· t ' 15 , 1segno s or1co, p. . 
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From the 1820's to the 1840's popular education movements appeared 
in Italy and had varying success according to local policy. In Tuscany 
and the Austrian lands, Lancastrian schools and "infant asylums" came 
into being under such reformers as Ferrante Aporti and Raffaele Lambrus-
chini; these were generally private or religious institutions, 24 but 
they inspired later efforts of varying kinds. In Piedmont, King Carlo 
Alberto announced that he would allow infant asylums to open in his 
kingdom, but subject to royal approval; that very restriction kept any 
such schools from opening before 1838. 25 
The existence of popular education movements attests to more than 
government interest in the extension of schooling. By and large, educa-
tional reformers and propagandists of the 1830's and 1840's were politi-
cal moderates who believed in the importance of popular education and an 
enlightened socioeconomic system. Their efforts were varied; some went 
forth to educate the rural poor, while others sought to popularize the 
cause of peasant education through their publications and appeals to the 
people. Private funds were sometimes raised for the creation of schools 
and "infant asylums" for the children of the working-class poor. 26 
24
"Infant asylums" were actually pre-schools for children whose 
parents were employed or otherwise unable to care for them in the 
daytime. The term is strange to Anglo-Americans. 
25 Robaud, Disegno storico, p. 15. 
26 Stuart J. Woolf, "La storia politics e sociale," Storia d' Italia 
(Einaudi), 3:329. 
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The impetus for educational extension and reform in Italy at the 
time of the Risorgimento was usually linked to the liberal-nationalist 
movement. The ideological ferment centered in the rich and industrial-
izing North. Farther south, the Papal states were ruled by a conserva-
tive, tradition-bound church. Although in the early nineteenth century 
the Papal administration had set up free church schools 27 that provided 
elementary education in many communes, their quality was inferior to 
that of the private "regional" schools that were attended only by the 
tuition-paying rich. In 1846, the Papal government took a step forward 
by creating a Ministry of Public Instruction, 21 but its work was cut 
short by the uprisings of 1848. 
In the Mezzogiorno, the deep South, the situation was far worse. 
The King of Naples persistently disregarded public demands for any 
state-supported education beyond the elementary level. In 1843, he 
signed a decree putting all education into the hands of the bishops. 29 
In Naples, education was tied to a feudal economy and class structure; 
as long as that order persisted, the general level of education remained 
abysmally low. In the census of 1871, ten years after Sicily and Naples 
had b~come parts of united Italy, the literacy 3 0 of ten-year-olds in 
those regions was still below fifty per cent, whereas in the North it 
27 Robaud, Disegno storico, p. 23. 
2~obaud, Disegno storico, p. 24. Further discussion of developments 
in the Papal states appears in a subsequent section of this chapter. 
2~obaud, Disegno storico, p. 24. 
30c;raglia and Ricuperati, "Analfabetismo e scolarizzazione," p. 756. 
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had climbed to eighty and ninety per cent. 
Out of the early beginnings outlined above, the Italian national 
system of schooling developed, and in particular through a series of 
laws and decrees emanating from Piedmont. In 1847, on the eve of the 
constitutional monarchy and the struggles of 1848, King Carlo Alberto 
altered national school policy by creating a Secretarial Ministry of 
State for Public Instruction. The decree provided a Superior Council 
for Public Instruction and special councils for the royal universities. 
It foreshadowed much legislation. 
The "Boncompagni Law" of 1848 was one of the earliest laws 31 of 
any kind to be enacted by the parliament of Piedmont, otherwise called 
the Subalpine Parliament. In accordance with Carlo Alberto's earlier 
decree, it established a Secretarial Ministry of State for Public 
Instruction and a Superior Council to act as an advisory body to the 
minister. The Ministry of Public Instruction was given authority to 
conduct "habilitation" examinations of teachers, both public and 
private, and the Council was given charge of disciplinary matters 
related to teachers. 32 In addition to the Superior Council, other coun-
cils were created for the three levels of education (elementary, secon-
dary, and university); provincial administrative councils were insti-
tuted; and the post of Provveditore agli Studi, a local executive 
position, was created giving this official the authority to supervise 
31Niccolo Rodolico, ed. Storia del parlamento italiano (Palermo: 
S. F. Flaccovio Editore, 1963), 1:294. 
32 Robaud, Disegno storico, pp. 25-26. 
54 
all schools, public and private. Communes were required by the law to 
provide the first two years of elementary instruction without charge, 
open to both sexes. Provisions were included for the creation of 
special technical courses at the secondary level. This law diminished 
the privileges of the clergy by providing supervisory control of non-
state schools, and virtual1y eliminated the clergy's interference in 
state schools. 3 3 The scope of the Boncompagni Law was broad, and it 
served as the model for the Casati Law that was to come a decade later. 
That decade between the Boncompagni Law and the Casati Law was one 
of considerable parliamentary activity regarding education. A law of 
1851 rearranged the Ministry of Public Instruction, and the Lanza Law of 
1857 attempted to improve the administrative machinery34 by altering 
various councils and creating provincial inspectors and other local 
authorities. A law of 1853 created certain regulations for state 
schools and re-established the principle of free, compulsory education 
for the first two years. This was to be paid for by the commune, which 
was specifically instructed to pay teachers' salaries. In order to cope 
with a serious shortage of teachers, parliament passed a law in 1858 
creating twelve new normal schools. During the parliamentary debate on 
this issue, Deputy Boggio claimed there were, in Piedmont, 145 communes 
without boys' elementary schools, 1151 without girls' schools, and that 
33 Anthony A. Scarangello, Progress and Trends in Italian Education 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 
1964), p.3. 
34Robaud, Disegno storico, p. 28. 
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the kingdom had a shortage of 1523 teachers. 35 
With the annexation of Lombardy and a spirit of success attending 
the nationalist movement, it became desirable to create a new "national" 
school law that could be systematically extended to whatever provinces 
became united with Piedmont. The law that eventuated, passed under the 
guidance of Prime Minister Gabrio Casati, became the Magna Carta of 
Italian education--the Casati Law 36 of November 13, 1859. 
The Casati Law was a complex and comprehensive law, with 374 arti-
cles regulating all levels of education, primary through university. It 
set up administrative bodies at national and local levels, and gave the 
communes the task of educating all children between the ages of six and 
twelve. It made provisions for elementary education of two types; for 
secondary education, both classical and technical; and for higher educa-
tion at the university level. The law allowed private educational 
institutions to exist as long as they complied with state regulations, 
and it retained religion as a subject in the elementary grades. Despite 
the intense centralization created by the plan, certain guarantees of 
academic freedom, 37 particularly at the university level, were incorpo-
rated into the law. 
35 Rodolico, Storia del parlamento, 2:258. 
36 Robaud, Disegno storico, p. 28. 
37 Robaud, Disegno storico, p. 33. 
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The efforts of parliament to extend and improve education did not 
end with the Casati Law. Some of the Ministry of Public Instruction's 
influence was altered by a law of 1861 that placed technical secondary 
schools under the Ministry of Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce. The 
change was intended to create certain economies, but in any case, most 
of the technical schools were returned to Public Instruction in 1877. 38 
In an effort to assess the effectiveness of school laws, the 
parliament conducted an investigation in 1864 under Deputy Matteucci, 
Vice President of the Superior Council of Public Instruction. The 
commission uncovered unsettling facts about the absence of elementary 
schools in many communes, especially in rural areas. It also disclosed 
that secondary education was not widely available; in fact, only 9 out 
of 1000 persons between the ages of eleven and eighteen years attended 
secondary schools in 1863-64, and less than a third of that number went 
on to a university. 39 
The Italian parliament soon made efforts to standardize the school 
system throughout the kingdom. Although the Casati Law was nominally in 
effect, regional variations persisted in the mid-1860's and thereafter, 
especially in Sicily and lands formerly belonging to the Kingdom of 
Naples. Having united the Superior Councils into one national body in 
1865, the parliament acted in 1866 to eradicate remaining local and 
provincial differences, many of which were perpetuated by local offi-
38 Robaud, Disegno storico, pp. 39-42. 
39 Giorgio Candeloro, Storia dell'Italia moderna (Milan: Feltrinelli 
Editore, 1976), 5:55. 
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cials. The result was the Berti Law of 1866, which prescribed the 
composition of provincial councils for education and removed the provin-
cial provedditori (superintendents) and inspectors; it passed these 
officers' authority to the provincial councils, which were composed 
largely of professional educators. 4 0 The composition and authority of 
the provincial councils for education were intended to be the same in 
all provinces, and the hope was that education in the hands of a council 
of competent educators would be more stable than that subjected to the 
whims of unreliable local politicians. 
The Minister of Public Instruction who succeeded Berti was Michele 
Coppino, who favored the centralizing tendencies of the original Casati 
Law. He found the provincial councils impossible to control under the 
Berti Law, and considered the experiment a failure. The law of 1867 
that Coppino authored strengthened the central offices of the Ministry 
of Public Instruction and created a central provedditore's office. 41 On 
the local level, the provedditori were returned to their offices, but 
the provincial councils were retained, with the local prefect and the 
provedditore added to them in official capacities. In keeping with the 
spirit of the times, Coppino sponsored other laws that put the manage-
ment of antiquities and fine arts into the hands of the Italian state. 
40 Robaud, Disegno storico, pp. 51-53. 
41 Robaud, Disegno storico, pp. 54-55. 
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The end of the Risorgimento period and its transformation into 
the era of National Unity in no way lessened the Italian parliament's 
efforts in the field of education. Reorganization of the Ministry and 
councils was frequent. The later, major Coppino Law of 1877 once again 
attempted to make elementary education compulsory, and had more success 
than previous efforts. The school legislation of the Risorgimento and 
early national periods also provided a backdrop for further activity in 
theoretical fields related to education. 
From I.deology to Public Policy 
The achievement of national unity in the 1849-1870 period made it 
necessary for Italians to face practical issues that were not fully 
anticipated by the visionary nationalists of the preceding period. The 
passage of school laws as outlined above was one consequence of that 
necessity. On another level, it was necessary to formulate policy for 
the new national schools, and the most fruitful early source of such 
policy was in Risorgimento ideology. 
The contributions of Mazzini to Italian educational thought have 
been discussed earlier. Mazzini, however, did not hold high political 
office in the Italian constitutional monarchy. Of the three great lead-
ers of the Risorgimento --M~zzini, Garibaldi, and Cavour--the most 
politically influential was obviously Count Camillo Benso di Cavour 
(1810-1861). An interesting character sketch of Cavour is provided by 
the liberal historian, Guido De Ruggiero: 
And we must not forget. . the personality of Cavour, that is, 
of the only truly "European" man of the Italian Risorgimento. In 
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him there is found no trace of that inherent stinginess of the 
landholding class that retards the intellectual development of the 
moderates. While coming from the petty nobility, he succeeded 
completely in divesting himself of the mental habits of his ~lass, 
and in conceiving the economic functions of society in a totally 
modern way. His scientific education was shaped by the Mancheste-
rian liberal school. The studies that he published before 1848 on 
the league against grain laws and on the Irish question are among 
the best afforded by the literature of the time, and 
. they reveal a sense of realism and a love of things rather 
than doctrinal formulas. Through Manchesterianism Cavour acquired 
not only a general view of the laws that regulate commerce, but also 
something more profound and intimate, that cannot be formulated in 
the abstract terms of science: that is, a perception of the expan-
sive capacity of modern industrial society; faith in initiative, in 
individual courage to break antiquated customs in order to go forth 
on a new road full of risk and hope. There lies the true value of 
the liberal ferment that the English middle class of the nineteenth 
century communicated to a lazy agrarian society. In Italy, however, 
the genius of industrialism appeared later and less lively; but its 
absence in the period culminating in the Risorgimento increases our 
admiration for men like Cavour, who had the spiritual energy to 
anticipate its advent by himself, and insofar as it was possible, to 
communicate its efficacy to the lethargic moderate element of that 
time. 42 
Other historians have painted a less glowing picture of Cavour. 
There is general agreement, however, that his outlook was northern Euro-
pean rather than typically Italian, and that he brought particularly 
English and French ideas into Italian politics. In Cavour's period of 
power, from 1852 until his death in 1861, during most of which time he 
was Prime Minister, he was able to leave his mark on Italian laws and 
institutions. 
On the subject of national education, Cavour wrote and said rather 
little. His social-economic policy was technocratic, technocratic, 
favorably disposed toward capitalistic industrial development and wide-
42 Guido De Ruggiero, Storia del liberalismo europeo (Milan: Feltri-
nelli Economica S.p.A., 1962; fourth ed., 1977), pp. 299-300. 
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spread employment in specialties afforded by technology. For that 
reason, he was favorably disposed toward the creation of technical and 
vocational schools, training schools of various kinds, and university 
science laboratories. 4 3 This direction in Cavour's attention is 
certainly in accord with his Manchesterian-liberal economics, and his 
opinions on a variety of public issues led De Ruggiero and other histo-
rians to point out the similarity of his thought to that of the Italian 
positivists. 
The Era of Positivism in Italy 
Nineteenth-century positivism was a philosophy that originated in 
France, developed by Auguste Comte upon earlier foundations of rational-
ism, illuminism, and materialism. Comte hoped to create a new social 
order founded upon scientific thought, reflecting a "positive" stage in 
human development surpassing the earlier "theological" and "metaphysi-
cal" stages. The attainment of this higher stage, characterized by an 
adhesion to "positive facts" and a negation of religion and metaphysics, 
would naturally herald an era of peace, prosperity, and progress--a 
technological utopia. Under this scheme, education would be a prepara-
tion of man for earthly life in order to benefit both the individual and 
society. Inasmuch as science was to be the guarantee of value and 
perfection, scientific and technical instruction was to have prime 
importance in the curriculum, eclipsing artistic and literary study and 
43 Benedetto Croce, A History of Italy, 1871-1915 (New York: Russell 
and Russell, Incorporated, 1963), p. 57. 
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substantially turning education into a process of scientific-technical 
_!!!.struction. Religious instruction would have no place in such a 
program, 44 but the new education would favor sociological research and 
experimental psychology. 
The earliest recognized positivist manifesto published in Italy 
was Invito agli amatori della filosofia (Invitation to the Lovers of 
Philosophy) (1857), by a Milanese, Carlo Cattaneo (1801-1869). Origi-
nally schooled in the illuministic thought of Romagnosi, Cattaneo devel-
oped a particularly historicist approach to scientific thought. 
Consciousness, for him, was not the "cogito" of Descartes, but the 
result of historical development as expounded by Vico. Cattaneo urged 
his contemporaries to understand their own era by studying the sciences 
and history. Philosophy, he said, in order to be meaningful must aban-
don old preoccupations and study man in his general relations with all 
other beings. 45 
Thus, in Cattaneo, there is a strong social emphasis, and impor-
tance is given to a combination of historical and scientific study. 
One of the most colorful figures in the intellectual transition 
from romantic nationalism to scientific positivism is Francesco De Sane-
tis (1817-1883). Best known as Italy's greatest literary critic of the 
nineteenth century, De Sanctis was also an educator, politician, novel-
ist, and lawyer. His interest in education began in the 1830's, when he 
44 Ernesto Bignami, L'esame di storia della pedagogia, 3 vols. 
(Milan: Edizioni Bignami, 1977), 111:132-135. 
45Dizionario dei filosofi, 1976 ed., s.v. "Cattaneo, Carlo." 
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taught in a private school in Naples and subsequently established a 
school of his own. He also embraced the nationalist cause in those 
years, and urged his boys to keep their characters clean for the day 
when the nation would call them. De Sanctis taught that school is life 
and not some secluded grove. That seditious sentiment cost him three 
years of imprisonment under the Bourbons. Expelled from Naples in 1853, 
he fled north and became a supporter of the Savoys. In 1861 and 1862, 
De Sanctis served as Minister of Public Instruction in Cavour's cabinet. 
He was in favor of school reform~' and caused the dismissal of numerous 
incompetent university professors. De Sanctis returned to the scholarly 
life in the 1860's and 1870's, then served again as Minister of Public 
Instruction from 1878 to 1882. 
As a romantic nationalist, De Sanctis believed in transforming the 
masses into a "free people" by means of education. He favored warmth 
and spontaneity in education, and abhorred the coldness and aloofness of 
some scholars. Nevertheless, he understood the necessity of moving 
Italy from its heroic and romantic phase (the Risorgimento) into a phase 
of material and moral reconstruction.~ 7 He became increasingly involved 
in practical concerns, and adopted the slogan of "things and not words." 
De Sanctis came to call his general philosophical position "realism" 
rather than "positivism," chiefly because he disliked some positivists' 
questionable interpretations of Darwin. Nevertheless, he agreed on the 
4~nciclopedia Biografica e Bibliografica "Italiana", Series 38, s.v. 
"D s . II e anct1s, Francesco. 
47Abbagnano and Visalberghi, Linee di storia, 3:173. 
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necessity of "positivism in the intellectual order," and his "realism" 
as applied to the classroom48 required particular attention to practical 
and scientific studies and a generally scientific way of thinking. 
Although some elements of French positivism appear in De Sanctis 1 
work, examples of positivist orthodoxy among the Italians are more 
clearly presented by three individuals: Andrea Angiulli, Aristide 
Gabelli, and Robert Ardigo. 
Andrea Angiulli was born in Bari province in 1833 and died in Rome 
in 1890. As a philosopher, he was first influenced by Hegel and later 
moved into positivism. He was a professor of pedagogy at the University 
of Bologna from 1872 to 1876, and then at the University of Naples from 
1876 to 1890. Angiulli was a champion of state education and an oppo-
nent of the religious orders. He believed that humanistic education of 
the Renaissance variety had become a tool of the "enemies of liberty of 
thought," and had little to offer generations born in the scientific 
age. Rather, he wished to exalt science in order to transform man 1 s 
cerebral S'tructure; changed inwardly, mankind would begin a new course 
of social progress. Angiulli wanted educators to eliminate the infan-
tile period of story-telling and fantasy, replacing it with observation 
of empirical facts, tested and coordinated in scientific order. He 
would have teachers use the physical sciences to demonstrate a connec-
tion between human progress and the laws of nature. 4 9 Angiulli 1 s most 
48 Abbagnano and Visalberghi, Linee di storia, 3:174. 
49 Santagata, Storia della pedagogia, 3:102-103. 
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influential publications appeared between 1868 and 1888. 
More direct influence on Italian schools was exercised by Aristide 
Gabelli (1830-1891). A northern Italian, he studied law in Padua and 
Vienna and worked as a journalist in Milan before becoming principal of 
a technical school in 1860. The appointment was evidently political, 
and his political career continued as superintendent of schools in Flor-
ence and Rome, and ultimately as chief inspector of schools for the 
Ministry of Public Instruction. In 1888, he proposed a restructuring50 
of elementary school programs that was approved by the Italian parlia-
ment and is generally accepted as one of the better school reforms of 
the period. 
Gabelli was a man of action who opposed dogmaticism and church 
authoritarianism. He admired northern European reformers and revolu-
tionaries, and he believed that Italy owed her few social advances to 
those foreign influences. He saw the common folk in Italy being held 
back by lifeless traditions, and he believed that the solution was a 
well-regulated and coordinated school system that would provide basic 
literacy, thus bringing the masses into the social and political life of 
the country and giving them a sense of liberty and patriotism. Once 
made literate, the child must continually exercise his mind in observ-
ing, examining, speaking, writing, computing, measuring, drawing, and so 
forth; his mental activity must be tireless and critical in nature. 
Gabelli writes of the school's duty to form the "head-instrument" 5 1 of 
50 Abbagnano and Visalberghi, Linee di storia, 3:178. 
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the Italian. That is, the school must be orderly and scientific, and 
moreover, it must stimulate thought. 
More contemplative and less in the public eye was Roberto Ardig~ 
(1828-1920). Educated by religious orders and ordained to the Roman 
Catholic priesthood, he left his position as Canon of the Cathedral of 
Mantova (Mantua) and renounced his priestly duties in 1871, the year 
after the publication of his first "positivist" work, Psicologia come 
scienza positiva (Psychology as Positive Science). Ardig6's positivism 
is grounded in his metaphysics: for him, the All is an Indistinct 
that distinguishes itself ever better but never completely; there is no 
Unknowable, as Spencer contends, but merely an Unknown. The process of 
intellectual understanding parallels the physical process of evolution. 
As the individual learns, he makes distinctions in an endless series out 
of the aboriginal psycho-physical substance. It is science, of course, 
that catalogues these distinctions. In the learning process, habits are 
formed, and formal education must help the student to develop habits 
that render his behavior automatic. Teaching can provide rules, 
schemes, and illustrations that help the child to understand what cannot 
be immediately experienced; and it must avoid instilling unscientific 
doubts and uncertainties. Ardiga's philosophy and pedagogy were 
pervaded by a kind of Spencerian52 progression. 
5lsantagata, Storia della pedagogia, 3:101. 
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Despite the obvious mechanistic quality of his world-view, Ardigd 
accepted the humanizing values of classical education and a place for 
spontaneous play and activity in the curriculum; but these were temper-
ing factors only. His publications remained close to the positivist 
position. Ardigo taught philosophy at the University of Padua from 1881 
until his retirement in 1909. He outlived his positivist colleagues by 
decades, and quite improbably committed suicide at the age of ninety-
two. 
The Idealist Reaction 
The sway of positivism over the Italian intellect was short-lived 
and never complete. It was, to say the least, a very "un-Italian" 
philosophy, not merely because it was derived from northern Europeans 
such as Comte and Spencer, but because in its insistence on order, 
materialism, and cold objectivity, there was something in positivism 
that was profoundly disturbing to the Italian mind. The Catholic 
church, of course, never endorsed positivism; but even among the laics, 
there were critics who saw positivism as something drab, narrow, and 
soul-less. The scientific presuppositions of positivism, as two contem-
porary Italian philosophers of education write, 
.. seem to deny that man and his psycho-spiritual world (art, 
religion, morality) may have any originality and autonomy whatsoever 
compared to the rest of nature; even these must be reduced to a 
collection of facts, ruled by laws that exclude freedom. It seems 
that one of the characteristics of positivism is the impossibility 
of any justification whatsoever for human values (esthetic, moral, 
and religious) and the true freedom of the mind that creates them. 
The philosophies that constitute the anti-positivist reaction, and 
in which contemporary philosophy has its beginning, draw their 
points of departure from this impossibility. 
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But to negate the theses of positivism means to negate the claim 
that natural facts are the only reality and thus that science is the 
only possible form of knowledge. This implies that philosophy has 
to do with another reality and that it has a way of knowing this 
reality that is not reducible to science. Thus the fundamental 
problem of anti-positivist philosophies is that of defining philoso-
phy itself: that is, to define the reality with which it must deal 
and the means of access that it must use to approach this reality. 53 
In a practical sense, the search for a new philosophy was compli-
cated by events. The intellectual of the late nineteenth century could 
not simply march backward into the fiery romanticism of the Risorgi-
~· National unity was an accomplished fact, and new social, 
economic, political, and intellectual situations were developing. Nor 
could the laic philosopher easily leap into the embrace of religion, 
since the events of 1849 had created an ever-widening gulf between the 
Catholic church and the Italian state. What many Italian thinkers 
desired at the turn of the century was a philosophy that was not only 
metaphysically respectable, but also more spiritual and exalted than 
positivism, more rational and systematic than romanticism, and free from 
the ancient dogmatic constraints of Thomism, the dominant philosophy of 
the Catholics. The new faith that would satisfy those requirements, 
while dissolving any apparent inconsistencies, was already present in 
the late nineteenth-century Italian intellectual milieu and needed only 
to be developed and disseminated. Ironically, its roots were not in 
Italy but in Germany, and yet it adapted well to the Italian environ-
ment. 
53 Abbagnano and Visalberghi, Linee di storia, 3:195 
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Italian idealism can be traced back as far as Ottavio Colecchi 
(1773-1847), a Dominican priest who taught mathematics in Naples and was 
also active in his order in Rome. Around 1815, he was sent on a teach-
ing mission to Russia, and returned to Italy via Koenigsberg, where he 
encountered the works of Kant. His studies of Kant led to further 
exploration of German philosophers including Hegel. In 1819, he was 
appointed professor of physics and mathematics in Aquilea, but he was 
soon removed from this position because of the political and philosophi-
cal ideas he had developed during his travels. In 1831, he was assigned 
to another teaching position, in Orticello; but he was removed from this 
position by the Bishop of Castellammare on charges of "atheism." Colee-
chi's life was difficult after that incident, and he remained under 
police surveillance for years. Nevertheless, he won the admiration of 
many young people, and at his death in 1847 his disciples staged a 
demonstration54 in favor of the liberalism that was then sweeping the 
church under Pius IX. 
It was not Kantianism, however, but Colecchi' s studies of Hegel 
that influenced the young Bertrando Spaventa (1817-1883). Spaventa came 
from a well-to-do Neapolitan family. In his youth, he took holy orders, 
although more to please his family than out of heartfelt religious 
conviction. While studying in Naples in 1840 he encountered Colecchi, 
who was then teaching there, and who taught him to read Kant and Hegel 
in the original German. From 1846 to 1848, Spaventa ran a private 
54 Enciclopedia Biografica e Bibliografica "Italiana," Series 38, s. v. 
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philosophy school but closed it after an unpleasant encounter with the 
authorities. He went to Florence in 1849. In 1850, he abandoned his 
priestly duties and fled to Turin, where he became involved in polemics 
against both the Jesuits and the liberal Catholics. His Hegelian ideas 
matured in the 1850-1860 period, and he developed his theory of the 
''circulation of European ideas." Having noted a similarity in the 
historicism of Vico and the historical theories of Hegel, he concluded 
that Hegelianism coincides with and is a legitimate addition to Italian 
thought. This "addition," understood primarily by Spaventa and provided 
through his commentaries, was an interpretation of Hegel's philosophy of 
Mind that Spaventa derived from Hegel's writings, 55 chiefly Phenomenal-
ogy of Mind. 
In 1859 and 1860, Spaventa taught at universities in northern 
Italy. Then, in 1861, after the unification of southern Italy with the 
Kingdom of Piedmont, he was called by De Sanctis to teach history of 
philosophy at the University of Naples. There, Spaventa assembled a 
circle of disciples that included Antonio Labriola, who eventually 
embraced Marxism; Andrea Angiulli, who became a positivist; and Donato 
Jaja, who remained faithful to the Hegelian-idealist view. In the 
1860's, Spaventa was also a member of the Superior Council for Public 
Instruction in Naples, and served as Superintendent of Studies for the 
Province of Naples from 1866 to 1870. Politically conservative, he was 
elected to the parliament several times, but was far less active politi-
SSE ' 1 d' B' f' B'bl' f' "I 1' "S . 38 nc1c ope 1a 1ogra 1ca e 1 1ogra 1ca ta 1ana, er1es , s.v. 
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callY than his brother, Silvio Spaventa. 56 In his comfortable home, 
Silvio Spaventa entertained some of the political and intellectual lead-
ers of his time; and dwelling with him for a time was his cousin's son 
who had been orphaned in his late teens by an earthquake. That young 
man's name was Benedetto Croce. 57 
From Bertrando Spaventa, Donato Jaja (1830-1914) derived an appre-
ciation for Hegel, and especially for the Phenomenology of Mind, 
although his understanding was colored by vaguely Kantian tendencies. 
For Jaja, the chief defect in Kant's thought was his inability to over-
come the noumenon-phenomenon duality, and this was a philosophical prob-
lem that Jaja worked on throughout his life, deriving considerable 
inspiration from Hegel. In 1887, Jaja went to the University of Pisa to 
teach philosophy, and among his students were Giuseppe Lombardo-Radice 
and Giovanni Gentile. 
Eventually, Benedetto Croce came to know his late relative's 
students, and through them, some of their students. Thus a close 
friendship developed between Gentile and Croce that was to have profound 
consequences for Italian philosophy and pedagogy in the twentieth 
century. Gentile, born in 1875, was nine years younger than Croce, but 
he was of a more dynamic temperament. Croce had for a time dallied with 
the idealistic Marxism that he had learned from Labriola, another of 
56 E · 1 d" nc1c ope 1a 
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Spaventa' s students; then he had studied the writings of Vico and De 
sanctis; but it was Gentile who brought him to a more orthodox interpre-
tation of Hegel. In 1902, Gentile and Croce began work on a philosophi-
cal review called La critica. Around this activity they assembled 
others who were like-minded, including Lombardo-Radice. 
The idealist movement gathered strength in the early years of the 
twentieth century preceding the First World War. Differences appeared 
among the young idealists, however, almost from the beginning of their 
association. Croce, probably influenced by Bertrando Spaventa's histo-
ric ism and his own studies of Vico, developed a strongly historicist 
approach to Hegelian idealism; moreover, he eventually added his own 
peculiar doctrine of "distincts" to overcome the Hegelians' problem of 
dealing with totality that was identical with and engulfed by the 
universal mind. Croce's distincts, of course, ran counter to orthodox 
dialectical thought. 51 Gentile, like his teacher Jaja, sought to over-
come individual particularity and to resolve all matter, thought, and 
experience in a grand concept--that of "thought in the act of thinking," 
active thought as the only reality. This philosophy59 came to be called 
"actual idealism," or in some texts, simply "actualism." Lombardo-Rad-
ice, the most humane and practical of the three, avoided metaphysical 
speculation and embraced idealism as a theory of individual and collec-
58 Abbagnano and Visalberghi, Linee di storia, 3:227. 
59 H. S. Harris, "Introduction," in Giovanni Gentile, Genesis and 
Structure of Society, tr. H. S. Harris (Urbana, University of Illinois 
Press, 1960), p. 2 ff. 
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tive improvement possible only through education. He had socialistic 
tendencies and was very much concerned with the welfare of human beings 
and the education of small children, more so than were his colleagues. 
He did not shun extraneous philosophies and techniques that could be 
adapted to Italian education in theory or practice; in fact, he was 
among the earliest Italian translators of John Dewey. 60 
At a time of intellectual crisis' (the widespread dissatisfaction 
with positivism) and social/political crisis (e.g., the weak and chaotic 
Giolitti governments), Hegelian idealism appealed to Italian intellectu-
als because of its systematic comprehensiveness, its exalted view of the 
human mind, and its suggestion of the grandiose unfoldings of universal 
mind through human culture and history. After the First World War, 
Hussolini and his Fascists developed warm relations with leading ideal-
ists, a situation made possible by the similarity of their thought where 
the glory of Italian culture was concerned. 
Benedetto Croce was named Minister of Public Instruction in the 
last liberal-socialist government before the triumph of Fascism, and he 
served in that post from June 1920 to July 1921. It was a weak and 
divided government, and although Croce had proposed some promising 
reforms for the Italian state school system, he was unable to get them 
passed by the parliament. Mussolini came to power in 1922 and asked 
Croce for advice on naming a Minister of Public Instruction; Croce, 
skeptical of Mussolini' s intentions, declined to name himself, but 
60 Abbagnano and Visalberghi, Linee di storia, 3:231-232. 
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suggested his young friend and colleague Gentile, who took office in 
October 1922. Gentile joined the Fascist party in 1923, and evidently 
remained loyal to Mussolini to the end of his days. 6 1 As Minister of 
Public Instruction, Gentile received broad powers to implement the 
school reforms already partly foreshadowed by Croce and by Gentile's own 
work with Croce. Lombardo-Radice was given the charge of Director-Gen-
eral of Elementary Instruction, working directly with Gentile. 
The murder of the socialist parliamentarian Giacomo Matteotti by 
Fascist thugs in June 1924 created a shock wave in Italy that ended in 
resignations and replacements in Mussolini's cabinet. Both Gentile and 
Lombardo-Radice were dismissed, but Gentile received political sinecures 
in recompense. 62 Croce, in the next few years, became an increasingly 
vocal opponent of the Fascists. Although Gentile's successors did not 
possess the idealistic vision or depth of mind of Gentile, the regime 
continued to profess "actual idealism" as the official philosophy of the 
Italian state schools until the end of that regime in the Second World 
War. 
61 Aldo Lo Schiavo, Introduzione a Gentile (Bari: Editori Laterza, 
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Italian Education and the Church 
Long before the Kingdom of Italy and its schools existed, the 
teaching orders of the Catholic church had operated schools in Italy. 
These schools were not easily accessible to large segments of the popu-
lation; those particularly deprived were the rural poor, for whom any 
form of schooling, even the tuition-free schools of the Jesuits, would 
have been a 1 uxury. Under adverse economic conditions, and in the 
absence of state schools and school laws, much of the pre-unification 
Italian population went unschooled. In 1861, when northern and southern 
Italy were united, a census showed that approximately seventy-five per 
cent of the population was illiterate, and that illiteracy figure 
reached ninety per cent in the South. Although a few state elementary 
schools had been initiated in the pre-unification decades, secondary 
education had been almost entirely in the hands of the clergy, and that 
group had maintained a certain exclusivity by its devotion to classical 
studies. 5 3 
Church schools in Italy were by and large conservative in curricu-
lum and general orientation; for example, the Jesuits' Ratio Studiorum 
had undergone only minor adaptive changes from its inception in 1599 
until its revision in 1832. Even during the suppression of the Jesuit 
Order (1773-1814), those schools that remained open and fell into other 
hands did not change substantially either in programs or texts. 64 
63 Abbagnano and Visalberghi, Linee di storia, 3:166. 
64 Santagata, Storia della pedagogia, 2:131. 
75 
Furthermore, there were elements in the Catholic church that opposed the 
idea of popular education. Writing in the conservative journal Civilta 
£!ttolica in 1855, a Father Curci warned against educating children of 
the poor to any degree beyond their status; that might cause them to 
remain there only with discontent or to want to leave their class with 
"inestimable damage" to themselves and the society to which they 
d 65 belonge · 
The education provided by the traditional schools of the church 
was essentially a product of Renaissance humanism, classical in orienta-
tion, and well-suited to the ruling class of the pre-industrial, pre-
liberal era. But the new age had its echoes even in the church, and by 
the middle of the nineteenth century there were voices calling for a 
renewal of Catholic social action, which included education. 
The Pedagogy of Liberal Catholicism 
One of the early liberal activists among Catholic educators was 
Ferrante Aporti (1791-1858), a priest from Mantova (Mantua). In the 
1820's he served as superintendent of elementary schools in that city. 
In 1829, he opened the first asilo infantile (literally "infant 
asylum," meaning pre-school) for young children whose families could not 
give them constant care. This institution required the children's fami-
lies or guardians_ to pay tuition, but Aporti soon realized that the need 
for such institutions was far greater among the poor. For that reason, 
he opened a free asilo in Cremona in 1831, enrolling the children of 
65Abbagnano and Visalberghi, Linee di storia, 3:167. 
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the poor and relying on support from faithful benefactors. Another such 
asilo opened in San Martino all' Argine in 1834. 
----
Asili, .as Father 
Aporti conceived them, were not simply day-care institutions, but genu-
ine schools where instruction took up at least four hours of the day and 
included moral and religious training.'' 
Aporti published a book in 1833 entitled Manuale di educazione e 
di addestramento per le scuole infantili (Manual of Education and Train-
ing for the Infant Schools). This book, besides providing a basis for 
the dissemination of asili infantili in Italy, stressed the educational 
and charitable traditions of the Catholic church.' 7 Soon the movement 
spread to other parts of Italy, but not without opposition. In 1839 the 
Papal states banned the asili infantili that had opened in that terri-
tory, and a book appeared by Count Monaldo Leopardi who accused the 
asili of offending against national traditions and good taste. Aporti 
found support and a greater measure of freedom in Piedmont, where he was 
invited to teach at the University of Turin in 1844. He subsequently 
became a senator in the Sub-Alpine Parliament and the superintendent of 
Piedmont's infant schools. In 1847 Aporti published another important 
book, Elementi della pedagogia (Elements of Pedagogy). He died in 1858, 
shortly before the unification of northern and southern Italy. 
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An educator of a more meditative nature was Raffaele Lambruschini 
(1788-1873). From a wealthy and religious Genoese family, Lambruschini 
first aspired to the priesthood; but after a season in Rome, he gave up 
his priestly calling and went to his family's lands in San Cerbone in 
Tuscany. There he conducted agricultural experiments and opened a 
successful experimental boarding school in 1816. He tried to maintain a 
"family" atmosphere in his school, and he allowed the children a measure 
of self-government. From his nature studies he derived a profound 
religious sense' 8 that he attempted to communicate to his students. 
Based on his experiences at San Cerbone, Lambruschini founded a journal 
called the Guida dell'educatore (Educator's Guide), which he published 
from 1836 to 1846. 
Lambruschini closed his school in San Cerbone in 1847 and went to 
Florence to join the publishers of the moderate- liberal paper La 
Patria (The Fatherland). After unification, he was named a Senator of 
the Kingdom, and in 1867 he became Professor of Pedagogy and Superinten-
dent of the Institute of Higher Studies at the University of Florence. 
In his writings and teaching, Lambruschini insisted that man's 
many problems cannot be solved without participation in supernatural 
reality; to political and economic problems man must add moral and 
religious perspectives. For Lambruschini, only Christianity, practiced 
with purity of heart and spontaneity of feeling, could save mankind from 
decline and ruination. He hoped, moreover, for reform and renewal 
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within the Catholic church, for he believed that doctrinaire Catholicism 
had developed a sterile objectivity in its rites that restricted the 
scope of faith and the spontaneity of the religious mind. 69 To overcome 
this sterility, he called for a return to the "simplicity of the Gospel" 
and a striving to internalize religious values. 
Lambruschini, the teacher, observed that there are really two 
forms of education: indirect education, that the child receives from 
his family and his environment; and direct education that is the result 
of the work of a teacher. The value of direct education is mitigated by 
the difficulty of finding individuals who have the necessary moral qual-
ities and personal gifts to teach well and constructively, so that indi-
rect education is the preferable mode when it is possible. Direct 
education, he thought, is often unsuccessful and destroys rather than 
edifies the child. If direct teaching must take place, then the teacher 
must avoid using punishments and rewards: punishments, because of the 
harm they do to the child, and rewards, because of the vanity that they 
can instigate. In all teaching, the teacher is advised by Lambruschini 
to respect the freedom and spontaneity of the child. 70 
Other liberals and reformers appeared in the mid-nineteenth 
century in the context of the Catholic church. It should be noted at 
this point that there has never been a total separation of church and 
state in Italy, even when relations between the two bodies were very 
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poor. The work of Aporti and Lambruschini inspired schools later 
created by the Italian state; and such thinkers as Pasquale Galluppi and 
GinO Capponi retained a strong allegiance to Catholicism while taking a 
great interest in the formation of the Kingdom of Italy and its educa-
tional machinery. Where such persons are concerned, the categories of 
"religious" and "secular" are rather arbitrary. 
Nationalism and Liberal Catholicism 
In the early Risorgimento, before the withdrawal of Pope Pius IX 
from the liberal cause and the ensuing rift between the church and the 
Italian state, there was a group of thinkers hoping for a simultaneous 
renewal of religion and the Italian nation. Two outstanding clerics 
were in the forefront of this movement, Antonio Rosmini and Vincenzo 
Gioberti. Although both were interested in education, their influence 
reached far beyond that field in the cultural and political history of 
Italy, where they represent the apex of the mid-nineteenth century 
"liberal Catholic" movement. 
Antonio Rosmini-Serbati (1797-1855) was a native of Rovereto, in 
the Veneto. He studied in Padua, and was ordained to the priesthood in 
1821. In 1828 he founded the Istituto della Carit~ at Domodossola in 
the Italian Alps. By the 1840's he had become associated with the 
"neo-Guelphite" movement that envisioned an Italian federation headed by 
the Pope. He retained liberal political views, however, and was eventu-
ally drawn to Piedmont. During the crises of 1848, he undertook a royal 
mission to Rome to enlist the Pope's aid in the struggle against the 
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Austrians; but by the time Rosmini arrived, nationalist uprisings had 
already occurred in Rome, and Pius IX had abandoned his early liberal-
ism. The prospect of increasing his temporal powers within the context 
of an Italian state was not sufficient to sway the Pope, and Rosmini, 
having failed to realize his greatest goal, returned to Piedmont and 
remained there until his death. 71 
In the study of philosophy, Rosmini had read and written on Kant, 
Condillac, Locke, and Victor Cousin; he was also well-acquainted with 
the thought of Pasquale Galluppi and Giandomenico Romagnosi. Rosmini 
held a belief that philosophy, building on a theory of knowledge, could 
renew humanity from its roots. His own work on the problem of knowledge 
brought him to reduce the plurality of forms to an idea of being that 
is implicit in all thought and is the very basis of intelligent thought. 
This idea of being, he contended, is innate or intuitive and is thus a 
"given" in thought. There is also a sensation-reality associated with 
bodily feelings, he argued, but man's ability to apply the idea of being 
to sundry sensations makes him primarily rational and demonstrates the 
union of body with intellect--which, for Rosmini, was equivalent to the 
soul. Although the human subject is empirical, Rosmini saw the subject 
as capable of an objective and universal knowledge derived from the idea 
of being; from it man intuits the Absolute Subject that is the source of 
the idea; and the Absolute Subject is equivalent to God. 72 
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From the idea of being, Rosmini developed a rather curious pedag-
ogy that proceeds from the most general concepts toward the most 
specific. The child, instead of being encouraged to generalize from 
concrete experiences, must be taught the most abstract ideas from the 
beginning, from which he is then to derive particular classifications 
and characteristics. A botany lesson, for example, might begin with a 
discussion of plants in general, leading to flowering plants, and on to 
roses and finally to the naming of a particular rose. 73 In practice, 
this method never found wide application. 
Despite his unusual approach to teaching, Rosmini believed in 
education as an integral part of the total life of man. He wanted the 
schools to develop and coordinate all of the student's faculties and 
possibilities, including the spiritual possibilities beyond the limits 
of positive science. Like other liberal Catholics, Rosmini called for a 
revival of spontaneous faith in the Gospel, and accused the Catholic 
church of having altered Christian principles by abandoning internal 
matters of faith for external uniformity. 74 
There is much that could be discussed in a consideration of 
Rosmini, for his writings were voluminous and touched on many subjects. 
For example, he 
having published 
significant works 
is widely studied in Italy as a moral philosopher, 
important works on morals in 1831 and 1837. His 
in the field of education include Dell' educazione 
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£!istiana (On Christian Education), 1823; Saggio sull 'unit~ 
dell'educazione (Essay on the Unity of Education), 1826; and Del prin-
cipio supremo della metodica (On the Supreme Principle of Method), 
published posthumously in 1857. 
Vincenzo Gioberti was both an ally and a critic of Rosmini. Giob-
erti was born in Turin in 1801 and died in Paris in 1852. He was 
ordained to the priesthood in 1825 and served as court chaplain to the 
savoys from 1826 to 1833. His political activities brought an end to 
his chaplaincy. He had joined a secret revolutionary society, and in 
1833 he was discovered and exiled to Paris. He taught in Brussels from 
1834 to 1845 and did not return to Italy until 1848. During the years 
of exile, Gioberti' s views turned to more orthodox Catholicism and 
royalism. Soon after his return to Piedmont, Gioberti was offered a 
cabinet post in Gabrio Casati's government. In December of 1848, Giob-
erti was named Prime Minister in a short-lived government that was 
dissolved in February 1849. In the following month, the King sent Giob-
erti to Paris as Minister Plenipotentiary, a post from which he resigned 
two months later. Gioberti went into retirement in Paris and remained 
there until his death in 1852. 75 
During his unusual and somewhat frenetic career, Gioberti contin-
ued to publish works of a philosophical nature. His published titles 
include Teorica della sovrannaturale (Theory of the Supernatural), 1838 
Introduzione allo studio della filosofia (Introduction to the Study of 
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fPilosophy), 1840; Degli errori filosofici di Antonio Rosmini (On the 
fPilosophical Errors of Antonio Rosmini), 1841; and Il gesuita 
!Qderno (The Modern Jesuit), 1846 and 1847. The most historically 
significant of his publications, however, was Del primate morale e 
civile degli italiani (On the Moral and Civil Primacy of the Italians), 
which appeared in 1843, a brief five years before the uprisings of 1848. 
The book gave considerable encouragement to the nationalist cause 
because it extolled the cultural accomplishments of Italians throughout 
history and asserted the superiority of Italian culture. 
Gioberti' s nationalism by and large agrees with that of Mazzini, 
with one important difference: Gioberti claims that Italian culture and 
the Roman Catholic Church are actually inseparable, and that the true 
genius of modern Italian culture lies in the church. 76 He calls for 
something more than a mere accommodation of church and state, as even an 
implicit separation would threaten serious damage to Italian culture; 
and in union, the church would necessarily have the stronger hand. 
Politically, Gioberti was close to Rosmini, but the two differed 
on certain philosophical issues, principally on the importance of sensa-
tions and ideas. Gioberti saw ideas as subjective, not objective, and 
believed that only the intuition of God has objectivity. He affirmed an 
indissoluble bond between theology and philosophy. The presence of an 
infinite God, he believed, is intuited dimly in ordinary life but is 
affirmed in theology and reflected upon by philosophy. The end of both 
76 
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disciplines is a moral attitude that is a return to the Divine Being; 
but such a return must occur through the medium of the human community. 
Morals are more than individual; they are social and political, and they 
are aimed at remaking society. Nations are part of the moral hierarchy 
and have historical roles to play in the moral reconstruction of soci-
ety. Gioberti contended that Italy is first among nations in this 
supra-national process of moral reconstruction. 77 
From social philosophy it is a short distance to education. Inas-
much as private education is not an option for the poor, Gioberti 
demands state-subsidized education accessible to all. The state, 
however, must not direct education as a monopoly, for the dangers of a 
secular dogmatism and state tyranny lie therein. Education must recog-
nize and include religion (the "genius" of society) among its studies, 
but Gioberti argues that schools must not be ruled by clerics. Rather, 
students must be taught by experts in various fields. 71 
It is evident that Gioberti desired an educational system that was 
neither entirely laic nor clerical, but a fusion of the two; that fusion 
reflects his social and political opinions, for Gioberti was both a 
cleric and a political activist. With the death of Rosmini and Giob-
erti, and deteriorating relations between the Vatican and the Italian 
state that culminated in the 1871 papal non expedit forbidding Catha-
lies to participate in Italian politics, the dream of a unified, theoc-
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ratic state faded. 
Don Bosco and the Salesians 
Outside the sphere of political activity and well within that of 
practical endeavor were the efforts of Don Giovanni Bosco ( 1815-1888; 
later canonized as San Giovanni Bosco, or St. John Bosco). Don Bosco 
was the son of peasants in Castelnuovo d'Asti. As a boy, he was excep-
tionally dedicated to his schoolwork; he once had a dream or vision in 
which he was divinely commanded to teach and care for the unfortunate 
young. Soon, he began giving informal lessons to neighborhood children 
who could not afford to attend school. 
In a suburb of Turin in 1847, Don Bosco founded the Oratory of 
Saint Francis de Sales; there he assembled three hundred poor or 
orphaned children with the intention of educating them to do honest 
work. He was an outstanding teacher and his activities soon drew the 
attention of like-minded persons. As a result, Don Bosco formed the 
Holy Society of Saint Francis de Sales, recognized by the Vatican in 
1860; the society developed rapidly thereafter. 79 
Much has been written about San Giovanni Bosco, but he wrote 
little himself. His only noteworthy publication was Il sistema preven-
tivo nell'educazione della . \ g1oventu (The Preventive System in the 
Education of Youth), 1877. The "preventive" system therein described is 
intended as a means of preventing failure and unacceptable behavior in 
students. This method, not a formalized system, is a combination of 
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faith, a deeply personal power of persuasion, and an intrinsic under-
standing of child psychology. Whatever the child's temperament, Don 
Bosco asserted that there is a "point accessible to good" in the person-
ality, and it is the teacher's task to discover and work with it through 
intelligent and active love, without punishments and repressions, while 
anticipating possible occasions for misbehavior. 80 
The aim of preventive education, moreover, is always to help the 
child to realize his possibilities and thereby to feel useful and appre-
ciated, able to do things for himself and for others. For this reason, 
and because many of Don Bosco's students came from the poorer classes 
and were not academically talented, the Salesian schools were organized 
to provide occupational and vocational training. Such training included 
manual skills, a unique feature in mid nineteenth-century Italian educa-
tion when the state "technical schools" were actually aimed at general 
education for clerical workers and preparation for further training in 
genteel occupations. 81 
Gradually, state schools developed that assumed similar functions 
to those of the original Sales ian schools, and by the middle of the 
twentieth century the educational mission of the Salesians had altered 
considerably; but the vision of Don Bosco had served an important 
purpose in making Italian educators aware of the educational needs of 
the poor. 
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Opposition and Rapprochement 
When Pope Pius IX abandoned his early liberalism and turned 
conservative, refusing to recognize the legitimacy of the Kingdom of 
Italy despite the Law of Guarantees, and declaring himself the "prisoner 
of the Vatican," it was obvious that liberal and progressive forces even 
within the church would face official opposition. The Pope assembled 
conservative advisers and catalogued the errors of modernism in his 
well-known encyclical of 1864, the Syllabus of Errors. Under such 
circumstances, educational reform was difficult for the Catholic schools 
in Italy, which for the most part continued to teach traditional 
subjects in a traditional manner. 
Gradually, the political atmosphere changed. The strength of the 
Italian socialists (and the evident irresponsibility of many left-wing 
legislators) brought the Vatican to reconsider its role in the Italian 
context. With a vast majority of Italian citizens claiming to be Roman 
Catholic, a Catholic political force had the potential of significantly 
opposing the socialists. In 1905, Pope Pius X abolished the non expe-
dit; but no Catholic party of great importance emerged until after World 
War I. What developed in that era was the Partite Popolare organized 
by a Sicilian priest, Don Luigi Sturzo. The Popolari were the forerun-
ners of the present-day Christian Democrats, and their ideology was 
intended to reconcile the Catholic faith with modern social and demo-
cratic ideas. 82 In their first parliamentary election in 1919, the Popo-
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lari won 101 seats. Their support was largely rural. 
-
The Popolari were suppressed by Mussolini, and the Christian 
Democrat party first appeared as an underground group during World War 
II. In the meantime, however, an important agreement regularized rela-
tions between the Italian state and the Vatican. The Concordat of 1929, 
engineered by Mussolini, which gave the church liberty in spiritual 
matters, sovereign rights, and diplomatic privileges, declared Catholi-
cism to be the religion of the Italian state. 13 After 1929, church and 
state relations fluctuated according to the political climate, but at 
least the "Roman question" was resolved. 
The provisions of the Concordat allowed priests in state schools 
as teachers of religion. Thus, the church gained official and legally 
sanctioned influence on the curriculum of government schools. In 
exchange, the Vatican accepted the principle of state supervision of 
education where such control was a matter of setting school standards, 
giving examinations, and approving the preparation of teachers. The 
principle of "parification" of non-state schools had actually come down 
from the late nineteenth century, but under the new regime it became a 
fact. Thereby, the Italian state was able to influence curriculum in 
Catholic schools, and changes in outlook became political necessities as 
well as responses to contemporary pressures. Despite such exigencies, 
Catholic schools retained their identity in twentiety-century Italy. 
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The Scholastic Revival 
One particular movement swept the Catholic church in the early 
twentieth century that had a considerable effect on Catholic eduaation, 
especially at the university level. It was the movement headed by Padre 
Agostino Gemelli, and is variously referred to as "Neo1:homismn or 11neo-
~- scholasticism." Father Gemelli, born Edoardo Gemelli in Milan on January 
18,1876, began his p~ofessional life by earning a doctorate in medicine 
at the University of Pavia. Vhile studying endocrinology, Gemelli 
became concerned about the elevation of the human race and turned to 
socialism. Unsatisfied by materialism, however, he abandoned socialist 
activities and took religious orders, becoming a Franciscan. Gemelli 
developed the viewpoint that interest in the Christian message had to be 
revived, even by means of combining Christianity with certain aspects of 
the scientific world-view. He was a good organizer and was instrumental 
in founding two Catholic journals, Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica 
(Review of Neo-Scholastic Philosophy) in 1909 and Vita e pensiero (Life 
and Thought) in 1914. In 1919, Father Gemelli became . the principal 
founder of Milan's Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, an institu-
tion recognized by the Italian state in 1924. He was its first rector, 
and from 1936 until his death in 1959 he was also president of the 
Pontifical Academy of Sciences. His entire life was marked by his 
energy and versatility. 14 
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Although not well-prepared in philosophy, Padre Gemelli believed 
that philosophy is the backbone of culture, especially of Christian 
culture. His grand aim was to restore Catholic thought, redirected to 
its (Thomistic) medieval sources and vitalized through its conflict with 
non-Catholic ideologies such as idealism and positivism. Thus strength-
ened, Christian philosophy should be at the center of the Catholic 
university. Despite his appreciation for philosophy, Father Gemelli saw 
himself as a psychologist and experimental scientist; he left the teach-
ing of philosophy to others, and concentrated on strengthening the 
psychology laboratory of his university. It was from his psychological 
research that his pedagogical viewpoint developed. Essentially, he 
taught the importance of social psychology for pedagogical activities 
and all human relations. He saw the human personality as a synthetic 
unity in which all the particular activities of the self--working and 
learning, for example--converge. For Gemelli, the supreme expression of 
the person occurs through the will; thus, he placed the highest value on 
"education of the will. " 15 
The Sacred Heart University and its related institutions attracted 
Catholic scholars from the 1920's on. It became a principal center for 
the Italian dissemination of French-inspired theories of "personalism" 
or "Christian spiritualism," which were seen to be coherent with the 
basically Neothomistic orientation of the university. These theories 
attracted some attention during the Fascist period, but were pronounced 
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more openly and became the basis for the major Christian school of 
pedagogical thought after 1945. 
Private Education in Italy 
The great majority of schools in Italy, at all levels, are either 
government schools or those of the Catholic church. Italian law allows 
other types of schooling to exist: in fact, the 1948 Italian constitu-
tion guarantees the rights of citizens to run private schools. 86 
However, there is not much social pressure for the creation of non-
state, non-church private schools. Those few that exist at the elemen-
tary level tend to be specialized, such as schools for non-Italian 
speaking communities residing in Italy (e.g., the Junior English School 
in Rome). 
At the secondary level, an interesting phenomenon exists in the 
form of private secondary schools that provide professional training not 
offered or not well-covered by state and church schools (for example, 
the linguistic high schools); in addition, a large number of private 
secondary schools offer special coaching and tutoring to students who 
have been unable to pass state examinations for entry into various 
professions or public university courses. In this latter function, they 
are commonly derided as "drop-out academies" and do not enjoy high 
public status. A leading educator writes of them: 
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... the private school, thus, as it was historically constructed 
and disseminated among us after the Casati Law, in the popular mind 
and before the authorities seems to be a "money-making institution," 
dedicated to providing "make-up" work for failures, if not exactly 
hiding them from view. 17 
Universities are almost entirely in the hands of the Italian 
state. Those few that are not are either institutions of the Catholic 
church (e.g., the Sacred Heart University of Milan or the Pontifical 
Salesian University of Rome), or they are highly-specialized institu-
tions for professional studies or the education of foreigners. 
Philosophers of education in Italy tend to be either laic or Cath-
olic, and by implication they are concerned with education in a state or 
church context, although the political power of the Christian Democrats 
after World War II gave the Catholics some influence over affairs in 
state schools. There appear to be no uniting ideologies or philosophies 
that are specifically aimed at private education in Italy; trends in 
educational theory, when they imply formal schooling of one sort or 
another, necessarily ignore the private nonconfessional schools. 
Educational Theory Before World War II 
In the first four decades of the twentieth century, educational 
theory in Italy, or pedagogia as it is properly called, became increas-
ingly the province of university professors, an academic discipline 
rather than a cause for activists and dilettantes. The Italian state 
continued to build a network of essentially non-confessional schools, 
whose teachers were for the most part trained in state institutions 
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under the tutelage of laic professors. Among the laics there were 
several "currents," the strongest of which was allied to Gentile's 
actual idealism. Other currents, including Crocian idealism and proble-
maticism, had a few representatives; during the Fascist era, the most 
politically radical were obliged to keep their opinions quiet or be 
forced out of academic circles. Thus the Marxists were not strongly 
represented, despite the intellectual influence of Labriola at the turn 
of the century. 
At the urging of the idealists, the Fascist regime of the 1920's 
and 1930's succeeded in purging most of the "scientific" influence out 
/ 
of teacher-training courses. Education was to be a matter for philoso-
phers, not scientists. The result was that education, at least at the 
most theoretical level, was maintained as a natural appurtenance of 
philosophy departments. From that time on, it was usual for laic 
philosophers of education to be teachers of philosophy who might, 
through choice or circumstance, perform the duties of training teachers 
or of preparing students in philosophy to compete for positions in 
teacher-training institutions. 
The Catholic educational enterprise was sustained by teachers and 
theoreticians who were trained in state institutions or possibly at the 
Sacred Heart University of Milan. Some Catholics managed to teach in 
state universities and normal schools, but the Catholics' principal 
forums were the Sacred Heart University and the Catholic press. By the 
advent of World War II, it was a rare Catholic educator who did not have 
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some academic connection or credential. It is not surprising that the 
catholic educators were more respected in the church-affiliated schools 
than in the state schools, especially in view of the absence of a strong 
catholic political party in that era. The few non-affiliated private 
schools existed for specialized purposes, but except for a few interest-
ing experiments (particularly in early childhood education), they 
attracted little attention among credentialed scholars in education. 
As the Second World War changed the political situation in Italy, 
so it altered (but did not totally revolutionize) the educational enter-
prise in theory and in practice. 
CHAPTER III 
ITALIAN IDEALISM: BENEDETTO CROCE 
AND HIS FOLLOWERS 
Any study of Italian educational thought in the twentieth century 
that neglects idealism as a pervading force is simply incomplete. From 
the time of Mussolini's rise to power to the end of World War II, ideal-
ism was the official philosophy of the Italian state, and as such it was 
supposed to have guided Italian education. Before that time, and back 
to the era of Bertrando Spaventa, there were prominent idealists in the 
Italian intellectual milieu; and after the war, those idealists who had 
not collaborated. too closely with the Fascists were able to maintain 
positions of respect in the academic community. The movement lost 
direction and momentum in the postwar years, but idealist educators were 
identifiable in university positions well into the 1960's. 
Hegelian Idealism in Italy 
The origins and early development of Italian idealism are summa-
rized nicely by two contemporary scholars, Nicola Abbagnano and Aldo 
Visalberghi: 
In the second half of the nineteenth century, Hegelian doctrine 
had its Italian center of study and diffusion at the University of 
Naples, where it was professed with theistic and Catholic tendencies 
by Augusto Vera (1813-1885), and by Bertrando Spaventa (1817-1885), 
who tried to develop it in an immanentistic sense, positing aware-
ness as a fundamental presupposition at the beginning of the dialec-
tical process. 
95 
96 
Among those who belonged to the Hegelian movement in Italy in the 
second half of the nineteenth century were numerous writers, histo-
rians, members of the legal and medical professions, and philoso-
phers as well, for all of whom Hegelianism served as a pplemic 
instrument against positivism. Not one of them, however, was able 
to add anything to the thought of the German philosopher. 
Idealism acquired originality 
Italy through the work of Gentile 
radically distinguishable from 
distinguishable from each other. 
and strength only in contemporary 
and Croce. These two thinkers are 
the English idealists and also 
The two doctrines are distinguishable from each other inasmuch as 
one is absolute subjectivism (actualism), and the other is absolute 
historicism. The characteristic that they share is the radical 
negation of all transcendence and the resolution of all reality in 
pure mental activity. 1 
For all of its cultural and historical importance, it is clear 
that Italian idealism was not a unified movement. Of the two important 
factions, historical idealism and actualism, the former was both earlier 
and longer-lived, although it probably had fewer adherents. Of the two 
major philosophers, Croce_ and Gentile, the one who came to be read and 
respected widely outside of Italy was Benedetto Croce, and thus histori-
cal idealism had wider dissemination than did actualism. 
Benedetto Croce and Historical Idealism 
"For the Italians Croce was the intellectual leader during his 
lifetime," an enthusiastic American scholar has written. "Every Italian 
began to call him 'maestro,' universal man, the great Croce, the honor 
of Italian letters, the new Erasmus, the great benefactor. " 2 One may 
~icola Abbagnano and Aldo Visalberghi, Linee di storia della pedago-
Jja, 3 vols., (Turin: G. B. Paravia & C., 1959), 3:221. 
2 Angelo A. De Gennaro, The Philosophy of Benedetto Croce (New York: 
The Citadel Press, 1961), p.1. 
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suspect hyperbole in these observations, but the fact remains that Croce 
was admired by many, and was widely translated and internationally 
known. "Never since Galilei had an Italian aroused such world inter-
t 113 es . 
Croce's Life and Work 
Benedetto Croce was born in Pescasseroli, in the province of 
L'Aquila, on February 25, 1866. His father was a wealthy landowner and 
a cousin of the philosopher Bertrando Spaventa and the parliamentarian 
Silvio Spaventa. Raised in Naples, Croce attended a Barnabite school 
which enrolled boys from the best Neapolitan families. He. later. 
pronounced his education there "satisfactory." Although temporarily 
inclined to religious life, religion soon lost its importance as his 
interests in literature and history grew. A good student and an avid 
reader, Croce found school easy and enjoyed reading such Italian think-
ers as De Sanctis and Carducci. Some of Croce's school compositions 
appeared in a Rome literary magazine in 1882. 
In 1883, Croce was suddenly orphan~d by an earthquake that killed 
his father, mother, and sister, and slightly injured him. He and his 
brother went to Rome to live with their relative, Silvio Spaventa. 
There Croce encountered a new environment among the men of politics, but 
he suffered from a lingering depression related to the death of his 
parents, and he took little interest in the law courses toward which his 
3De Gennaro, The Philosophy of Benedetto Croce, p. 2. 
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cousin directed him. 4 In 1886 Croce returned to Naples to study history. 
He had arranged his legacy from his parents in such a way that his 
economic security was guaranteed for life, allowing him a life of study, 
travel, and independent action and thought. 5 
In the 1890 1 s, Croce 1 s interests in philosophy were awakened, 
spurred on chiefly by his reading of the Scienza nueva (New Science) of 
Giambattista Vico. That stirred in his mind the problem of the rela-
tions of art and history, and from the experience came a book, La storia 
ridotta sotto il concetto generale dell'arte (History Reduced Under the 
General Concept of Art), published in 1893. Croce's association with 
Spaventa 1 s student, Antonio Labriola, acquainted him with the works of 
Marx, and between 1895 and 1900 he wrote a series of essays of Marxism 
published as Materialismo storico ed economia marxista (Historical 
Materialism and Marxist Economics), 1900. It was his association with 
Giovanni Gentile, however, that eventually led Croce to an appreciation 
of Hegelian idealism which he then reinterpreted in a characteristically 
personal way. Most significant was his collaboration with Gentile on La 
Critica (Criticism), a philosophical journal of idealistic tendencies, 
which both men edited from 1903 to 1923. 6 That period, as history shows, 
was extremely formative for the course of twentieth century Italian 
philosophy, and ultimately for the history of Italy itself. 
4senedetto Croce, An Autobiography, tr. R. G. Collingwood (Oxford, 
England: Clarendon Press, 1927), p. 40. 
Snizionario dei filosofi, 1976 ed., s.v. "Croce, Benedetto." 
Etizionario dei filosofi, s.v. "Croce." 
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Before the cataclysmic events of 1923 and 1924, relations between 
Croce and Gentile had already begun to cool. Croce had worked on elabo-
rating a set of distinctions among the manifestations of Mind; these are 
modifications of Hegel's original doctrines, and Gentile criticized them 
as "empirical" (an idealist epithet). The work on La Critica contin-
ued, however, until political events made further collaboration impossi-
ble. 
In the first two decades of the twentieth century, Croce estab-
lished his reputation as a philosopher by publishing substantial philo-
sophical material independently of his work with Gentile. Eventually, 
he was drawn into political life. In 1910, Croce was named a senator of 
the Kingdom of Italy. (Under the Italian constitution, senators were 
appointed for life, in contrast to members of the Chamber of Deputies, 
who were elected periodically; to be named a senator was a high honor.) 
Croce's political activity, however, did not reach a peak until 1920, 
when he was given the post of Minister of Public Instruction under Giol-
itti, the liberal prime minister. At that time, Croce strove to initi-
ate a reform of the state schools that would have reduced the bewilder-
ing variety of schools and would have turned curricula in the direction 
of "culture" (history, classics, fine arts), de-emphasizing mere profes-
sional or vocational training. The government in which Croce served was 
weak and chaotic, and fell in July 1921. The school reforms proposed by 
Croce had not been passed. When Mussolini came to power in 1922, he 
asked Croce to suggest a suitable Minister of Public Instruction, and 
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Croce named Gentile, knowing the younger man to be more of a Fascist 
sympathizer than himself. Croce's hope was that Gentile, with Fascist 
help, would be able to implement the reform which both men had envi-
. d 7 s~one . 
The murder of the socialist parliamentarian Matteotti in 1924 was 
a shock to some of the idealists who had been swayed by Fascist rhet-
oric. Up to that time, Croce, while not actually favoring Fascism, had 
tried to justify it as a dialectical movement of renewal in Italian 
political life. After the bloodshed of 1924, his acceptance changed to 
opposition. He avoided attending senate meetings, and condemned govern-
ment policies. Even on the theoretical level, Croce revised his opin-
ions. He came to see Italian Fascism as an aberration rather than a 
genuine manifestation of the Hegelians' "Universal Mind." That signi-
fied a considerable revision of his judgment of the historical value of 
Fascism. Croce's status was such that he did not suffer serious attacks 
during the Fascist period, unlike other opponents of the regime. It is 
recorded that on one occasion his home was invaded by Fascist sympathiz-
ers, but they were routed by Croce's wife, Adele.• 
After the fall of Fascism, Croce returned to the political life. 
In the second Badoglio government (22 April 1944 to 18 June 1944) he and 
Palmiro Togliatti, the Communist leader, served as government consult-
ants (referred to as "Ministers Without Portfolio"), and they remained 
7Dizionario dei filosofi, s.v. "Croce." 
8Dizionario dei filosofi, s.v. "Croce." 
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in that position under the succeeding government of Bonomi, until 
December 1944. 9 Croce remained active in reconstruction politics until 
his retirement from public life in 1948. In 1947, he established a 
research library in Naples for the purpose of assisting young scholars 
in historical studies. Benedetto Croce died in 1952. 
Outlines of Croce's Philosophy 
Croce's philosophy is derived from both Vico and Hegel, but the 
synthesis is uniquely his. For Croce, the fundamental idea is that of a 
Universal Mind that is becoming and progressing in an ongoing process. 
That Mind comprises all reality and there is nothing outside of it. It 
develops in a circular manner, its "moments" or forms recurring 
constantly, but without exact repetition, as in each recurrence Mind is 
enriched. The moments (a term borrowed from Hegel) are manifested in 
history, and there are four of them: art or esthetics (equivalent to 
knowledge of individual particulars); logic or philosophy (knowledge of 
universal concepts); economics (the will toward individual utility); and 
morals (the will toward the good of all). In the case of each moment, 
Croce explains its meaning in conceptual terms. He also subdivides the 
four into two pairs: art and philosophy comprise the theoretical forms 
of Mind, while economics and morals are the practical forms. 
Sbomenico Agasso, Storia d'Italia, 8 vols. (Milan: Arnoldo Mondadori 
S.p.A., 1978), 8:532-533. 
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Although the idea of a Universal Mind that encompasses all reality 
in its progressive becoming is a derivation from Hegel, the four moments 
enumerated by Croce are his own. Croce believed that Hegel's dialectic 
of opposites was an over-simplification of the historical process of 
Mind. Hegel's theory, as Croce saw it, had led to a general confounding 
of the distinct forms of Mind, as Hegel did not make them apparent in 
his dialectic. Dialectical opposition is necessary for the development 
of all forms, and can and does take place within them; but the opposites 
(light/dark, good/evil, etc.), are not themselves forms of Mind, accord-
ing to Croce; they only represent typical poles of the dialectic. Thus, 
Croce affirms an important difference between distincts, the four 
moments (or the forms of Mind), and opposites, the necessary features of 
dialectical thought. The development of Mind in its circular and recur-
rent patterns is equivalent to the unfolding of history. Only in 
history, affirms Croce, can reality be in movement and progress. This 
doctrine has been called "absolute historicism," and it is a central 
feature of Croce's philosophy. In fact, Croce equates philosophy with a 
"methodology of historiography," that is, with the study of the modes 
and forms in which Mind concretizes itself as historical knowledge--the 
only knowledge possible because there is nothing that can be known 
outside of history. 10 
10 ~bbagnano and Visalberghi, Linee di storia, 3:227. 
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Croce was heavily involved in the study of esthetics, that first 
form of Mind, which he saw as the basic expression of feeling and intui-
tion. He concluded that esthetic activity transforms crude emotions 
through the work of imagination, and esthetic activity is the 
beginning-point in the expression of Mind--insofar as there can be a 
beginning-point in an essentially circular system. 11 
In the few scattered fragments in which Croce deals with 
education, chiefly in Pagine sparse (Scattered Pages), a series of 
essays and memoirs that appeared in 1929, he tends to stress the 
importance of historical and esthetic studies. This leaning is 
concomitant with his effort to reform Italian schooling during his brief 
period as Minister of Public Instruction. The reform that Croce 
envisioned in 1920-1921 was largely a reaction against the positivist 
influence in Italian schooling and schools' resulting emphasis on 
science. Antipositivism was part of the idealist creed, and Croce duly 
mistrusted science and relegated it to the status of an "economic" 
study. 12 
Unfortunately, there is no single book or essay by Croce that 
details a systematic educational theory derived from his philosophy. 
Yet Croce was an intellectual of enormous importance to Italians in the 
first half of the twentieth century. It was up to his followers, 
therefore, to devise Crocian pedagogies. It is necessary, then, to turn 
11 Abbagnano and Visalberghi, Linee di storia, 3:229. 
12 Abbagnano and Visalberghi, Linee di storia, 3:230-231. 
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to them to see how coherent educational thought was developed from the 
ideas of Italy's greatest contemporary philosopher. 
Adelchi Attisani and the Historical Individual 
In postwar Italy, historical idealism or absolute historicism did 
not have a large following among educational thinkers. Among the few, 
the best-known and most articulate was Adelchi Attisani. He was born in 
Leece Province on September 12, 1898. He spent most of his career 
teaching moral philosophy and pedagogy at the University of Messina. 
Attisani' s first publications in 1924 dealt with problems in esthetics 
and education, and showed his affinities for Croce's theories. In 
general, Attisani respects the Crocian union of philosophy with the 
study of culture--that is, he regards literature, history, and art as 
the subject matter of philosophical contemplation. In a modification of 
Croce's doctrine of the dis tincts, Attisani identifies four groups of 
problems deserving of separate philosphical attention: they occur in 
the disciplines of history, ethics, education, and esthetics. 13 
Attisani's ethical theories are strongly influenced by Croce; his 
writings also contain numerous references to Kant and Rosmini, moralists 
of different but not totally incompatible natures. Although Attisani is 
concerned about the discovery of objective values, his ultimate project 
is to develop an autonomous ethic in the Kantian sense that can satisfy 
the individual need for moral concreteness. The "historical individual" 
that Attisani describes is not a mere instrument of Idea or Universal 
13 Dizionario dei filosofi, 1976 ed., s.v. "Attisani, Adelchi." 
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Hind; that person is above all an ethical individual, participating in a 
living process of ethical thought. 14 Attisani's ethics are actually the 
point of departure for his educational theories, which are best devel-
book oped in his 
published in 1951. 
Liberts ed educazione (Freedom and Education), 
The Growth of the Moral Will 
Clearly, Attisani's Libert~ ed educazione is written from a 
particular ethical viewpoint. In the preface, its author states his 
intentions as follows: 
This book, with the nexus of concepts announced by the title, 
attempts to provide a solution for an important problem in the ethi-
cal theory of historicism. . . 
In facing it, I have not neglected the occasion provided to me to 
re-examine and clarify ethical problems of today, bound to the 
fundamental problem of freedom, which is evaluated here with partic-
ular regard to education. 15 
The "important problem" to which Attisani refers is the problem of 
freedom in a moral (human) world; specifically, he wants to develop a 
concept of freedom that is not destructive of morality. Obviously, if 
freedom is taken to mean something like "absolute freedom of choice," 
then one may choose to be grossly immoral. Attisani intends to demon-
Strate that human beings are free, but that they cannot choose evil. 
14Dizionari dei filosofi, s. v. "Attisani." 
15Adelchi Attisani, LibertA ed educazione (Messina: A. Sessa, 1951; 
2d ed., Naples: Morano, 1967), preface. 
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He begins by assuming that the only freedom worth discussing is 
freedom in the moral context, that indeed, freedom is a moral.problem. 
He asks whether freedom should be conceived as an equivocal choice 
between good and evil, or whether we must necessarily select good and 
avoid evil. (These are really two opposing theories of moral action.) 
At this point, Attisani begins a rather curious argument in favor of 
moral necessity rather than moral choice. Human beings, he contends, 
generally recognize the difference between good and evil; they are able 
to label certain objects and states as "good" and others as "evil." 
This ability to discriminate suggests that the choice of good over evil 
is implicitly made; in other words, the discrimination between good and 
evil is really the choice itself. 
What becomes, then, of the moral conscience? If making a moral 
discrimination is tantamount to choosing the ensuing action, no further 
deliberation of a good-versus-evil sort is required, and as a result, 
human beings do not have to refer to a "moral conscience" as a tertium 
quid that directs human action. Such an entity would be an unreliable 
guide in any case, because it would have to stand beyond good and evil 
in order to allow us to deliberate freely; and if it is beyond good and 
evil, it must be indifferent to values, and that entity is therefore 
irrational. 16 If we cannot allow the conscience to be indifferent to 
values, then it must be oriented one way or the other (toward good or 
evil), and hence it is not free. If we insist that conscience is not 
16Attisani, Libert~ ed educazione, pp. 11-12. 
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oriented one way or the other, then it must refer to independent 
criteria to make a choice, but these criteria, whatever they are, must 
have a compelling power to influence the choice. Attisani concludes 
that what has been discussed here 
... is not free choice, the faculty of choice between good and 
evil, but it is always the selection of good against evil; and, as 
liberation from this evil, and only in this sense, is there moral 
freedom. 17 
There are two important judgments in this conclusion. The first is that 
there is no free choice in moral matters; and the second is that the 
necessary enactment of good brings about the moral agent's liberation 
~ evi1. 18 
Attisani next attacks theories that propose moral freedom as the 
individual's power to refer the self, or not refer the self, to Being, 
which is understood as the Good. Here again, Attisani thinks that the 
choice is not a real one, for this formulation requires a person to be 
able to recognize Being as the Good; but if Being can be so recognized, 
then it must be chosen over nonbeing, for it is impossible for a human 
being, a manifestation of Being, to choose not to be. 
17Attisani, Libert! ed educazione, p. 13. 
' 
18Although Attisani uses the term "selection" in this passage, he 
means to deny that one can actually choose between good and evil as if 
they were two equal options; the "selection" is properly a discrimina-
tion between good and evil, and when the discrimination is made 
correctly, the subject is required to follow the superior course. 
Later, Attisani will argue that evil deeds are the results of inadequate 
knowledge. It is inconceivable to him that a person could consciously 
judge a contemplated action to be evil and still choose freely to 
perform it. Some will see this as a flaw in Attisani's moral philoso-
phy. 
108 
Attisani is really concerned about the recognition of moral law as 
a necessary condition of human life; and freedom must be freedom from 
anY tendency to disavow that law. Yet if, as Attisani contends, persons 
are free only to recognize good and shun evil, how can evil exist at 
all? That is the next problem on the agenda. Here Attisani goes into a 
consideration of Plato and the theory of the involuntariness of evil. 
According to this theory, evil is a failure to recognize the good; and 
that failure occurs because the individual's consciousness of the moral 
. law has not yet been awakened. Nevertheless, as evil is still evil, the 
evildoer cannot be held morally exempt, and he or she is to be punished 
with an eye toward future corrigibility. 19 In that way, Attisani 
attempts to overcome the dilemma created by positing involuntariness on 
one hand and moral responsibility on the other. 
Attisani contends that Plato's view of evil prefigures a dialecti-
cal theory in which evil is seen not as what is willed, but as what is 
no longer willed and has since been negated and overcome by a superior 
good. Good and morality may then be identified with the very act of 
willing, and evil becomes merely a precedent good that has deteriorated. 
Moral unawareness, or ignorance of good, is ignorance of what is still, 
for the individual, in the future. 
Thus, then, the bad is not voluntarily or conscientiously bad, 
but through ignorance of the true good. that is, through actual 
deficiency--we might say--of the moral conscience. 20 
19Attisani, Liberta ed educazione, p. 20. 
20Attisani, Libert~ ed educazione, p. 23 
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Obviously, this "deficiency" theory of evil preserves the notion of 
corrigibility, for if a wrongdoer is morally deficient, he or she may 
yet be instructed in proper moral knowledge. 
In order to solve the problem of the moral significance of certain 
actions, Attisani eventually introduces the idea of a double order: 
there is moral will and amoral will. He is careful, however, to specify 
that practical affairs do not belong to an order of nature outside of 
the moral will. As Croce teaches, Mind is never passive and irrational, 
and there is nothing outside of it. Even a practical fact is the result 
of will; but some choices, as for example between two equally good 
actions, may be merely facultative and dependent on "free initiative" or 
" ... the will in general in contrast to moral will or ethicized 
will. " 21 Similarly, Attisani uses the term "practical initiative" to 
refer to the power of self-determination in matters of fact. 
Attisani attempts to integrate the individual will into a great 
universal moral consciousness. The will, he contends, must be conformed 
to the moral law by a posteriori judgments of reality, and it is 
thereby drawn into the orbit of moral consciousness. There the will 
becomes part of the process of rationality, (also called "~pirituality" 
by the idealists), and the individual's will is then involved in the 
ideal eternal history of will, ". in which will is perpetually 
unfolding, and according to a necessary order of certain eternal values 
and attitudes. " and in such a way that will is forced to pursue new 
21Attisani, Libert~ ed educazione, p. 37. 
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ends in order to satisfy a superior order. 22 
How, then, does the individual will fit into the grand scheme of 
the unfolding of the ideal eternal will in history? 
In brief: man is always free in the choice of his goods and his 
aims within limits, and proportionately to the degree of practical 
conscience that he has attained; but man is not free in the choice 
of the degree of practical conscience which he attains: sometimes 
he wills in a utilitarian way--as a mere individual--or morally--as 
the man who transcends the merely individual--but he does not will 
sometimes to will in a utilitarian way or to will morally; he does 
not choose and he is not free to choose between one and the other 
will, between being only an individual and being both individual and 
man.23 
Thus we are always free and never free. We are free to will particu-
lars, but not to choose the forms of awareness or will, or the degree of 
freedom in which we find ourselves. If we are evil, we are so because 
we or others have so judged our actions a posteriori. If we are good, 
it is only because we have attained a higher grade of knowledge, and 
that knowledge is ultimately moral awareness. 
There is much further discussion and borrowing from both Kant and 
Croce. Eventually, Attisani turns to a consideration of civilization 
and the realm of human society. Like Croce, he accepts that Mind 
unfolds in history, and that its highest moral manifestations occur in 
civilization. He finds a dialectic that develops in the interaction of 
individuals. In the course of human history, the interaction of persons 
takes place and spurs the ·individual's ascent to moral awareness, teach-
22Attisani, Libert~ ed educazione, p. 30. 
23A · · L'b ~ d d . 40 tt1san1, 1 erta e e ucaz1one, p. . 
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ing him or her the moral law. 24 Society, then, exerts a moral influence 
that unfolds the powers of the mind and paves the way for moral 
conscience. That same society permits the development of arts and 
sciences; they do not by themselves make a person moral, but they do 
provide conditions for moral development. Society's laws, too, permit 
moral development by promoting the freedom (and therefore morality) of 
all, and by punishing infractions of that freedom. 25 
Education as a Moral Enterprise 
The end of moral development in society is an attitude of individ-
ual moral responsibility, which implies a dialectic of moral realization 
on one hand, and a process of moral education on the other. The prime 
duty of education, then, is to promote the moral sense of the populace; 
education is most significantly a moral enterprise. Education must also 
foster the growth of the individual's creative will (but always along 
moral lines), and it must promote one's sense of vitality, growth, and 
history. 
The Basis of Education 
A major consideration for Attisani is that education, whatever it 
does, takes place in society; and the social context is necessarily a 
moral context. On that assumption, Attisani develops his notion of 
education: 
24Attisani, Libert~ ed educazione, p. 61. 
25Att. · J.sanJ., Liberta ed educazione, pp. SS-56. 
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Now, among the 'active forces in the world,' among the actions by 
which every individual interacts with other individuals, and works 
and can work upon their likeliness to develop themselves and evolve 
in specific modes and directions, there is that particular m9de of 
action, that particular manner of doing things that is called educa-
tion, and whose force in human development in general and in the 
Cfi'rection of that development is attested to by more than history 
and by the experience of all times and all eras; in fact, this force 
(education) is profoundly justified by the very concept of the indi-
vidual, who is rightly defined by his eternal self- individuation. 
That means he is defined by his self-distinction among all other 
individuals, which obviously cannot happen except by means of his 
self-definition in actions and reactions toward and in relation to 
other individuals (with their actions and reactions); except by 
means of a process, that is, in which individuation is also unifi-
cation and unification is also always individuation. 26 
Here Attisani concentrates on the essential social quality of 
education. He refers to education not as an activity, but as an "active 
force" or a "mode of action" that results in certain activities. That 
is education at an abstract level; and seen as a metaphysical entity, it 
is not far from what Croce (Attisani' s mentor) calls the "forms of 
Mind," meaning those cultural forces that shape human activities. 
Attisani observes that individuals interact with other individu-
als, and that this interaction affects their "likeliness to develop 
themselves and evolve in specific modes and directions." In other 
words, social interaction has a shaping effect on human development. 
The basis for that observation is partly naturalistic, but Attisani 
draws inspiration from several quarters. His next argument is histori-
cal: The "particular manner of doing things" called education is 
"attested to . by history," or more precisely, its efficacy in human 
development is so attested. We educate, then, because education can 
26Attisani, LibertA ed educazione, p. 76. 
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develop human beings in certain ways; and we know this is the case 
through the evidence of the historical record. 
So far, the assumption that this influence on human beings is 
desirable has been implied; but Attisani next attempts to justify it. 
He claims that the force of education is justified by the "very concept 
of the individual" (the idealist concept of the individual), and that is 
the crux of the argument. According to that concept, the individual is 
necessarily "self-individuated," or made distinct among all other indi-
viduals. As to how that individuation occurs, Attisani insists that the 
individual can be self-defined only" ... through actions and reactions 
toward and in relation to other individuals. . . . " That is, the pres-
ence of the individual in a social context really defines the individ-
ual. Alone, he or she would not have as clear a sense of self as that 
obtained through interaction with others, nor would as much development 
be necessary in particular directions. Attisani does not stipulate that 
this development is always intentional; rather, it seems to be the 
inevitable result of social life. In the historicist scheme, history 
acts with or without the conscious cooperation of the ordinary individ-
ual, but it does have an effect of producing moral awareness in the 
individual. 
The social process of human action and interaction is said to have 
a dual aspect, bespeaking reciprocal functions. It allows individua-
tion, but that individuation "is also unification," for it is a process 
common to all, not restricted to one or to a few; in that commonality 
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there is unity, as common values are realized. At another level, social 
unification--the combining of individuals in societies and cultures--is 
a process that allows the individual additional means of self-identifi-
cation (as a member of that society or cultural group), and thus 
contributes to individuation. Although that argument is not water-tight 
(because the concept of individuation modifies subtly), it has a reci-
procity that appeals to the nee-Hegelian mind and provides yet another 
example of dialectical movement. 
That morality is the basic condition for human society is a propo-
sition never questioned by Attisani and those of a similar persuasion. 
Hegel himself requires morality in the civil society and beyond, and it 
is unthinkable to the idealists that an immoral or amoral society could 
exist. Such a society not only contradicts the idealist notion of a 
society, but if it could somehow come into existence, it would surely 
destroy itself. The very fact of the existence of others raises moral 
questions for the idealists, and so the entire matter of living in a 
social body becomes the subject of moral deliberation. Attisani does 
not use the word "morality" in the cited paragraph, but he is setting 
the stage for the concept through these preliminary considerations. 
Obviously, then, education is taken to be part of the "course of 
things" (history) that forms individuals in an especially moral way. 
Furthermore, it seeks to bring out the individual's 
. . . free creative action, seeing to it that all the powers of the 
soul have their appropriate development, and in that way, bring 
about that equilibrium and interior harmony that are the foundations 
115 
of human personality and the principles of moral liberty. 27 
II t' II Here free ac 1.on and "liberty" must be understood to mean freedom 
within the confines of morality, for Attisani has gone to some pains to 
demonstrate that immorality is not free. The "powers of the soul" to 
which he refers are not some mysterious powers, but rather the poten-
tials of the individual. 
The Task of Teaching 
Attisani directs some attention toward the educator and that 
person 1 s duties. Inasmuch as education deals with the development of 
moral and mental powers, the educator must have full knowledge of things 
in their eternal forms and of individuals in whatsoever way they appear 
(the educator is a philosopher). The work involves kindling native 
energies; it is not the filling of empty vessels. Education is in one 
sense self-education, while the activity of teaching is the stimulation 
of self-education. The educator must maintain a proper attitude: the 
students must not be considered malleable material at the educator 1 s 
whim, nor should he or she ever abandon efforts to educate them. The 
right way to educate is through an intersubjective process that the 
educator must understand and master. 28 It is education, and not individ-
ual initiative, that lifts human beings out of their undifferentiated 
efforts. That elevation is the arduous task of education, and · it 
requires the formation of good habits according to reason. Miseducation 
27Att · · 1.san1., LibertA ed educazione, p. 76. 
28Att' · L'b \ d d 76 1.san1., 1. erta e e ucazione, p. . 
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can do great harm (a principle Attisani derives from Plato), while good 
education fosters a nobility of spirit that overcomes man's natural 
coarseness. Attisani agrees with Kant that man needs to be educat.ed for 
the Good· 25 
In chapter ten of Libert~ ed educazione, Attisani arrives at a 
synthesis that explains his title. He refers his readers to a similar 
title from Ernesto . Codignola, Educazione liberatrice (Education the 
~berator), 1947. Education, says Attisani, is liberating inasmuch as 
it frees us from the forces that attach us to our particularity and deny 
our vision of that totality in which we might redeem and exalt 
ourselves. Any e~ucation that is not liberating in that sense does not 
deserve to be called education--it is training or coaching or even mis -
education. Of course, attempts at education cannot guarantee one 1 s 
liberation, but rather they promote liberation by establishL,g favorable 
conditions for that intellectual development that is really the unfold-
in& of Mind among human beings. The learner must be the author of 
self-liberation through learning, but the individual does not have the 
power to be entirely self-educated and self-liberated from egoistic 
tendencies; what is really required is an external stimulus to self-de-
velopment. (The preceding sentence summarizes Attisani's attack on the 
Deweyans.) In society there is a moral duty to educate and be educated. 
It is a corollary of Kant's moral imperative. The educator is a libera-
tor who is self-transcendent and sympathetic with others whom he or she 
29 
· Attisani, Libert~ ed educazione, p. 81. 
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cannot leave trapped in their narrow egoism. Liberation must be for 
all. 3 • 
Attisani warns that parents, too, have a duty to promote moral 
growth, as do all others in their vocations and their dealings with 
fellow human beings. Whoever acts upon others may educate, but only 
moral action produces effects that are properly educational. 
Moreover, education as liberation implies a right of each indi-
vidual to be educated, inasmuch as one cannot be educated or liberated 
without the help of others. One's right is to learn to be free, which, 
for Attisani, means to be moral. It is a right not only to be unham-
pered in pursuing this goal, but to be helped along the way. Finally, 
Attisani affirms the right of the individual to be seen as central to 
education, the moral end of education. 31 
There are several essays appended to Libert~ ed educazione that 
repeat and continue themes mentioned in the main section of the book. 
In the essay called "Liberazione dell'uomo" ("Man's Liberation"), Attis-
ani restates the work of education in purifying the individual for 
participation in superior values without losing individuality, and he 
incidentally derides Giovanni Gentile's form of idealism (actualism) as 
"the indiscriminate doings of the super-personal I. " 32 He also criti-
cizes the "active" (Deweyan) school as an institution unable to rise 
30Att · · 1san1, Libertl ed educazione, pp. 91-94. 
31Att · · J.sanJ., Libert.i ed educazione, pp. 95-98. 
32Att · · "Liberazione dell'uomo, " in Libert a ed educazione, J.sanJ., p. 
120. 
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above particular individuality to a universal and superior level of 
individuality· 
~tisani's Critique of Dewey 
In 1953, Adelchi Attisani published a book called Problemi di 
~todo attivo (Problems of the Active Method). The book discusses 
modern education and the spirit of humanism. Attisani affirms that the 
only truly humanizing education is based on historicism: "Since man is 
essentially a historical individual, all education that is not (histori-
cal) does not develop the individual. " 3 3 
While Attisani accepts the idea of learning-connected activities 
for helping the student think about subject matter, he warns that activ-
ity is not a goal in itself. Education must be active without ceasing 
to be educational. The teacher, especially, must take an active part in 
educating the students. Furthermore, educational activity should not be 
just any spontaneous activity, but a form of rational cooperation 
between teacher and students. Mere activity may lead to a deterioration 
of authority and thence to mere physical freedom, which encourages 
passivity and ignorance. Too much permissiveness, love, and forgive-
ness, he argues, may occlude the true spirituality which is the spirit 
of learning. Attisani repudiates education "made to the measure" of the 
child and advocates education "made to the measure" of supreme (moral 
and cultural) values. He makes a distinction between an "activity 
33Adelchi Attisani, Problemi di metoda attivo (Messina: A. Sessa, 
1953), p. 25. 
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school" and an "active method" of teaching, and he chooses the latter.u 
History, culture, and morality: These themes of Croce's philoso-
phY, with an admixture of material from Kant, Plato, and others, are 
evident in Attisani' s writings on education. It is not recorded what 
Croce might have known or thought of Attisani's pedagogy. Croce retired 
in 1948 and died in 1952. Attisani's last book on education appeared in 
1953. By that time, Italian education had already begun to move in 
other directions. 
Alfieri's Crocian Pedagogy 
While Attisani's most active efforts to construct a Crocian pedag-
ogy took place in the late 1940's and early 1950's, another attempt 
appeared in 1967, really too late for a thorough treatment in this 
discussion, but worth some attention. The book was Pedagogia crociana 
(Crocian Pedagogy) by Vittorio Enzo Alfieri. Although principally a 
historian of philosophy, Alfieri turned his hand to writing on education 
as a result of the student protests and general educational turmoil of 
1966-67. 
Born in Parma in 1906, Alfieri as a young man studied the works of 
Croce and became politically allied to him in 1925. Arrested twice by 
the Fascists, he was forbidden to teach because of his antifascism. 
After World War II, he returned to teaching, and in 1956 became 
professor of philosophy at the University of Pavia. Much of his 
research concerned ancient philosophy, particularly the Greeks and 
34Attisani, Problemi di metodo attivo, pp. 35-64, passim. 
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Lucretius and Epicurus. He also studied and wrote on political theories 
from the medieval to the illuminist period, esthetic theories from the 
' 
seventeeth to the nineteenth centuries, and the philosophies of Pascal 
and Fichte. 35 
Pedagogia crociana, which first appeared in turbulent times, 
attempts to delineate a theory of pedagogy in line with the spirit, if 
not the letter, of Crocian philosophy. Alfieri introduces the book 
thus: 
My book is the fruit of the experiences and meditations of a 
schoolman, tenaciously in love with the school, disappointed but not 
discouraged in the face of the present grave crisis situation: it 
is a crisis not only of the school, and not only of pedagogical 
theories, but of our society itsel£. 36 
Someone might object, with a knowing air, that a Crocian 
pedagogy does not exist. But precisely because Croce did not write 
anything about education in its theoretical aspects, what is being 
pursued here is the problem of the sense that a pedagogy might have 
within the framework of Croce's philosophical concepts. 37 
The most vital of Croce's concepts which Alfieri uses as premises 
for this book are ". . . historicism and a non-ethnological concept of 
culture. 113 8 His stated goal is to exalt "Tradition and culture: an 
inextinguishable lamp, more truly inextinguishable than that which 
according to legend shone in the tomb of Pallas." 39 
35 Dizionario dei filosofi, 1976 ed., s.v. "Alfieri, Vittorio Enzo." 
36Vittorio Enzo Alfieri, Pedagogia crociana 
Editore, 1967), p. 7. 
(Naples: Morano 
37 Alfieri, Pedagogia crociana, p. 9. 
38Alf. . 1.er1., Pedagogia crociana, p. 9. 
39Alf' . 1.er1., Pedagogia crociana, p. 10. 
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In the text of Pedagogia crociana, Alfieri first recalls Croce's 
career as an educator and delineates his sympathies for education. He 
gives Croce credit for having introduced the idea of state-administered 
examinations to allow national recognition of credentials from non-state 
schools. By proposing that mode of achieving parity, Croce made himself 
unpopular with a large number of students who did not want to take such 
examinations. That was the situation in 1920 and 1921, during Croce's 
term as Minister of Public Instruction. In advocating the recognition 
of non-state schools Croce displayed his liberalism, but above all he 
still strove to defend the state school as " ... the highest achieve-
ment of the modern state. 1140 Moreover, Croce strove to retain 
quality in the state schools, and to awaken the interest of parents and 
citizens in school affairs. 
Alfieri reviews the era of Gentile and outlines Croce's political 
activities in opposition to the Fascist line. There is mention of the 
ensuing difficulties for Croce and also for those who held to his 
ideals. In the postwar era, Alfieri contends, Crocian idealism failed 
to make an impact on the Italian schools because of pressures from the 
Communists on one side and the Catholics (through the Christian Demo-
crats) on the other. Both parties, of course, had strong ideological 
objections to Croce's philosophy, which was both non-Marxist and 
nontheological. Croce's main educational activity after the war was his 
membership in the Association for the Defense of the National School, 
40Alf' · P d · ' 33 1er1, e agog1a croc1ana, p. . 
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but his age and health restricted his work. 41 
In succeeding chapters, Alfieri apologizes for Croce's lack of 
interest in pedagogical matters, and digresses to attack American prag-
matists, Rousseauian romanticists, and the proponents of various demo-
cratic and "scientific" pedagogical creeds. He holds up historicism as 
an educational ideal, and derides mass media and popular culture for 
trying to overcome tradition and the written word. The danger that 
Alfieri warns of is a regression to "pictorial civilization. 1142 The 
school, he contends, has an ethical and historical mission; education 
designed to be useful is mere ignorance. Neither the utility-school nor 
the play-school is the answer to modern society's crisis. The counter 
to vapid and mechanistic education is humanism, and not the humanism of 
Latin and arid rules, but 11 • • • the living sense of culture in the 
continuity and variety of that development that projects from the pres-
ent toward the future. 1143 Alfieri lauds the humanism of Croce because it 
emphasizes language, which is 11 • • • the key to the understanding of 
perennial values, and not accidentally, of the humanistic and histori-
cist ideal of education. " 44 
41 Alf. . 1er1, Pedagogia crociana, pp. 38-53, passim. 
42 Alfieri, Pedagogia crociana, p. 122. 
43 Alf. . 1er1, Pedagogia crociana, p. 127. 
44 Alf · · 1er1, Pedagogia crociana, p. 139. 
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In the final chapter of Pedagogia crociana, Alfieri attacks the 
Marxist, Catholic, and Deweyan views of education. Marxism, he says, is 
the religion of economics and production, wherein individuals are subor-
dinated to an authoritarian state. Catholicism is also authoritarian 
and dogmatic, conceiving its purposes as the only admissible ones. The 
"new education," including Deweyan activism, pragmatism, and experimen-
talism, subordinates the teacher to the interests of the child and is 
indifferent to culture and tradition. Moreover, its emphasis on self-
education and independence for ignorant schoolchildren is merely absurd. 
In place of those three, Alfieri advocates the "seated" school of a 
traditional and conservative type. He dislikes modern innovations such 
as the unified high school and group learning projects. Study, he 
contends, must involve individual effort and the use of the memory as 
well as the understanding. Teachers are allowed to question students . 
. . . A useful counsel might be this one: that the teacher limits 
himself to a few important questions, perhaps only one, but such as 
to interest the class in the subject and to force the student being 
questioned to an intellectual effort that may reveal his attitudes. 
It should be understood that, in being able to judge the students by 
such a system, what is strongly required is the honesty and impar-
tiality of the teacher. 45 
Such questioning, for Alfieri, could well replace mechanistic "objec-
tive" testing. 
Pedagogia crociana closes in praise of precision and mental 
effort (Croce, after all, "adored" work). The teacher, too, learns 
through teaching clearly and precisely, employing personal effort and 
45 Alf · · P d . ' 60 ~er~, e agog~a croc~ana, p. 1 . 
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persuasiveness. In effect, the teacher persuades the student to learn 
and develop; and teaching so conceived is in the cultural tradition of 
ancient Greece, the "fatherland" of our minds. 46 
The Twilight of Historicism 
In the social and political upheavals of the late 1960's, there 
were few voices calling for a return to the classical and humanistic 
curriculum. Alfieri, although respected as a scholar, was not able to 
attract a significant following, nor did the historical idealists have 
any appreciable influence on the further course of Italian schooling. 
Another attempt to revive interest in Croce's ideas appeared in Vincenzo 
Ammendola's La concezione educativa in Benedetto Croce (The Educational 
Concept of Benedetto Croce), published in Naples by Loffredo Editore in 
1973. In it, Ammendola applies Crocian principles to particular 
concerns such as the teaching of esthetics, philosophy, history, and 
other subjects. It is an interesting effort, but provides nothing star-
tlingly new. 
Alfieri was essentially correct when he suggested that the forces 
of Marxism on one side and Catholicism on the other reduced the near-
prophetic status of Croce after World War II. A more negative judgment 
of Croce is offered by the radical historian of education, Tina Tomasi, 
when she refers to the "cultural pontificate" of Benedetto Croce that 
reached its high point during the Allied liberation in 1943 and 1944, 
and then declined under the criticism of the Marxists, who had come to 
46 Alf · · P d · · 161 163 ~er~, e agog~a croc~ana, pp. - . 
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revile Croce's essential conservatism and elitism. 47 In addition to the 
ideological issues, there were probably other factors that contributed 
to the decline of Croce's influence. Among them might be the fact that 
he did not seek political office, and the one high office that he 
accepted was his only for a short time. Another factor might be Croce's 
tendency to be a lone scholar; although well-known among the Italians, 
he did not strive to build a "school" around himself and his work. When 
he died, only a handful of scholars carried on in his tradition. In 
contrast, Croce's antagonists in the "actual idealist" school of Gentile 
were both politicians and proselytizers. 
47Tina Tomasi, La scuola italiana dalla dittatura alla repubblica 
(Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1976), pp. 27-33. 
CHAPTER IV 
ITALIAN IDEALISM: THE DISCIPLES 
OF GIOVANNI GENTILE 
The Era of Actual Idealism 
In the Italian context, as has been noted, Hegelian idealism 
developed in two forms: historical idealism and actual idealism. Both 
schools grew out of the teachings of Bertrando Spaventa, but all of 
Spaventa' s students had particular interpretations of what he (and 
Hegel) meant. From the founding of the idealist journal La critica in 
1903, it was clear that Benedetto Croce and Giovanni Gentile were to be 
prominent in the idealist movement; their leadership emerged in the next 
two decades, but the political events of 1922-1924 created a rift 
between them. Beyond that, their philosophies had developed diver-
gences: Croce, impressed by his reading of Vico, formulated historical 
idealism; Gentile, more involved in metaphysical problems, developed 
actual idealism (or simply "actualism"). 
The mature thought of Giovanni Gentile (1875-1944) appears for the 
first time in an essay, L'atto del pensiero come atto puro (The Act of 
Thinking as Pure Act), published in 1912. Gentile's philosophical 
purpose, outlined in that study, is to reform and improve upon the Hege-
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lian dialectic; early in his career, however, he saw neo-Hegelianism' s 
possible consequences for education, and in 1913 he published Sommario 
di pedagogia come scienza filosofica (Summary of Pedagogy as a Philo-
~ophical Science). 
Next to Gentile, the most important figure in the actual idealist 
movement was Giuseppe Lombardo-Radice (1879-1938). While Gentile played 
the role of theoretician, the conceptual clarifier of thought, Lombardo-
Radice was the practitioner who tried to relate philosophy to daily life 
in the school. 1 Among Lombardo-Radice's influential writings are Lezioni 
di didattica (Readings in Teaching Practice), published in 1914-1915, 
and Lezioni di pedagogia generale (Readings in General Pedagogy), from 
1916. 
Actual idealism is a complex philosophical system that is not 
quickly summarized. It is essentially a peculiar interpretation of 
Hegel. 
Gentile abhors inert thoughts and ideas, and from the Hegelian 
mind-object dichotomy he wants to synthesize a concept of thought in 
action, of thought taking place at the point of connection between 
subject and object; that synthesis of subject-object has to be an active 
process, overcoming the inert dualism of subject and object. There can 
be no meaning for merely potential thought, or for thought left 
unthought. Thought is a process of interiorization whereby man (the 
1Iclea Picco, "Il pensiero pedagogico dell' idealismo italiano," in 
Questioni di pedagogia, 3 vols., (Brescia: Editrice La Scuola, 1973), 
3:173. 
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subject) comes to know the object, to conquer it and make it his. 
Because one says "I know that. II . , the knowledge that is achieved is 
both self-knowledge and knowledge of the object. 2 
In thinking (the act of knowing or coming to know), Gentile sees 
man as the creator of his own life and world. Man's knowing is the 
process of (transcendental) Mind itself, whose nature is unity: it is a 
process that unifies feeling, perceiving, willing, and self-creation 
with the multiplicity of sensations, perceptions, volitions, and 
concepts. Mind is the center of a circle, whose points lie only in 
relation to that center. But the mind of the individual, for Gentile, 
does not create a solipsistic, egocentric world: the world that man 
conquers in his process of interiorization is not his world, but the 
world. He rediscovers science, culture, and all knowledge whatsoever, 
and reconstructs it in himself. The process of conquest and interiori-
zation is also the process of education, which is necessarily self-edu-
cation, 3 self-initiated and self-directed. Any other possibility would 
violate Gentile's concept of man and mind (or properly, Mind). 
If education is self-directed, then of what use are schools? The 
answer to that question is more clearly spelled out by Lombardo-Radice 
than by Gentile. 
2p· "Il · d ' " 3 785 1cco, pens1ero pe agog1co, : . 
3Picco, "Il pensiero pedagogico," 3:787. 
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While Lombardo-Radice generally upholds the principle of self-edu-
cation, he allows that the individual is capable of making mistakes and 
reaching his limitations. Still, the individual is capable of struggle 
against weakness and evils, and has the possibility of self-improvement. 
In the educational process, the student becomes aware of personal fail-
ings; thereby, an ideal is found that transcends the individual and 
forces realization of a fuller self. That ideal destroys the self-im-
posed limitations of narrow egoism and fosters conscientiousness and 
responsibility. The learner searches for teachers who represent or 
embody that ideal, and finds a truer self in these others.~ The truth 
attained, then, is not one's own particular truth, but a general level 
of awareness that has been reached by some already (those who teach) and 
is yet to be attained by others (those who learn). Inasmuch as all are 
in some regard between the highest and lowest levels of awareness, 
everyone is both teacher and student. 
The differences between teacher and student can be resolved in the 
process of education, which is a process of synthesis not only of 
subjects and objects, but of individual minds: a diffusion of the self 
in others and an acceptance of others' knowledge in oneself. A full and 
voluntary spiritual unity must take place in the classroom; concretely, 
this means that the teacher reviews what he has learned and is a living 
example of it, while the student, eager to transcend himself, seizes 
that example and uses it in his conquest of knowledge. This "fusion of 
4 Picco, "Il pensiero pedagogico," 3:788. 
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souls" in Lombardo-Radice's thought should be understood as a full 
application of both persons to the same problem, together in the same 
research, in an act of consensus and mutual esteem. The fusion is 
emotional as well as intellectual, not unlike the bond of love between a 
mother and her infant. In this blending, the old antinomies are 
resolved: the self versus the other; freedom versus authority; private 
thought versus universal knowledge. 5 Those are overcome; they have no 
relevance here. 
At first reading, it seems curious that such a lofty vision came 
to be associated with state Fascism. Yet despite the idealists' profes-
sions of liberty and self-direction, idealism has an authoritarian 
undertone. The 
("egocentric"), 
knowledge that man conquers is not individual 
but the knowledge of all. The process of education 
requires a fusion, a blending of wills. The transcendent, universal I 
that one must pursue is there in others as well, in their society and 
their culture (and this implies Italian culture, preferably.) That 
society and its culture are expressions of the universal I, and respect 
for it is imperative; it must be seen as the highest form of self-re-
spect. Practically, then, if a schoolboy's revered teachers are march-
ing to the tunes of Mussolini, and the schoolboy is not, he is then 
seriously out of step with his culture, his nation, his truest self-in-
terest. Gentile asserts this clearly in his doctrine of the state; it 
is another derivation from Hegel. In his last book, Genesis and Struc-
5 Picco, "Il pensiero pedagogico," 3:793. 
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~re of Society, Gentile argues that the state (meaning particularly the 
Italian state) is a unity and that it is identical with the transcenden-
tal Will. 6 It is the sum of all wills in continuous process. The state 
embodies liberty, but not in an individualistic way; rather, it embodies 
a collective and universal liberty, a freedom wherein the individual 
cooperates with the state to enact its will as his will. True freedom 
lies in perceiving one's duty and doing it, but always within the 
national and cultural context. It is the general will that matters; the 
individual acting alone is a nobody, a nothing. 
Such state-centered theory was perfectly suited to the aims of the 
Fascists. Naturally, the Fascists curried favor with the idealist 
professors, especially in the early years; some even claimed to be 
idealists themselves. But the politicians who made up Mussolini's 
entourage were not noted for their level of culture or philosophical 
erudition; they were men of action, generally of a crude sort. The 
idealist educators were useful to the Fascist cause when they attempted 
to convince Italian schoolchildren that 11 • • • Mussolini is always 
right." 7 
From the murder of socialist deputy Matteotti in 1923 to the end 
of Fascist power in 1945, the 11 actual idealists" and the Fascists had 
their differences and their reconciliations. Even the docile Gentile 
6Giovanni Gentile, Genesis and Structure of Society, tr. H. S. Harris 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1960), pp. 162-164. 
7Denis Mack Smith, "The Theory and Practice of Fascism," in Nathanael 
Green, ed., Fascism: An Anthology (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell 
Company, 1968), pp. 109-110. 
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was offended by the anti-Semitic legislation of 1938, although he subse-
quently returned to Mussolini 1 s cause. In the words of a sympathetic 
biographer, 
... the truth is that Gentile understood politics hardly at all. 
He did not see what fascism was because he did not want to see. Or 
rather, he twisted what he saw until it corresponded in some measure 
with what he wanted to see, and explained the result in terms of his 
speculative philosophy by means of a whole series of equivocations 
and ambiguities.• 
Gentile was still in the service of the Mussolini regime (the 
Nazi-supported Salo Republic) when he was murdered in the doorway of a 
Florence hotel by unknown persons on April 15, 1944. His colleague 
Lombardo-Radice had gradually fallen away from Fascism after 1923; the 
excesses of the regime led him to conclude that Fascism 1 s principles 
were actually inimical to his own.' Lombardo-Radice was able to remain 
safely in university teaching until his death in 1938. As for the 
idealists, all denounced Fascism at one time or another, before or after 
the war; some also gave up idealism, some clung to it in an apolitical 
way, and some modified it to accommodate new ideas. 
Ernesto Codignola and Idealism in Upheaval 
Of all the educators who in their formative years came under the 
influence of Gentile and Lombardo-Radice, the most visible in the post-
war era was Ernesto Codignola. This complex man stands out as a link 
.
8H. S. Harris, The Social Philosophy of Giovanni Gentile (Urbana: 
Un1versity of Illinois Press, 1960), p. 217. 
9Mario Santagata, Storia della pedagogia, 3 vols. 
Editrice Ciranna e Ferrara, 1979), 3:177-178. 
(Seregno, Milan: 
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between prewar idealism and the postwar "democratic" ideology. 
Codignola was born in Genova (Genoa) on June 23, 1885. Although 
in his youth he had planned to study medicine, he developed an interest 
in philosophy and eventually enrolled in the Faculty of Letters at Pisa 
University. There he wrote a thesis on Thomism, and received his degree 
in 1909. 
As a result of his university studies, Codignola came to identify 
himself as a nee-idealist (Hegelian) in philosophy and a Herbartian 10 in 
education. His earliest teaching position was that of instructor in the 
Royal Normal Schools for Men, in Palermo. While there, he came under 
the influence of Giovanni Gentile, a development that was to direct the 
course of his career. In 1912, Codignola published his first book, a 
book of readings for use in teacher-training schools. His second book, 
in 1917, clearly shows an idealistic bias; La riforma della cultura 
magistrale (The Reform of Teacher-Training) advocates idealistic redi-
rection in teacher-training practice. 
Between 1917 and 1919, Codignola worked on a program for educa-
tional reform intended above all to transform the normal school from a 
place of encyclopedic professional instruction into a culturally unita-
rian institution of a humanistic character, a true "teachers' lyceum-
gymnasium" having its center in the direct study of classics and, in 
particular, philosophy. 11 The transformed normal school was to be the 
10Mauro Laeng, I contemporanei (Florence: Giunti Barbera, 1979), p. 
840. 
11Dizionario dei filosofi, 1976 ed., s.v. "Codignola, Ernesto." 
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basis of school reform, producing teachers who would go into their 
fields not as practitioners of stale techniques, but as philosophers 
inspired by "living thought" (i.e., thought akin to actual idealism). 
With such a vision, Codignola returned to the prestigious Univer-
sity of Pisa in 1919, where he had obtained a teaching position in the 
Faculty of Pedagogy. There his reformist work became intense. In that 
year, he published La pedagogia rivoluzionaria (Revolutionary Pedag-
£&!), delivered a paper on teacher-training reform at a Fascist confer-
ence, and joined with Giuseppe Lombardo-Radice and others in the found-
ing of a national Fascist education group, an event documented in 1920 
in Appello per il Fascio di Educazione Nazionale (Call for the National 
Education Group). All of this activity had obvious Fascist overtones in 
the years prior to 1922, the year in which Fascism became "official." 
Political and Cultural Activities in the Fascist Era 
From 1921 to 1923, Codignola took a great interest in the proposed 
"Gentile Reform" of education and assisted Gentile in working on the 
plan. Codignola's publishing activities continued unabated. His trans-
lation of Lucien Laberthonniere's Theory of Education appeared in 1921, 
and in the following year he published a translation of Paul Monroe's A 
Brief Course in the History of Education. In 1922, Codignola became a 
professor at the Royal University of Florence, and directed the Faculty 
of Teaching there until 1936. In 1923, largely because of Gentile's 
good offices, Codignola became president of the National Organization of 
Culture, a government body aimed at a broad diffusion of literacy in 
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rural areas. Codignola also edited two journals begun in the 1922-1923 
period: Levana (a synthetic name suggesting "rising," from levata), a 
cultural and scientific journal, and La Nuova Scuola Italiana (The New 
Italian School), aimed at educators. He became editor of Civilt~ 
Hoderna in 1929; that was a bimonthly review of historical, literary, 
and philosophical criticism. In that year as well, he wrote an article 
for the Educational Yearbook of Teachers College, Columbia, entitled 
"The Philosophy Underlying the National System of Education in Italy." 
With the 1929 Concordat between the state and the Vatican, and the 
growing oppressiveness of the Fascist regime, Codignola began to lose 
faith in institutional Fascism, even though he continued to teach in a 
national university and to contribute to Fascist publications. 12 For the 
next fifteen years, Codignola remained active in teaching and publish-
ing, but rather removed from political affairs. 13 He also pursued schol-
arly research, producing a number of publications that included a trans-
lation of Hegel's Readings in the History of Philosophy (1930), works on 
the history of education (1935 and 1938), a book on Pestalozzi (1938), 
and a collection of readings on the Ligurian Jansenists (1941), a 
particularly long-standing interest of his. Another journal, La nuova 
Italia (The New Italy), appeared in the 1930's as a monthly review of 
culture, both Italian and foreign; its establishment led to the founding 
12F or example, see Ernesto Codignola, Il rinnovamento spirituale dei 
&iovani, in series, Panorami di vita fascista (Milan: A. M. Mondadori, 
1938). 
13 Laeng, I contemporanei, p. 841. 
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of a publishing house of the same name which Codignola directed long 
after World War II. It has continued to exist as a major Italian 
publishing house of educational and scientific material. 
It is difficult to assess the relationship between Codignola and 
the Fascist politicians. On the surface, he appears to have been heav-
ily involved in Fascist activities, but especially after 1929 there is 
evidence that his opinions had evolved away from Fascist government 
policies. In self-defense against postwar accusations of Fascist 
collaboration, Codignola authored a lengthy statement in 1946 entitled 
"Memoriale autobiografico" ("Autobiographical Memorandum"). In it, he 
contends that: The National Education Group of 1919-20 had nothing to 
do with what Fascism later became, and was rather concerned with assist-
ing the Gentile Reform of 1923; his early association with Fascism was a 
protest 14 against labor-unionists and "admirers of Sorel"; the Matteotti 
crime and subsequent events led Codignola away from Fascism, until in 
1933 he saw a need for civil war; Mussolini loathed Codignola's journal 
Civilt~ Moderna; although under political pressure, Codignola refused to 
include Benito Mussolini in his 1939 "Pedagogisti ed educatori," a 
volume 15 of the Enciclopedia Bibliografica e Biografica "Italiana"; he 
employed Jews under false names at La Nuova Italia and helped some to 
14Ernesto Codignola, "Memoriale 
in 50 anni di battaglie educative 
p. 182. 
autobiografico," in Ernesto Codignola 
(Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1947), 
15 In fact, Mussolini is not in that volume, but Mussolini's mother, 
Rosa Maltoni Mussolini, who was a rural teacher at one time, is 
included. See p. 277. Achille Starace, Fascist party secretary, is 
also listed as an "educator." Seep. 403. 
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escape; and he was arrested in 1944 under suspicion of having been a 
collaborator in the murder of Gentile. He includes similar incidents. 
Despite such attempts by Codignola to defend himself from the worst 
criticisms of his prewar activities, he still had far to go to preserve 
his reputation as an educational leader. 
Codignola's Postwar Activities 
The intellectual climate in Italy changed rapidly after the Second 
World War. Gentile and Lombardo-Radice were dead, and the Fascists were 
no longer in power; those whom the Fascists had suppressed, Marxists and 
Jews and various dissidents, were free to speak again; and the Americans 
had sent a Deweyan progressive, Colonel Carleton W. Washburne, to help 
rebuild Italy's national school system. 
In spite of those upheavals, Ernesto Codignola's career continued. 
The Allied liberation had occurred in time_ to save him from growing 
mistrust and harassment by the Fascist authorities. He no longer 
directed the Faculty of Teaching at the University of Florence, but his 
position as professor was secure. There, in the relative freedom of the 
postwar years, Codignola was able to assemble a coterie of avid students 
and admiring young faculty members who formed the nucleus of the "School 
of Florence." Not one of them professed actual idealism; in fact, all 
of them to one degree or another came under the influence of Deweyan 
ideas. Codignola himself showed enthusiasm for the educational prac-
tices of the Deweyans, and took issue only with the more philosophical 
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aspects of Dewey's work, those tied to the principles of pragmatism. 16 
The practical, applied aspects of Deweyanism were dubbed "activism" by 
the Florentine scholars, 17 and that activism made impressions on many 
postwar Italian educators, not only in Florence, but in other university 
centers such as Rome, Padua, and Turin. It was disseminated by univer-
sity teaching, and also by numerous publications, many of which emanated 
from the presses of La Nuova Italia Editrice in Florence. 
In 1946 Codignola published his two most important postwar works 
on educational theory: Le "scuole nuove" e i loro problemi (The "New 
Schools" and Their Concerns) and Educazione liberatrice (Education the 
Liberator). In the following year, he published another volume of his 
material on Jansenism, a book called Illuministi, giansenisti e giaco-
bini nell' Italia del '700 (Illuminists, Jansenists, and Jacobins in 
Eighteenth-Century Italy). Then began some rather interesting transla-
tion-work. 
One of Codignola's outstanding colleagues in Florence was Lamberto 
Borghi (b. 1907), a young scholar who had spent the war years in America 
and had earned a Ph.D. under the guidance of Horace Meyer Kallen at New 
York's New School for Social Research. Borghi returned to Florence in 
1947 and taught history and philosophy in the high schools before becom-
ing a professor at the city's university in 1949. Together, Codignola 
16 Laeng, I contemporanei, p. 842. 
17 The activist movement was 
of Florence and its offshoots. 
of this study. 
actually more extensive than the School 
For further discussion, see Chapter VI 
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and Borghi translated Dewey's School and Society, which was published by 
La Nueva Italia in 1949. In that same year, Codignola's translation of 
Experience and Education also appeared. Borghi again worked with 
Codignola in the translation of Washburne's Winnetka's Schools, 
published in 1952. 18 
Another of Codignola's notable publishing efforts was the founding 
of the educational journal Scuola e citt~ (School and City) in the post-
war years. Produced on the presses of La Nueva Italia, it achieved wide 
circulation among Italian educators in the 1950's and continues to be a 
major voice for democratic and scientific approaches to education. 
In keeping with the spirit of the postwar era, Codignola was 
active in international organizations that advocated progressive or 
scientific educational practice. Chief among these was the New Educa-
tion Fellowship (N.E.F.), which originated in 1921 and had been looked 
on with interest by Codignola and Lombardo-Radice from its inception; 
during the Mussolini years, however, Italian participation in the N.E.F. 
was limited. 19 By 1945, Codignola had established contacts with Carleton 
Washburne and with the Swiss educator Adolphe Ferri~re (1879-1960), one 
of the founders of the N .E .F. Desiring to know still more of the 
progressive educators, Codignola re-joined the N.E.F. and through it 
established contacts with J. A. Lauwerys, Clare Soper, A. S. Neill, 
18 For further discussion of Borghi and his accomplishments, see Chap-
ter VI of this study. 
19Raffaele Laporta, "L' educazione nueva nel secondo dopoguerra," 
!_rnesto Codignola in 50 anni di battaglie educative (Florence: La 
Nuova Italia, 1967), p. 160. 
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Decroly's followers in Belgium, Kilpatrick and his heirs in the U.S.A., 
and other eminent educators of that period. 20 Soper provided Codignola 
with N.E.F. documents that he translated and later published through La 
Nuova Italia. In 1946, Washburne was in Italy as head of the U.S.I.S. 
office in Milan. At that time, he and Codignola discussed the formation 
of a N.E.F. branch in Italy; the result was the Florentine section of 
the N.E.F., which was inaugurated on May 2, 1947, with Professor and 
Mrs. Codignola in charge. Subsequently, an all-Italian section was 
formed in 1949, and Codignola naturally became its first president. The 
stated goals of the Italian section of the N.E.F. were 
.. to promote democracy, human dignity, peace and international 
cooperation; to promote freedom from myths and ideologies; and to 
oppose authoritarianism and the privilege that prevents human devel-
opment.21 
The membership included such younger men as Borghi, Aldo Visalberghi, 
and Francesco De Bartolomeis, who was Codignola's last protege. Codig-
nola presided over the Italian N.E.F. even through a period of financial 
and organizational difficulties 22 in the late 1950's, but in 1962, old 
and ailing, he passed the presidency to Riccardo Bauer. 
Two other educational organizations in which Codignola was active 
in the postwar years were the F. I. C. E. (Fed6ration Internationale des 
Communaut~es d'Enfants) and the S.E.P.E.G. (Semaines Internationales des 
20Laporta, "L'educazione nuova," p. 161. 
21 Laporta, "L'educazione nuova," p. 165. 
22L "L' d · " 173 175 h aporta, e ucaz1.one nuova, pp. - . Laporta recounts t e 
important N.E.F. meeting held in Rome in 1956, notable for the presence 
of Harold 0. Rugg. 
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Etudes pour l'Enfance Victime de la Guerre). F.I.C.E. shared a number 
of directors with the N.E.F., and its meeting in Florence in 1950 was 
attended by many N.E.F. members. 23 The S.E.P.E.G. was limited in scope 
to discussing social, medical, and educational problems in war-ravaged 
countries; it enjoyed support from UNESCO. Several of its meetings were 
held in Italy, but its activities there ceased in 1951. 24 
By far the most significant and socially redemptive of Codignola's 
postwar activities was the establishment of a model school, the Scuola-
Citt~ Pestalozzi (Pestalozzi School-City) of Florence. Established 
partly at the urging of Mrs. Codignola (Anna Maria Codignola, herself an 
articulate and thoughtful woman), it opened in 1944, shortly after the 
Allied liberation of Florence. Its original purpose was to provide 
living quarters and education for some of the homeless and destitute 
children who roamed the city at the end of the war. Within a few years, 
it evolved into one of the few showplaces of innovative education in 
Italy. 
Codignola found quarters for his school in central Florence, near 
the Arne River and the National Library in the Santa Croce district. He 
obtained financial support from the Giulio Gori Foundation and set up a 
governing board that also received financial contributions from its own 
members and other individuals as well as from national and communal 
23 Laporta, 11L' educazione nuova, 11 p. 16 7. 
24 G· . p 1" . 11 Il . d . d "1 1 45 II 1org1o ag 1azz1, rJ.nnovamento e ucat1vo opo 1 9 , 
Ernesto Codignola in 50 anni di battaglie educative (Florence: 
Nueva Italia, 1967), p. 156. 
in 
La 
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organizations. The governing body included representatives of the 
American Friends Service Committee of Rome; the Boys' Club of Utica, New 
York; the American Youth for World Youth, New York; and distinguished 
educators such as Carleton Washburne and William Heard Kilpatrick. 25 
From the earliest years of Scuola-Citt~ Pestalozzi, CodignoJ.a saw .f.t as 
more than a charitable institution for war orphans. It had the possi-
bility of becoming , a laboratory for innovative education,. a weapon 
against wh&:t Codignola bad come to see as n ••• the verbaHsm, the 
encyclopedism, the lack of real experiences ·tr in the Italian 
school. 21 In a letter to Laporta, his successor at Scuola-CittA, Codig-
nola wrote: 
It is necessary to liberate the school from programs of mere 
conformity-to-the-letter, so levelling and depressing, and to take 
greatest care to keep that conformity from polluting and vitiating 
the autonomy that we have achieved with so much tenacity--an auton-
omy that alone can justify, in our view, the experimental and exem-
plary function assigned to our school from its beginning.~ 7 
Codignola indicted the traditional school for not preparing its 
students to face and resolve the host of problems they would encounter--
for being, that is, a mere transmitter of 
abstract encyclopedic notions, uninteresting and without savor, that 
fail to engage the personality and leave the mind and will inert 
because they do not touch the sources of creativity, or intellectual 
appetite, or emotion. 21 
25Ernesto and Anna Maria Codignola, La Scuola-CittA Pestalozzi 
(Florence: La Nuova ltalia Editrice, 1962), pp. 267-274. 
26Pagliazzi, "Il rinnovamento educativo," p. 150. 
27 \ E. and A. M. Codignola, La Scuola-Citta Pestalozzi, p. xii. 
28Ernesto Codignola, Educazione liberatrice (Florence: La Nuova 
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In his writings of the period, Codignola contends that attempts to 
remedy the deficiencies of Italian education were halfhearted or absent. 
Education must come out of its academic cloister, he urges, and center 
itself on the "vital interests" of the student, helping the student to 
take possession of inner forces and to apply self-discipline in all 
activities. The student must be enabled to define and solve problems of 
immediate interest. The result of such a change could be the transfer-
mation of the school and ultimately of the entire country. 29 
Codignola asserts that his experiment was born out of his concerns 
for the lives of the young. The children at Scuola-Citt.i Pestalozzi 
were faced with life-like responsibilities and practical problems from 
the beginning. Boys and girls from six to fourteen years of age were 
called to take on all of the tasks of a living community, from cleaning, 
kitchen work, and repairs to civic administration and disciplinary 
justice. In the democratic spirit, the school annually elected a 
"mayor" and various officials. Teachers were enjoined not to speak from 
the podium, but to present problems for the students to solve; and if 
mistakes occurred, the children were to see and feel the natural conse-
quences. Discipline, a requirement for an orderly community, was 
demanded by the children, who also helped to administer it. 30 According 
Italia Editrice, 1947), pp. 261-262. 
29 Codignola, Educazione liberatrice, p. 263. The rhetoric in these 
pages bears the stamp of John Dewey. 
30 In this regard, compare the experiences of A. S. Neill and A. S. 
Makarenko. 
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to Codignola, the most difficult newcomers learned to respect order in a 
few months. 
Teaching at Scuola-Citt~ was intended to grow out of practical 
situations. For example, the children were not "taught to write": they 
learned to express themselves orally and then in written form through 
their debates, correspondence, theater productions, and through being 
required to express themselves well in their civic roles. They did not 
need to be coerced to perform tasks; group morale was high and exclusion 
from work was a disappointment. It was in community life that Scuola-
Citta students attained both knowledge and morality; and Codignola saw 
that community neither as a charming microcosm nor as a training-ground 
for future life, but as authentic social life" ... in all the fullness 
of its meaning." 31 
The social and educational experiment of Scuola-CittA Pestalozzi 
did not go unnoticed outside of Italy. In 1952 and 1953, the school was 
studied by a group from Harvard University that left believing in the 
positive results of the experiment. 32 More personal and revelatory is 
the text of a letter from Carletone Washburne to Codignola, dated June 
25, 1947. It reads in part: 
I have visited many schools in most parts of the world and, as 
you know, I was head of the public schools in Winnetka, Illinois, 
for a quarter of a century. Thus, I recognize a good school as soon 
as I see it. Therefore, I would say that Scuola-CittA Pestalozzi is 
among the best worldwide. In my visits to the school I have 
observed the kind of spirit and atmosphere that represent the best 
31 Codignola, Educazione liberatrice, p. 266. 
32 E. and A. M. Codignola, La Scuola-Citt~ Pestalozzi, p. 20. 
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practice of modern education. I have observed the creative work of 
the students and the cooperative work of the children in the labora-
tory and in the garden and in taking the responsibility for the good 
functioning of the entire school. The children's writings and orig-
inal compositions were truly excellent. It is the kind of school 
that prepares citizens for a better tomorrow. 
You are one of the rare persons who not only thinks and writes 
about education as a scholar of school problems, but you also demon-
strate the ability to put theory into practice. 33 
Codignola retired from his general directorship of Scuola-Citt~ 
Pestalozzi in 1958 and left the office to Professor Laporta. Eventu-
ally, the school was integrated into the Italian state system of 
schools, although it continued to be a focus of interest for the Floren-
tine professors and retained its essential character. Ernesto Codignola 
died on September 28, 1965. 
Codignola Between Idealism and Deweyanism 
Ernesto Codignola's intellectual origins were in idealism, and his 
thought never evolved away from its beginnings. While his positions on 
certain issues changed in time, there is no evidence that his inner 
vision altered appreciably. Nevertheless, in the postwar decades he 
developed a considerable interest in the educational activities of the 
Deweyans, and this professional interest is well-documented. 
33 
Codignola, Educazione liberatrice, pp. 304-305. 
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~ Idealist's Viewpoint 
Codignola' s 1938 Avviamento a11o studio de1la pedagogia, a book 
that was reprinted several times after the war, provides an example of 
his view of education: 
To educate means to unite with one's disciples in the ideal life. 
In this most profound area of self-awareness one must discover 
the point at which men unite with one another, understand one 
another, and function in solidarity. 
Thus we explain the irresistible attraction that has always been 
exerted upon others by those who derive inspiration through their 
working toward this most profound consciousness of their brotherhood 
with all creatures. It is the attraction of Socrates, of Saint 
Francis, of Pestalozzi, of the martyrs of the faith, of the great 
and humble heroes of the moral life. Heroism, affirms Bergson in a 
book in which this most profound zone of humanity is analyzed with 
much refinement, " ... does not preach; it is enough that it shows 
itself, and its presence alone will be able to move other men." The 
saints ask for nothing, and yet they receive spontaneously. Morally 
creative minds constitute, above the human city, ". . . a divine 
city, which they invite us to enter. We may not hear their voices 
clearly, but the call has gone out; something responds to it from 
the depths of our souls. From the real society to which we belong, 
they transport us in thought to the ideal city." 
The teachers who are truly masters (the excellent ones have 
always been .few), even the very humble ones, belong to this family 
of minds. Whoever does not know how, at least in the most felici-
tous moments of his teaching, to "transport" his students "by 
thought into the ideal society," does not educate. Insofar as he is 
an individual closed in his egoism and in the pettiness of his 
mundane interests, he cannot speak to others, and especially not to 
children, because he will not be listened to. The teacher is 
followed only when in his teaching, in whatever way, he personifies 
the universality of the spirit of knowledge and truth, and in that 
most truly ethical environment (he personifies) a superior law, the 
law of custom and of the state, and, at a still more profound level, 
the moral and divine law, that which has appeared concretely, 
revealing and defining itself in those of the highest mind (relig-
ious prophets, heroes, poets, and thinkers.) 
To educate means to unite with one's own disciples in the ideal 
kingdom of trut~, and to speak a universal language that all under-
stand or in which they at least glimpse the liberating signifi-
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cance.
34 
While a passage such as the one just quoted is a good example of 
the Italian idealists' style of philosophy, its hyperbolic and poetic 
language make it less than immediately clear to those trained in Anglo-
American philosophical thought. It is the grand style of continental 
European philosophy, against which the Vienna Circle and the British 
analysts revolted. A term such as "the ideal life," for example, has no 
experiential referent, and tends to fall into the analysts' category of 
"unintelligible" statements. 3 5 The passage, however obscure, is not 
exactly meaningless: it is full of figures of speech and allusions that 
signify something that the reader, unaccustomed to this style of philos-
ophy, must try to decipher. 
Codignola defines the verb "to educate" as meaning "to unite." 
While it may seem strange to think of "educating" as "uniting," it is 
not surprising that Codignola defines it in this way. As an idealist, 
he abhorred dichotomies and dualisms of all sorts. An idea, being suit-
ably general and removed from what the idealists contemptfully called 
"particularity," has that power to unite. In fact, idealism's enemies 
contended that its tendency to include dissimilar things in a uniting 
whole led to losing all distinctions in a "night in which all cows are 
34 Ernesto Codignola, Avviamento allo studio della pedagogia (Flor-
ence: La Nuova Italia Editrice, 1938), pp.lS-17; 41-43. The quotations 
in the third paragraph are from Bergson's The Two Sources of Morality 
and Religion. 
35 For further discussion of this issue, see A. J. Ayer, Language, 
Truth, and Logic (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1946), p. 14 et 
passim. 
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black." The idealists answered that Mind (the ultimate reality) also 
differentiates itself in specific "determinations," and such determina-
tions occur in the course of human history. Education then, is one of 
those determinations of Mind; and as Mind unites, education also unites. 
Others might observe that there is a circularity in this reasoning, but 
the idealists did not object to circles. In education, the teacher 
unites with the students in "the ideal life." The word that Codignola 
1 f II t d t tl • 11d • • 1 tl • t 1 1 f 11 uses in p ace o s u en s 1s 1sc1p es ; 1 suggests oya o ewers 
of a great teacher or master who provides a wisdom or a set of values to 
which the disciples also subscribe. The imagery is religious. While 
not many schoolteachers would call their students "disciples," it was a 
goal of idealist educators to make the young their disciples, at least 
in cultural matters. The "ideal life," as Codignola will elaborate it, 
is really the cultural life at its highest moments. 
Codignola next calls education a "profound area of self-
awareness." "Profound" is a word that appears often in idealist writ-
ings; this metaphor of "depth" suggests a going beneath the surface 
appearances of things to discover what they are at base: one seeks the 
grounds on which they stand or the sources from which they spring. The 
educator must be profound in "self-awareness," the self- knowledge that 
allows him to understand his role in the life of culture. Only then can 
the educator "discover the point" at which the students may be brought 
into that ideal life, the point at which unity is possible. The unity 
to be discovered is one in which " men .. . understand one another," and 
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work together. Here Codignola allows a suggestion that clarifies the 
nature of the unity that is proposed as desirable. Certainly, persons 
do not become homogenized in some mysterious way: Codignola's own life 
and teaching testify against that misunderstanding of "unity." Rather, 
when individuals understand one another and function in sympathetic 
solidarity, that ideal unity begins to be realized. 
Codignola extols the "attraction" of great teachers, the "great 
and humble" (a deliberately ambiguous phrase) who are heroes of the 
"moral life." That last observation should remind the reader that for 
Codignola, education is a supremely moral activity; from the metaphy-
sics of Mind, Codignola and the other idealists quickly derive a theory 
of morals in which the Good is necessarily attuned to the manifest 
unfolding of universal will in history and culture. Those souls whom 
Codignola admires are the "morally creative," meaning not "inventive of 
morals," but showing creative force in their participation in the moral 
enterprise; "creatively moral," although an inexact translation, carries 
this sense. Included with such persons are the heroes and saints whom 
Codignola values not for their theology but for their morality; they 
constitute a community of minds that is, for him, a superior realm. 
Drawing on St. Augustine via Bergson, Codignola refers to the civitas 
~. the divine city; only here, it is not a realm of sanctified souls, 
but of exalted minds. The saints of this new religion have availed 
themselves of the knowledge of the ages, and they call others (their 
disciples) to join them "in thought," forming an ideal city of the mind 
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where all are united by a common appreciation of the significance of 
culture. Their correct understanding of culture, one presumes, may be 
aided by the writings of the idealist prophets. 
Codignola writes about great teachers, which he admits have been 
few in number; Pestalozzi is evidently one of the elect, as indicated 
here and in other texts. Such teachers, Codignola suggests, belong in 
the company of saints and sages. Their effect is to "transport" their 
students into the ideal society by means of thought. Inasmuch as the 
ideal city really exists only among minds (and in Mind itself), it is 
appropriate that thought is the vehicle for reaching it. The teacher is 
a pilot/guide who directs this vehicle, because he or she has visited 
the ideal city and knows the way; but there is no guarantee that the 
vehicle will arrive, except in the "most felicitous moments" of teach-
ing. Codignola lived in the age of the airship, and he might well have 
imagined a great zeppelin floating off toward the ideal city. Unfortu-
nately, zeppelins were full of unstable gas and sometimes exploded, 
crashing to the ground with disastrous results. When the journey is not 
successfully accomplished, Codignola believes that true education has 
not taken place. He thinks it essential for the student to reach that 
golden realm where great problems are solved and great understandings 
pervade, and to glimpse it for himself or herself. 
The obstacles to the teacher's achievement, Codignola suggests, 
are egoism and petty and mundane interests. He believes that the young 
can discern the shallow egoist from the teacher who comprehends truth 
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and universality. For the idealists, universality is the antithesis of 
individuality, and a persistent individuality is inimical t~ unity. 
Thus, the true teacher in this passage is the unifier who is devoted to 
the universal "spirit of knowledge and truth" and personifies it in his 
or her teaching through the pursuit of ethical and cultural ideals, 
which are unifying forces. Such a teacher is able to create an "ethical 
environment" that embodies a "superior law"--superior, that is, to ordi-
nary and particular laws. That superior law manifests itself in custom 
(which is an ethical matter because it is the basis of culture); in the 
state (because it is the highest concretization of Mind in history, as 
Hegel teaches); and at a deeper level, in the "moral and divine" law 
that is revealed through the builders of culture--the religious proph-
ets, heroes, poets, and thinkers. Codignola might have named other 
groups, but here he is trying to be evocative rather than precise. 
The passage closes by restating Codignola' s definition of educa-
tion, as though it were now demonstrated, and to which he adds the 
requirement that education must "speak a universal language that all 
understand." (If a language is universal, all must understand it; this 
is another example of idealist circularity.) The "universal language" 
is said to have a "liberating significance," but "liberating" in what 
sense? To be "liberated" in the idealist lexicon means to be free from 
vexatious particularities, and to be able to deal with universals; thus 
the "universal language" is also a language of universals, and another 
fortunate ambiguity is introduced. Mixing his metaphor somewhat, Codig-
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nola ends by saying that the hearers of the universal language must 
"glimpse" its liberating significance, which is in any case its univer-
sality. 
The Approach to Activism 
Between 1946 and 1948, Ernesto Codignola published a dozen schol-
arly books, most of which are translations and historical studies. 
Although all of them express particular interests of their author, only 
two contain substantial discussions of contemporary educational theory: 
Le "scuole nuove" e i loro problemi (The "New Schools" and Their 
Concerns), 1946; and Educazione Liberatrice (Education the Liberator), 
1946-47. In these works, and in introductions and comments in other 
books, Italian scholars have noted a shift in Codignola's thought away 
from the canons of Gentile's actual idealism and toward a partial accep-
tance of Deweyan progressivism. Codignola is both interesting and 
crucial as a postwar educator because he never moved completely from one 
philosophy to the other; that fact, along with his visibility and 
personal charisma, establishes him as the most important transitional 
figure between prewar idealism and the "Americanized" ideology of the 
postwar era. In the words of Professor De Bartolomeis, Codignola in the 
last twenty years of his life was "between idealism and (Deweyan) activ-
ism. " 3 6 
36Francesco De Bartolomeis, "Fra idealismo e 
Q9dignola in 50 anni di battaglie educative 
Italia, 1967), pp. 146-147. 
attivismo," 
(Florence: 
in Ernesto 
La Nuova 
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De Bartolomeis, in his brief retrospective article, observes that 
for Godignola 
. . . there was no passage from idealism to activism if by 
"passage" one means a radical turn as a means of escape from a trou-
blesome crisis in the system in which he had believed up to that 
time. Rather, we should speak of an encounter. 37 
Yet the term "encounter" does not clearly explain what happened to 
Codignola 1 s philosophy and pedagogy to cause him to arrive at such a 
singular position, the position between idealism and activism. Franco 
Camhi, another scholar, points out that Godignola ended up "close to 
. " b t G b" k " pragmat1sm ; u am 1 spea s . of proximity rather than membership 
since Godignola 1 s philosophical bias remained idealistic, even though he 
passed from an actualistic creed to critical historicism. " 38 That 
sentence suggests the tortuous pathway that Codignola took. 
As his postwar writings indicate, Codignola retained a basic view-
point of Hegelian idealism. He had failed to succumb entirely to 
Gentile 1 s rhetoric of the "pure act" as the expression of Mind in 
history because he saw the excesses and contradictions countenanced by 
that rhetoric in the defense of later (post-1929) Fascism. Perhaps as a 
result of his early studies of Kant and Rousseau, or because of his 
admiration for the Jansenists, Codignola valued the individual and his 
right to dissent. 3 9 In Hegelianism there is always a strong belief in 
37De Bartolomeis, "Fra idealismo e attivismo," p. 146. 
38Franco Cambi, La "scuola di Firenze" (Naples: Liguori Editore, 
1982)' p. 25. 
39 . Camb1, La "scuola di Firenze", pp. 18-21. 
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the role of history as the final judge; thus Codignola, disturbed by the 
misdeeds of the Fascists, could save his faith by "historicizing" the 
actualist movement. Without accepting the highly idiosyncratic histori-
cist system of Croce, Codignola could nevertheless accept actualism and 
the Fascist movement as a "moment" in the historical process--in fact, 
as a reaction against positivism and the feeble democracy of the Giol-
itti period, yet destined to alter through its own weaknesses and to 
yield to a more democratic idealism introduced, if necessary, by civil 
or international war. 
In the grander scheme, the democratization that Codignola foresaw 
did not necessitate a move away from Hegelianism or a move to accept a 
foreign philosophy (for example, pragmatism). The remedy for actual-
ism's faults could also be seen as a "moment" in the historical process, 
and what the Americans brought may have been a means of furthering that 
process. Thus, the Deweyan approach to education could be accepted not 
as an end in itself, but as an instrumentality in the realization of a 
cultural ideal. Such a construction of historical events was not 
entirely original; it had been suggested in the 1930's by Lombardo-Rad-
ice and Gino Ferretti. 40 By revising his philosophy to this historico-
critical form, Codignola could retain idealism while allowing new polit-
ical or pedagogical methods to play their roles in realizing the 
historical, cultural ideals. Theory was one issue and methodology 
another; they were not, as Gentile had insisted, identical. 
40c b' 1 " 1 d' F' " 19 am 1, a scuo a 1 1renze , p. . 
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There is another element in Codignola's halfway approach to prag-
matism, and that is his attitude toward science. While pragmatists 
intended to place philosophy on a level equal to the sciences, idealists 
always claimed to be above science and assumed the right of validating, 
if not actually rejecting, science. That claim of the idealists seemed 
reasonable to Codignola because he had been conditioned into a pre-sci-
entific mentality, in a society that ". . . was always reluctant to 
allow scientific elements in pedagogy. 1141 The culture with which he 
identified resisted beliefs in the advantages of science and industrial-
ization. "In other words, certain basic conditions, certain points of 
reference were lacking." 42 
While Codignola may have lacked a measure of appreciation for 
science, relegating its role to that of another instrumentality, he 
nevertheless contributed much to the "Italian road to activism" in terms 
of an ever-increasing respect for the individual. He came to believe in 
the worth of the individual as a value that eludes and surpasses the 
classifications and generalizations of science. For Codignola, the 
worth of the individual became the ultimate "religious" issue (religious 
in a modern and laic sense), and that emphasis may be seen to contrast 
strongly with the Gentilians' tendency to absorb the individual into the 
universal. 43 Codignola as a teacher was always interested in his 
4lne Bartolomeis, "Fra idealismo e attivismo, II p. 146. 
42De Bartolomeis, "Fra idealismo e attivismo, II 146. p. 
43De Bartolomeis, "Fra idealismo e attivismo, II 147. p. 
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students' points of view, always willing to discuss and debate 
alternatives. That openness, more than any ideological conversion, 
allowed him to be the mentor of the "School of Florence," the center of 
new pedagogical ideas in Italy during the postwar years. 
Codignola's Postwar Publications 
Scholars who point out the post-World War II change in Ernesto 
Codignola's thought have cited his early postwar book, Educazione liber-
atrice (Education the Liberator), 1946-47, for evidence of that change. 
In fact, the change was not a sudden postwar development but a matter of 
evolution, and that very book proves the "sudden shift" proposal an 
oversimplification. Educazione liberatrice is not a monograph but a 
collection of essays, chapters, journal articles, and miscellaneous 
documents from a twenty-year period, 1927 to 1947. Of course, the 
contents were carefully selected by Codignola, and the book was issued 
by his own publishing company, La Nueva Italia; therefore a deliberate 
consistency is present. 
Educazione liberatrice opens with an essay from a 1938 volume, La 
formazione spirituale dei giovani (The Spiritual Development of Youth). 
The essay's title proclaims "The First Duty: To Be Oneself." In it, 
Codignola asserts the historicist position: 
Man is what he makes himself and he is nothing other than this 
self-making. By nature we are nothing: our personality coincides 
with our history. 44 
44 Ernesto Codignola, Educazione liberatrice 
Italia Editrice, 1947), p. 5. 
(Florence: La Nueva 
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Yet, the author argues, this self-making cannot be purely egocen-
tric. It is puerile to dream of being free of all laws and 
restrictions. The milieu of history demands a recognition of the lives 
of others, for, as a good Hegelian understands, antitheses are comple-
mentary. 
I and not-I, liberty and law, subject and object are complementary 
terms. Only by an abstraction can we sever them and contemplate 
them in isolation. Whoever destroys one of the two terms destroys 
or at least attempts to destroy life in its actuality. 45 
The life of originality and freedom is arduously conquered by 
self-discipline and renunciation, but the process, Codignola argues, 
must be spontaneous. The duty of the teacher is not to submit the 
student to a dead law, for that leads to sterility; rather, one must 
promote the student's liberation and sense of intrinsic authority. Like 
Lombardo-Radice, Codignola insists that the teacher must personify a 
certain order of the mind and spirit; but he adds that when the teacher 
values only the order created by the students' subordination, " 
teaching ceases to be an intrinsically liberating force and becomes the 
most oppressive and odious of tyrannies." 46 What is most essential is to 
inculcate students' self-affirmation and faith in their own life 
missions: "Only the iron intransigence of faith has left deep furrows 
in the history of man." 47 Moreover, that faith must be tolerant, so that 
young people, while having sound pride in themselves and their tasks, 
45 Codignola, Educazione liberatrice, p.6. 
46 Codignola, Educazione liberatrice, p. 9. 
47 Codignola, Educazione liberatrice, p. 10. 
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may also respect the projects of others: 
The sane man is not only proud of himself, of his own act~ons, but 
he always participates in the more elevated and sublime pride of 
being an active and aware member of a higher community that tran-
scends him while validating and enriching him, and in which he 
enjoys feeling almost fused in mystical unity. 48 
In a few pages, that opening essay exposes the major themes of the 
book: liberty and authority, the individual and society, the role of 
the teacher. 
The second chapter, an article from a 1927 journal, is an evalua-
tion of methods of teaching the very young. Here Codignola highlights 
the problem of translating the personality of a great teacher (e.g., 
Pestalozzi) into a method that can be followed by others who are not 
great teachers. He criticizes the "mechanical" nature of Montessori's 
method and ends with praise for the kindergartens of the Agazzi sisters. 
In the chapters that follow, there is another discussion of 
interior discipline (1940); an essay on the duty of the school to seek 
truth and rationality (1934); a statement on political conquest as an 
anachronism (1945); a surprisingly contemporary (and sympathetic) essay 
on women's emancipation (1945); and an appreciation of Benedetto Croce 
as a teacher and inspirer of resistance to inhumane ideals and attitudes 
(1945). 
In a brief essay on the rights of youth ("Diritto di giovani," 
1945), Codignola restates his idealistic position on education as self-
conquest, a spiritual unity that youth 
48
codignola, Educazione liberatrice, p. 11. 
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. . . must achieve with their powers as intelligent collaborators 
with their teachers, and not as passive slaves. Education, as an 
institution, is this intimate and unbreakable collaboration of 
teacher and student. 49 
In that passage, the words that Codignola uses for "teacher and student" 
may be interpreted also as "master and disciple," giving the concept a 
suggested religious tone. 
Codignola closes the first section of Educazione liberatrice with 
another article from 1945, "Faith in Ourselves." It is one more effort 
on the theme of freedom and discipline. He suggests that the best 
educated have learned a respect for order, precision, and seriousness; 
but discipline and order must remain at the service of freedom. As ends 
in themselves, they become execrable instruments of oppression. The 
teacher who expects obedience must come to deserve it by performing 
appropriate duties well and by being true to sound values. Even the 
youngest students, Codignola contends, notice and respond to the charac-
ter strengths of their teachers. "In plain words, the student must not 
be forced to obey me because of the simple fact that I sit in the teach-
er's chair." 50 
To strengthen his concept of discipline, Codignola defends a 
rather Deweyan idea of learning: 
The process of learning does not really consist of passively bending 
one's knees before the idol of objectivity, of absorbing others' 
solutions of problems, even though they may be the ones with the 
most advanced minds .... It consists of the solution of one's own 
49Codignola, Educazione liberatrice, p. 109. 
5
°Codignola, Educazione liberatrice, p. 113. 
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concrete problems. 51 
The school that disallows spontaneous problem solving, Codignola 
insists, takes the joy out of learning and turns the students into 
machines; they then become". mediocrities, chatterboxes, know-it-
alls, swell-heads. . . . " 52 Spontaneity, the expression of curiosity, 
and the natural appetite for knowledge are the conditions for liberty, 
and authority within that liberty, for 
. . . the only liberty worthy of a reasonable being is spontaneous 
subordination to the order that one identifies as his own knowledge 
and reason .... 53 
The second section of Educazione liberatrice consists of essays on 
specific problems of teaching and school policy. The third section 
contains descriptive material on educational innovations and closes with 
a chapter on Scuola-Citta Pestalozzi and the previously-quoted letter 
from Carleton Washburne. 
Another important work, Le "scuole nuove" e i loro problemi (The 
"New Schools" and Their Concerns) appeared in 1946. The title is 
misleading to English -speaking readers: the term problemi does not 
translate as "problems" in the sense of "difficulties"; rather, it is 
used in a Kantian sense, referring to matters that educators define and 
approach through systematic thought; an easier way to express that idea 
may be through such words as "concerns" or "· If J.ssues. 
51Codignola, Educazione liberatrice, p. 114. 
52Codignola, Educazione liberatrice, p. 115. 
53 Codignola, Educazione liberatrice, p. 115. 
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Codignola states his intention to testify about exceptional educa-
tors and to 1 ink each one " . intimately with the historical tradi-
tions of the country in which he was born and flourished." 54 That state-
ment, of course, shows no diminution of Codignola's historico-cultural 
idealism. In that cultural framework, the work of foreign educators is 
suggestive and illuminating, but also essentially nontransferrable to 
other contexts. They are presented for inspiration, to encourage the 
teachers who feel the "profound discomfort" within the Italian elemen-
tary school. 55 
Codignola begins an essay on educational pioneers by invoking 
Rousseau, Pestalozzi, and Froebel as the great pedagogical thinkers of 
the nineteenth century, whose ideas were later eclipsed by the more 
mechanistic theories of Herbart. Herbart, Codignola suggests, was an 
inspirer of both the positivists and the "sociological" educators, but 
positivism had the earlier prominence. Only at the end of the nine-
teenth century did humanistic subjectivism reappear and prepare the way 
for a new movement in the twentieth century. What follows this intra-
duction is an essentially expository account of the educators whom 
Codignola regards as significant. 
The author begins by mentioning the English "new schools" and the 
work of British educators Cecil Reddie and Haden Badley. From there 56 
54Ernesto Codignola, Le "scuole nuove" e i loro problemi (Florence: 
La Nueva Italia Editrice, 1946; revised edition, 1962), p. 3. 
55Codignola, Le "scuole nuove", p. 4. 
56Codignola, Le "scuole nuove", pp. 8-11. 
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he turns to the continental Europeans and discusses the contributions of 
Edmond Desmolins (French, 1852-1907), Hermann Lietz (German, 1868-1919), 
Georg Kerschensteiner (German, 1854-1932), Roger Cousinet (French, 
1881-1973), and Celestin Freinet (Swiss, b. 1897). 57 A large part of 
this essay, however, is devoted to John Dewey and an exposition of his 
pedagogical thought. 58 
The judgment of Dewey in this chapter is peculiarly Codignola's. 
Dewey's followers and admirers, he asserts, have failed to notice 
. . . the vigorous idealistic inspiration of his philosophy and 
pedagogy, which, to wandering eyes, appear only as some of the many 
variations of pragmatism and contemporary naturalism. Of all that 
has appeared in contemporary speculation, his, next to Italian 
idealism, is the most powerful defense of autonomy in education, and 
the most pressing criticism of the residues of didactic objectiv-
ism. 59 
Despite this idealistic transformation of Dewey's intentions, 
Codignola provides his readers with a faithful gloss of Democracy and 
Education, a discussion of Dewey's definition of education as 11 recon-
struction, 11 some consideration of the human and democratic elements in 
Deweyan education, and finally, a sympathetic summary of Dewey's metho-
dological developments. 
Following this discussion, Codignola devotes a mere paragraph to 
William Heard Kilpatrick and three pages to Angelo Patri, a Deweyan of 
!talc-American origins. He also deals with his colleague Washburne and 
57 Codignola, Le II scuole nuove", pp. 11-30. 
58Codignola, Le "scuole nuove", pp. 31-60. 
59Codignola, Le "scuole nuove", p. 32. 
163 
describes Ellen Parkhurst's Dalton plan. 60 
From this point Codignola moves back to the Europeans: Ovide 
Decroly (Belgian, 1871-1932), Maria Montessori, and the Agazzi sisters. 
Like most Italian educators, Codignola is critical of Montessori; he 
refers to her approach as a "scientistic gospel" that appears "naive and 
archaic" to Italians. 61 He is much more favorably inclined toward the 
infant schools of Rosa and Carolina Agazzi, as was Lombardo-Radice. The 
Agazzis receive praise because there is nothing "scientific" or artifi-
cial in their work. 62 On the other hand, Codignola criticizes the Agaz-
zis for lacking revolutionary novelty and global vision; those features, 
by implication, are not lacking in Scuola-Citt~ Pestalozzi. 
There follows another description of Scuola-Citta Pestalozzi, 
stressing its reliance on cultural forces rather than on methods taken 
from the "cabinets" of psychologists and sociologists. 6 3 Codignola 
closes with some words on Adolphe Ferrithe and the N.E.F., and on 
Baden-Powell and the scouting movement in Europe. 
The main text of Le "scuole nuove" e i lore problemi is followed 
by appendices: a laudatory essay by Aldo Visalberghi; additional mater-
ial on progressive educational developments in the United States and 
6
°Codignola, Le "scuole nuove", pp. 60-69. 
61Codignola, Le "scuole nuove", p. 89. 
62 c d · 1 1 " 1 " 93 94 Th " · · f · " h o ~gno a, e scuo e nuove , pp. - . e term sc~ent~ ~c as 
negative connotations to many Italian scholars; it suggests "sterile" 
and "contrived." For Codignola, Dewey was a pardonable case. 
63Codignola, Le "scuole nuove", p. 97. 
164 
Europe; a sketch of A. S. Makarenko 1 s work in the U.S.S.R. and of 
Mohandas Gandhi 1 s Wardha Plan; and similar material. No profound, 
sustained theoretical arguments emerge in this book. It is obvious that 
by the time of its publication Codignola had come to favor a certain 
kind of pedagogical approach, that of the "new schools" and their found-
ers; and that he, too, wanted to be included among them. It is also 
obvious in his comments that Codignola developed a certain ideology that 
he used as a basis for assessing and criticizing other educators. A 
reading of Le "scuole nuove" e i loro problemi should make that agenda 
clear. 
The other books published by Codignola after the Second World War 
are, as has been stated, translations and historical studies. There are 
scraps of commentary in them that strengthen the impression of Codignola 
as one struggling to bridge the gap "between idealism and Deweyanism." 
What is absent is a coherent, extended argument such as that provided in 
his concise 1938 work Avviamento allo studio della pedagogia (Prepara-
tion for the Study of Pedagogy), a book that provides definitions and an 
enumeration of essential points in Codignola 1 s educational philosophy. 
That book, like many of his earlier writings, was reprinted by La Nuova 
Italia after the war. The reappearance of his older works suggests a 
continuity in Ernesto Codignola 1 s thinking. Whatever he added after 
1946 was not intended to negate the cultural idealism of his middle 
years. 
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Guido Calogero: from Actualism to Presentialism 
Actual idealism was the great Italian pedagogical movement of the 
1920's and 1930's; like all such movements, it had its wings and 
factions. Giuseppe Lombardo-Radice had socialist leanings that eventu-
ally alienated him from the Fascist political system. There were others 
on the "left" of actual idealism, 54 and one whose career attracted much 
attention after the war was Guido Calogero. 
Highlights of Calogero's Career 
Born in Rome on December 4, 1904, Calogero was reared in an 
academic environment: his father, Giorgio Calogero, was a professor, 
and his mother, Ernesta Michelangeli, was the sister of a classical 
scholar, Luigi A. Michelangeli. As a studious youth, Calogero had the 
encouragement of his father and his uncle. Calogero attended the 
University of Rome, where he studied letters and jurisprudence, and 
received his degree in 1925. A study of the thought of Croce and 
Gentile had kindled his interest in philosophical matters, and his 
doctoral thesis was on the foundations of Aristotelian logic. 65 
In 1927, Calogero became an instructor in ancient philosophy at 
the University of Rome. He spent the following year studying in Heidel-
berg, Germany, under a scholarship from the Italian Ministry of National 
Education. Calogero returned to Italy in 1929 and taught philosophy and 
64 Cambi, La "scuola di Firenze", p. 25. 
65 Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Biografie e bibliografie degli 
accademici lincei (Rome: Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, 1976), p. 
809. 
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history at the "Torquato Tasso" state senior high school in Rome. He 
was also given the opportunity to edit philosophical entries in the 
Enciclopedia Italiana, a favorite project of the Fascist government (and 
one on which Gentile worked after his removal from public life). In 
1931, Calogero was selected for a professorship in the history of 
philosophy at the teacher-training institute (Magistero) of the Univer-
sity of Florence; from there he transferred to Pisa in 1934, and taught 
at the Superior Normal School and the University of Pisa. 
During the ominous 1930's, Calogero developed increasingly liberal 
socialist views and fell from favor with the regime. He was arrested 
for political reasons in 1942, and during his captivity completed a book 
called Lezioni di filosofia (Readings in Philosophy). With the fall of 
the Mussolini regime, Calogero returned to teaching and became politi-
cally active, serving as one of the founders of the Partito 
d'Azione (Action party), a key political party in the early postwar 
years. Shortly after the war ended, his career also took on an interna-
tiona! dimension. 
Calogero had already demonstrated his ability to deal with schol-
arly material in the English language'' when he was invited to Canada to 
teach philosophy at McGill University in Montreal in 1948 and 1949. 
From 1950 to 1955, he was director of the Italian Institute of Culture 
in London, England. In 1956 and 1957, he was visiting professor of 
66 5 11 ee, for example, On the So-Called Identity of History and Philos-
ophy, 11 published in English in Philosophy and History (Oxford, England: 
The Clarendon Press, 1936). 
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philosophy at the University of California in Berkeley, California. 
After that time, he returned to his teaching post at the Faculty of 
Teaching at the University of Rome, a post that had been officially his 
since 1951. 6 7 
In the postwar years, Calogero was a member and served as presi-
dent of the International Institute of Philosophy, Paris; he was presi-
dent of the Italian Philosophical Society, and a member of the Italian 
National Academy of the Lincei. As a member of the Lincei, he received 
the 1960 "Feltrinelli Prize" for philosophical studies. In addition, he 
was on the editorial boards of several philosophical journals. 
Calogero's publications are many and varied. Two books on educa-
tion are important in that field: La scuola dell' uomo (The School of 
Man), 1938, revised and reissued in 1956; and La scuola sot to inchie-
sta (The School Under Scrutiny), 1957. Calogero published a translation 
of John Dewey's A Co~on Faith in 1959. Several of his articles on 
philosophy and education have appeared in Italian and English-language 
journals. Beyond his rather small output on education, Calogero 
published much material on logic, law, and classical studies; he touched 
on other subjects as well. 
67Who's Who in Italy, 1957-1958 ed., (Milan: Who's Who in Italy 
S.r.l., 1958), p. 185. 
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Philosophy and the Morality of Action 
In 1948, a scholar named Giuseppe Maria Sciacca contacted a number 
of prominent Italian philosophers and asked them a rather standard 
series of questions about their work. The result was a book called 
Filosofi che si confessano (Philosophers Declare Themselves), and one 
of its subjects is Guido Calogero. 68 
Asked to name the important contemporary orientations, Calogero 
turns his reply into a statement about philosophers. He affirms that 
any orientation can be interesting or foolish, depending on whether or 
not it is professed by "intelligent persons." As he wrote, 
Philosophers deserve attention, then, always as individuals, and so 
do some of their individual books, but not "orientations" or "move-
ments" or "tendencies" or "schools. . . " 69 
This emphasis on the individual is typical of Calogero's writings. For 
his favorite individual philosophers, he names Croce, Gentile, Bergson, 
Dewey, and Aristotle, and defends the last as more "contemporary" than 
some living philosophers. 
On a more theoretical matter, Calogero states his belief in the 
increasing irrelevance of metaphysical and epistemological debates. If 
different schools read one another carefully, he suggests, there would 
be fewer such debates. As for his own orientations, Calogero stead-
fastly refuses to summarize them, but invites interested readers to 
visit him at home to discuss philosophy--he would "stay up all night" if 
68 Giuseppe Maria Sciacca, Filosofi che si confessano (Messina: Casa 
Editrice G. D'Anna, 1948), pp. 40-44. 
69 Sciacca, Filosofi che si confessano, p. 40. 
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necessary to carry on such discussions. 70 
Guido Calogero's contemporaries did not have to stay up all night 
in his parlor to learn his opinions on ethics and education. That 
information was available in his publications, and was presented quite 
clearly. From Gentilian actual ism Calogero retained two key notions: 
that of the "I" and that of the "act"; but in his work they underwent a 
transformation. Far from Gentile's "I" that resolves itself into the 
great thinking Mind of history, Calogero's "I" remains a distinct 
person, moving consciousness this way and that, seeing the self as one 
among many; that person is not God and does not coincide with the 
universe. I think, certainly, but whatever I think, I cannot get out of 
my thoughts. I cannot stop being myself. 71 Reflecting on his own expe-
rience, the individual realizes that there may be experience other than 
his own; moreover, everything in his experience takes on an objective 
nature, surrounded by the "atmosphere" of his "I." 72 
At the end of the journey lies the realization of the world as 
inter-subjective, a world of separate "I' s" experiencing a common real-
ity, however understood. What is important, according to Calogero, is 
the problem of action --what I may do in a world of hard realities and 
other people. 73 Calogero turned the Gentilian "act" into a concept of 
70Sciacca, Filosofi che si confessano, p. 43. 
71Guido Calogero, La scuola dell'uomo (Florence: 
1939; revised ed., 1956), p. 6. 
72 Calogero, La scuola dell'uomo, pp. 7-8. 
73 Calogero, La scuola dell'uomo, p. 11. 
Sansoni Editore, 
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EFaxis, or how the "I" acts in the conscious presence of persons and 
things. The subjective aspect of praxis suggests the origin of the term 
. 1' " th "present1a 1sm -- e necessary presence of one thinking and acting. 
More importantly, the "I" wills and is conscious, and it is on that 
"effective nature" that Calogero wishes to concentrate. 74 He denies that 
there is blind will or empty knowledge in the world, or abstract tran-
scendental activity. Theory and practice, the abstraction and the 
action, must· unite to yield human reality and concreteness. 
The danger in Calogero's formulation up to this point is that of 
lapsing into egoistic solipsism, the attitude that others do not exist 
except in my subjectivity. But for Calogero, that solipsism is a prison 
that denies the individual any real freedom. Consider, rather, that 
... the true liberty, serious liberty that is of interest to men, 
whose conduct is the moral tissue of the world, is neither the 
liberty of God nor Providence nor History (which, if it exists, 
needs no help) nor the liberty of the little personal I that 
pretends to expand itself. It is the liberty that is recognized in 
others with the sovereignty of the true moral gift. . . . the 
liberty that one must love is really the liberty of the other. 75 
In the above quotation, Calogero's reference to history reflects 
his criticism of the "historicist" attitude that pervaded actual ideal-
ism: that attitude was ethically inadequate, he charges, because it 
denied the realities of individual history and suffering. Certainly, 
action takes place in history (and Father Braido 7 ' alludes to Calogero's 
74 Enc1'cloped1'a f1'losof1'ca, 1979 d s "Cal G 'd " b I _ e . , . v. ogero, u1 o, y . 
Piovesana and D. Scolari. 
75 Calogero, La scuola dell'uomo, p. 54. 
76p. 1etro Braido, Filosofia dell'educazione (Zurich: PAS-Verlag, 
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"primal historicism"), but action conceived as a function of the blind 
will of history fails to provide any sense of real human life. In 
Calogero's thought, action is primarily a moral issue. When the "I" is 
no longer alone and is not equivalent to the Universe, it is no longer 
incorrigible; it must look about itself and determine how to behave, 
especially in regard to those other thinking, willing beings who popu-
late the world and allow the "I" to move in moral liberty. 
If I propose the problem of others before me, I see that the only 
way to resolve it is to recognize their existence as the product of 
my moral will. . . . Morality is the positing of the existence of 
others. 77 
The moral attitude, that respect for the existence of others and 
the love for their liberty, has inevitable consequences in praxis that 
may be generally described as a condition of altruism. In Calogero's 
ethical system, one of the important forms of altruism is education. 
Education as Altruism 
Guido Calogero's approach to education is first of all a reaction 
against the Gentile/Lombardo-Radice concept of education as essentially 
self-education, with the teacher being somehow subsumed into the person-
ality of the learner. Calogero took II II a common-sense posit ion and 
opposed the actualists' formulation: 
Any man of good sense knows that he does not converse without being 
with someone else, and that to influence the soul of another person 
it is extremely necessary that this other person exist. One can 
therefore be certain that he should agree with whoever tells him 
1967), p. 30. 
77 Calogero, La scuola dell'uomo, p. 30. 
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that in order for there to be education, it is necessary that there 
be, on the one hand, someone who educates, and on the other, someone 
who is being educated. 78 
Any other opinion, according to Calogero, is an abstract invention of 
philosophers for other philosophers. Simply, the educator must recog-
nize the educand as another person. Such a recognition is ethical by 
its very nature, and so is the question of action that follows immedi-
ately from it. 
For Calogero, the individual ego, that erstwhile solipsistic crea-
ture, emerges from its prison by recognizing other beings and entering 
into dialogue with them. Its respect for their existence demands an 
altruistic attitude, one of attempting to assist others in their own 
interests, and of helping them to expand their worlds. "Morality is 
this unlimited expansion of worlds that the I posits in its own 
world." 79 Thus, morality demands an educative attitude, and education is 
a supremely moral undertaking. 
Lest it be thought that all activities of teachers are acts of 
great moral virtue, Calogero is careful to distinguish between education 
and mere instruction. Education, he contended, is as different from 
instruction as "rearing the heart differs from rearing the brain. " 8 0 In 
other words, education is not the imparting of rote knowledge; it is a 
matter that involves the feelings as well. Altruism cannot be demon-
78 Calogero, La scuola dell'uomo, p. 1. 
79 La scuola dell'uomo, 41. Calogero, p. 
80 
scuola dell'uomo, Calogero, La p. 125. 
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strated in merely mechanical activity. This distinction is important to 
Calogero as a basis for his critiques of schooling. By means of it, he 
could insist that the worst schools (in fact, most schools) do not prop-
erly educate, but only instruct. 
Up to this point, references have been made to the 1956 (revised) 
edition of La scuola dell'uomo. About half of that book is devoted to 
theoretical issues, while the remainder is an examination and critique 
of school practice. 
A later book on education, Scuola sotto inchiesta (The School 
Under Scrutiny), first published in 1957, is centered on school matters 
and questions of national policy. Here Calogero's practical criticisms 
come to the fore. The first essay, "La scuola dell 'onniscienza" ("The 
School of Omniscience") laments the absurdly encyclopedic program of the 
Italian middle school that pretends to teach everything and at the end 
requires a "maturity" examination that few professors could pass. The 
result of that program is a generation of anxious adolescents who need 
psychotherapy 8 1 more than they need additional instruction. Calogero 
follows these provocative statements with suggestions for humanizing the 
middle school: use of the project method, allowing students to select 
examination subjects, and similar changes. 
Another chapter (originally a newspaper article) is a defense of 
the laic state school that embodies Calogero's concept of dialogue: 
81 Guido Calogero, Scuola sotto inchiesta 
Editore, 1957), p. 28. 
(Turin: Giulio Einaudi 
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Laicism consists of the fact of never accepting, in any case, the 
organization and use of instruments of religious or political or 
social or moral or economic or financial pressures for the purpose 
of the diffusion of certain ideas and the repression of certain 
other ideas; and of always allowing, rather, an opportunity for the 
possibility of ideas in individual dialogue. 82 
In commenting on an article of his son, Francesco, in Il Mondo 
(August 25, 1953), Calogero passes a gloomy judgment on the Italian 
school: 
The Italian school is so antiquated in so many of its aspects that 
it cannot pretend to correct them all rapidly. . . . The Italian 
school, in general, must be made much less laborious, less authori-
tarian, less alien and distressing, and thus less productive of 
neuroses than it is now. 83 
The only English-language article in the book ("Some Comparisons 
Between Education in the United States and in Italy") praises the free-
dom of choice that exists in the typical American school. 84 
Numerous other topical items appear in Scuola sotto inchiesta, but 
their tenor is much the same. They speak of the need to modernize and 
humanize Italian schooling in the interest of social altruism. 
What is Calogero's vision for education? Buried in an enumeration 
of philosophical positions that Calogero was prevailed upon to write in 
1958, is a brief paragraph stating an aim for education that is conso-
nant with its author's altruistic morality and his social-democratic 
politics: 
82 Scuola inchiesta, 70. Calogero, sot to p. 
83 Scuola inchiesta, 215. Calogero, sot to p. 
84 Scuola inchiesta, 199-205. Calogero, sot to pp. 
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. . . what should have been eliminated by now is any pretense of 
assigning an aim to education other than that of facilitating the 
acquisition of the maximum possible capacity for enjoying the common 
life, that is to develop those tastes to the maximum that are maxi-
mally compatible with the analogous development of others' tastes. 
Instead, our educational traditions still continue broadly to direct 
men toward different ideals: for example, toward those ideals of 
victory through competition that create all the superiority and 
inferiority complexes that have made the world neurotic. Men who do 
not know how to live seek comfort in knowing how to win. But civi-
lization is in knowing how to live, not in knowing how to win. 85 
Briefly, then, Calogero retains his ideal of education as a prac-
tical form of morality and altruism that operates by helping others to 
expand their subjective worlds; and the aim of that expansion is a maxi-
mum degree of mutual social enjoyment. 
An Idealist Diaspora 
"Idealism," said Luigi Volpicelli, 86 "resisted until the 1960's." 
Certainly idealism did not remain quite intact in that difficult postwar 
period, but some of its proponents clung to basic tenets of the philoso-
phy they had learned from Gentile and Lombardo-Radice. 
Volpicelli is a case in point. Born in Siena on June 13, 1900, 
Luigi Volpicelli studied in Rome and completed a degree in jurisprudence 
in 1921. His interest in philosophy and literary studies then led him 
to work on an additional degree, which he obtained in 1927 under the 
direction of Giovanni Gentile. Over the next decade, Volpicelli concen-
trated on problems of teaching practice, and in 1938 he was named by 
85Guido Calogero, "Dodici tes i filosofiche," in La filosofia contem-
poranea in Italia (Asti: Arethusa, 1958), p. 142. 
86Interview with Luigi Volpicelli, Professor Emeritus, University of 
Rome. April 19, 1982. 
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Education Minister Bottai to head a center for pedagogical research and 
experimental teaching. 87 In 1939, he was called to teach at the Univer-
sity of Rome's Institute of Pedagogy, where he took the post left vacant 
by the death of Giuseppe Lombardo-Radice. 
Volpicelli's main teaching and publishing activities occupied the 
three decades following the war. His bibliography includes over fifty 
postwar titles including works in comparative education, studies of 
childhood and family life, and reflections on contemporary developments. 
His sustaining strengths were in being able to welcome the challenges of 
modern times (and to this end he wrote on such subjects as films, tele-
vision, comic strips, and driver education); and in taking a balanced 
approach to ideological struggles. Throughout his postwar career, he 
retained a quiet admiration for Gentile: "We must not think that 
Gentile was a crude Fascist. He was a great philosopher and personal-
ity. " 88 As of 1982, Volpicelli was alive and active, although he had 
retired from teaching at the University of Rome. 
Among others who deserve attention, an important member of the 
younger generation of Gentilians was Gino Ferretti. He was born in 
Acireale (Catania) on March 30, 1880, and died in Palermo in 1950. 
Having completed a doctorate in philosophy in 1906, Ferretti went to 
WI! urzburg, Germany, to study experimental psychology. From 1913 to 1922, 
he was principal of an elementary school in Rome. He taught pedagogy at 
87Laeng, I contemporanei, p. 1013. 
88 Interview with Luigi Volpicelli, 1982. 
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the University of Catania from 1924 to 1928, and then taught at the 
University of Palermo until his death. Ferretti was not a member of the 
Fascist party, but was inactive politically during the Mussolini period; 
in fact, he helped the Allied liberators to modernize school curricula 
in 1943. 8 9 Although his philosophical bas is was actual idealism, he 
quickly accepted the value of positive science; eventually he abandoned 
the metaphysical abstractions of idealism and developed a kind of prag-
matic phenomenism, open to the discoveries of the psychologists. 
Vito Fazio Allmeyer was born in Palermo in 1885. He accepted 
actualism insofar as it was a critique of positivism, but he moved 
beyond it to an autonomous position much more infused with a sense of 
morality. His postwar publications were few and do not reflect much of 
his educational thought; that work appeared earlier, between 1914 and 
1921. 90 Allmeyer died in Pisa in 1958. 
Giuseppe Saitta (1881-1965) was a Renaissance specialist who 
turned to actual idealism as an alternative to Christian theology; he 
saw the latter as a force opposed to human liberty. Later, he detached 
himself from idealism as another religion equally destructive of 
liberty, and he came to exalt the individual as a fully self-sufficient 
being and creator of his own destiny. Saitta's only works on education 
were two studies of Renaissance humanism 91 (1923 and 1928). 
89 Laeng, I contemEoranei, p. 846. 
90 Laeng, I contemEoranei, p. 847. 
91 I contemEoranei, 845. Laeng, p. 
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Armando Carlini (1878-19590 was Gentile's successor as professor 
of theoretical philosophy at the University of Pisa. Altho.ugh origi-
nally attracted to idealism, he found certain disparities in the works 
of Croce and Gentile that he sought to overcome. By 1933, his growing 
desire to find spiritual value in the world had led him close to Chris-
tianity, and although he retained reservations that kept him from Neo-
Scholasticism, his interest in religion did not wane. 92 
Mario Casotti (1896-1975) made a dramatic break with actualism 
early in his career. A student of Gentile, he nevertheless underwent a 
religious conversion in the 1920's and was called by Father Gemelli to 
teach pedagogy at the Sacred Heart University of Milan in 1924. There 
he worked with Neo-Thomist scholars and produced works on education with 
a distinct Christian orientation. He is particularly remembered as the 
founder and director 93 of the Catholic educational review Pedagogia e 
vita (Pedagogy and Life), a journal that took on new importance in the 
postwar years. 
There is insufficient space to devote to the many other students 
of Gentile and Lombardo-Radice. Whatever their directions, actual 
idealism was the frame of reference which they carried with them or 
against which they revolted. As the second generation of idealists died 
or retired, their philosophy no longer supplied a major framework for 
Italian educational thought. 
92 Laeng, I contemporanei, p. 877. 
93 Laeng, I contemporanei, p. 877. 
CHAPTER V 
PROBLEMATIC CONCEPTS OF EDUCATION 
Asked to name the important forces in Italian educational thought 
after World War II, the typical Italian scholar names three: Christian 
spiritualism, Marxism, and something vaguely denoted as laicism. These 
turn out to be ideological orientations, however, and are broadly 
related to commitment to the Catholic church and Christian Democrat 
party, or the Italian Communist party or its splinter groups, or the 
democratic-socialist center-left. Philosophy, as something other than 
ideology, demands closer scrutiny. 
A small but significant group of laic educator/philosophers in the 
1945-1965 period was known as the "problematicist" school. Problemati-
cism, while not a movement that attracted large numbers of adherents, is 
worth examining because it centered on a definite philosophical approach 
rather than a generally ideological orientation. 
Problematicism is described in the following way in the Enciclope-
dia filosofica (1979 edition): 
In part this term (problematicism) applies to a number of philosoph-
ical positions opposed either to the general concept of absolute 
knowledge, or to specific concepts of the absoluteness of knowledge 
that have had particular historical importance, or to notions of the 
absoluteness of specific concepts of knowledge (metaphysics, physi-
cal science and mathematics, logic, ethics, law, etc.). Such a 
position is transformed into the affirmation that the content of 
knowledge under consideration is not a principle, but rather a prob-
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lem. 1 
If knowledge is not absolute and if its content is problematic, then the 
thinking mind must face a reality whose meanings must be deciphered and 
evaluated continually. In an important book on problematicism, these 
words are used: II mentality appears in this way not as a being or 
a duty, but as a problem or a system of problems that are posed to the 
existing being, and of which his life, as a mental life, consists." 2 
The problematicists of the post-World War II period were philoso-
phers interested in the major questions of philosophy. In Italy, educa-
tion is ordinarily considered a philosophical matter, hence these think-
ers did not neglect it. 
The Unorthodoxies of Antonio Banfi 
The earliest contemporary Italian problematicist was Antonio 
Banfi. He was born in Vimercate (Milan province) on September 30, 1886, 
and he died in Milan on July 20, 1957. 
Unlike many of his contemporaries, Banfi was not drawn to the 
idealism of Croce and Gentile. In 1908 he completed a doctoral thesis 
in literature at the Scientific-Literary Academy of Milan, and in the 
following year he took a doctorate in philosophy at the University of 
Milan, where his director was Professor Martinetti, a positivist. 
Despite his interest in philosophy, the young Banfi thought that the 
1 Enciclopedia filosofica, 1979 ed., s.v. "Problematicismo," by E. 
Severino. 
2 Gustavo Bontadini, Dall'attualismo al problematicismo (Brescia: La 
Scuola Editrice, 1950), p. x. 
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predominant Italian philosophers of the time lacked breadth and 
concreteness. 3 For that reason, the philosophy he developed had little 
to do with the Italian intellectual climate of the time. 
In 1910, Banfi went to Berlin, Germany, to extend his knowledge of 
Hegel, and there he imbibed other northern European philosophies as 
well: the vitalism of Bergson, the phenomenology of Husser!, the neo-
Kantianism of the Marburg school (Natorp, Cohen, and Cassirer), and the 
historical structuralism of Dilthey and Spranger, to name a few. 
After Banfi's return to Italy, he took up high school teaching and 
spent many years in that work before accepting his first university post 
in 1932. Certainly, his period of high school teaching was not one of 
intellectual stagnation. During World War I, he was a Tolstoyan and a 
pacifist who deplored the churches' compromises and blamed religious 
philosophers for blessing patriotism and war. 4 Although in his youth 
Banfi had been rather religious, after the First World War he drew away 
from religious orthodoxy until he included himself among the "atheists"; 
and yet he admired certain "intransigent" theologians, including Kierke-
gaard and Karl Barth. For Banfi, what replaced religion was a "theoret-
ical and ethical agnosticism" that was critical, antidogmatic, and anti-
sectarian. 5 In politics, he came to favor socialism, but of an "open," 
3Mauro Laeng, I contemporanei, (Florence: Giunti Barbera, 1979), p. 
903. 
4Giovanni Maria Bertin, "L'esperienza religiosa nel pensiero di Anto-
nio Banfi," in Antonio Banfi e il pensiero contemporaneo, (Florence: La 
Nueva Italia, 1969), p. 122. 
5 Angelo Peroni, "L' impegno politico e culturale nella personal ita di 
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antimetaphysical and antidogmatic type that was mostly of his own inven-
tion; he preferred his idiosyncrasy to the international orthodoxy of 
Soviet Marxism. 
In 1932, Banfi became a professor of philosophy at the University 
of Milan, specializing in the history of philosophy. With few interrup-
tions, he remained there to the end of his career. 
World War II pushed Banfi ever closer to the Marxist camp. In 
1941, he became a member of the clandestine Communist network, a deci-
sion that reflected his ethical convictions. His home in Milan became a 
meeting-place for anti-government intellectuals, and there he offered 
refuge to members of persecuted minorities. 6 From 1943 to 1945, Banfi 
was officially enrolled in a partisan organization. He did not give up 
his Tolstoyan distaste for violence, but he accepted violence as a 
possible force for the reconstruction of the world. At the end of World 
War II, he became active in leftist cultural activities, helping to 
found a Communist youth group, boarding schools, and workers' theaters. 
He was made a member of the central committee of the Italian Communist 
Party (P.C.I.), and in 1949 he was appointed to the Italian Senate. 
Political activities did not preclude philosophical activities, 
and in 1952 Banfi hosted a conference in Milan to assemble Italian 
philosophers and put them in touch with one another and with the world; 
the result was the formation of the Societa Filosofica Italiana (Ital-
Antonio Banfi," in Antonio Banfi e il pensiero contemporaneo, (Florence: 
La Nueva Italia, 1969), p. 158. 
6p . eron1., "L'impegno politico," p. 166. 
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ian Philosophical Society), of which he was made vice president. As a 
professional philosopher, Banfi wrote and published on various . themes 
during his long career. Some of his theoretical works are on rational-
ity, morality, philosophy of mind, and esthetics. He was also an avid 
historian of philosophy; he wrote on the problems of historiography of 
philosophy, and produced critical works on key developments and figures 
in the history of thought. Two of his books deal with Galileo; another 
is on the Copernican revolution; and there are individual portraits of 
Socrates, Pestalozzi, and Nietzsche. 
It is not quite correct to say, as Banfi's disciple G. M. Bertin 
states, that Banfi never wrote a book on education. 7 The study of 
Pestalozzi (1929) might be considered a book on education, and in 1931 
Banfi published a historical summary called Sommario di storia della 
pedagogia (Summary of the History of Pedagogy). In addition, he wrote 
numerous journal articles, chapters, and papers that deal with education 
and related matters. Some of these were collected, edited, and 
published after Banfi's death in 1957. The first such posthumous work 
to appear was Scuola e societ~ (School and Society), 1958; another 
collection, La problematicitd dell'educazione e il pensiero pedagogico 
(The Problematicity of Education and Pedagogical Thought) was edited by 
Bertin and published in 1961. As the result of such efforts, Banfi' s 
educational thought was probably better known after his death than 
7 Cited in Ileana Ragusa, "Il rapporto tra pedagogia banfiana e la 
pedagogia italiana contemporanea," in Antonio Banfi e il pensiero 
contemporaneo (Florence: La Nueva Italia, 1969), p. 289. 
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during his lifetime. 
Individual, World, and Culture 
The "problem" that pervades Banfi's work is the antithesis between 
the individual and the world: it is a form of the old problem of the 
one and the many, debated first by the ancient Greeks and then by 
successive schools of philosophy. 
In laying the groundwork for a resolution of that problem, Banfi 
proposed a "critical rationalism" based on a concept of transcendental 
reason. In Banfi's thought, reason is neither a faculty of the human 
mind nor an external cause or end of experience; rather, in any plane of 
experience, it is an ideal necessity for liberation from particularity 
or partiality resulting from pragmatic instances of any kind whatso-
ever. 8 Reason thus defined affects the mental life by producing two 
kinds of knowledge: scientific and philosophical. While scientific 
knowledge accentuates universality and the infinite connections among 
the data of experience, philosophical knowledge accentuates the indepen-
dence of thought from dogmatic presuppositions. Philosophy, for Banfi, 
seeks radical systematicity; that is, a systematic approach that does 
not require the invocation of a preexisting system. 
Faced with the material of experience that is the life of human 
culture, philosophy unfolds itself in three moments: the dialectical 
moment, in which existing conceptual syntheses are seen to be incomplete 
8Enciclopedia filosofica, 1976 ed., s.v. "Banfi, Antonio," by G. M. 
Bertin. 
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and unable to account for the infinity of experience; the eidetic 
moment, in which the underlying principle of any field of thought is 
understood; and the phenomenological moment, in which the two previous 
moments are combined and organized without deformation or mutilation 
created by aprioristic judgments or presuppositions or dogmas of any 
sort. 9 
Retaining this concept of philosophy, Banfi built a philosophy of 
culture. He outlined four "planes" in which culture resolves the 
antithesis between the individual and the world: the economic, juridi-
cal, moral, and educational planes. All of the relationships that Banfi 
defines are similar, in that the basis of each plane is some aspect of 
human culture--the historical, collective life of humanity. 
If culture is offered as Banfi's solution to the human dilemma, it 
must not be assumed that a particular culture, or culture in any preex-
isting phase, offers the ideal solution. Unlike the actual idealists, 
who proposed Italian culture as the paragon of human history, Banfi 
thought that empirical cultures suffer from too many shortcomings and 
limitations to be so enshrined. It is rather the transcendental ideal 
of culture, the principle of culture itself, 10 to which education must 
refer in order to approach its own ideal. Those ideals must be arrived 
9Enciclopedia filosofica, 1976 ed., s .v. "Banfi, Antonio." The 
language of "moments" used here is obviously borrowed from Hegel, while 
the synthesis itself is almost pure Husserl. 
10Giovanni Maria Bertin, "La filosofia dell' educazione di Antonio 
Banfi," in Antonio Banfi, ;::Lc::a_..:P.;;.rc..::oc..::bc..::l:..:eo.::m::..:a:..:t:..:J.':::. c"=l.::... t:..:a=-' _d=ec::lc::l_'c..::ec..::do.::uo.::cc..::ao.::zo.::io.::oc..::n::..:e'---e'--:-'l.=·l 
Rensiero pedagogico, ed. G. M. Bertin (Florence: La Nueva Italia 
Editrice, 1961), pp. xx-xxi. 
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at dialectically, as Banfi outlined; they exist in thought rather than 
in actuality. To tie education to a particular culture, rather than to 
the life of the mind itself, would require education to sustain ruling 
elites and various kinds of historical deformities and pedagogical 
absurdities. Nevertheless, Banfi had to value education as an actual 
institution tied to living cultures, because in the philosophical system 
that he derived from Husserl, the material of experience is a necessary 
starting point for the discovery of the eidetic. As a result of that 
orientation, Banfi' s discussion of education often shifts levels from 
the actual to the ideal and back again, and his arguments are therefore 
difficult to follow, especially for those unacquainted with his work. 
Education as Idea and Practice 
In the preface to his 1931 Sommario di storia della pedagogia, 
Banfi offers a definition of education that is couched in abstract meta-
physical terms: 
Education, considered as a universal idea, can be defined as the 
process of formation and development of the spiritual (mental) 
personality; it (the process) is fulfilled in the relation between 
the individual soul and the world of experience and culture. 11 
As the elaboration of the definition proceeds, it is evident that Banfi 
is borrowing concepts from Kant, Hegel, and Husserl. The reader who is 
unfamiliar with those philosophers is at a disadvantage in interpreting 
the passage. Expressions such as "universal idea," "spiritual personal-
ity," and "individual soul" bear testimony to the complexity of Banfi's 
11Antonio Banfi, Sommario di storia della pedagogia (Urbina: Arga-
lia Editore, 1931; 1964), p. 9. 
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philosophical writings in that early period. When he paraphrases his 
own definition in a subsequent paragraph, however, the centrality of 
life in society is a theme that may be discerned: 
Education, ideally expressed as the formation of the personality 
in the relation between its center of spontaneous individual unity 
and the world of experience, represents a direction of the spiritual 
life that is unlimited and infinite itself, but appears to us in the 
history of humanity as a concrete and determinate function that has 
its own sphere of reality, and its own limited and definite organi-
zation of activities, connections and institutions, to which typical 
social and psychological reflexes correspond. 12 
What Banfi is trying to provide in those passages is a definition of 
education as an ideal, rather than a description of its actuality. The 
person is a "personality," or indeed a "spiritual personality," where 
spiritual means "mental" in the most abstract, general sense. Through 
its growing awareness, Banfi suggests, the personality comes into 
contact with the "world of experience," which is ultimately the world of 
other minds in communion and therefore of culture. The changes that 
education works on the personality are consequences of the individual's 
relations with that world. 
Schooling, as the general mode of education in advanced societies, 
is dealt with in a more descriptive and less metaphysical way in Banfi's 
1955 essay "School and Society" that was the first chapter in a book of 
the same name published posthumously in 1958: 
Every human society tends, by its own nature, to strive not only 
for its own immediate preservation, but for its survival and contin-
uation through new generations to which it supplies the structures 
and tools. While in primitive, closed societies the initiation 
ceremony signals the solemn moment of the acceptance of the young 
12Banfi, Sommario di storia della pedagogia, p. 10. 
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into the social body, in fact their education and formation is 
accomplished through their moral participation in the life of a 
given society, whose customs and traditional capabilities they take 
upon themselves. But where the horizon of the collective life 
becomes open, the internal forces are differentiated and developed, 
and under those influences customs are altered and traditions face 
new situations; the continuity of the social life can be assured 
only if the permanent quality of traditional values finds a place 
among the youth along with the acquisition or learning of the use of 
certain formal structures that provide elastic and adaptable capa-
bilities in each new generation. Every technical, warlike, magical, 
divinatory, or inventive vocation that is distinguishable from the 
everyday conduct of life requires a true apprenticeship. And when 
the entire life of society is altered and articulated, the tribal 
groupings give rise to political organization, and the collective 
relations among men as well as the relations between men and nature 
become complex and differentiated; each activity requires an open, 
informed, foresighted body of skills whose formal means of implemen-
tation is what we consider to be intelligence, and the learning of 
which (skills) we call instruction. It is thus, with that aim, that 
the school arises, as an essential function of a human society in 
motion. 
The history of schooling reflects the history of society. As 
that proceeds according to the dialectic of a moment of conservation 
and a moment of progress, so the structure and history of the school 
express the temper of one time or another, the supremacy of a moment 
of closed traditionality or of a moment of open intellectual devel-
opment. The relations between school and society and individual 
social organizations; the structure of school society; the teacher-
student relationship, the professional character of one and the 
private characters of the others, individually and collectively; the 
nature of programs; the functioning of methods; the school program 
itself: all of these in their internal tension and their evolu-
tion depend on that fundamental dialectic that is the determining 
law of the complex phenomenology of school life. 13 
In this late work, Banfi's comments on schooling reflect an 
approach that is different from (but not necessarily contradictory to) 
his eidetic definition of education that appeared in his 1931 work. 
While education remains an ideal reality for Banfi, he sees schooling as 
13 Antonio Banfi, Scuola e societA 
pp. 11-12. 
(Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1958), 
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8 matter of praxis: it is the idea in practice. In this passage, he 
writes in a descriptive way, building his definition empirically and 
anthropologically, much in the style of Dewey in the opening chapter of 
Democracy and Education. 
What Banfi assumes in this discussion is that schooling is a 
social function, and that in order to understand it as such, one must 
first look at the society which it serves. The school, Banfi tells us, 
responds to two basic needs of human society: immediate preservation 
and survival through new generations. To insure both, the young must be 
somehow "initiated" into their society. Even though a ritual may mark 
the official moment of acceptance, the true test of an individual's 
socialization is his or her moral participation in that society. By 
"moral participation," Banfi evidently means a life lived according to 
an internalization of the moral structures of society; that is, a will-
ingness to accept the beliefs and obey the ethical tenets of one's 
peers. (To illustrate Banfi' s distinction between ritual and moral 
participation, one might use the example of the Christian confirmation, 
a rite of passage that may or may not lead to a life of committed Chris-
tian practice.) Banfi adds that moral participation includes taking on 
the customs and traditions of one's society. 
Up to this point, Banfi has discussed the initiation rites and 
rather simple tribal pressures of a primitive, "closed" society--one 
that is static and self-perpetuating, but not in any noticeable process 
of evolution or upheaval. He contrasts that society to an "open" soci-
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ety, in which new social differentiations are taking place and, as a 
result, custom and tradition clash with change and are themselves modi-
fied. In such a situation, the society can hope to preserve itself only 
if its value structure can be made compatible with the learning of 
"formal structures" (concepts, ideas) that are themselves elastic and 
adaptable to new situations encountered in each generation. A key char-
acteristic of the open society is its increasing complexity: there are 
more occupational specialties, and each requires its own kind of appren-
ticeship. A result of the more complex division of labor is a more 
complex structure of social relations, out of which grows a formalized 
political system. That political system, in turn, has a major stake in 
an ongoing system of formal instruction to provide the perpetuation and 
improvement of the skills and techniques that are the marks of an 
advanced division of labor. Reasoning in this way, Banfi emphasizes an 
essential relation of society and political organization on one hand, 
and of society and its schools on the other. Implicit in his emphasis 
on labor and production skills is the notion of the economic system as 
the underlying structure that is actually in change; thus it is not 
surprising to find Banfi in sympathy with the Marxists, who think simi-
larly. 
Banfi accounts for both the conserving and innovating functions of 
the school, seeing both as moments of a (Hegelian) dialectic. There is, 
he admits, a moment of "closed traditionality" and a moment of "open 
intellectual development." The positing of this dialectic solves the 
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riddle as to how the school can both preserve and perpetuate society and 
also introduce change: both effects are sustained reciprocally. Banfi 
ends this meditation by suggesting that all social relations in an open 
society are governed by the dialectic of conservation and change, and 
that one must see the "complex phenomenology of school life" in terms of 
that tension in order to understand what occurs in the school. (From 
that point in the text, Banfi goes on to discuss specific school issues 
and to relate them to the dialectical framework.) 
Banfi's Social Concerns 
Because of education's necessary limitations, Banfi focused most 
of his attention on broader social and cultural issues. In Scuola e 
societ~ he argues vigorously for a "democratic" society on the Marxist 
model as the most ethically ideal form of society. The school that he 
then advocates conforms closely to that ideal of society: it is a state 
school, laic, free, and open to all, for the formation of all (including 
the "difficult, retarded or disabled"), 14 but always serving the higher 
purposes of the state, and protected from serving "contrary and extrane-
ous" ends. In contrast to the nee-idealists and the Christian personal-
ists, he insists that: 
The school is not a family or a city: it is the school, and its 
functions as such must be delineated and not confused or substituted 
by those belonging to other social organisms. . . . Its structure, 
its internal relations, its methods and its programs must correspond 
to the social end for which it is constituted. 15 
14 Banfi, Scuola e societs, p. 15. 
15 Banfi, Scuola e societ~, p. 21. 
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Even so, Banfi allowed that a "democratic" school, if it could be 
achieved, would contribute to the reform of Italian society. Not in the 
central way that Dewey saw the school as an instrument for social 
reform, Banfi saw it as an integral part of the broader effort for 
social change: "The struggle for the social function of the school, for 
the democratic school, is only an episode in the struggle for democracy 
in Italy." 16 
Banfi was a powerful figure in Italian philosophy, respected even 
by those who disagreed with him. He did not live to see many socialis-
tic or democratic reform efforts alter the Italian schools. Had he 
survived into the late 1960's, he might have taken a place alongside 
Herbert Marcuse as an idol of the radical students. 
A Second Problematicist: Ugo Spirito 
The Dizionario di filosofia (Dictionary of Philosophy), edited by 
Nicola Abbagnano, attributes the diffusion of the term "problematicism" 
in Italian philosophy not to Antonio Banfi but, rather, to an ex-ideal-
ist turned problematicist, Ugo Spirito. 17 
Spirito was born in the east Tuscan city of Arezzo on September 9, 
1896. He studied law at the University of Rome and completed his degree 
in 1918; subsequently, he studied philosophy and received a doctorate in 
that subject in 1920. From 1920 to 1927 he was an instructor in pedag-
16Banf1.· S 1 · t" 21 , cuo a e soc1.e a, p. . 
17Nicola Abbagnano, ed., Dizionario di filosofia, 1971 ed., s.v. 
"Problematicismo." 
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ogy at the University of Rome, and after 1924, he taught philosophy 
there as well. In those years, his philosophy was essentially that of 
Gentile. 
Spirito moved into a different area of teaching, that of economics 
and politics, when he accepted a post at the University of Pisa in 1932. 
In the late 1920's and early 1930's, Spirito's nonteaching activities 
also had political and economic overtones. He was for a time one of the 
main theorists of the Fascist "corporative" economic movement attempting 
to transform private into corporate property, an effort that had little 
success. With Arnalda Volpicelli, brother of Luigi Volpicelli, he 
founded and co-edited a journal of law, economics, and politics. Spir-
ito was also given charge of editing entries in philosophy, economics, 
and law for the Enciclopedia Italiana, the Fascist government's prestige 
project in the field of culture. After brief university appointments in 
Messina and Genoa, Spirito was called to the University of Rome in 1937, 
where he taught philosophy until his retirement. 
By the late 1930's, Spirito had begun to drift away from actual 
idealism and Fascist politics; he had seen contradictions in Gentile's 
philosophy, and particularly, a hidden dualism of thought and deed. In 
social thought, he had moved to the "left" of actualism along with Guido 
Calogero. 18 Although he was still writing on Fascist economics as late 
as 1939, Spirito was coming to see social questions in an increasingly 
democratic and egalitarian light. When National Education Minister 
18Franco Camhi, La "scuola di Firenze" (Naples: Liguori Editore, 
1982), p. 25. 
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Bottai presented a plan for school reform in 1938, Spirito responded 
with a paper warning of probable dire consequences in view of the fact 
that the projected reform did not go far enough toward providing oppor-
tunities fairly and eradicating the inequalities of class. As it was 
never an honest intention of the Fascists to create a classless society, 
Spirito's paper was suppressed. 19 
In 1937, Spirito published a book called La vita come 
ricerca (Life as Research) in which he used the term "problematicism" 
for the first time in his work, and by his own account 20 gave the word a 
general circulation among Italian philosophers. The problematicism that 
he outlines in that book and later develops in other publications is 
intended to resolve the contradictions of actualism as well as the 
contradictions of all Western thought. He advocates a position in which 
one can recognize the existence of such contradictions and at the same 
time seek to overcome them through nonjudgment and profound comprehen-
sian. The title of La vita come ricerca signifies the first of three 
powerful metaphors that Spirito developed, and it focuses on the search 
of the thinker who hopes to find solutions to the problems of philoso-
phy. The second, La vita come arte (Life as Art) of 1941 stresses imme-
diacy and the absence of systematized philosophy; the third, La vita 
come amore (Life as Love), published in 1952, puts the thinker in a 
19 ugo Spirito, La riforma della scuola (Florence: G. C. Sans ani 
Editore, 1956), p. 1. 
20 u s · · r1 bl t · · go p1r1to, pro ema 1c1smo (Florence: G. C. Sansoni Editore, 
1948), p. 1. 
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position of realizing that he or she has not yet understood another's 
point of view, cannot make judgments, and out of nonjudging can only 
21 love. 
After World War II, Spirito continued to teach at the University 
of Rome and to publish on various themes. Some of his postwar books 
are: I1 problematicismo (Problematicism), 1948; La vita come 
~ (Life as Love), 1952; Significate del nostro tempo (The Meaning of 
Our Time), 1955; La riforma della scuola (The Reform of Schooling), 
1956; Nuovo umanesimo (New Humanism), 1964; I1 fallimento della scuola 
italiana (The Failure of the Italian School), 1971; and L'avvenire dei 
giovani (The Future of Youth), 1972. Spirito also edited journals and 
anthologies and served as president of the Giovanni Gentile Foundation 
for philosophical studies. He died in Rome in 1979. 
Life and the Critical Attitude 
There are tensions evident in Spirito's work, and one of the most 
obvious is his alternation between criticism and attempts to define a 
position of nonjudgment. One who wishes to understand Spirito must keep 
in mind the progression of metaphors: life as research, then as art, 
and finally, as love. The nonjudgmental attitude advocated in La vita 
come amore is Spirito's attempt to solve the problem that he inherited 
from Gentile, that of dualism. 22 In judgment there is dualism, for the 
one who is judging must stand apart from the object of judgment. By not 
21n · · · d · f ·1 f · 1976 d 1z1onar1o e1 1 oso 1, e., s.v. "Spirito, Ugo." 
22Dizionario dei filosofi, 1976 ed., s.v. "Spirito, Ugo." 
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judging, Spirito contends, we achieve a superior comprehension and a 
resulting unity: 
We are dealing, then, with drawing close to our neighbor to under-
stand, to begin a discussion without judgments and without preju-
dices, with the goal of making otherness vanish. 23 
Even what was once seen as negative can be viewed positively in terms of 
its genesis and its function within a system. By using this approach, 
one can allow everything its own center; thus Spirito's thought went 
beyond nonjudgmental problematicism to what has been called omnicen-
trism. This omnicentrism was more than abstract speculation for Spir-
ito; he saw traces of it in the intellectual remaking of postwar Europe, 
and he predicted that its consequences would include a breakdown of old 
philosophical doctrines and an erasure of the boundaries between disci-
plines, leading to a new unity of knowledge. Spirito was particularly 
interested in uniting philosophy with science and technology for the 
creation of a new society informed by scientific values. 
Had Spirito followed his own teachings on omnicentrism and 
nonjudgmental love to an extreme, his philosophy might have ended up 
immobilized and laden with contradictions. Rather, he chose to ignore 
the contradiction in maintaining an attitude of total openness while 
carrying on unrelenting criticism. It was in criticism, a requirement 
of the "life as research" metaphor, that Ugo Spirito excelled in his 
later publications. His prose, unlike that of many of his contemporar-
ies, is clear and forceful, to the point of being abrasive. 
23 Ugo Spirito, La vita come amore (Florence: G. C. Sansoni Editore, 
1953), p. 34. 
197 
With regard to the critical attitude, there is a particularly 
characteristic passage that occurs at the beginning of La vita come 
ricerca and sets the tone for the entire book: 
To think means to object. The naive person listens and believes; 
he passively receives the word from another, in much the same way as 
his eyes receive light. After the first doubt flourishes in his 
soul and he acquires understanding, little by little, he replaces 
dogma with "the problem," and thought springs forth. He not only 
listens, but he reacts and speaks. The first word that gives life 
to his speech, nurturing it with his entire personality--the first 
word, in fact, in which the personality discovers and affirms 
itself, is a terrible monosyllable: but. 24 
The Future of Education 
In the decades following World War II, Ugo Spirito said "but" many 
times. He played the role of social philosopher and critic, and in his 
books he turned his critical eye upon many areas of human endeavor. One 
particularly wide-ranging book is Significate del nostro tempo (The 
Meaning of Our Time), published in 1955. Its chapter on education ("The 
Situation and Future of Pedagogy") contains some of Spirito's more 
important and typical statements about that enterprise. 
Spirito begins that chapter with a discourse on the history of 
Italian education that to an extent defends the legacy of positivism, 
and he traces the "crisis" in Italian education to Gentile's Summary of 
Education as a Philosophical Science, published in 1913-1914. 25 The 
idealists, Spirito contends, rejected the scientific approach to educa-
24Ugo Spirito, La vita come ricerca 
Editore, 1937; 1943), p. 7. 
(Florence: G. C. Sansoni 
25ugo Spirito, Significate del nostro tempo 
Sansoni Editore, 1955), p. 304 ff. 
(Florence: G. C. 
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tion and brought a virtual halt to psychological and sociological 
inquiry. The identification of pedagogy with philosophy led to confu-
sion among teachers and a breakdown of sound teaching practice. Yet 
idealism had one positive effect in that it made Italian educators more 
critical of the "naive" presuppositions of foreign educators; thus, 
foreign pedagogy cannot be imported successfully into Italy. The proper 
approach, he insists, is that of the problematicist, the one who works 
on the metaphysical plane of radical investigation. 
The Complexity of Education 
An excerpt from Significate del nostro tempo reveals some of 
Spirito's reflections on the problem of education: 
Problematicity in the field of properly pedagogical studies has 
taken on two essential aspects that have to do with the means and 
the ends of the educational undertaking. With reference to the 
means, we are ever more clearly aware of the character of extreme 
complexity and also of organic unity in every manifestation of life. 
The idealistic principle of the universal individual, whether one 
still wishes to conceive it historically and immanentistically, or 
if one wishes to translate it into the terms of transcendental real-
ism, has become such a target of our critical sensibilities as to 
render it almost impossible to isolate any of its ramifications or 
any group of ramifications to remake it into a principle or a law. 
That, expressed in pedagogical terms, means that we have no serious 
basis on which to presume to know the practical consequences of any 
of our actions upon the psycho-spiritual development of the student. 
An educative act, in fact, acquires a meaning and efficacy that 
result from the systematic combination of all of the other educative 
acts of ourselves and others, in the family, the school, and soci-
ety: within a system, that is, of infinite elements that cannot be 
known and controlled. Within the heart of the student, our every 
word has an individual echo of all reality. And into this reality 
enters not only what we usually call the spiritual element, but also 
what we hold to be natural, biological, and physiological. Above 
all, there exists a world of which we have only a hazy notion when 
we speak of unconscious or subconscious. The foregoing explains the 
enormous differences that can be demonstrated and are always appear-
ing, in effect, in the educational results obtained under apparently 
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identical conditions by students who are relatively alike. The 
relative effects of these differences are in reality always greater 
than we generally recognize, a result of our conventional habit of 
judging the most apparent and extrinsic outcomes, allowing the 
escape of that which lives, in most intimate and hidden ways, in the 
human soul. 
This specif'ic awareness cannot fail to hinder the will of the 
educator and to leave him or her extremely perplexed. But while 
Rousseau could soothe himself with the idea of negative education, 
now the negative has become equivalent to the positive, and the act 
of teaching or the failure to act are both revealed as deeds. 
Educational theory fails, but man continues to educate in spite of 
his unwillingness and his lack of knowledge. Parents take part in 
the miracle of raising children in whom they do not recognize them-
selves; teachers perceive that their students have learned in a way 
that is different from or contrary to the way in which they have 
been taught. But fathers and teachers, perhaps without noticing it, 
have contributed directly to the results about which they complain. 
How, then, shall we educate if we do not have an adequate possi-
bility of evaluating the means that we have and their suitability to 
the ends? This question implies a preliminary issue that threatens 
to compromise the very existence of pedagogy, or, at least, to 
destroy all of its normative meaning. Between educator and student 
a dualism is created that does not allow rationality in the rela-
tionship, nor thus, a determination of its value. 
To the problematicity of the means is added that of the end, and 
as burdensome as the former may be, its weightiness necessarily 
takes second place when confronted with the latter. The Catholics 
know why they educate; the Communists know why; the idealists know 
why; and in general anyone who lives within a metaphysical system 
and believes himself in possession of truth knows why. But this 
means that education is shattered into educational theories, that 
philosophy or science is multiplied into philosophies or sciences, 
and therefore, that the work of education is carried on in different 
and contrasting ways, with results destined to contradict one 
another and to fuel the discord in our public life. Pedagogy, far 
from being the guarantee of a process of spiritual unification, 
becomes an instrument of contention and exhausts itself in the 
pursuit of narrow ends. If, then, pedagogy frees itself from the 
bonds of a particular metaphysical system because it recognizes the 
system's dogmatic character in a critical way, the multiplicity of 
ends may be overcome and it may be redirected to a single task, but 
the single end also becomes problematic in that it reveals the lack 
of a settled metaphysical basis. The certainty of value fails, and 
thus the ideal for which to educate; and the aim is moved towards 
the infinite, transcending the more strictly pedagogical research. 
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The crisis of educational theory flows into the more engulfing 
metaphysical crisis and has value only in exemplifying one of its 
aspects. 26 
In the preceding passage, the concern of the uprooted idealist is 
expressed: Spirito sees "problematicity" as regards both the means and 
end of education in the new era; but the real crisis is that of metaphy-
sics. Without a metaphysical system on which to ground one's thinking, 
how is it possible to formulate a rationale for education (something 
that Catholics, Communists, and idealists have), and to derive from it 
appropriate methods of teaching? The idealist notion of the "universal 
individual" has been destroyed, and curiously, Spirito argues that with-
out it, nothing can be generalized or predicted about education. (One 
may object that he generalizes about this ungeneralizability.) 
With laudable clarity, Spirito delineates the phenomenological-
epistemological-psychological problem of teaching: within each 
student's head, the world reverberates in a slightly different way, and 
therefore the outcome of any preplanned act of teaching27 is in doubt. 
The factors that influence teaching are "natural, biological, and physi-
ological" as well as what Spirito, still using the idealists' vocabu-
lary, calls "spiritual" (meaning "mental" in the most abstract sense). 
Yet the educator (the teacher, parent, or whoever plays that role) must 
26Spirito, Significate del nostro tempo, pp. 309-312. 
27The term "act" of teaching is a translation of the Italian inter-
~' a word used to mean anything that one does formally and inten-
tionally to influence another; the same word is used in medical circles 
to mean "a surgical operation." Some dictionaries translate it as 
II • II ~nterference. 
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go on educating, and so that person contributes without foreknowledge to 
the results obtained. 
What a system of metaphysics would provide for Spirito is a means 
of declaring a fixed end of education (whatever harmonizes with the 
metaphysical judgment of "what is") and a standard for measuring the 
means employed to that end. Only in such a system may the "normative 
meaning" of education be derived; here Spirito reveals how swiftly and 
necessarily the metaphysical leads to the axiological in the idealist 
system that he rejects. When he says that a "dualism" is created, he 
means the dualism outlined in his preceding paragraph: while the ideal-
ists believe that the teacher and student coincide in an ideal unity, 
the inability of teachers to foresee the effects of their teaching 
suggests otherwise. There is in fact a barrier between teacher and 
student that destroys the relationship's "rationality" (that would allow 
y to be predicted from x) and disallows the possibility of determining 
the ideal value of what has taken place (empirical evaluations notwith-
standing). 
Freeing education from a particular metaphysical system may remove 
it from essentially ideological conflicts, but the end it is to serve 
then becomes problematic without a rigid system of values springing from 
any metaphysical source. In this 1955 publication, Spirito suggests 
only that the "pedagogical journey" toward the solution of the problem 
is difficult and complex, and that it is an act of courage to bare the 
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~~egative character" of its point of departure. 28 
fedagogy and Social Progress 
Spirito 1 s pedagogical (and ideological) journey did not stop at 
that point of departure. In 1956, he examined the problems of education 
in detail and published a book called La riforma della scuola (The 
Reform of Schooling). In that book, Spirito 1 s criticisms of Italian 
education are strong and clear. 
The book begins with a discourse on the history of Italian schools 
after the Fascist rise to power in 1922. With some bitterness, Spirito 
recalls the political struggles that disillusioned some of the younger 
men associated with the movement. The Fascists believed that they were 
producing revolutionary reforms in education, but the various factions 
within Fascism were not in complete agreement on what reforms were 
needed. When it became clear that Minister Gentile 1 s reform was not 
succeeding as envisioned, the 1938 (Bottai) reform law was passed to 
create some fundamental changes in Italian education. There arose 
class-oriented controversies over the "labor" provisions of the new law, 
and the implementation of the law was halted by those controversies and 
by the Second World War. The war had a debilitating effect on schools 
and universities by diverting the ablest university students and school-
teachers into armed service, while the less able remained. After the 
war, when new ideas were needed, the strongest influence was the Ameri-
can ideology promoted by "some American colonel" (obviously Washburne); 
28 
Spirito, La riforma della scuola, p. 313. 
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the principal change was the inclusion of psychology in teacher training 
courses, but in any case the reforms were short-lived. The ruling 
middle class did not care for innovation, and the general incompetence 
of teachers and professors forestalled effective reform. Thus, in the 
postwar era, Italian schools remained essentially the schools of Gentile 
and Bottai. Reform attempts reached a crisis point when the Gonella 
reform commission of 1947-1949 tried to change the schools to please 
everyone; the resulting plan was a jumble that soon ended in the waste-
basket. Spirito concludes this section by affirming that genuine school 
reform is necessary, but he takes the radical position that simple 
efforts to improve the existing school system are doomed to inadequacy: 
Primarily, no one has noticed that the question (of school reform) 
has a political and social foundation that is the same as that of 
today's civilization; and it imposes requirements of a revolutionary 
type that are valid for the schools only insofar as they are valid 
for the entire structure of our society. 29 
The failure of the modern democratic government, Spirito claims, is that 
it has not understood that the Fascist sun has set and that idealistic 
historicism and the 1923 Gentile reform no longer have a place in the 
world. 
In the second chapter of Riforma della scuola, Spirito argues that 
the central problem of Italian education is the problem of social class: 
an elite school cannot serve the masses, but the bourgeoisie who control 
the government will not stop wanting their children to become (or 
remain) an elite. Thus, writes Spirito, "This is the crux of the prob-
29 Ugo Spirito, Riforma della scuola 
Editore, 1956), p. 22. 
(Florence: G. C. Sansoni 
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lem. All other discussion and all attempts to conceive of it differ-
ently are fatally destined to fall into misunderstanding. " 3 0 Spirito 
contends that the elite school is historically backward and morally 
corrupt. It binds the young with fetters of class prejudice; it serves 
the interests of the ruling class, promoting those who do not deserve to 
be promoted, and denying opportunities to others. It provides a program 
that is difficult and tiresome, but little meaningful learning takes 
place. While these criticisms apply to the secondary schools, the 
universities have suffered their own ills. They have become political 
creatures, ". shrouded in words and arguments." 31 Spirito catalogues 
a host of plagues that afflict the universities--overcrowding, 
incompetence, and curricular absurdities of all sorts. A result of this 
miseducation is a great deal of anxiety over passing and failing, 
getting one's diploma or degree (or not getting it), and choosing among 
prestigious and less-prestigious fields. Political leaders, sympathetic 
to the aspirations of the middle class, condone and perpetuate the 
system. 
In chapter three, Spirito reexamines the "crisis of bourgeois 
society. " 3 2 Talk of school reform accomplishes nothing, he contends, 
because the schools' underlying problems are deliberately ignored. 
Anachronisms persist because they serve the social and political 
30 Spirito, Riforma della scuola, p. 25. 
31 Spirito, Riforma della scuola, p. 45. 
32 Spirito, Riforma della scuola, p. 67. 
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purposes of those in power (the middle class). It would make sense, for 
example, to separate the scientific laureate degree from the profes-
sional doctorate, as preparation and coursework for each are quite 
different; but all bourgeois university graduates want to be called 
"doctor" no matter what they have studied. The result is a cheapened 
bestowal of academic titles. Spirito asks whether middle-class influ-
ence can be removed from the schools. He suggests that the answer lies 
not in the schools themselves, but in the social process. Spirito 
announces that bourgeois-capitalist regimes are under growing pressure: 
either they will "open their eyes" and be reformed from within, or they 
will be overthrown by violence. 33 A positive reform might begin with a 
general change of attitude toward the manual labor of the "inferior" 
classes. By this and other means, the schools could find their place in 
the context of a new national and international social and political 
life. 
What follows these chapters is the text of Spirito's 1938 report 
to National Education Minister Bottai, a report that makes essentially 
the same assertions as those discussed above. There is then a series of 
essays on problems in particular instructional areas. Spirito ends 
Riforma della scuola with a report on his visit to schools in the 
U.S.S.R. in 1956. There, he believes, the underlying class problems 
have been resolved. He lauds the Soviet schools' open selectivity and 
special efforts to benefit disadvantaged students. He comments favora-
33Spirito, Riforma della scuola, p. 77. 
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bly on the overall planning of Soviet society and the evident 
cooperation between the workplace and the school. In the U. S . S . R. , 
Spirito (the problematicist) sees problems in the process of resolution. 
The intellectual and ideological journey of Ugo Spirito continued. 
A move farther to the left was signalled in a 1962 journal article, "La 
scuola italiana ignora laCina" ("China Is Unknown in Italian Schools"), 
in Riforma della scuola. In the article, Spirito takes Italian schools 
to task for teaching little about the Russian revolution and paying 
virtually no attention to China. Young people turned out by Italian 
middle schools, he contends, know nothing of China and its "heroic" 1949 
revolution, although it is a land as big as Europe, "in full revolution 
and transformation," and bound to influence the future. 34 Thus Italian 
schools preserve an anachronistic world view, and such deliberate igno-
ranee infects Italian culture in general. 
Spirito launches another diatribe against the middle class and 
proposes a major reorientation of Italian schools in Nuovo umane-
simo (New Humanism), published in 1964. The humanism that he advocates 
is not the "old" humanism of middle-class schools, derived from the 
ratio studiorum of the Jesuits and productive of class prejudice: "The 
bourgeois Italian feels himself diminished if his son does not study 
Latin for eight years and Greek for five. " 35 In place of that ethos, 
34 Ugo Spirito, "La scuola italiana ignora la Cina," Riforma della 
scuola 8 (August-September 1962):18. 
35 Ugo Spirito, Nuovo umanesimo 
1964), p. 15. 
(Rome: Armando Armando Editore, 
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Spirito proposes an ever closer social integration, opposing individual 
isolation. That is his intimation of the future, when man's life will 
be essentially social, " ... even if not necessarily linked to social-
ist and communist ideologies." 36 
Spirito's indictment of the "old" humanism rests not only on its 
inherent classism but also on its neglect and mistrust of science. The 
new world that he sees evolving is based on a common understanding of 
science. While theologians and philosophers debate, scientists are able 
to agree on basic facts and principles; with the help of science, ordi-
nary human beings are transforming the world. The new scientific 
mentality leads to new forms of social life. As the values of science 
become supreme, even religion and philosophy must be forged into a new 
synthesis. The outcome that Spirito hopes for is that " ... philosophy 
acquires the very methods of science and is established as a science 
among sciences." 37 
The preceding statement can be related to Spirito's early search 
for a synthesis of science and philosophy when still under the influence 
of the idealists, a quest that is also evident in Life as Research. He 
envisions a scientific-humanistic culture that is unlike the culture of 
modern Italy. It must be, above all, a society of problem solvers, 
communal and collaborative by nature. For an example of its practica-
bility, Spirito points to China, where, free of burdensome Western 
36Ugo Spirito, Nuevo umanesimo, p. 7. 
37 spirito, Nuevo umanesimo, p. 31. 
traditions, the Chinese exhibit " 
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. the premonitory signs of the 
society of tomorrow ... 1138 To guard against such a society becoming 
mechanistic and conformistic, it must educate for individual competence 
and the expression of personality through creative work. Among its 
science, Spirito asserts, must be "the science or art of living," aimed 
at educating for "happiness." 39 
Spirito concludes this book with a lengthy retrospective discus-
sion of the humanistic concepts of Gentile and Croce, which he criti-
cizes as concepts that were insufficient to change Italian culture in 
any significant way. Their failure, nevertheless, gives Spirito hope 
for the creation of a rationalistic, scientific, and socialistic soci-
ety; as long as neo-Hegelian idealism has been overcome, the way to the 
future is clear. 
Ugo Spirito continued to teach and write in the 1960's and 1970's. 
His interests extended through a variety of topics related to philosophy 
and education; but neither the upheavals of the late 1960's nor the 
changes wrought in their aftermath did much to alter his post-Gentilian 
problematicism. 
38Spirito, Nuovo umanesimo, p. 33. 
39Spirito, Nuovo umanesimo, pp. 134-153. 
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Banfi's Disciple: Bertin 
Both Ugo Spirito and Antonio Banfi followed the professorial 
tradition of training younger scholars in their methods and particular 
interests. In his later years, Ugo Spirito was a popular teacher of 
philosophy at the University of Rome. Antonio Banfi's appeal was more 
esoteric, yet in his role as professor of philosophy at the University 
of Milan, he was able to instruct a small but devoted band of students 
who followed careers in philosophy based on interests of their teacher. 
Banfi's heir in philosophy of education was Giovanni Maria Bertin. 
Bertin was born in Ballo di Mirano (Venezia Province) on September 
7, 1912. He attended the University of Palermo in the early 1930's, but 
transferred to the University of Milan, where he received a degree in 
philosophy in 1935. (Bertin's mentor, Antonio Banfi, had begun teaching 
at the University of Milan in 1932.) In 1937 and 1938, Bertin taught 
philosophy and pedagogy at the Teacher Training Institute of Vibo Valen-
tia. He transferred to a high school teaching position in 1938, and in 
that year he married Maria L. Orgnieri. For the next eleven years, 
Bertin taught philosophy at the state classical high school of Busto 
Arsizio (northwest of Milan); after that period, he occupied a similar 
position at the "C. Beccaria" classical high school of Milan, where he 
remained until 1953. From 1945 to 1953, concurrent with his high school 
teaching duties, he held an instructorship in pedagogy and moral philos-
ophy at the University of Milan. In 1953, Bertin was selected for 
appointment to a chair in pedagogy at the University of Catania, in 
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Sicily. He remained in Sicily for four years and then became a 
professor of pedagogy in the division of teacher training at the Univer-
sity of Bologna, where he has remained to date. 40 
Bertin's first publication was, appropriately, a bio- bibliograph-
ical study of Antonio Banfi (1943). Three books on specific topics in 
philosophy were followed by Introduzione al problematicismo pedagogico 
(Introduction to Pedagogical Problematicism), published in 1951. His 
next publication on education was Etica e pedagogia dell'impegno (The 
Ethics and Pedagogy of Commitment), 1953; that was soon followed by 
Stampa, spettacolo, ed educazione (The Press, Entertainment, and Educa-
tion), 1957; Aspetti e problemi della scuola italiana (Aspects and 
Problems of Italian Schools), 1957; Il problematicismo pedagogico e le 
sue aporie (Pedagogical Problematicism and Its Pitfalls), 1957; Esis-
tenzialismo Marxiso Problematicismo (Existentialism, Marxism, and 
Problematicism, an essay on ideology with strong implicationsfor educa-
tion), 1960; La pedagogia umanistica europea nei secoli XV e XVI (Euro-
pean Humanistic Pedagogy in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries), 
1961; L'idea pedagogica e il principia di ragione in A. Banfi (The Idea 
of Pedagogy and the Principle of Reason in A. Banfi), 1961; Educazione 
alla socialita e processo di formazione (Education for Socialization 
and the Process of Development), 1962, reissued in 1968; Scuola e soci-
et~ in Italia (School and Society in Italy), 1964; Scuola e riforme 
educative (School and Educational Reforms), 1965; Educazione alla 
40La mia pedagogia (Padua: Liviana, 1972), p. 92. 
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ragione: Lezioni di pedagogia generale (Education Toward Reason: 
Readings in General Pedagogy), 1968; and still others that appeared in 
the 1970's. Among Bertin's publications that did not focus on education 
were works on esthetics, medieval mysticism, ancient Greek philosophers, 
and the personalism of a Swiss philosopher, Ernst Hello. Evidently, 
Bertin's output on education increased considerably after his 1953 
appointment to a university chair in that subject. 
A Poet Finds a Philosophy 
In his autobiographical sketch furnished for the anthology, La mia 
pedagogia (My Pedagogy), G. M. Bertin outlines his intellectual develop-
ment as a youth and his eventual attraction to philosophy. 41 He was, by 
his own account, an irrationalist and near solipsist, drawn to the 
literature of esthetics and religion. His early philosophical concerns 
were chiefly "metaphysical"; as he explains, " ... the problems that 
interested me most concerned the origin and destiny of man, the nature 
of reality, and the ultimate meaning of life. 1142 Bertin's attraction to 
Catholicism was diminished by exposure to positivist (scientific) 
authors, but until the early 1930's he continued to study romantic writ-
ers and went so far as to write poems and short stories, some of which 
were published in a Palermo literary paper. He reports that his liter-
ary characters were creatures of fantasy, filled with "desperation" and 
41 Giovanni Maria Bertin, in La mia pedagogia 
Editrice, 1972), pp. 67-93. 
42 La mia pedagogia, p. 70. 
(Padua: Liviana 
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a longing for peace. 
At the University of Palermo, Bertin became familiar with the 
nee-Hegelian idealism of Gino Ferretti and Vito Fazio-Allmayer. In his 
own attempts at philosophy, Bertin was still quite subjectivistic and 
irrationalistic. When he transferred to the University of Milan in 
1933, Bertin encountered Antonio Banfi. There, in a small group of 
students that Banfi had formed, Bertin's views were subjected to 
rational criticism, and he began to move toward an understanding of 
Banfi 's "transcendental reason." In that period, Bertin's interests in 
metaphysics and esthetics waned somewhat, and he developed new interests 
in ethics and education. Under Banfi' s tutelage, Bertin learned of 
Husserl' s phenomenology and its value as a methodology for analyzing 
cultural experience. Bertin did not entirely abandon his interest in 
Christianity, but under Banfi' s influence he came to believe that the 
Christian message had been misunderstood by organized religions, leading 
to the churches' support of a conservative social order and their resis-
tance to social and cultural change. 
Subjective elements remained in Bertin's philosophy through the 
early war years, even though he came to share Banfi's ideal of a postwar 
economy based on practical, collectivist structures in which the scien-
tific and technical elements would dominate. Perhaps as a result of his 
early interest in esthetics, Bertin retained a vision, in the postwar 
years, of a pedagogy capable of allowing emotion and interior equilib-
rium to complement the forces of rational intellect and practical 
213 
concern. Nevertheless, Bertin admitted that esthetism could assert 
contemporary relevance only by fitting into the political, economic, and 
social situations defined by history. These curious assertions seem to 
mean that an esthetic or religious outlook is permissible and even 
advantageous, but only if it does not shut the individual in an ivory 
tower of subjectivism, " .. detaching him from the reality in which he 
must work ... with regard to reason. 1143 Bertin developed a psychology 
(partly from Jungian sources) in which opposing psychic forces move in 
dialectic tension, requiring the individual to produce a dynamic person-
ality structure ". . . in relation to the energies and possibilities 
offered by experience." 44 The forces which Bertin refers to here include 
subjectivity and objectivity, individuality and universality; that an 
individual might be expected to construct a personality from them leads 
inevitably to considerations of behavior and learning; hence, to social 
ethics and pedagogy. 
As Bertin's thought developed in the postwar era, he came to see 
philosophy as a discipline whose task is to clarify problems, suggest 
hypotheses, and verify solutions. Bertin intended philosophy, under-
stood in this way, to confront social problems; thus philosophy was to 
have an important social-cultural function. His own social philosophy 
supports a rational socialism against the ideologies of existentialists 
and orthodox Marxists, both of whom he derides as "mystical evaders. " 4 5 
43La mia pedagogia, p. 82. 
44La mia pedagogia, p. 83. 
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Bertin's socialism is an attempt to find a plausible balance between the 
necessary autonomy of the individual and the inevitable connections 
between individuals and social forces. Time and again, Bertin's philo-
sophical writings return to a perennial theme in Italian philosophy, 
that of the conflict between individual man and society. His social 
philosophy and his pedagogy are aimed at finding acceptable solutions to 
that conflict. 
Reflecting on his postwar teaching experience, Bertin recalls his 
high school students as "lively." He confesses that becoming a father 
made him more aware of the needs of young people and stimulated his 
pedagogical thought. Eventually, he came to see the satisfaction of 
youth's developmental and individual needs as a prime area for the 
employment of a problematic approach. In 1957, Bertin had an opportu-
nity to expose teacher-trainees to his style of philosophy and thus to 
affect young people through their teachers. Therefore, after four years 
of teaching pedagogy as an academic subject at the University of Cata-
nia, he eagerly accepted the post offered to him at the teacher training 
institute of the University of Bologna. 
Bertin's Pedagogical Formulations 
The years between 1949 and 1971 were particularly productive for 
Giovanni Maria Bertin in terms of publications: nineteen books and long 
essays appeared in that period. Most of those writings had something to 
do with education, directly or indirectly; but there are a few particu-
451a mia pedagogia, p. 84. 
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larly useful sources in which Bertin discusses his concept of problemat-
icity and spells out its relation to education. 
One particularly illuminating text is Introduzione al problemati-
cismo pedagogico (Introduction to Problematicism in Education), a book 
that was published in 1951. In the first part, Bertin sets forth a 
concept of philosophy as "critical awareness of cultural experience," an 
awareness of problems in the historical-cultural milieu and of the need 
to resolve them rationally. 46 Philosophy of education, then, is a 
particular kind of cultural reflection, aimed at the awareness of prob-
lems in education. Its special function is to delineate the process of 
educational experience, pointing out those kinds of educational experi-
ence which are" ... most apt to comprehend problematicity."47 In other 
words, given the problematic nature of experience, Bertin sees philoso-
phy of education as a guide to the discovery of those educational expe-
riences able to assist the educand in the incessant problem solving 
activity of life. Such a level of consciousness in education has 
another characteristic beside encouraging the solution of problems: it 
fosters opposition to rigid formulae and dogmas. As it was for Banfi 
and Spirito, "antidogmatism" is a watchword for Bertin; the problemati-
cist's assumption is that dogmatism can in no way meet the challenge of 
experience, as dogma of any kind (philosophical, social, or religious) 
implies rigidity, while the attitude of problematicity is a response to 
46 Giovanni Maria Bertin, Introduzione al problematicismo pedagogico 
(Milan: Dott. Carlo Marzorati Editore, 1951), p. 9. 
47 Bertin, Introduzione, p. 10. 
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ongoing change. 
Bertin makes a distinction between philosophy of education and 
pedagogy in this manner: philosophy of education reflects the purely 
theoretical need to comprehend educational experience in its structural 
and universally experiential framework; pedagogy refers to the pragmatic 
need to determine the means and ends of education and their concrete 
possibilities of realization. In this section of Introduzione al prob-
lematicismo pedagogico, Bertin applies himself to the philosophical 
dimension of education (the theoretical understanding), rather than to 
the pedagogical principles that he and others might derive from it. 48 
Basically, the philosophy of education that Bertin outlines is 
dialectical in nature. Educational experience, he argues, can be under-
stood only as a problem, inasmuch as experience never exhausts itself in 
solutions (that is, it does not come to a halt). The nature of that 
problem is best expressed as a process of antinomies whose terms result 
from contrasting positions that nevertheless move education toward 
syntheses. 49 As Bertin tells us, the process conforms to the description 
of a Hegelian dialectic. He finds it possible to analyze education in 
terms of antinomies--a basic antinomy, and others resulting from it. 
Bertin justifies the dialectical method by asserting the partiality of 
all positions, and the awareness that every position is a choice among 
many possibilities and is therefore fatally deficient in some respect 
48Bertin, Introduzione, p. 10. 
49 . Bert1n, Introduzione, p. 11. 
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(that is, in whatever way the alternative is not lacking). 50 
But what is the "basic antinomy" of education to which Bertin 
refers? It is the conflict between the autonomous development of the 
individual and the necessity of integrating that individual's develop-
ment in a larger (social) framework. Ultimately, it is the problem of 
the individual and society. Bertin notes that Banfi saw it as the prob-
lem of personality caught in the individuality/universality conflict 
presented by experience. 51 
In this analysis, Bertin does not attempt to "solve" the problem. 
The only suggestion that he offers here is that no possible position may 
be absolutely excluded; all options remain active forces, even when they 
are negated or absorbed by some other choice. In that configuration, 
they enter into a compromise or equilibrium of some sort. 52 What Bertin 
is saying, in effect, is that problems exist, but final solutions do 
not. Conflict cannot achieve a final resolution, because its elements 
change constantly; what it may achieve is an equilibrium, a temporary 
balance that is subject to an endless process of imbalance and readjust-
ment. 
In the second part of Introduzione al problematicismo pedagogico, 
Bertin discusses what educators must take into account to function 
rationally, and what kinds of problems they are called upon to solve. 
50 Bertin, Introduzione, p. 12. 
51 Bertin 
' 
Introduzione, p. 13. 
52 Bertin , Introduzione, p. 13. 
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In the first place, educational activity deals with the individual; and 
the individual's life may be organized egocentrically, objectively 
(around the demands of others and the environment), or in a creative 
synthesis of the two that Bertin calls "rational" because it resists the 
universal claims of any partial rationale. (That is, it is rational to 
see the shortcomings of any value system, be it one's own or someone 
else's.) That critical and rational orientation, however desirable, 
lacks determinacy in itself and therefore demands a continuous process 
of personal research and action. Contemporary education, Bertin 
suggests, should be constructive and efficacious in assisting the devel-
opment of that rational personality. 53 From Bertin's point of view, to 
educate means to make efficient problem definition the directing princi-
ple of rationality. Critical rationality of that sort allows the indi-
vidual to escape the limits of subjectivity (because other points of 
view become possible), and to resist the temptation of flight into pure 
other-directedness; it gives the individual confidence in the force of 
rationality. Bertin here contrasts rational pedagogy with what he 
considers irrational positions. Among the irrational pedagogies are 
individualism and "sociologism" (Deweyan or Marxist-oriented theories); 
these enclose the individual in limited structures of individuality or 
community. Bertin suggests that educational thought must have a goal of 
universality, inasmuch as universality (not in the vulgar Fascist sense, 
but as an abstract ideal) signals the desired overcoming of any limited 
53Bertin, Introduzione, p. 36. 
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formulation. To pursue universality, Bertin (faithful to Banfi's 
vision) proposes rationality: reason is the tool by which one critiques 
all forms of dogmatic and normative pedagogy, leaving the individual 
free to seek. true universality through whatever constructive efforts he 
or she might make in the process of living; and reason is especially 
apparent in the choice and organization of a value system. 54 
The mention of a value system inevitably brings up the matter of 
ethics. According to Bertin, the search for (impartial) universality 
gives educational thought an essentially ethical character, inasmuch as 
it is on the ethical plane that questions of the interaction of individ-
ual and community must be answered. They are, in effect, ethical ques-
tions. For the individual to deal with ethical problems, it is 
supremely necessary for a moral sense to be developed within, hence the 
need for moral education. Such education begins with the creation of 
optimal conditions: the educand must not be allowed to lapse into anar-
chic subjectivity, nor to be closed in by social authoritarianism. In 
the school setting, something like self-government is useful in creating 
the appropriate conditions for learning to synthesize individual needs 
with the needs of others. The educator must seek to develop three 
desirable attitudes in the learner: courage and self-affirmation, will-
ingness to understand others and compromise, and a relentless desire to 
undertake actions combining both forces. 55 
54Bertin, Introduzione, p. 37. 
55Bertin, Introduzione, p. 37. 
220 
To assist in the creation of constructive ethical attitudes, 
Bertin requires an education of the intellect that is of a clearly 
critico-rational nature. Such education must be historical and critical 
on the one hand, and technical and experimental on the other, so that 
human experience is revealed to the learner as a process of incessant 
development toward rationality. Applied to instruction, the critico-ra-
tional method must affirm a principle of "infinite problematicity," 
resisting any definite trend toward child-centered or authoritarian 
education (the two poles of contemporary education). 
Inasmuch as education (in Bertin's view) aims to unite the objec-
tive and subjective, the exterior reality with the individual person, it 
must not neglect either (objective) matters of intellect or (subjective) 
matters of the personality. The latter area corresponds to the affec-
tive domain. The individual must be guarded from allowing the subjec-
tive and affective to control his or her life; rather, the individual 
must learn to utilize the creative urges that originate in the psyche. 
In the course of developing an "ethical integrality" in the person, an 
"esthetic horizon" must be formed where the individual may enjoy a 
II 
richness and fineness of lyrical resonances from the entire expe-
rience of the world and of things. " 56 When education deals with such 
concerns, it is fundamentally esthetic. 
56 Bertin, Introduzione, p. 38. 
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Finally, Bertin warns that professional training of any type must 
not undo the work of critico-rational education. The danger is that it 
will encourage a technocentric viewpoint, impoverishing and restricting 
that open and constructive horizon that is the foundation of man's 
rationality and the most urgent necessity of contemporary education. 57 
Bertin's theoretical position did not alter appreciably in the 
1950's and 1960's, but he turned his attention increasingly to practical 
issues in education. In Aspetti e problemi della scuola italiana 
(Aspects and Problems of Italian Schooling), published in 1956, he 
begins by stating that he is offering suggestions for the reform of 
schooling in Italy. 58 Nevertheless, he first considers it necessary to 
reexamine the matter of antinomies in education, from the basic individ-
ual/collective antinomy to some of the more subtle (humanism/technology, 
individual/environment). In the course of the discussion, Bertin 
attacks both existentialists and Marxists for their one-sidedness. He 
also rejects Ugo Spirito's position on "love" and "dialogue. " 59 Bertin 
ends the chapter by calling for a simplification, purification, and 
amplification of Italian schooling, especially at the elementary level; 
however, Bertin does not elaborate on those points, but saves his 
specific comments for later chapters in which he deals with such issues 
as the effects of economic conditions on education, the prospects of 
57 Bertin, Introduzione, p. 39. 
58 Giovanni Maria Bertin, Aspetti e problemi della scuola italiana 
(Milan: Dott. Carlo Marzorati Editore, 1956), p. 5. 
59 Bertin, Aspetti e problemi, p. 30. 
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reform programs, and the teaching of mathematics and philosophy. 
In 1964, Bertin published Scuola e societ~ in Italia (School and 
Society in Italy), a book of practical material and discussion that 
arose out of a conference in which Bertin participated, the subject of 
which was schooling and Italian society in transformation. It is 
replete with facts and figures on social and economic progress and 
school situations worldwide, as well as on the state of schooling in 
Italy and numerous aspects of its development. The book illustrates 
Bertin's ability to apply himself (and his philosophical approach) to 
problems of a concrete nature. The concerns which it expresses provide 
a fitting and not totally unexpected counterpart to the issues of a more 
theoretical nature dealt with in earlier writings. 
It is not surprising that Giovanni Maria Bertin enjoys a position 
of respect among many of his colleagues in education in Italy. Although 
a student of Banfi, Bertin has managed to avoid the rather distracting 
ideological polemics of his mentor, and without falling into the pecul-
iar aimlessness and tendency toward contradictory speculation that marks 
some of the work of Ugo Spirito, Bertin has demonstrated the efficacy of 
a critico-rational approach to the problems encountered in a life and a 
career. 
Problematicism and Laic Philosophy 
Among the laic philosophies that survived World War II or devel-
oped in the postwar era, problematicism was not a school with large 
numbers of adherents. In whatever ways they developed their philoso-
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phies, and whether they addressed questions of education, ethics, 
economics, or other concerns, the problematicists are of interest prin-
cipally because of their shared disdain for dogmatism, their efforts to 
challenge the "isms" of the Italian cultural past: idealism, histori-
cism, positivism, and Catholicism. Perhaps in their zeal to criticize 
and reform Italian life, they raised too many questions about the famil-
iar world. Moreover, they could not hope to capture the glamor bestowed 
on certain other philosophers by shifts in public opinion and changes in 
Italian political life. In the postwar era, Italian problematicism was 
overshadowed by another laic school that employed a similar problem 
solving approach and was especially favored because of its association 
with the recently victorious Americans: Problematicism had to compete 
with Deweyanism. 
CHAPTER VI 
JOHN DEWEY AND THE SCHOOL OF FLORENCE 
Of the laic schools of pedagogical thought that existed in Italy 
between 1945 and 1965, one was a major and relatively new development in 
the Italian cultural milieu. The School of Florence, developed around 
Deweyan principles and related to progressive education movements else-
where in Europe, attracted considerable attention among Italian intel-
lectuals and also produced a wave of new publications in philosophy and 
educational theory. Its history and evolution is of considerable inter-
est because it represents, in part, a foreign and particularly "Ameri-
can" influence that was one of the cultural consequences of the Second 
World \~ar. 
American Philosophy and Italian Pedagogy 
Although Italy had historically forged links to the New World from 
the time of the voyages of discovery through the era of massive emigra-
tion, the cultural products of European settlers in America were not 
taken quite seriously by Italians before the Second World War. American 
philosophers, for example, were not generally thought to be sufficiently 
steeped in the culture of centuries to be able to compete with their 
European counterparts. Americans were obviously capable of impressive 
technical and industrial achievements, but it was commonly held that as 
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intellectuals they lacked profondit~ --"depth." 1 
The Allied victory created the psychological conditions necessary 
for a change in attitude toward America. If the U.S.A. was the chief 
power on the winning side in the war, then perhaps she deserved closer 
scrutiny, or even emulation. The American victory may have been due to 
superiority in manpower, weapons, and industrial production, but the 
Italians could easily interpret it in another way; they had a widespread 
belief in the arbitrary power of history. Indeed, even Hegel had once 
prophesied that America's time as a world power would come. If that 
time had arrived, then the Europeans had best study America and the 
Americans. Among American philosophers and educators in the postwar 
era, none was more prominent than John Dewey, and no one was more arche-
typally "American" in attitude. Although some familiarity with Dewey's 
works had existed among Italian scholars before the war, a widespread 
interest was awakened in the late 1940's when a group at the University 
of Florence began intensive study and translation of Dewey. From that 
time on, Dewey's importance in the intellectual milieu was assured, and 
many came to familiarize themselves with the thought of the newly 
respected great American philosopher. 
~he verb approfondire--"to deepen," related to the noun profondit~. 
is commonly understood as a metaphor suggesting the digging of a hole to 
get to the bottom of things; the goal is to find out what the phenomena 
in question are "based" on, hence it is a "grounding" metaphor. See the 
Lessico universale italiano, 1969 ed., s.v. approfondire. 
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Defining Deweyanism 
One of the first problems in presenting Dewey's thought to the 
Italian intelligentsia was that of finding appropriate 
denominations--ways of categorizing it for a public that knew nothing of 
pragmatism or instrumentalism, or at best had negative associations with 
such terms. Although Ernesto Codignola continued to insist that Dewey 
was part of the Hegelian idealist tradition, to consider Dewey as a 
representative of that discredited school would not have made him 
attractive to the postwar generation of Italian philosophers and educa-
tors. It made more sense to find a new term for Dewey's corpus of 
ideas, a term that would be meaningful in a positive way. The words 
"progressive" and "progressivism," often used in the United States, do 
not translate well into Italian, as progressive means "graduating by 
steps or degrees," as in the case of a tax; obviously, traditional 
schools proceed by grades or steps, a recollection that the Deweyans 
wanted to avoid. The term Deweyismo is sometimes found in the litera-
ture, but it does nothing to explain what Dewey is about. 
Some Italian scholars of the postwar era noted a similarity 
between Dewey's educational theories and those of Durkheim. 2 It is true 
that many of the European members of the New Education Fellowship were 
not schooled in the Deweyan tradition, but in that of the French sociol-
ogists. Clearly, there is a "social" emphasis in Dewey's work that 
harmonizes with that bias in Durkheim. For both Dewey and Durkheim, it 
2Fabrizio Ravaglioli, Profile delle teorie moderne dell' educazione 
(Rome: Armando Armando Editore, 1980), p. 44. 
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bas been pointed out, education " ... coincides with the process of 
socialization." 3 Thus, it was (and is) not uncommon for Italian scholars 
to refer to Dewey's pedagogy as a form of sociologismo, meaning "sociol-
' II ogl.sm. 
By far the most common descriptive word used in Italy to denote 
Dewey's philosophical and educational theories is attivismo--"activism." 
As a philosophical term, it is evocative of the socialistic writings of 
Georges Sorel (French, 1847-1922), for whom a social philosophy is a 
myth to unite the working class and to inspire it to action in the 
interest of overcoming its oppressors. More generally, however, attiv-
ismo denotes an attitude that influences the subordination of abstract 
values to the demands of action, and particularly to the outcomes or 
success of projected action that is of a political nature. 4 A less 
political construction of attivismo is also possible. It may mean 
simply the tendency to affirm the primacy of practical activity over 
theorizing, placing emphasis on the autonomous and dynamic possibilities 
of one who acts rather than on the passive and purely mechanical aspects 
of a situation. 5 For educators, the term attivismo had a particularly 
fortunate association with the most salient feature of Deweyan 
education--the continual activity of the children. That activity is in 
clear contrast to the character of the traditional Italian classroom, 
3Ravaglioli, Profilo delle teorie, p. 44. 
4Dizionario di filosofia, 1977 ed., s.v. "attivismo." 
5Dizionario delle idee, 1977 ed., s.v. "attivismo." 
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the scuola seduta or "seated school" where the children sit at their 
desks, listen to lectures, answer a barrage of questions, and write 
copiously in their notebooks. Thus, from a philosophical standpoint 
(emphasizing action over speculation) and from a teacher's viewpoint 
(experiencing active rather than passive learning), attivismo seems an 
appropriate term to denote Dewey's thought; from the 1940's onward, it 
has been so used. 
It is important to note, however, that activism or attivismo does 
not refer exclusively to Deweyan pedagogy. An educational activist 
movement existed in Europe long before World War II; the general term 
was applied to the activities of a host of progressive and innovative 
educators that included the Englishmen Cecil Reddie (1858-1932) and J. 
Haden Badley (1865-1940), the Germans Hermann Lietz (1868-1919) and 
Georg Kerschensteiner (1854-1932), the Frenchmen Edmond Desmolins 
(1852-1907) and Roger Cousinet (1881-1973), the Spaniard Andres Manj~n 
(1848-1926), the Swiss Adolphe Ferri~re (1879-1960) and Edouard Clapa-
r~de (1873-1940), and the Belgian Ovide Decroly (1871-1932). 6 Activism, 
as the Europeans understood it, was a movement that had many adherents; 
but in the post-World War II era, Dewey became a major source of inspi-
ration for the activists, largely because his extensive system of philo-
sophical and educational thought became available to educators by means 
6M . M 11" "Il . d 11' tt" . II • N t" . ar1o encare 1, mov1mento e a 1v1smo, 1n uove ques 10n1 
di storia della pedagogia (Brescia: Editrice La Scuola, 1977), 
3:381-465. This essay also mentions several Italian educators among the 
Pioneer activists; curiously, they are associated almost exclusively 
with preschool and early elementary education. 
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of numerous publications. 
John Dewey's Progress in Italy 
Long before World War II, John Dewey's philosophy and educational 
thought were known in Italy. Curiously, Dewey himself seems to have had 
little to do with the Italians. In Dykhuizen' s carefully researched 
biography of Dewey, only a few references to Italy appear. According to 
this source, Dewey and his family spent some time in Italy in 1894 and 
1895; early in 1895, Dewey's son Morris, aged two and a half, contracted 
diphtheria and died in Milan. 7 The Deweys went to Europe again in 1904, 
and this time their eight-year-old son Gordon contracted typhoid and 
died in Ireland. On a visit to Italy shortly thereafter, the Deweys 
adopted an Italian boy named Sabino who was about the same age as 
Gordon. 8 There are no mentions of scholarly contacts made by Dewey on 
those trips to Italy, and in view of the tragic family events oversha-
dowing those journeys, it would not be surprising if Dewey had 
restricted his attention to family matters. In later years, Dewey trav-
eled widely, visiting China and Japan, the U.S.S.R., Turkey, and Mexico, 
but there is no evidence to suggest further travel in Italy. Perhaps a 
diligent search of archival material would reveal scholarly contacts 
with Italians, but neither Dykhuizen nor Dewey's daughter, Jane, sees 
fit to discuss any "Italian connection" of John Dewey in the scholarly 
7George Dykhuizen, The Life and Mind of John Dewey 
Southern Illinois University Press, 1973), p. 79. 
Boykhuizen, The Life and Mind of John Dewey, p. 115. 
(Carbondale: 
230 
world. 
By whatever means Dewey's fame as a philosopher and educator may 
have traveled in the early twentieth century, it is safe to say that he 
came to enjoy a worldwide reputation. His books were translated into 
manY languages and were discussed by scholars everywhere. The first 
Italian translation of Dewey was of excerpts from School and Society. 
They appeared in an article on Dewey written by Giuseppe Lombardo-Rad-
ice, the Hegelian idealist philosopher. 9 Although Lombardo-Radice devel-
oped and retained an interest in Dewey's instructional theories, he 
rejected the American scholar's philosophical formulations and tried to 
reinterpret Dewey's work to harmonize with the tenets of idealism. A 
complete translation of School and Society appeared in 1915, and was 
the work of Giuseppina Di Laghi, who was a student of Lombardo-Radice. 10 
In 1930, Italian interest in Dewey was stimulated from another quarter 
when Giovanni Vidari (1871-1934), a Christian spiritualist philosopher, 
went to the United States to deliver a series of lectures at the Univer-
sity of California at Berkeley. While there, Vidari developed an inter-
est in Dewey's theories, which he later introduced to his own students 
in Italy. 11 A translation of Reconstruction in Philosophy was published 
by Laterza of Bari in 1931, the work of Guido De Ruggiero (1888-1948), a 
9 Francesco Cafaro, "John Dewey e il pensiero italiano," L' Italia che 
scrive 33 (July 1950):1. 
lOG · 11 F d . . V . ' "L f d ' J hn D . I 1 . " raz1e a e er1c1 escov1n1, a ortuna 1 o ewey 1n ta 1a, 
Rivista di filosofia 53 (January 1961):64. 
11 Cafaro, "John Dewey e il pensiero," p.l. 
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noted liberal historian, philosopher, and educator. De Ruggiero wrote 
an introduction to the book which was also published as an article in La 
critica, a journal edited by Benedetto Croce. 12 
The first major Italian study of Dewey's work appeared in 1939. 
This was I1 pensiero di Giovanni Dewey (The Thought of John Dewey) by 
Maria Teresa Gillio-Tos, published by Loffredo of Naples. Gillio-Tos 
was a member of a religious order and a student of Bernardino Varisco 
(1850-1933), an idealist philosopher with religious leanings. The 
publication was an effort to analyze all of Dewey's works from his first 
article of 1886 to A Common Faith of 1934. Although her research was 
thorough and scholarly, Gillio-Tos missed no opportunity to criticize 
Dewey from a religious and absolutistic viewpoint. 
Thus Dewey had been introduced to the Italians before the Second 
World War, but to a large extent by persons who wished to critique 
Dewey, reinterpret him, or incorporate elements of his thought into a 
system that was not his. For example, Giuseppe Lombardo-Radice and 
Ernesto Codignola discovered what they presumed were Hegelian elements 
in Dewey's thought and sought thereby to make him more palatable to 
Italians who were familiar with nee-Hegelian idealism. It was not until 
after World War II that less biased interpretations of Dewey began to 
appear in Italian publications in sizable numbers. In addition, numer-
ous Italian translations of Dewey's writings began to appear in 1949 and 
12Cafaro, "John Dewey e il pensiero," p. 1. The translations by Di 
Laghi and De Ruggiero are corroborated in Jo Ann Boydston and Robert L. 
Andresen, John Dewey: A Checklist of Translations, 1900-1967 (Carbon-
dale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969), pp. 43 and 47. 
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continued to be produced into the mid-1950's. Many of these came from 
Codignola's publishing house, La Nuova Italia Editrice. 13 
Part of the change was an indirect result of the Allied victory, 
which brought Colonel Carleton Washburne to Italy to assist in the 
reconstruction of the Italian school system; Washburne encouraged 
several Italian educators to join the New Education Fellowship, an 
organization with a progressive orientation. Beyond the attention 
aroused by Washburne and the N.E.F., there were Italian scholars whose 
respect for Dewey was sufficient to encourage them to promote a general 
awareness of Dewey in Italy. The influence of Ernesto Codignola at the 
University of Florence has been discussed in a previous chapter. The 
strength of the center at Florence was that it did not depend on one 
man: in those postwar years, there was a School of Florence, and its 
leading figures deserve further examination. 
Lamberto Borghi's Discovery of American Thought 
Of all the Florentine scholars who interpreted Dewey in the post-
war era, Lamberto Borghi was the most familiar with the American intel-
lectual environment of the 1930's and 1940's. Borghi was born in 
Livorno on January 9, 1907. He studied at the University of Pisa and 
received a degree in philosophy in 1929. In the following year, he 
completed the requirements for a teaching diploma in German language and 
literature. Borghi passed the state competitive examination for the 
position of high school teacher of history and philosophy, and in 1931 
13 Boydston and Andresen, John Dewey: A Checklist, passim. 
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he was assigned to the classical high school of Urbina. He was trans-
£erred in the next year to La Spezia, and in 1934, he was transferred to 
Pisa. Borghi remained at his post in Pisa until 1938, when the Fascist 
racial decrees of May and November were invoked against him. Because of 
his Jewish background, Borghi was forbidden to teach. 14 Like many of his 
faith, Borghi found it prudent to flee the anti-Semitic hysteria of Axis 
Europe. He left Italy in May of 1940 and traveled to New York. 
In New York there is an institution called the New School for 
Social Research; founded in 1919, its founders include Charles Beard, 
Thorstein Veblen, James Harvey Robinson, Alvin Johnson, and John Dewey. 
In the 1930's, Johnson was president of the New School, and in 1933, he 
decided to invite a group of refugee German scholars to form a "Univer-
sity in Exile" connected with the New School. 15 John Dewey served as an 
active member of the University in Exile's advisory committee. Over the 
next few years, the institution attracted a number of talented Europeans 
who, because of religious or political reasons, could not remain in 
Europe. Lamberto Borghi was one of those refugees. 
Borghi's sojourn in America in the 1940's was a busy one. His 
first year in New York was spent at the University in Exile, where he 
assisted Lionello Venturi in a research project on the history of art. 
In the academic year 1941-1942, Borghi was a Research and Visiting 
Fellow at Yale University, participating in philosophy seminars with 
14 Mauro Laeng, ed., I contemporanei (Florence: Giusti Barbera, 
19 7 9 ) , p . 9 34 . 
15Dykhuizen, The Life and Mind of John Dewey, p. 269. 
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Ernst Cassirer and Charles W. Hendel. From 1942 to 1944, Borghi taught 
Italian language courses at Harvard University and Cornell University. 
In 1943, the International Institute of Education at Columbia University 
asked him to prepare an essay on the possible postwar reconstruction of 
Italian schooling. On that project, Borghi had the assistance of 
Gaetano Salvemini and Giorgio De Santillana. Another scholarly activity 
in which Borghi was involved was the publication of Italian cultural 
journals with Bruno Zevi and Aldino Felicani. 
In 1945, Borghi began work on a historical study called Educazione 
e autorit~ nell' Italia moderna (Education and Authority in Modern 
Italy). During the first stages of that project, he was supported by 
fellowships from the Littauer Foundation, the Social Science Research 
Council, and the American Philosophical Society. In 1946, he enrolled 
in the New School for Social Research, where he studied with Horace 
Meyer Kallen and Felix Kaufmann. 16 The book which Borghi had begun to 
write, Educazione e autorit~, was eventually accepted as a doctoral 
thesis, and he was awarded the degree of Doctor of Social Science. 
Borghi returned to Italy in mid-1947. 17 
When Borghi returned to Italy, he found employment as a teacher of 
history and philosophy in the state high school system. In 1949, he was 
licensed as an instructor at the university level; however, in that year 
16According to Johnson's autobiography, the University in Exile even-
tually became the Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science of 
the New School for Social Research. See Alvin Johnson, Pioneer's Prog-
~ (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1952), p. 347. 
17Laeng, I contemporanei, pp. 934-935. 
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he was also awarded a UNESCO fellowship that allowed him to spend much 
of academic year 1949-1950 in England and the U.S.A., conducting 
research on the problems of children affected by the war. From 1950 to 
1952, Borghi taught pedagogy at the University of Pisa. For a brief 
time in 1952, he returned to New York as Visiting Professor of Philoso-
phy at the New School for Social Research. Between 1952 and 1955, he 
had two university appointments in pedagogy: the University of Palermo 
(1952-1954) and the University of Turin (1954-1955). Finally, in 1955, 
Borghi was called to the University of Florence to take the chair of 
pedagogy vacated by Ernesto Codignola, who retired in that year. It is 
not surprising that Borghi received the appointment in Florence, inas-
much as he had been in contact wih Codignola and the Florentine group 
almost from the time of his return to Italy. Florence was Borghi 1 s 
final academic appointment, where he remained until attaining emeritus 
status. 18 
In the two decades following the Second World War, Borghi was 
active in a number of educational organizations and assisted Ernesto 
Codignola in publishing the journal Scuola e citta. (School and City). 
Borghi 1 s principal activity beyond teaching, however, was the writing 
and translating of books on education, particularly those having to do 
with educational developments in America. 
18Laeng, p. 935. I contemporanei, p. 935. As of late 1982, Borghi 
was still in Florence, living in an apartment near the Ponte Vecchio. 
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Erasmus, Dewey, and Beyond 
Lamberto Borghi had done scholarly writing before his sojourn in 
the United States. In 1935, an article on Renaissance humanism appeared 
in the yearbook of the Superior Normal School of Pisa. In 1936, Borghi 
published a book called Umanesimo e concezione religiosa in Erasmo di 
Rotterdam (Humanism and the Religious Concept in Erasmus of Rotterdam). 
It is important to note the element of religion in the title, a concern 
that played a major role in Borghi's work for many years, and one that 
was shared by his mentor, Horace M. Kallen, who expressed interest in 
" ... extending pragmatic philosophy to the arts, education, culture, 
and religion. " 19 
While in America, Borghi wrote articles for an Italian exile jour-
nal, and in 1944 he contributed his English-language essay20 to the last 
volume of I. L. Kandel's Educational Yearbook of Teachers College, 
Columbia. 
The Yearbook article begins with a historical survey of Italian 
educational developments from the pre-Gentile era through the Fascist 
period and the Bottai reform of 1939. A populist leaning in Borghi's 
essay is evident in his criticism of the 1939 reform, where he states 
that the reform accomplished nothing toward ". . . the creation of a 
19 Alfred J. Marrow, 
Believe and Why--Maybe 
"Introduction," in Horace Meyer Kallen, What .! 
(New York: Horizon Press, 1977), p. 10. 
20 Lamberto Borghi, "Italy," in Educational Yearbook of the Interna-
tional Institute of Teachers College, Columbia University, vol. 21, ed. 
I. L. Kandel (New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1944) pp. 
173-216. 
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real people's school for the Italian people. " 21 Borghi deplores the 
preservation of the class structure under Fascism and looks for the end 
of those cleavages among the Italian people. Education, in particular, 
" must become a solvent of the obsolete divisions, a promoter of 
unity, a bearer of the gifts of culture to everybody. " 22 He continues: 
"All the Italian schools must become the schools of the Italians and 
cease to be. the privilege of the children of the bureaucrats of the 
Fascist party and of the war profiteers. " 2 3 In place of the Fascist 
schools, Borghi insists on reconstructing the Italian system of educa-
tion on "really democratic" principles. 
Borghi goes beyond mere rhetoric in his advocacy of a democratic 
school system. In the Yearbook essay, he offers concrete suggestions, 
some rather novel. For example, in order to keep the schools under 
popular control, he suggests total decentralization of public education, 
replacing the Ministry of Education with " . local committees for the 
reconstruction of popular education . . " representing cultural and 
political groups that are actively engaged in studying the problems and 
conditions of the populace. 24 As for the characteristics of the new 
schools, 
21B h' org 1, "Italy," p. 202. 
22Borghi, "Italy," p. 203. 
23Borghi, "Italy," p. 203. 
24Borghi, "Italy," pp. 206-207. 
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All types of schools ... will be free. The ages of compulsory 
attendance will be from three to fifteen. The training will be 
scientific, anti-authoritarian and anti-dogmatic, aiming to create 
in the students the capacity to think for themselves and to guide 
themselves. 25 
Borghi wants religion to play an important role in inspiring the 
education of Italians, but it will be a religion based on a new concep-
tion of "God as unifying love," helping each individual to master his 
selfish impulses; to that religion he contrasts the "worldliness" of 
Roman Catholicism. Moreover, he will not allow any church (e.g., the 
Catholic church) to enjoy a privileged status in the new society, or to 
impart its doctrines to the young enrolled in public elementary and 
secondary schools. 26 
Borghi outlines programs for primary and secondary schools. 
Essentially, the primary schools' concern must be ". . . the formation 
of character and the strengthening of (the children's) social aptitudes 
through cooperative activity. " 2 7 Secondary schools must ". . look to 
the development of the pupils on a broad humanistic basis," emphasizing 
"social and practical work" along with classroom instruction. In the 
secondary school classroom, ex cathedra teaching must be abandoned for 
free discussion. Differentiation is maintained at the secondary level, 
but admission to all four types of school (classical, technical, scien-
tific, and normal) must be available to all based on merits and apti-
25B h' org 1., "Italy," p. 204. 
26B h' org 1., "Italy," pp. 203-205. 
27B h' org J., "Italy," p. 208. 
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tudes. Above all, "Culture will be considered as an end in itself," and 
education cannot be regarded as a guarantee of social privilege. Schol-
arly individuals must do their share of hard work, and Borghi points to 
China and Israel for example of this ethos. 28 
Introducing Dewey in Italy 
After Borghi's postwar return to Italy, his proficiency in English 
and his familiarity with the American educational scene enabled him to 
work successfully at translating American educational writers for his 
countrymen. He collaborated with Ernesto Codignola in a translation of 
John Dewey's School and Society, which appeared in 1949 and was conven-
iently published by Codignola's own publishing firm. In 1950, Borghi's 
translation of Dewey's Education Today appeared in Italy. The year 
1952 saw the joint Codignola-Borghi translation of Carleton Washburne's 
Winnetka's Schools. In 1954, Borghi, Codignola, and Enzo Agnoletti 
published a translation of My Pedagogic Creed by Dewey, contained in a 
book of essays on Deweyan education. In addition, Borghi produced Ital-
ian translations of Horace M. Kallen's The Education of Free Men and 
William Heard Kilpatrick's Philosophy of Education and he wrote an 
introduction to Aldo Visalberghi' s 1958 translation of Dewey's Human 
Nature and Conduct. 
Borghi's educational writing was certainly not limited to transla-
tion. In the 1950's and 1960's he maintained a high output of original 
scholarly works. The book that Borghi began in the United States, 
28 B h. " 1 II org 1, Ita y, p. 215. 
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Educazione e autorit~ nell' Italia moderna, was published in Italy in 
1951. In his introduction, Borghi asserts that his book really grew out 
of the 1944 article for the Educational Yearbook of Teachers College, 
Columbia. 29 The content of the book, however, is more heavily historical 
than the article. Each chapter deals with a separate phase in the 
development of Italian education, beginning with the Italian state of 
the Risorgimento and ending with the World War II resistance. Borghi 
comments freely and interprets the major phases of Italy's educational 
history. His underlying theme is that of the struggle for control of 
Italian education, a struggle involving the Church and various political 
movements; he underlines the contributions of liberal and progressive 
forces contending against reaction. Even though it is a historical 
study, the ideological bias in Educazione ed autorit~ is clearly 
discernible. 
Borghi wrote several studies on American thought. Among them are 
John Dewey e il pensiero pedagogico contemporaneo negli Stati Uniti 
d'America (John Dewey and Contemporary Pedagogical Thought in the 
United States of America), 1952; "Aspetti morali e religiosi del 
pensiero americana contemporaneo" ("Moral and Religious Aspects of Amer-
ican Religious Thought"), in the journal Il saggiatore, January-March 
1953; "I fondamenti della concezione pedagogica di Dewey" ("The Bases of 
Dewey's Pedagogical Concept"), in Rivista critica di storia della fila-
sofia, October-December 1952; "La categoria della socialita nel pensiero 
29 Lamberto Borghi, Educazione e autorita nell'Italia moderna (Flor-
ence: La Nuova Italia Editrice, 1951), p. ix. 
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pedagogico di John Dewey" ("The Category of Sociality in the Pedagogical 
Thought of John Dewey"), in an anthology called Il pensiero americano 
£?ntemporaneo, (Contemporary American Thought) 1958; and a book 
published in 1955, bearing the title L'ideale educative di John Dewey 
(The Educational Ideal of John Dewey). 
Franco Camhi points out three phases in Borghi's approach to 
Dewey: in the first, Borghi is presenting and summarizing Dewey for his 
Italian readers, a phase that was completed around 1955; in the second, 
Borghi is expanding upon Dewey (in the Italian idiom, "deepening" Dewey) 
and developing a more complex idea of education and society, a phase 
that extends into the mid-1960's; and in the third, from the 1970's 
onward, he is critiquing Dewey from historical and dialectical view-
points. 30 
Of the books published in Borghi's first (introductory) phase of 
Deweyan activism, L'ideale educative di John Dewey, published in 1955, 
is one of the most important. Borghi begins with a historical gloss of 
Dewey's early "pedagogical" activities, and points out the already pres-
ent linkage of thought and action in Dewey's work, " ... the theme that 
constitutes the golden thread in all Deweyan speculation. " 31 The second 
chapter contrasts Dewey to Herbart and Kant, two significant figures in 
European educational thought. Most of the chapter is really concerned 
3
°Franco Camhi, La "Scuola di Firenze" (Naples: 
1982), p. 66. 
Liguori Edi tore, 
31 Lamberto Borghi, L' ideale educative di John Dewey (Florence: La 
Nuova Italia Editrice, 1955), p. 4. 
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with moral education; Borghi takes a cue from Herbart, who teaches that 
education has a moral end, the formation of moral attitudes in the indi-
vidual. According to Borghi, Kant's concept of moral education is 
authoritarian, demanding submission and obedience to the authority of a 
teacher. 3 2 It requires the suppression of the young person's inclina-
tions, with the result that nature is opposed by reason. One of Dewey's 
intentions was to overcome that kind of dualism. Dewey relied on Hegel 
as a guide, but there was a right-Hegelian clique that stressed obedi-
ence, abnegation, effort rather than interest; one of its representa-
tives, writes Borghi, was William Torrey Harris, an early influence on 
Dewey. Dewey had to critique that group in order to develop a nonau-
thoritarian concept of moral education. Herbart' s concept of moral 
education is less oppressive, based on the learning of self-control and 
ideas of goodness and justice; but it is still dualistic, requiring an 
intellectualistic mistrust of natural impulses. Borghi contends that 
Dewey wanted to overcome those dualities and involve the whole mind and 
personality of the learner in the moral process: 
Here, morality is made by Dewey to consist of harmony of soul, in an 
accord between internal and external, motive and action, attention 
turned to what is prescribed and attention turned to one's own inner 
fantasies. . . 33 
Morality, Borghi continues, must lie within the continuity of the 
psycho-spiritual life. In the same continuity with morality are effort 
and interest (which are not opposed, as in Herbart), and all are unified 
32Borghi, L'ideale educative, p. 18. 
3~orghi, L'ideale educative, p. 22. 
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by personal impulses that lead to self -express ion. Hence for Dewey, 
Borghi argues, morality is a component of self-expression. 34 
To this point, Borghi has traced an argument that he perceives in 
Dewey, leading from psychology through morals to a doctrine of self-ex-
pression; but it is really morals that Borghi wants to return to, and to 
do so he must affirm the synthesis of what he has revealed. The key is 
Dewey's "unitary concept of psychic activity," in which the dynamics of 
the personality have a strong moral import. Unlike Kant, Dewey cannot 
invent a moral end extraneous to the impulses of personality. Extrinsic 
motivation, such as fear of external authority (e.g., a teacher) impedes 
self-realization and is therefore detrimental to genuine morality. Even 
Her bart, who would arouse interest in preselected ideas, proposes a 
psychology of subordination that could lead to the submission of a 
people to an arbitrary authority. 35 A Deweyan school, in contrast, would 
allow students to develop active powers through occupations that spring 
from inward impulse and the need for self-realization. Thus Dewey 
creates both a morality and a rationale for education that are based on 
self-realization. Borghi is thus convinced that a "profound moral 
sensibility" exists in Dewey. The moral task of education is to insure 
the integrity and continuity of personal development, concludes Borghi. 
34Borghi, L'ideale educative, pp. 23-29. 
35Borghi, L'ideale educative, p. 32. 
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Yet to make that vision of the moral task acceptable to the Ital-
ians, Borghi must explain it further, which he does in the following 
section. 3 6 He asserts that mind is no longer considered a discrete 
entity, opposed to an external world; in contemporary psychologies, it 
is a function of the social life, requiring constant stimuli and nour-
ishment from the social milieu. The mind that belongs to the self is 
neither separate from nor opposed to the society in which it lives. 
While the moral ideal may be self-realization, the self is supremely 
revealed in its social functioning. Thus the moral ideal concretizes 
itself in the individual's social development. Here, contact with the 
(social) environment must promote its continuation and development as 
well as that of the person. Unlike morality based on morbid and narrow 
conformism, the Deweyan morality that Borghi draws out suggests that 
true moral motivation stems from an understanding of and response to the 
need for human solidarity. 
Morality in education, then, is achieved through social under-
standing and shared interests. Every activity, every subject taught in 
school, has a social aspect and therefore moral weight as well. Under-
standing that, the child might pass from an individualistic, self-cen-
tered attitude to a positive attitude of altruism. The ethos of the 
school must be one of common effort, in which everyone including the 
teacher takes part. The child develops a capacity for practical judg-
ment in response to social demands, and he or she learns sensitivity to 
36Borghi, L'ideale educative, pp. 34-41. 
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the needs of others. Public conduct is a powerful criterion of moral 
development: without that criterion as a test, the individual can be a 
1 • t II mora 1mpos or, . . . and the old social and moral order of privilege 
and injustice will remain intact." 37 
Responses to Critics 
From the end of the first essay in L' ideale educative di John 
Dewey, Borghi proceeds to discuss other aspects of Dewey's philosophy 
and pedagogy, assured that he has accomplished the most arduous task of 
the Deweyan facing the Italian intelligentsia. In essence, Borghi has 
defended Oeweyanism from the criticisms of "essentialists and tradition-
a lists" (by which he means Catholics and aging idealists) who found a 
sense of morality lacking in Dewey, and who thought that Dewey's insis-
tence on the right to self-expression would lead to intolerable narcis-
sism. By pointing out that morality exists primarily in the social 
context, and by placing the essential aspects of individual development 
there as well, Borghi sought to sustain the moral sense of Deweyanism 
from those critics. There were other critics, however, whom Borghi 
eventually had to face. 
In 1962, Borghi published another important book on educational 
theory. This was Educazione e sviluppo sociale (Education and Social 
Development). Its theme is announced by its title, but the "social 
development" that Borghi intends is not simply the development of the 
child (or learner) in society; he implies a program for the development 
37 
Borghi, L'ideale educative, p. 41. 
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of human society itself. This book is representative of the period in 
which Borghi extended the concepts of Dewey, largely by finding compati-
ble ideas in the work of others. 
In the preface to Educazione e sviluppo sociale, Borghi states his 
intention to examine the links between pedagogy and social factors. 
Education, he insists, is an "irreplaceable" agent of social develop-
ment. In view of education's social role, schooling is faced with a 
double task: 
In the first place, it must select and filter social contributions 
in such a way as to transmit cultural models to youth that will 
constitute both the bases of their personal security and the instru-
ments of social continuity, however without anchoring youths to 
those models, but allowing them the irrevocable capacity to rectify 
and transform those models, and to open them to other influences in 
an expansive process without limits; and in the second place, 
schooling must act as a renewing ferment in society by means of the 
forms of free and associated activity that are created in the 
school, and also through (the schools') active participation in the 
field of adult and community education. 38 
In that statement, Borghi denies that education is only an instrument of 
cultural transmission. Its function is the facilitation of a process of 
endless development among learners of all ages. 
In the first chapter, called "The Transformation of the Environ-
ment as Inherent to Behavior and Learning," Borghi draws on several 
sources to support essentially Deweyan concepts of behavior and learn-
ing. In the first place, Borghi asserts that behavior and learning are 
irrevocably linked in the total activity of the human being. To define 
learning, he borrows words from William Heard Kilpatrick: 
38 Lamberto Borghi, Educazione e sviluppo sociale 
Nuova Italia Editrice, 1962), p. xiv. 
(Florence: La 
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To learn now means, and most properly means, to acquire a new mode 
of behavior, and to do so in such a way that it (the behavior) soli-
difies in the character so that it may subsequently flow back into 
life at the right moment to exercise its appropriate function. 39 
Borghi then places that concept of learning in the biological matrix, as 
adaptation of intelligent organisms. What is really important is the 
transactional relation of the individual to the environment: the indi-
vidual organism is in the center of an environment that he or she 
perceives and is also always reorganizing or conserving. In this 
regard, Borghi quotes from Dewey's 1939 article, "Theory of Valuation," 
where Dewey uses the term "transaction."40 
Now Borghi attempts to clarify the meaning of the term "behavior." 
In contrast to the behaviorists, Borghi posits a distinction between 
adaptive and expressive behavior, and that distinction requires a 
consideration of motivation; he points his readers to the American 
psychologist G. W. Allport. Considerations of motivation, Borghi 
suggests, help to explain the learner's role in reorganizing the envi-
ronment, as stressed by Dewey and Kilpatrick. 
Borghi proceeds to a discussion of adaptive and expressive behav-
ior in work and play, emphasizing the development of creativity in the 
learner. This section reveals Borghi's interest in the dynamics of 
individual and environment. He has not forsaken his earlier interest in 
39Borghi, Educazione e sviluppo, p. 2. The reference is to an arti-
cle by Kilpatrick that appeared in a festschrift for Ernesto Codignola, 
Prospettive storiche e problemi attuali dell'educazione (Florence: La 
Nuova Italia, 1960). 
40 Borghi, Educazione e sviluppo, p. 7. 
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morality; rather, he is developing a wider context for it. In finding a 
paradigm for the relation of the human being to the environment, he 
turns to the field psychology of Kurt Lewin. Borghi then declares 
development and maturation as dynamic processes, and invokes Abraham 
Maslow and Piaget. This foray into psychology is not really a digres-
sion; Borghi sees the psychologists as supportive of the dynamic view 
that is properly associated with Dewey. 
One of Borghi's announced purposes is to establish an "ideology of 
action." Action, he contends, is influenced by attitudes and percep-
tions, but action also influences them in its turn. Human experience 
necessarily involves action: "True knowledge does not remain on the 
verbal plane, but links itself with activity, and is nurtured by 
experience. " 41 The values that enhance experience are openness, free 
choice, and a willingness to experiment. Here Borghi relies on Kilpa-
trick to support his thesis that affective and intellectual activities 
are inseparably linked. Above all, the student's attitudes are strongly 
influenced by others, particularly when a situation of social acceptance 
exists. Those socially derived attitudes affect everything the learner 
does, even to acquiring logical language and powers of reasoning. 
Drawing heavily on Piaget, Borghi advocates a "cooperative" class-
room environment to promote affective and intellectual development; he 
relegates the authoritarian environment to the stage of prelogical 
thought. Preadolescent children, allowed to interact with one another, 
41 . Borgh1, Educazione e sviluppo, p. 10. 
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are forced by the confrontation to doubt and to prove their ideas; thus 
they are assisted in developing hypothetical reasoning and logical 
discourse. The social environment provides opportunities for reality 
testing. Borghi strengthens his "social" argument with material from 
Nicholas Bowlby on the intellectual consequences of emotional depriva-
tion. 
In the following paragraphs, Borghi restates the notion of learn-
ing that is based on the modification of cognitive structures. Again 
the emphasis is on action, now as a necessary factor in the modification 
of those structures; but Borghi warns against forced or repetitive 
action that leads to satiety and may be counterproductive. Borghi 
suggests that properly educative action must be freely pursued; thus he 
must develop a concept of freedom in education: 
Education is the reinforcement of a natural process, not the 
substitution of an activity for its absence, since "no cognition 
learned by force is kept in the soul. " 42 
Education by force, on the other hand, satisfies the needs of the 
teacher rather than the learner, and to underline this point, Borghi 
alludes to education in Nazi Germany. 
Borghi closes this essay with a consideration of democratic group 
dynamics appropriate for the classroom, and stresses the importance of 
sensitive leadership, toleration for diversity, and group identification 
through individual participation and voluntary cooperation. Impor-
tantly, the social climate of the Italian classroom must change from 
42 Borghi, Educazione e sviluppo, p. 42. The quoted line is a refer-
ence to Plato's Republic, 536e. 
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what it was in the past: "The change of social atmosphere creates new 
feelings and new values in individual awareness, and cognitive change is 
expanded through a change in affective attitudes."43 
Having made his points about education and the democratic environ-
ment, Borghi proceeds into chapters on a variety of topics including the 
importance of group work, the place of manual labor in education, the 
uses of free time, aspects of international education, and possible 
directions for adult education. The Deweyan presence is felt throughout 
the book. Borghi's increased emphasis on society and social change is 
largely a response to criticism from Marxist philosophers and educators. 
Whereas in the early 1950's, Borghi had had to defend Deweyan thought 
from Catholic and idealist charges of amorality, in the 1960's he sought 
to defend it from Marxist charges that Dewey was socially naive, did not 
understand the class structure, and foolishly advocated reform as a 
remedy for the ills of society. 
Educazione e sviluppo sociale contains a direct response to those 
Marxist critics. In a chapter on education and social change, Borghi 
points out the limitations of Marxist social and educational doctrines. 
He objects to the Marxist notion that man's liberation from present 
alienation will come about through inevitable changes in the nature of 
productive forces. That contention is not only without an empirical 
basis, but more importantly, by concentrating on production as man's 
liberation, it bespeaks II . the emancipation of things and not of 
43Borghi, Educazione e sviluppo, p. 46. 
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men. · · In fact, he observes, the organization of industrial 
production in socialist states is no less oppressive than in bourgeois 
states. The cult of production and efficiency is present in both 
systems, when what is really required is a transformation of productive 
technology to favor the growth of the individual. Moreover, the social-
ist system of production has reintroduced alienation and a society split 
into two factions, the managers and the workers. In that context, 
education tends to be a support for the ruling bureaucracy, inculcating 
conformity and obedience to the system. Finally, the doctrine of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat not only separates society's brains from 
its heart, but also permits inhumane treatment of the masses and sets 
aside personal liberty while claiming to pave the way for greater free-
dams. Thus, observes Borghi, "A leftist dialectic becomes a cloak for a 
more sinister (left-handed) reality." 45 The closing remark on the matter 
is a brief reference to Dewey's disillusionment with education in the 
U.S.S.R. after 1928, when the Soviet educational system, having aban-
doned the spirit of free experimentation, had become a dispenser of 
state-approved verities. 
Presenting and defending Dewey in the Italian cultural milieu was 
not the sum of Borghi's activities as an educational writer. His inter-
ests, in fact, were quite wide-ranging. In 1951, he published a book of 
essays on psychology of education. In the next few years, he published 
44Borghi, Educazione e sviluppo, p. 314. 
45Borghi, Educazione e sviluppo, p. 315. 
sinistra (left) is nearly lost in English. 
The deliberate pun on 
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studies of educational programs and child development in specific commu-
nities. A very useful survey of contemporary Italian education appeared 
in 1958; Borghi called it Educazione e scuola nell' Italia di oggi 
(Education and Schooling in Today's Italy). The first part of that book 
deals with attempted school reforms in Italy and relates them to expen-
ditures for education, school attendance, and other factors. The second 
and third parts summarize Italian pedagogical thought and major pedago-
gical trends in the contemporary world. Borghi closes with chapters on 
the educational impact of liberty in postwar Italy and violations of 
religious freedom in Italian state schools. 46 Borghi's productivity as 
an educational writer continued unabated through the 1960's and 1970's, 
but gradually his attention was claimed by specific projects and prob-
lems in Italian education, and he therefore devoted less energy to writ-
ing on educational theory and the defense of Dewey's ideas. 
The School of Florence in Evolution 
Lamberto Borghi, like Ernesto Codignola, was a key figure in the 
founding of the School of Florence; but those men were not its only 
noteworthy representatives. A number of bright, younger scholars were 
attracted to Florence in the 1940's and 1950's, and each developed 
unique syntheses or interpretations of what was being taught and studied 
there. It is instructive to consider their accomplishments. 
46 Lamberto Borghi, Educazione e scuola nell' Italia di _£&&i (Flor-
ence: La Nuova Italia, 1958), passim. 
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Raffaele Laporta: Freedom and Progress 
Raffaele Laporta was born in Pescara, on the Adriatic coast, on 
March 11, 1916. He was educated at the University of Rome, where one of 
his teachers was Giuseppe Lombardo-Radice, the idealist philosopher. 47 
Laporta completed a degree in jurisprudence in 1937, but his growing 
interest in education led him away from a career in law. In 1939, he 
was hired to teach philosophy, history, and pedagogy in the state upper 
secondary schools, and began a lengthy period of teaching. From 1954 to 
1957, he was involved in an adult education project in the mountainous 
Abruzzo region. 
In 1958, Laporta was invited to Florence to become director of the 
Scuola-Citt~ Pestalozzi, the institution which Ernesto Codignola had 
founded and from whose directorship Codignola was retiring. Having 
recently obtained a university lecturer's license, Laporta accepted a 
concurrent appointment to a teaching post at the School of Social Servi-
ces of the University of Siena. In 1960, he was offered a position as 
professor of pedagogy in the Division of Letters and Philosophy of the 
University of Florence. 
Laporta remained in Florence, teaching at the university and 
directing Scuola-Citts Pestalozzi until 1965. In that year, he accepted 
a chair in pedagogy in the Division of Teaching at the University of 
Cagliari, in Sardinia. At the same time, he became director of 
refresher courses for middle-school teachers in the three Sardinian 
47
cambi, La "Scuola di Firenze ",p. 78. 
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provinces. In 1967, Laporta went to Bologna, and held a professorship 
in pedagogy at that city's university until 1969. His final move, in 
1969, was to the University of Rome, where he accepted a chair in pedag-
ogy in the Division of Teaching; from 1970 to 1975, he also directed 
that university's Institute of Pedagogy. 48 
Laporta's professional activities have included membership in 
progressive (or "activist") educational organizations. In 1952, he and 
a group of teachers formed the Cooperative della Tipografia a Scuola 
(Cooperative for Typography in School); that group evolved into the 
Movimento di Cooperazione Educativa or M.C.E. (Educational Cooperation 
Movement) in 1955. Laporta attended and addressed many meetings held by 
the M.C.E. and by similar organizations. He was secretary of the Ital-
ian section of the New Education Fellowship from 1955 to 1962, and 
served as Italian editor of the N.E.F. journal, The New Era. After 
1960, he was on the editorial board of the laic education journal, 
Scuola e cittA. In the 1970's, his activities in the field of education 
drew him into government commissions. Laporta has been adjudged to be 
one of the more classic and orthodox of the Italian interpreters of 
Dewey. 49 
All of Laporta's principal publications date from the early 1950's 
onward. Journal articles written by Laporta began to appear around 
1952, and his first book was published in 1957. 
48 Laeng, I contemporanei, pp. 975-976. 
49 Cambi, La "Scuola di Firenze", p. 13. 
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..U.bertg nel pensiero di Vincenzo Cuoco (Liberty in the Thought of 
Y!ncenzo Cuoco), a study of concepts developed by a major Italian histo-
ricist philosopher who lived from 1770 to 1823. It was Laporta's. first 
extended effort on a recurring theme in his work, that of the meaning of 
freedom. In 1957 he published Il sensa del comico nel fanciullo (The 
Child's Sense of the Comic), and in 1959 another book, Per una didattica 
della scuola secondaria superiore (Toward a Theory of Teaching for the 
Upper Secondary School), went to press. 
Laporta's first important theoretical work was published in 1960. 
That was Educazione e libert~ in una societa in progresso (Education 
and Liberty in a Society in Progress). In it, Laporta addresses the 
problem of freedom in human society. He states his intention to 
approach freedom in an empirical, commonsense way, and not as a metaphy-
sical concept. 50 Human societies, he argues, are located in time and 
space, and the individual lives in the social context in relation to 
physical elements and other people. The individual's personality is 
determined by his or her efforts, within that context, to attain a 
dynamic equilibrium, nourished by personal expansion; and equilibrium 
and expansion constitute the elements of individual functionality. The 
quest for equilibrium and expansion is spontaneous, governed by interior 
impulses; that spontaneity is the basis of its freedom. Laporta's defi-
nition of freedom is: 
50Raffaele Laporta, Educazione e libert~ in una societa in progresso 
(Florence: La Nuova Italia Editrice, 1960), pp. 3-4. 
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... the constant drive of the individual to react, among all the 
convergent stimuli that are presented to him in a given moment, to 
that which is apt to determine the maximum increment in his func-
l 't 51 tiona 1. Y· 
Whether the individual's reaction to the environment is purely 
mechanical is a problem that Laporta refuses to try to solve. What is 
important to Laporta is that one reaction is more apt than any other to 
increase the equilibrium-expansion of the subject in the environment; 
thus he or she can act "for the better," and anything that interferes 
with such a possibility is an obstacle to human functionality, hence 
also to human freedom. Laporta notes that there are both active and 
passive obstacles to human action, and the passive (physical) obstacles 
are the easier to overcome; few of us, for example, are locked in cells. 
The active obstacles are social interferences with liberty, such as 
laws, taboos, and the constraints of social class. To an extent, these 
exist in all societies, but it is desirable to keep them to a minimum; 
and their minimalization depends on expanding the educational level of 
the populace to allow intelligent reform of social institutions. A bad 
society, suggests Laporta, is not only oppressive, but also fails to 
extend the general educational level. 
As for the choice involved in "acting for the better," Laporta 
does not care to quibble over whether it is a true choice or not, or 
whether (as some contend) the best choice is the only possible choice. 
What is important to Laporta is the individual's conviction of freedom 
in the matter of choosing, and the resulting commitment to what is 
51 \ Laporta, Educazione e liberta, p. 9. 
257 
perceived as his or her own choice. The elements of one's freedom are 
impulse and conviction of action, and these are subjectively interior; 
therefore, he insists, freedom is immune from externally imposed 1'meta-
physical" formulations. 52 
For Laporta, then, freedom comes to be not simply the possibility 
of individual expansion and dynamic equilibrium, but also the interior 
conviction of the same. He sees all normal human behavior as a "protest 
of liberty" against impeding factors. Nevertheless, there are criteria 
for judging the success of our actions, and they are primarily rational; 
it is rationality that also provides the controls of morality. The 
free, moral individual defends liberty in all that he or she is and 
does; yet that liberty exists in a physical and human context from which 
it cannot be separated. Laporta explains: 
We are not talking about absolute freedom . . . but the freedom of 
each individual insofar as he is connected with his peers in the 
organic framework of nature: in other words, it is the freedom of 
each with respect to all and everything. 53 
Thus Laporta realizes that there is interdependence and common interest 
in human society. He refers his readers to Dewey's Democracy and Educa-
tion for the outlines of the desirable society. 
Returning to the role of law (an understandable concern for a 
philosopher trained in jurisprudence), Laporta allows that laws must 
exist to protect society from the damage caused by overzealous individ-
52 Laporta, Educazione e 
tions to which he refers 
philosophers. 
liberta, p. 15. The metaphysical formula-
are undoubtedly those of the late Fascist 
53 Laporta, Educazione e liberta p. 21. 
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ual interest. But law must not overarticulate; it must not stifle the 
individual, and it must allow freedom to "act for the best." Free-
dom, concludes Laporta, makes two demands upon society: 
. . . to guarantee and increase the area of legal rights to the 
maximum possible limits; and to place all citizens in positions of 
enjoying their own liberties equally which is the same as 
requiring equality of economic, social, and cultural levels for all 
members of society, a necessary and sufficient condition for provid-
ing an objective liberty. 54 
The second essay in Educazione e libert~ is a reflection on 
social function and dysfunction. Laporta points out two key functions 
in society--the productive and the directive. He contends that individ-
ual activity of the expansive kind, when socialized, leads to produc-
tion, either in a material or a cultural sense. Social obstacles, 
including ruling classes, restrict expansion and therefore production. 
The more the individual's productive efforts are socialized, the more 
efficiently productive that society becomes. To insure maximum sociali-
zation, a directive function becomes necessary in society; and the pano-
rama of forces operating in society furnishes the agenda of problems to 
be confronted and resolved by the directive function. 
Society, says Laporta, must be kept functional; otherwise, it 
requires reform or revolution. To remain functional, society's 
processes must have a dynamic and expansive character, and that charac-
ter is central to the concept of progress. The debate between liberals 
and socialists is over whether individual freedom may be allowed to 
impede social progress, or whether social progress may be allowed to 
54 ' Laporta, Educazione e liberta, p. 42. 
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deny individual freedom. Laporta, as before, affirms society's right to 
laws that restrain an individual from becoming the opponent of everyone 
else. (Even the ruling class has limits on its action in the form of 
threatened uprisings and revolutions.) Moreover, the freedom of the 
individual is essentially subjective. Therefore, there are restraints 
and limitations on freedom in society; but Laporta wants to define an 
"objective" liberty determined by the interaction of the productive and 
directive forces in society, a freedom reckoned by the maximum recipro-
cal gains realized from that interaction. He devises a formula: 
Lo=Lp-Li, where objective liberty (Lo) equals the potential free energy 
of society (Lp) minus the coefficient of inertia (Li), inertia that 
represents the restrictive and authoritarian factors in society. 55 Obvi-
ous ly, unless Li=O, the value of Lo is less than Lp, and according to 
Laporta, that signifies a degraded form of liberty, and is the usual 
condition of human society. The greater the value of Lo, the greater is 
the degree of social progress that one may infer. 
The maximal value of Lo is Laporta's social goal, and he finds 
that its greatest possibilities may be realized through education. 
Education, he says, works on the whole reality of man and his world and 
explores the possible connections between them. Its function is not to 
produce laws, formulas, and techniques but " . a better human 
substance of all individuals. " 56 That is the highest aim of education; 
55Laporta, Educazione e liberta, p. 109. Laporta does not indicate 
whether or not this formula was derived from another source. 
56Laporta, Educazione e liberta p. 119. 
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and what education may best accomplish is a facilitation of maximal 
freedom and progress in the social organism. 
In the following chapters of Educazione e liberta, Laporta 
explores the actual and possible work of education in greater detail, 
expanding upon the themes announced in his opening chapter. In the 
appendix, he reflects on some of the failures of "active" education and 
warns against the myth of the perfect, error-free school. He also 
discusses the prospects for a single, unified middle school in Italy. 
In 1963, Laporta published a lengthy book on the concept of commu-
nity in the school, La communita scolastica (The School Community). 
His interest in entertainment and free-time activities led to Il tempo 
libero giovanile (Youth's Free Time) in 1964. Throughout the 1960's and 
1970's, Laporta continued to write and published on themes as varied as 
the unified school, education through films, technical education, 
dietology, and proposals for school reform. In 1971 he published 
another important theoretical work, La difficile scommessa (The Diffi-
cult Wager), developing some of his earlier themes; its content, 
however, is- outside the scope of the present study. 
De Bartolomeis: Science and Pedagogy 
Francesco De Bartolomeis has been called the "last and best" of 
Ernesto Codignola's students. 57 De Bartolomeis was born in Pellezzano, 
Salerno province, in 1918, and was educated at the University of Flor-
57R ff 1 L "L' d . 1 d d II • a ae e aporta, e ucaz1one nuova ne secon o opoguerra, 1n 
Ernesto Codignola in 50 anni di battaglie educative (Florence: La Nuova 
Italia Editrice, 1967), p. 166. 
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ence. He taught at the University of Florence and subsequently trans-
£erred to the University of Turin, where since 1956 he has. been a 
professor of pedagogy and director of the university's Institute of 
Pedagogy and its school for specializations in psychology, pedagogy, and 
psychopedagogy. During the 1950's and 1960's, he was particularly 
interested in the problems of active education, and to further that 
interest he joined progressive educational associations, including 
Laporta's Movimento di Cooperazione Educativa. 58 De Bartolomeis was also 
on the editorial board of the important laic journal Scuola e citt~. 
Much of De Bartolomeis' scholarly attention was focused on the 
problem of linking a scientific pedagogy to classroom instructional 
practice. That was the basic concern of his first major book in educa-
tion, La pedagogia come scienza (Pedagogy as Science). In it, De Barto-
lomeis states his intention to 
. . remove educational theory from a priorisms of various hues 
and origins, and particularly from the despotism of idealistic 
philosophy which ... has shown itself to be an adversary not only 
of science but also of the democratic orientation of society and 
contemporary culture. 59 
In attacking idealism so vehemently, De Bartolomeis may be wounding a 
dragon that was already dead or dying, but whose memory was nevertheless 
strong in the Italian psyche; by invoking it, he is able to set up a 
contrast for the purpose of making the newness of his position clearer 
58Further biographical information is available in Laeng, I contempo-
ranei, p. 958. 
59Francesco De Bartolomeis, La pedagogia come scienza (Florence: La 
Nuova Italia Editrice, 1953), p. ix. 
262 
to his readers. 
In La pedagogia come scienza, De Bartolomeis catalogues the forms 
of scientific research that are valuable to the educator. He insists 
that education is not the province of one specific science, nor of one 
approach to science (e. g., experimentalism alone); rather, he desires 
education to have the rigor in procedures and appropriate control that 
pervade the scientific mentality. A broadly based scientific approach 
is necessary, because a broad range of concerns must be addressed in 
education: 
To educate means to further psychic development for the satisfaction 
of fundamental human needs considered in solidarity with the socio-
cultural situation of experience. In this definition appear 
concepts, or rather, groups of problems: psychic development; the 
satisfaction (and implicitly, frustration) of needs; and the socio-
cultural situation. 60 
The pedagogical sciences which De Bartolomeis goes on to discuss are 
psychology, sociology, and experimental pedagogy. 
From his scientific viewpoint, De Bartolomeis cautions educators 
against renouncing the "infertile haughtiness" of philosophy only to 
become ancillaries of a narrowly conceived science that they cannot 
practice. It is the business of educators to draw on the various 
sciences and thus hold them together, finding the educational value in 
each. There can be a "science of education," but it must be a science 
in the sense of a body of systematic knowledge, with its sources in 
various related disciplines: 
60 De Bartolomeis, La pedagogia come scienza, p. xvi. 
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To investigate the nature, the means, and the aims of education, 
from the outset seems unable to mean anything other than to systema-
tize the kinds of knowledge that refer to education and to organize 
them into a science--pedagogy--with its own characteristics and 
ends. 61 
While he can accept the notion of philosophy of education as a 
realm of critical thought valuable to the educator, De Bartolomeis 
denies that a particular philosophy of education can proclaim itself 
independent of and superior to the pedagogical sciences. Philosophy of 
education must take its place among the sciences of education, limiting 
II its sphere to . illuminating human areas that remain obstinately 
closed before investigative attempts of other sorts." 62 The usual focus 
of philosophical inquiry is on values, and in that field it reigns 
supreme: "Thus the philosophical attitude is better defined as the 
reflected on and discovered sensitivity to values than as a presumed 
power of all-comprehensiveness. 1163 De Bartolomeis continues this line of 
discourse by suggesting themes for philosophy of education to explore: 
education and crisis in the contemporary world, educational and social 
transformation, the aims of education, and many others. 
On the issue of teacher preparation, De Bartolomeis predictably 
finds scientific training the sine qua non of the new kind of educator; 
and for its efficacy in linking science to instructional activity, he 
recommends what he calls "the new education," embodying the scientific 
61De Bartolomeis, La Eedagogia come scienza, p. 3. 
62De Bartolomeis, La Eedagogia come scienza, p. 39. 
63De Bartolomeis, La Eedagogia come scienza, p. 40. 
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oach of the activist or Deweyan educator. Much of La pedagogia come 
appr 
~ is devoted to the origins of the new education, a comparison of 
the traditional vs. active models of schooling, and the place of educa-
tion in the social context. 
In a thin volume that appeared in 1958, De Bartolomeis returns to 
an examination of active education. The book is called Cos'e la scuola 
~tiva (What the Active School Is). The author chastizes those who hope 
that the solution to educational difficulties can be found in a formula. 
He advocates personal reflection and research: "Learning is intelligent 
understanding." 64 The "new" education, he insists, is not a miracle, nor 
was the "old" education entirely bad. Pedagogy is in an evolutionary 
process, and now it has reached the point where passivity is seen to be 
undesirable in terms of the needs of the child; hence the present need 
for active education. 
De Bartolomeis, ever interested in psychology, examines personal-
ity theory and the hierarchy of needs (based, he admits, on Abraham 
Maslow). De Bartolomeis concludes that 
. activity has educational value when it satisfies a need, or 
rather when it arises from a motivation (either conscious or uncon-
scious) that constructively involves the affective, social, and 
expressive aspects so as to contribute to the formation of the 
personality. 65 
64Francesco De Bartolomeis, Cos'~ la scuola attiva (Milan: Gianasso 
Editore, 1958), p. 12. 
6SD B 1 . '' e arto ome1s, Cos e la scuola attiva, p. 20. 
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Returning to the theme of pedagogical evolution, De Bartolomeis 
notes that the history of education is a story of progress that reveals 
a series of reforms from Plato to positivism. While it is futile to 
apply present-day criteria to past reforms, considering a historical 
person or movement "progressive" or "activist," recent developments in 
psychology and the social sciences can help us to evaluate the nature 
and efficacy of past educational practices. 
In reviewing the history of modern education, De Bartolomeis comes 
to the conclusion that not all reformers and reformist movements have 
been revolutionary in nature. To clarify this point, he wants to use 
the term "new education" to refer to reformist education in general, 
while he will apply "active education" or "the active school" to the 
revolutionary trend, which he sees as analogous to "progressive educa-
tion" in the U.S.A. 66 It is revolutionary education that interests 
him--revolutionary, that is, not only in its own right, but also 
politically and socially. 
66 There is some ambiguity here. Deweyanism and progressivism are 
generally considered reform movements in the United States. Certainly, 
Dewey did not advocate violent overthrow of the U.S. government, and his 
statements about Communism after the Commission of Inquiry on Leon Trot-
sky (Mexico City, 1937) were sufficiently negative to disabuse anyone of 
the idea that Dewey was a Communist revolutionary. Nevertheless, Dewey 
expressed admiration for the "revolutionary power" of education in 
Turkey and Mexico in the 1920's, emphasizing his belief in the power of 
education to effect profound social change. In that sense, perhaps, De 
Bartolomeis interprets Deweyanismjprogressivism as "revolutionary." See 
Dykhuizen, The Life and Mind of John Dewey, p. 284, and Jane M. Dewey, 
"Biography of John Dewey," in The Philosophy of John Dewey, val. 1, ed. 
Paul A. Schilpp (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 
1939), p. 42. 
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De Bartolomeis believes that the active (revolutionary) school 
derives its character from the attitudes of individual teachers; thus it 
is not chiefly a matter of institutional organization. The teacher is 
not called upon to be perfect in all matters, but to oppose the collec-
tive and intellectualistic wisdom about teaching, and to take account of 
" . expressive and constructive demands, of the need for movement and 
exchange, initiative and responsibility. " 6 7 What will aid the teacher in 
overcoming particular difficulties, De Bartolomeis contends, is a rigor-
ous scientific foundation. 
A major key to active education, in De Bartolomeis' view, is the 
normal behavior of children in nonschool situations. Children are 
active, exploring the world and adapting themselves to situations. It 
is not necessary to idealize or romanticize the child, but one must 
interpret children's behavior accurately and realistically. Free from 
artificial restraints, children behave according to their developmental 
needs. That is not to say that children can care for themselves and 
educate themselves entirely, for the difficulties they encounter are 
often overwhelming, and adult help is needed. The knowledge based on 
observation of children's natural behavior can be systematized in order 
to maximize the benefits of adult intervention in the lives of the 
young. 
67De Bartolomeis, Cos'~ la scuola attiva, p. 34. 
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In this book, De Bartolomeis presents a consideration of personal-
ity factors involved in the learning process, then moves to the evalua-
tion of school activities based on the needs they serve. "It is .needs 
that reveal to us the logic of human behavior, even at its most intri-
cate and absurd," insists the scholar. 68 
De Bartolomeis closes Cos'e la scuola attiva with a discussion of 
Dewey and some early French activists and includes material about 
programs of active schooling. 
In 1962, De Bartolomeis published Lezioni di pedagogia (Readings 
in Pedagogy), an investigation of the role of pedagogy in the social and 
political milieu. School policy, he suggests, is conditioned from an 
". . . ideological, social, and economic point of view. " 6 9 Politics, he 
states, is involved in all h~man activities, and whoever fails to 
confront political questions is apparently satisfied with the existing 
system. An attitude of pure scientific detachment is not an alternative 
to political involvement, because it bespeaks an unwillingness to face 
facts and a desire to retain privileges. 
Pedagogy, De Bartolomeis contends, is a potentially revolutionary 
study whose aim for the individual is ". . . to acquire that knowledge 
and those ·attitudes that make us able to contribute, to some degree, to 
the transformation of educational institutions. 117 0 He makes it clear 
68De Bartolomeis, Cos'e la scuola attiva, p. 71. 
69 Francesco De Bartolomeis, Lezioni di pedagogia (Turin: Gheroni and 
Company, 1962), p. 3. 
70De Bartolomeis, Lezioni di pedagogia, p. 5. 
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that science should not be confounded with politics, but he wants scien-
tific and educational thinkers to stir up general political awareness 
and combat noxious influences in the schools. 
De Bartolomeis charges that the political system in Italy provides 
free speech and other personal freedoms while it impedes social and 
public actions: thus there is liberty, but without the power to do 
one's duty and save the community. De Bartolomeis uses the image of a 
medical doctor, one who does not talk about medicine, but who actually 
cures sick people; the educator, he says, has no such freedom. 71 
De Bartolomeis refers to some of the critical problems that Ital-
ian educators had not solved in that era. He blames those in power for 
propagating the weaknesses of Italian schooling, and suggests an alter-
nate vision: 
The school should help the individual to be free, to use his "head-
instrument" constructively, to make a coordinated use of critical 
powers, to form firm convictions for himself, to appreciate the 
highest and most noble things of life, and to increase his sensitiv-
ity to important problems. And what does the school do instead? It 
prepares him to be a conformist, to accept solutions that others 
impose on him selfishly, to let himself be diminished by decadent 
cultural products, and to prefer superficial and passive assimila-
tion to active and involved participation. 72 
While obsolete and dysfunctional education continues, De Bartolo-
meis laments, the government creates an atmosphere of capitalistic 
euphoria and seeks to silence the leftists and intellectual malcontents. 
71De Bartolomeis, Lezioni di pedagogia, p. 10. 
72De Bartolomeis, Lezioni di pedagogia, p. 14. The use of the term 
"head-instrument" is an allusion to the positivist philosopher, Aristide 
Gabelli. 
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Democracy becomes increasingly illusory in Italy. Yet there is no 
virtue in remaining silent, for the schools are deteriorating and 
government-instituted government-instituted reforms fail to solve any of 
the basic problems. 
From this point in Lezioni di pedagogia, De Bartolomeis catalogues 
the urgent needs of Italian schools and discusses possible reforms and 
their socioeconomic consequences. He has some particularly bitter words 
for the Catholic church and its interpretation of the "freedom of teach-
ing" principle. Only laicism, he argues, can guarantee freedom to all. 
Finally, he adds a historical survey of scientific influences in Italian 
education, concentrating on the era of positivism. 
De Bartolomeis provides suggestions about the uses and diffusion 
of teaching methods in I metodi nella pedagogia contemporanea (Methods 
in Contemporary Pedagogy), published in 1963. In that book, he argues 
against the old Gentilian prejudice against practical training for 
teachers, based on the notion that whoever knows a subject can teach it 
and therefore needs no training or apprenticeship. De Bartolomeis advo-
cates a reform of teacher-training institutions, with a simplified 
system putting more emphasis on scientific thinking and creating more 
opportunities to apply pedagogical knowledge. His appreciation of 
method is quite Deweyan: ". . . method, instead of being a system of 
norms or rules to apply externally according to pre-established proce-
dure, is education in action." 73 
73De Bartolomeis, I metodi nella pedagogia contemporanea 
Loescher Editore, 1963), p. 5. 
(Turin: 
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De Bartolomeis' goal for teachers, then, is not the mechanical 
application of methodological formulae, but a critical, problem-solving 
use of technique as developed by educational specialists. 74 Unsurpris-
ingly, the methodological knowledge which he prizes most is that which 
enhances student-centered teaching and maximal individualization. 
Starting from a strong scientific bias and a rather orthodox 
Deweyan position in 1953, De Bartolomeis moves increasingly into the 
area of social and political concerns. In effect, his ideology went 
farther to the left, until by 1969 he was criticizing the educational 
establishment for its apolitical facade, and in 1972 he was urging 
educators to undertake a struggle for social and cultural renewal. The 
shift to the left is evident in his later publications, notably in La 
ricerca come antipedagogia (Research as Anti-pedagogy), published in 
1969, and in La profess ionali tci sociale dell' insegnante (The Social 
Professionalism of the Teacher), published in 1976. Since the late 
1960's, De Bartolomeis has come to be thought of as one of the leading 
spokesmen for the left wing of the School of Florence. 75 
Aldo Visalberghi: Education as Transaction 
Still another major educator of the Florentine group deserves 
attention for his careful study and interpretation of Dewey. Aldo 
Visalberghi, who was born in Trieste in 1919, was first educated in his 
native city and then at the Superior Normal School of Pisa, where he 
74 De Bartolomeis, I metodi, p. 32. 
75 cambi, La "Scuola di Firenze", p. 13. 
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completed his degree in 1941. Visalberghi 's thesis, on values in the 
philosophy of Benedetto Croce, was directed by Guido Calogero. In his 
early teaching career, Visalberghi held positions in the upper secondary 
schools of Aosta and Turin. Subsequently, he became a professor of 
pedagogy at the University of Milan and the University of Turin. His 
roost recent university post was (and is) that of professor of pedagogy 
in the Division of Letters and Philosophy at the University of Rome. 76 
Visalberghi' s association with the School of Florence is the 
result of his affinity for certain principal features of Deweyan theory. 
He did not study in Florence, but there are instances of his cooperation 
with the Florentine scholars in the matter of editing and preparing 
publications. Among other enterprises, Visalberghi is an editor of a 
scholarly series published by La Nuova Italia (the Florentine publishing 
house founded by Codignola), and he is on the editorial board of that 
group's journal, Scuola e citta. 
Many of Visalberghi' s more important books appeared after 1965. 
Nevertheless, there are a few from an earlier period (roughly 1951 to 
1965) that illustrate his thought and set forth themes for later devel-
opment. 
It is interesting that Visalberghi's first major publication was a 
study of John Dewey, published in 1952 and called, simply, John Dewey. 
It was a successful academic work that went through new editions in 1961 
and 1973. In it, Visalberghi presents a portrait of Dewey as a philoso-
76 Laeng, I contemporanei, pp. 1010-1011. 
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pher and as a man, outlines the connections between Dewey's philosophy 
and his pedagogy, discusses the concept of interest as a central part of 
Dewey's formulations of morals and pedagogy, examines Deweyan concepts 
as they apply to concrete teaching situations, and reflects on the 
nature and importance of Dewey's thought in a broad intellectual 
context. Visalberghi strongly defends Deweyan philosophy and inveighs 
against those (chiefly leftist) critics who want to "go beyond" activ-
ism, denying Dewey's democratic inspiration. 77 
Visalberghi's John Dewey is not intended as a complete and 
systematic treatment of Dewey's life and thought; rather, it is a study 
aimed at demonstrating the "unity and overall coherence of his atti-
tude." 78 At the outset, it is a reply to the early right-wing critics of 
Dewey who tried to separate his pedagogy from his philosophy. Visalber-
ghi defends Dewey's relativism and his unwillingness to assert absolute 
values: thus, says the author, Dewey affirmed that there is value in 
all and that every man's life is worthy of being lived. Visalberghi 
also chides the Marxists, who want to replace Dewey's critical attitude 
with their own style of (historical-materialist) absolutism. Dewey, 
asserts Visalberghi, intended economics to serve mankind, and not vice 
versa; he was concerned about the rights of the individual. Neverthe-
less, Dewey was also concerned with social renewal. His social as well 
as his educational interests grew out of his basic doctrine of action. 
77Aldo Visalberghi, John Dewey (Florence: La Nuova Italia Editrice, 
1952; 1961), pp. vii-viii. 
78Visalberghi, John Dewey, pp. 196-197. 
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According to that doctrine, all particular activity, whether in the 
educational, ethical, or sociopolitical realm, is subsumed as a species 
of action and is irreversibly linked to other forms of action. The 
question of universality in Dewey's pronouncements is answered by his 
appeal to the pervasiveness of human communication and by the expansive 
quality of experience itself. 79 
In the next few years, Visalberghi refined his understanding of 
Dewey's concept of action, leading to a 1958 publication with the Dewey-
an-sounding title of Esperienza e valutazione (Experience and Evalua-
tion). Although it is primarily aimed at the problems of evaluating 
school learning, the book begins with a crucial theoretical discussion. 
Visalberghi announces that among the conflicting theories of evaluation, 
he has chosen" ... the critical instrument provided by the most mature 
form of naturalism, that is to say the 'transactional criterion,' the 
latest development of Deweyan instrumentalism." 80 Visalberghi then 
proceeds with a historico-critical examination of the concept of trans-
action. He admits that he has borrowed the term from a study by John 
Dewey and Arthur B. Bentley, Knowing and the Known. Visalberghi finds 
the term "transaction" superior to "interaction" to denote the circuit 
of nature and experience81 in Dewey's theory of knowledge, and he 
79
visalberghi, John Dewey, pp. 107-131. 
80Aldo Visalberghi, Esperienza e valutazione, 
Editore, 1958), p. 2. 
(Turin: Taylor 
81 In one of his later articles, Visalberghi draws spirals to illus-
trate the nature of experience. 
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relates the concept to contemporary develop!!!ents in the psychology of 
perception. 
The main differences between interaction and transaction, as 
Visalberghi sees them, are in the areas of intentionality and value. An 
interaction may be accidental and accomplish little; but in a trans-
action, something is intended and something (of value) is accomplished. 
While Visalberghi has studied the logic of discourse, he concludes that 
a somewhat different logic applies to transactions. They cannot be made 
intelligible by the usual (interactional) analyses of discourse: as an 
example, Visalberghi refers to the logic of imperatives. "Do thus-and-
so and I'll reward (or punish) you " is an imperative (or a perfor-
mative, some linguists now say) that has no overt truth value; yet as a 
human transaction it has a great deal of meaning. The consequences of 
such a statement are practical rather than logical. An imperative, says 
Visalberghi, is really a kind of norm, a prescription for action. Out 
of the complexity of human transactions come value judgments that are 
equally impervious to ordinary logical analysis, but their consequences 
are verifiable in physical and psychological terms, and thus they have a 
logic of their own. 82 On those grounds, Visalberghi asserts that value 
judgments are normative--that they are instruments for 
action-orientation. 
82Visalberghi, Esperienza e valutazione, pp. 37-66. 
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From that point, Visalberghi begins to build a theory of trans-
actional evaluation based on an elaboration of transactional criteria. 
He discovers difficulties in objectifying such criteria and establishing 
their reliability, but nevertheless he advocates a concept of trans-
actional evaluation that might be developed in a methodological instru-
ment to be used as an adjunct to scientific research. 
In 1960, Visalberghi published Scuola aperta (The Open School), in 
which he outlines his vision of rejuvenated public schools open to a 
multiplicity of positions, different viewpoints, and genuine dialogue, 
while engaging students and teachers in common lines of research. Above 
all, such schools should be socially open, he proposes; and "open" means 
free from structural constrictions and premature social distinctions or 
exclusiveness. 8 3 Visalberghi offers suggestions for school policy and 
provides a historical and comparative study of educators whom he sees as 
sympathetic to the open school, including Edouard Claparede and John 
Dewey. 
The concept of transaction became increasingly central in Visal-
berghi's intellectual life in the late 1950's and 1960's. Although he 
was involved in a host of research activities in philosophy and educa-
tion, it was a recurrent concept in his work. Asked to summarize his 
basic position in 1972, Visalberghi replied: "Life educates. It 
educates us when we are involved in a serious vital transaction." 84 
83 Aldo Visalberghi, Scuola aperta (Florence: La Nueva Italia 
Editrice, 1960), pp. ix-x. 
84 
"Aldo Visalberghi," La mia pedagogia (Padua: Liviana Editrice, 
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Other Florentines and Followers 
Not all of the accomplishments of the School of Florence can be 
summarized by the work of Borghi, Laporta, De Bartolomeis, and Visalber-
ghi. There were many in Italy associated with or influenced by the 
School of Florence in the 1950's and 1960's. Educators, philosophers, 
and psychologists were involved in that movement, and have been so up to 
the present day. 
One of the more interesting figures to be loosely associated with 
the Florentine group is Nicola Abbagnano, the existentialist philoso-
pher. Born in Salerno in 1901, Abbagnano was educated in Naples and 
completed a degree in philosophy. He was a high school teacher for 
several years, and from 1936 to 1939 he taught philosophy in the Divi-
sion of Teaching of the University of Turin. In 1939, he accepted a 
position in the same university's Division of Letters, and since that 
time he has devoted himself to teaching philosophy and the history of 
philosophy. 85 
Despite his early efforts in the field of education, Abbagnano 
directed most of his scholarly output toward theoretical philosophy and 
the history of philosophy. In his mature years, he added his personal 
touches to a philosophy of existentialism, and had the distinction of 
being one of the few Italian existentialists. Abbagnano' s work in 
philosophy centers around the concept of "possibility," a development 
1972), p. 292. 
85 Nicola Abbagnano et al, La filosofia contemporanea in Italia 
(Asti: Arethusa Editrice, 1958), p. 381. 
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that renders his work rather less nihilistic than that of his northern 
European counterparts. For interested scholars, there is an excellent 
English-language study of Abbagnano called Education as Existential 
Possibility, by Gari Lesnoff-Caravaglia. 8 6 Dr. Lesnoff-Caravaglia 
derives pedagogical ideas from a number of Abbagnano's written works and 
provides a splendid interview of her subject. 
One of Abbagnano's considerable services to the Deweyan cause was 
the publication of a brief article in Rivista di filosofia in 1948, 
"Verso il nuovo illuminismo: John Dewey" ("Toward the New Illuminism: 
John Dewey"). The article compares Dewey's faith in scientific problem 
solving to the scientific faith of the eighteenth-century illuminists; 
however, Abbagnano asserts the superiority of Dewey's vision, which, in 
his words, 
abandons the optimistic illusion of eighteenth-century illu-
m~n~sm and the weighty dogmatism of nineteenth-century rationalism, 
and sees reason for what it is: a humane force directed at making 
the world more humane. 87 
Abbagnano's article, appearing at a propitious time (1948) and bearing 
the name of an already respected philosopher, certainly helped to 
prepare the Italian cultural ground for the interest in Dewey that 
flourished in the 1950's. It is often cited by Dewey scholars in Italy. 
86 Gari Lesnoff-Caravaglia, Education as Existential Possibility (New 
York: Philosophical Library, 1972). 
87 Nicola Abbagnano, "Verso il nuovo illuminismo: John Dewey," Rivi-
sta di filosofia 39 (October-December 1948):325. 
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There are others associated with the School of Florence who might 
be mentioned: Giacomo Cives (b. 1927) and Maria Corda Costa (b. 1922) 
of the University of Rome; Egle Becchi (b. 1930) of the University of 
Milan; Guido Petter and Lydia Tornatore, who are primarily psycholo-
gists; Angelo Broccoli (b. 1933), Antonio Santoni Rugiu (b. 1921), Tina 
Tomasi Ventura (b. 1912), and Fortunato Brancatisano, all considered 
part of the left wing of the Deweyan movement. 
No matter what their particular interpretations, the scholars 
associated with the School of Florence established Deweyan thought (or 
its criticism) as a major feature of the Italian intellectual firmament. 
As such, it was an influence on educational theory: although in Italy 
as in the U.S.A., Deweyanism was a force resisted by many educational 
practitioners. Nevertheless, the power and novelty of Deweyanism in the 
1950's led one Italian scholar to prophesy: "The interest in such a 
complex personality as that of Dewey cannot cease, nor will it cease." 88 
88 Iclea Picco, "Note sul Dewey in Italia," Problemi della pedagogia 1 
(1955): 514-515. 
CHAPTER VII 
ORIGINATING A MARXIST PEDAGOGY 
In any study involving contemporary European intellectual move-
ments, the existence of socialism, and particularly Marxist socialism, 
must not be ignored. 
European socialism has its origins in the utopian and chartist 
movements of the 1830 1 s and 1840 1 s. By the middle of the nineteenth 
century, the anarchist teachings of Proudhon and Bakunin had achieved 
some currency; but socialism in the second half of the century was domi-
nated by the thought of Marx and Engels. The social-democratic movement 
associated with Jaures and Bernstein emerged from the Second Interna-
tional after 1903. Following that split, both factions continued to 
exert a considerable influence in European political matters and do so 
to the present time. 
Earlier chapters of this study, particularly those dealing with 
the problematicist and Deweyan philosophers in Italian education, have 
hinted at Marxist tendencies among the laic groups. Yet the involvement 
of Marxist thinkers in Italian education is more extensive than the few 
instances mentioned. In fact, the Marxist group, especially by the 
1960 1 s, was articulate and visible enough to be considered a separate 
school of philosophy and not part of the laic current at all. Thus 
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Marxism, as a major ideology affecting both philosophy and education, 
demands separate attention. 
The Political Background of Italian Marxism 
The history of Marxism in Italy is entangled with that of leftist 
movements in general. The Communist Manifesto was published in 1848, 
but in that year Italian attentionwas turned to the campaign to liberate 
Italy from foreign rule. Right-wing Manchesterian liberals dominated 
the Italian parliament from its inception until the election of 1876; 
then the parliamentary left came into power. The left-right struggles 
that began in the 1870's continued until the imposition of Fascist power 
in 1922. The early parliamentary left, it should be noted, was not a 
revolutionary left: its principal heroes were Mazzini and Garibaldi 
rather than Marx and Bakunin. 
Outside of parliamentary circles, early Italian radicalism was 
strongly anarchist in character. Most of the Italian delegates to the 
Socialist First International were followers of Bakunin. From the 
1870's on, their presence was made known by assassination attempts 
against government figures: in November 1878, an anarchist attempted to 
kill King Umberto I during a visit to Naples and wounded the prime 
minister instead; in 1894, an anarchist fired a shot at Prime Minister 
Crispi; and in 1900, an anarchist succeeded in assassinating King 
Umberto I. 1 The years 1897 to 1900 were a time of social unrest and 
1
sergio Romano, Storia d' Italia dal risorgimento ai nostri giorni 
(Milan: Arnalda Mondadori Editore, 1978), pp. 278-283. 
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popular uprisings, and anarchist agitation contributed to the strife. 
In the latter decades of the nineteenth century, certain forms of 
socialism began to develop as political forces in Italy. A Workers' 
party was formed in 1880 to represent the extreme left in parliament, 
but it was dissolved by the government in 1886. Opposition to the 
authoritarian policies of the Crispi government led to the founding of 
the Italian Socialist party in 1892. The head of the new party was 
Filippo Turati (1877-1932). In the interest of ideological solidarity, 
the party's first action was to expel its anarchist faction. A subse-
quent congress in September 1902 confirmed the ascendancy of Turati' s 
socialist-revisionist group, resulting in policies of opposition to the 
revolutionary faction. 
By 1911 or 1912, the socialists had become an accepted feature of 
the Italian political scene. When an anarchist attempted to shoot King 
Vittorio Emanuele III in April 1912, three socialist deputies were among 
those who congratulated the monarch on his escape from injury. 2 Shortly 
thereafter, however, Mussolini and his supporters took control of the 
party and expelled the three, took over publication of the socialist 
newspaper Avanti! (Forward!), and exercised a major influence until 
after World War I when Mussolini organized a new party. Socialists 
joined with anarchists and republicans in a brief insurrection that took 
place in 1914, but World War I soon turned national attention to other 
matters. 
2Romano, Storia d'Italia, p. 286. 
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In the chaotic years following the First World War, the nature of 
socialist and Marxist groups in Italy changed considerably. The success 
of Bolshevism in Russia encouraged the formation of a "maximalist" 
(pro-Soviet) faction in the socialist party, many of whose members with-
drew in January 1921 to become a separate entity, the Communist Party of 
Italy (PCd'I). The new party was led by Palmira Togliatti (1893-1964), 
who was to become a leading figure in Italian politics. The Communists, 
despite their revolutionary fervor, continued to participate in parlia-
mentary government until they were banned by Mussolini. 
While the Marxist-socialist camp was in disorder, Mussolini (who 
had become independent of the socialists in 1919) was building his party 
and consolidating his political base. By October 1922, Mussolini had 
rallied enough support to lend credibility to his "march on Rome" and 
his demand for power. 
Mussolini's first cabinet contained two revisionist socialists 
(then called Social Democrats). But the election of 1924 gave the 
Fascists 65% of the vote, and they then began to eliminate the non-Fas-
cist opposition. On June 10, a group of Fascists murdered a socialist 
deputy named Giacomo Matteotti; in protest, most of the opposition depu-
ties walked out of the parliament. Mussolini soon empowered Fascist 
party secretary Farinacci to use violence against opposition leaders, 
many of whom went into exile or became active in the underground. 
During World War II, antigovernment "partisan" groups were formed 
to assist Allied efforts against the Fascists and Nazis. The Communists 
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figured prominently in that struggle and achieved a reputation for 
effectiveness, dedication, and honesty. Their actions did much to 
prepare the way for the emergence of the Italian Communist party (PCI) 
as a major postwar political force. 
Palmiro Togliatti spent a number of years in exile in Spain and 
the Soviet Union, but he returned to Italy in 1944 and participated in 
coalition governments until 1947. At that time, the Communists adopted 
an anticlerical line that was one of the major reasons for their subse-
quent exclusion from coalitions with the dominant Christian Democrat 
party. 
In the socialist camp, 1947 was important for the formation of two 
rival parties. The more radical of the two was the Italian Socialist 
party (PSI), led by Pietro Nenni (b. 1891). The more conciliatory 
party, called the Partite Socialdemocratico Italiano (PSDI), was led by 
Giuseppe Saragat (b. 1898). The PSDI participated regularly in coali-
tion governments, and Saragat himself became president of the republic 
in 1964. The "Nenniani," increasingly disillusioned by Soviet heavy-
handedness as a force dimming the prospects of international socialism, 
finally agreed to participate in the Italian government in 1963. The 
Italian Communist party remained an opposition party, strong but out of 
power; it participated in no coalition governments in the years between 
1947 and 1965. 3 
3H. Hearder and D. P. Waley, A Short History of Italy, (Cambridge, 
England: Cambridge University Press, 1963), pp. 236-238 et passim. 
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Considering the political turmoil of the period from the Risorgi-
mento to the end of World War II, it is not surprising that the Italian 
:::-----
Marxists did not direct much energy toward the creation of a coherent 
pedagogy. Nevertheless, there were some intellectual pioneers who 
prepared the way for such a development. 
Marxism as an Intellectual Movement 
Marxism was understandably slower to develop as an intellectual 
force in Italy than it was as a political force. When Marxism began to 
appear in Italy around the end of the nineteenth century, it did not 
arrive in a cultural vacuum. Among laic thinkers of the late nineteenth 
century, positivism was an important philosophy. In the early twentieth 
century, positivism was eclipsed by nee-Hegelian idealism, which was 
later favored by the Fascists and remained an "official" philosophy 
until the end of World War II. 4 Moreover, a new philosophy arriving in 
Italy at any time has to contend with the perennialist philosophy of 
Catholicism, a major feature of the Italian intellectual environment. 
Gradually, however, from the 1890's on, and despite strong opposition, 
~1arxism began to establish itself as an intellectual movement in Italy. 
4Positivism and idealism are further discussed in Chapters II and IV 
of this study. 
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Pioneers of Marxist Thought in Italy 
The first noteworthy Italian Marxist intellectual was Antonio 
Labriola (1843-1904). He was a student of Bertrando Spaventa, the nee-
Hegelian philosopher, and in his youth Labriola was an adherent of nee-
Hegelian idealism. In the 1890's, however, he became interested in 
political socialism and theoretical communism, and his published titles 
of the period bear witness to that fact: among them are In memoria del 
manifesto dei communisti (In Memory of the Communist Manifesto), 1895; 
and Del materialismo storico (On Historical Materialism), published in 
1896. 5 
Labriola was attracted to two particular features of Marxism: the 
"scientific" character of Marxism as contrasted with the utopian nature 
of some other forms of socialism; and Marxism's philosophy of praxis, 
according to which Marxist philosophy cannot be separated from social 
and political action. Nevertheless, Labriola's interpretation of Marx-
ism was heretical in some ways. Labriola accepted the tenet that 
historical materialism is a philosophy of history, but he denied its 
power to explain all historical facts. Rather, he saw historical mater-
ialism as a method of historical study and a means of discovering the 
relations of historical facts. To reduce history to economics seemed to 
Labriola to be reductionist system building, imputing a "metaphysical" 
structure to history. 6 Labriola agreed that class consciousness is an 
5 Dizionario dei filosofi, 1976 ed., s.v. "Labriola, Antonio." 
6 Dizionario dei filosofi, s.v. "Labriola, Antonio." 
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important phenomenon, but he contended that its nature is as much 
cultural and sociological as it is economic. Furthermore, he insisted 
on voluntaristic and idealistic impulses as the effective antecedents of 
concrete political action. 
Labriola was not entirely silent on the subject of education, but 
the few pages he addressed to it date from his "Herbartian" period prior 
to his discovery of Marx. 7 They are therefore of minimal interest in an 
examination of Marxist philosophy and pedagogy. 
In different ways, Labriola's thought influenced both Benedetto 
Croce and Antonio Gramsci. In the early decades of the twentieth 
century, Croce moved away from Marxist analyses and developed a complex 
theory of history,' while Gramsci became an important Marxist theoreti-
cian. 
Labriola's successor as the leading Marxist academic was Rodolfo 
Mondolfo (1877-1976). He was a professor of the history of philosophy 
and taught at the universities of Turin and Bologna; during the Fascist 
period, however, he went into hiding and eventually left Italy, whence 
he emigrated to Argentina. Thus, the last three decades of his life 
were spent principally in South America, and his reputation in Italy was 
maintained mainly through his publications. Like Labriola, Mondolfo 
emphasized the activist character of Marxism, but he refused total 
7 Mauro Laeng, I contemporanei (Florence: Giunti Barbera, 1979), p. 
653 ff. 
8 Croce's philosophy is discussed at greater length in Chapter III of 
this study. 
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acceptance of its materialistic interpretations of human activity. 9 For 
Mondolfo, Marxism became a philosophy of liberty and humanism. That 
attitude is expressed in one of his later works, Umanesimo di Marx (The 
Humanism of Marx), published in 1968. 
The Life and Work of Gramsci 
Among Italian Marxist thinkers of the early twentieth century, one 
name in particular stands out: Antonio Gramsci. Born in Ales, Sardi-
nia, in 1891, Gramsci grew up in poverty, and his early education in the 
local schools was interrupted for several years as he worked to help 
support his family. Gramsci was always in poor health, suffering from 
internal disorders, a nervous condition, and a malformation of the spine 
which stunted his growth and caused him to become hunchbacked. His poor 
health also impeded his education. Nevertheless, in 1908, Gramsci 
passed a competitive examination that enabled him to enroll in the 
senior high school in Cagliari. 10 
In 1911, Gramsci won a scholarship to the University of Turin, 
where he encountered social and political radicalism of all kinds. One 
of his fellow students was Palmira Togliatti, who was to become the 
founder of the Communist Party of Italy. Eventually, ill health caused 
Gramsci to abandon his university studies, but not before he had read 
some leading radical thinkers, including Antonio Labriola and Rodolfo 
9Dizionario dei filosofi, s.v. "Mondolfo, Rodolfo." 
10Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. and 
trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International 
Publishers, 1971), "Introduction," pp. xviii-xx. 
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Mondolfo. Gramsci also read and appreciated Benedetto Croce. Although 
in his later years Gramsci chastened Croce for his insipid resistance to 
the Fascists, there were elements of Crocian idealism that Gramsci 
retained and even used in the critique of his fellow Marxists. 11 
In Turin, Gramsci joined the Socialist party (PSI) and became 
active in leftist journalism. When the Bolshevik revolution occurred in 
Russia in 1917, he was favorably impressed, and his published articles 
soon called for the formation of "workers' soviets" on the Russian 
model. 
At the socialist convention in Livorno in 1921, Gramsci joined the 
radical group headed by Palmiro Togliatti, which combined with a similar 
group headed by a Marxist purist from Naples, Amadeo Bordiga. Together 
they left the PSI and formed a new party, the Communist Party of Italy 
(PCd'I). From May 1922 to November 1923, Gramsci was in the U.S.S.R. at 
the invitation of the Third International. Later, he traveled to Vienna 
to do political work on behalf of the International. 12 When he returned 
to Italy in 1924, the Fascists were already in power but had not yet 
attempted to eradicate their opposition. Gramsci resumed party activi-
ties in Italy, and was arrested by the Fascists on November 8, 1926. 
Eventually, he was incarcerated in Bari province. 
11Hoare and Smith, "Introduction," p. xxv. 
12Antonio Gramsci, L'alternativa pedagogica, ed. Mario A. Manacorda 
(Florence: La Nuova Italia Editrice, 1972), "Nota biografica," p. xliv. 
While in prison, Gramsci wrote and studied endlessly. 
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He kept 
voluminous notebooks which survived the war and have been published and 
translated widely. He was also an avid letter writer, and his prison 
letters now constitute a separate volume. 
Between 1931 and 1933, Gramsci's health began to deteriorate seri-
ously. He was released from prison in 1935 to obtain medical treatment, 
but he remained under police surveillance. In a Rome clinic on April 
27, 1937, he suffered a cerebral hemorrhage and died at the age of 
forty-six years. 
Gramsci' s early journal articles, as well as his prison letters 
and notebooks, survived World War II and constituted a unique patrimony 
for the reconstituted Communist party, the Partite Communista Italiano 
(PCI), and for postwar leftist intellectuals in general. In his life-
time, Gramsci was often concerned with questions of education, and 
sections of the Prison Notebooks attest to that fact. Essentially, 
Gramsci' s writings on education urge a reorganization of schooling in 
order to eliminate class privileges and to train intellectuals from the 
working class. That material is one of the major sources upon which 
later Marxist educators were able to draw. 
The Sources of Marxist Education 
Before the establishment of the Soviet regime, the Marxist politi-
cal parties in Europe did not devote much energy to delineating the 
possible character of Marxist education. A few scattered passages in 
the works of Engels and Lenin are all that Marxist educators can draw on 
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from the period leading up to the Russian revolution. On the eve of 
that revolution, when the Bolsheviks formed a sizable opposition to the 
Russian government and were planning their own accession to power, some 
educational policy principles were set forth. Those policies led to 
official documents that were published shortly after the Bolshevik take-
over in late 1917. In effect, the new government was forced to think 
about problems of education, and it responded as well as it could; thus, 
a Marxist approach to education had to be created in that period. 
The Soviet Sources 
In December 1917, the Bolshevik government of the U.S.S.R. issued 
a decree that stated, in part, that universal compulsory education was 
to become law; the new government would increase provisions for educa-
tion at all levels; a new emphasis was to be given to scientific study; 
and school building and teacher-training programs were to intensify. 13 
Those decrees were intended to counteract the most obvious shortcomings 
of schooling in the late Tsarist period. Further elaborations of the 
principles of Marxist education were yet to come. 
The first People's Commissar of Enlightenment, A. V. Lunacharsky 
(1875-1933), made an early statement supporting the principle of educa-
tion for the masses. He desired a "high level of public education" to 
make popular government possible. 14 A major principle of the new Soviet 
13 James Bowen, Soviet Education (Madison, Wisconsin: The University 
of Wisconsin Press, 1962), p. 27. 
14Bowen, Soviet Education, p. 29. 
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school was that it would be "polytechnic," uniting intellectual 
understanding with manual work, and its style of operation would be 
aimed at eliminating class distinctions. 
In the early years, however, the optimal form of instruction could 
not be specified. During the period of Lunacharsky's tenure as People's 
Commissar of Enlightenment, from 1917 to 1929, the official line favored 
scientific experimentation on the social level and allowed a variety of 
methods to be tested in the Soviet schools. Among the contending 
currents of educational thought was Pavel Blonsky's "pedology" movement, 
Krupskaya' s ideal of politically-controlled polytechnical schools, and 
several instructional theories imported from America. 15 In general, the 
experiments failed to produce the desired results. When Andrei Bubnov 
became People's Commissar of Enlightenment in 1931, the era of experi-
mentation came to a rapid end. 
The greatest of the Soviet educators was neither a commissar nor a 
politician, but a country schoolteacher named Anton Semyonovich Makar-
enko (1888-1939). Intensely loyal to the Soviet regime and an avowed 
admirer of the OGPU (the political police), Makarenko was given charge 
of colonies of delinquent and homeless youths in the 1920's and 1930's. 
Makarenko introduced a military style of discipline in his colonies, 
complete with uniforms, drums, and bugles. At all times, he stressed 
the primacy of the collective over the whims and desires of the individ-
ual. While sometimes at odds with local officials, Makarenko believed 
15 Bowen, Soviet Education, pp. 139-144. 
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in the ideal of a new Soviet society and culture, and he was sure that 
in his colonies he was approaching that ideal. 
In the mid-1930's, the Soviet government began to promote Makaren-
ko's approach as a means of solving the problem of reviving a disci-
plined, competitive system of education while not losing sight of 
collective aims. Makarenko's views of education were widely dissemi-
nated through the publication and translation of his books. Makarenko 
obviously considered himself a man of action rather than By the 1950's, 
his Pedagogicheskaya Poema (Pedagogical Poem, translated as The Road to 
Life), was one of the favorite books of Soviet readers and was available 
in several world languages as well. 16 In addition to the Pedagogiche-
skaya Poema, Makarenko published two other books, Flagi na Bash-
nyakh (Learning to Live), and Kniga dlya Roditelei (A Book for 
Parents), both of which achieved wide circulation. 
Education in the Works of Gramsci 
In the 1950's and 1960's, Marxist educators in Europe were gener-
ally aware of the contributions of Lunacharsky, Krupskaya, Makarenko, 
and other Soviet educators. The Italian Marxists also had a native 
source of educational thought in the writings of Antonio Gramsci. 
Sections of the Prison Notebooks contain discussions of education that 
are ideologically "safe" as foundations upon which to build. 
16Bowen, Soviet Education, p. 3. 
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In the Prison Notebooks, Gramsci envisions a new type of schooling 
that removes class barriers and eliminates the special privileges of the 
few. The basis of the new socialist education can be nothing other than 
productive work; by this Gramsci means that learning is itself a form of 
work, while it prepares individuals for their future work. Nothing 
extraneous to that ethic must be permitted. 
To replace the traditional world view of the school (particularly 
the conservative ethos of the confessional school), Gramsci advocates 
the development of a "historical, dialectical conception of the world"; 
obviously, such a viewpoint would be consistent with Marxist theory. 17 
Gramsci directs several arguments against the idealist concept of 
education, the "rhetorical" type of school resulting from the 1923 
reform law, and the "romantic" nature of most experimental education. 
For Gramsci, education must be closely linked to work, and learning 
itself ought to be an arduous task. He admires the discipline imposed 
upon schoolchildren by the study of Latin and Greek, but he concedes 
that the crisis of modern culture demands a new focus for the formative 
school. One possible remedy is formal logic, which requires study 
because its principles are not innate, and whose study necessarily 
imposes discipline and self-control. 
The main criticism that Gramsci launches against contemporary 
education is its perpetuation of the class structure. Italian education 
is oligarchic, he contends, because each social group has its own type 
17 Bowen, Soviet Education, p. 3. 
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of school carrying on its own tradition. Gramsci' s antidote for the 
class nature of Italian education is the abolition of the variety of 
schools and the establishment of a single type of school for all citi-
zens: 
If one wishes to break this (class) pattern one needs . . . to 
create a single type of formative school (primary-secondary) which 
would take the child up to the threshold of his choice of job, form-
ing him during this time as a person capable of thinking, study-
ing, and ruling--or controlling those who rule. 18 
Gramsci refers to this proposed school as the "common" school and envi-
sions it as a state school whose task would be to provide 
. a general, humanistic, formative culture; this would strike 
the right balance between development of the capacity for working 
manually (technically, industrially) and development of the capaci-
ties required for intellectual work. From this type of common 
schooling, via repeated experiments in vocational orientation, 
pupils would pass on to one of the specialized schools or to produc-
tive work. 19 
Finally, Gramsci intends the power of the working class to be 
consolidated and maintained by the creation of a new group of intellec-
tuals from the working class itself. That must be a major aim of 
socialist education in spite of the great difficulties involved. 
Thus, in the Prison Notebooks, Gramsci announces some of the main 
themes of Marxist education: the single school, maximal education for 
all, suppression of the religious influence, the linkage of education to 
labor, and the creation of a working-class intelligentsia. That 
18 Quintin and Hoare, Selections, p. 40. 
19Quintin and Hoare, Selections, p. 40. The school that Gramsci 
describes is easily compared to the Unified Labor School created by the 
Soviet government in the Lunacharsky era. 
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program, ideologically unassailable, was to remain essentially 
unchallenged by successive Marxist educators. 
Marxist Pedagogy in Postwar Italy 
During the Fascist period, avowed Marxists and those suspected of 
leftist sympathies were persecuted by the state; whenever and wherever 
possible, Marxist scholars in university or secondary school teaching 
positions were removed from their posts and forbidden to teach. One 
legacy of the period is that, in the 1940's and 1950's, few Marxists 
enjoyed prestigious positions in the Italian universities. That is 
especially true of the field of education, where Gentilian idealists 
predominated until the early 1950's, when they were gradually replaced 
by Deweyan activists. Partly because of political considerations within 
the state university system, it was difficult for Marxists to establish 
themselves firmly before the mid 1960's. Therefore, the educational 
theorizing of Marxist scholars of the 1940's and 1950's was often 
carried on outside of the universities or at best by professors whose 
academic appointments were not in philosophy or education. 
In the scholarly summaries of philosophers and educators of the 
postwar period, the Marxist entries are invariably few. One important 
figure who is often included among the Marxists is Antonio Banfi. 2 0 
Undeniably, Banfi was a Marxist in the political sense, a prominent 
member of the Ital,ian Communist party, and a committed activist in 
20 see, for example, Giovanni Giraldi, Storia della pedagogia (Rome: 
Armando Armando Editore, 1969), p. 512, and Mauro Laeng, I contempora-
nei (Florence: Giunti Barbera, 1979), pp. 685-702. 
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public affairs. Yet his intricate system of philosophy can hardly be 
encompassed by the term "Marxism." His sources are far too varied--Hus-
serl, Bergson, Dilthey, and Natorp and Cohen, among others--to lend 
ideological purity to his work. His insistence on the "problematic" 
nature of experience permits unorthodoxies to enter at will, creating a 
philosophical dialectic whose dimensions are wider than that of the 
class-oriented dialectic of orthodox Marxists. As Giraldi reflects on 
Banfi, " ... his relativist position, contained in his problematicism, 
endures to cover the present and the future." 21 
Among the Deweyans there were those who attempted to combine 
elements of Marx's social theory with reformist pedagogy; but elements 
drawn from Marx do not make theory necessarily Marxist. 
The Marxists found reliable sources in their journal, Riforma 
della scuola (The Reform of Schooling), which began appearing in 1955. 
In fact, it was the successor to an earlier publication, Educazione 
democratica (Democratic Education), which began publication at the end 
of World War II. That journal, however, was not as well edited as 
Riforma della scuola and did not attract as much attention in scholarly 
circles. From 1955 on, Riforma della scuola appeared regularly in an 
attractive format and accepted contributions by both Marxist and non-
Marxist educators. Its editorial policy did not require it to accept 
only articles by bona fide Communists, although the sympathies of the 
editorial board were apparent. 
21 Giraldi, Storia della pedagogia, p. 512. 
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To a large extent, Riforma della scuola was concerned with basic 
policy issues, those that grew out of economic and demographic 
constraints on the schools and that figured into the parliamentary 
debates of the time: school expenditures, attendance laws, curriculum 
changes, and so forth. More esoteric discussions of educational theory 
rarely appeared on its pages in the first decade of publication. For 
example, an article contributed by the illustrious Banfi in 1956 (the 
year before his death) attacks a suggestion made to the Italian parlia-
ment to reform the schools without any financial expenditures. 22 In the 
article, Banfi makes a few ideologically inspired claims about education 
to the effect that education for all is a right rather than a privilege 
and that the cupidity of the ruling class has impeded the implementation 
of that right. Yet the theme of the article (that educational expendi-
tures must be increased) rests upon comparisons of the percentage of the 
national income spent upon education in several countries, on statements 
of various experts, on denunciations of spending for armaments, and so 
forth. Although there is argumentation, it is hardly a study in philos-
ophy despite its authorship, and it is fairly typical of the material 
published by Riforma della scuola in the early years. 
The contributors to Riforma della scuola did not turn their 
attention to more abstract matters of theory until 1965, when the debate 
was touched off by recognition of a publication of the preceding year. 
In 1964, Mario Alighiero Manacorda published the first volume of Il 
22 Antonio Banfi, "Riforma ad alto prezzo," Riforma della scuola, May 
19 56 , pp . 3-5 . 
298 
marxismo e l'educazione (Marxism and Education), a three-volume histori-
cal study of Marxist documents pertinent to education. 
'd " gul. e to the book, actually an introductory chapter, 
A "reader' s 
appeared in 
Riforma della scuola in January 1965. Eleven months later, several 
articles appeared in the same journal in response to Manacorda's piece. 
They marked the beginning of an intensifying theoretical discussion, 
spurred by the political unrest of the late 1960's. 
New Reflections on Marxist Pedagogy 
Mario Alighiero Manacorda was born in Rome on December 9, 1914. 
He was educated at the Scuola Normale Superiore (Higher Teacher Training 
Institute) of Pisa and at the University of Pisa, where he received a 
degree in literature in 1936. After a year of postgraduate study at the 
University of Frankfurt/Main in Germany, he began a career as a scholar 
and translator. His early work was in disinterested literary study, but 
the occurrence of major political changes, particularly at the end of 
World War II, gradually led him into research of a more politically 
committed nature. Thus his early studies of the German romantics, 
Navalis (in 1942) and von Hofmannsthal (in 1946), gave way to intensive 
studies of Marx and Engels. 
In the postwar years, Manacorda' s political sympathies drew him 
into a number of practical activities. Qualified and experienced as a 
secondary school teacher, Manacorda accepted the responsibility for 
directing a boarding school in Rome for the children of partisans and 
war veterans under the sponsorship of the National Partisans Association 
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of Italy. He remained at the school from 1946 to 1948. Later, he 
became active in the Cultural Commission of the Italian Communist party, 
which led him to participate in a Communist-backed law project for the 
establishment of a single middle school in Italy. In 1962, he became a 
member of the Pedagogical Section of the Gramsci Institute, a Communist 
cultural organization. 
In the 1950's, Manacorda was heavily involved in editing and 
publishing Marxist-oriented books and periodicals. He served as a 
director of Edizioni Rinascita, a Communist publishing house, from 1954 
to 1957. At various times, he prepared or edited articles on schooling 
and pedagogical matters for a number of small journals circulated among 
Marxist intellectuals, and in 1964 he joined the editorial staff of 
Riforma della scuola. He contributed to various other pedagogical and 
historical journals, including Scuola e citta (published by the Dewey-
ans in Florence), and two journals published in the U.S.S.R. 
Manacorda's article in Riforma della scuola, January 1965, 
addresses what he considers to be the principles of Marxist education. 
He announces a basic thesis in these words: 
Marxism, insofar as it is a theory of the emancipation of man, 
has an implicit pedagogical component that is articulated by a 
sociological investigation of the state of instruction, by a philo-
sophical critique of the problem of man's nature and ends, and by a 
specific delineation of determinate pedagogical choices. 23 
23Mario Alighiero Manacorda, "L'uomo onnilaterale," Riforma della 
scuola, January 1965:7. 
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Manacorda extracts pedagogical significance from many of the t."orks of 
~tarx and Engels. He refers to an exemplary passage from Engels: The 
~tuation of the Working Class in England, describing the deplorable 
state of nineteenth-century schooling. Manacorda insists that the 
passage provides evidence of Engels 1 humanitarian sympathy for the 
oppressed. 
Manacorda suggests that the Marxist approach to education, sepa-
rated from historical accidents, reveals an extraordinary thematic 
consistency. It is based on a consideration of the nature of man and of 
what is unique to man--labor. That "work created mann is an essential 
article of Marxist belief which Manacorda also affirms: 
In work, man actualizes his true human essence, distinguishing 
himself from the animals insofar as he produces his ot.;-n means of 
subsistence in a way that is voluntary, conscious, and universal--
that is, extended to all nature. 2 • 
Having made that point, Manacorda summarizes the standard Marxist 
theory of the socialization and division of labor, emphasizing the 
alienation of workers. According to this theory, what is produced in 
the industrial system becomes increasingly extraneous to the needs and 
aims of the workers, subjugating them to a social order imposed by 
others. The promise of education is " . as a form and method for 
man 
1 
s reintegration in work, in contrast to work that has divided 
men." 25 
24 Manacorda, "L'uomo onnilaterale," p. 7. 
25 Manacorda, "L'uomo onnilaterale," p. 8. 
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The division and specialization of labor has created what Mana-
corda calls "unilateral" man, who is necessarily limited, dehumanized, 
divided within himself and isolated from others. Marxist education, in 
contrast, aims at creating "omnilateral" man, a being who is completely 
developed in every way. The alienation that besets the working class, 
according to Manacorda is equally devastating to the ruling class; thus 
it is useless to propose any (class-oriented) conservative pedagogy as 
the possible salvation of society. 
Manacorda stresses the group nature of social processes and 
insists that overcoming the conditions of the working class is a neces-
sary part of the historical process " . independent of the abstract 
will of isolated individuals." 26 The task before the working class is to 
abolish the condition of its own alienation. "Thus," he concludes, 
"while any individualistic pedagogy must be excluded from the objective 
of personal reintegration, the pedagogical process is linked to the 
general process of society as an objective and revolutionary process. 
We posit, in effect, a close relation of education to revolution." 27 
Referring to Marx's Kapital, Manacorda states that modern produc-
tion methods, while encouraging specialization, also require the versa-
tility of individuals in the labor force. That need has led to the 
establishment of polytechnical and professional schools, but therein 
Manacorda sees a source of revolutionary ferment. 
26Manacorda, "L'uomo onnilaterale," p. 8. 
27Manacorda, "L'uomo onnilaterale," p. 8. 
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concession won by the workers is a step toward revolutionary victory, 
and will reveal the "contradictions" of capitalistic production. 28 
Various writings of Marx, says Manacorda, go beyond asserting a 
polytechnical versatility as the proper educational goal of the workers. 
They should study science and technology in order to understand and 
control the process of production. Marx outlines a complete education 
for the working-class young, encompassing intellectual development, 
physical education, and polytechnical instruction, at the same time 
combining productive labor. In fact, Marx opposes the abolition of 
child labor, calling it a "democratic-humanitarian illusion." The early 
union of classroom instruction with productive work, he contends, is a 
powerful force for the transformation of society. 2 9 Only a growth of 
revolutionary consciousness and activity, Manacorda writes, is necessary 
to impel the process to its logical end. 
Recapitulating, Manacorda states the central motif of Marxist 
pedagogy as ". . . the recovery, by means of technological instruction 
united with productive labor, of human omnilaterality lost in the 
historically-produced division of labor .. lf30 
28 Manacorda, "L'uomo onnilaterale," p. 9. 
29M d "L' '1 t 1 " 9 Th 'd f ' . 1 anacor a, uomo onn~ a era e, p. . e ~ ea o un~t~ng earn-
ing with work is reflected in records of early Soviet experiences in 
education. Makarenko, for example, had his students produce furniture 
and similar objects for use in the school or for outside sale, with the 
proceeds going to the school. 
30Manacorda, "L'uomo onnilaterale," p. 9. 
303 
There are other pedagogical points that Manacorda derives from his 
study of Marxist thought. For example, he links the relation of man and 
environment to the doctrine of labor. That doctrine is part of the 
materialistic theory of history, in a nontraditional sense, because it 
asserts that human beings have the power to modify their environment. 
The ruling class must be educated to the fact that the workers can 
modify not only their environment but their social situation as well. 
Thus the educators must be educated; they must learn that man's activity 
educates. In Hegelian fashion, Manacorda predicts that the reign of 
things and circumstances over man will be overcome by the reign of man 
over things and circumstances. The environment will then be understood 
as an outcome of the revolutionary activity of humanity. 31 
Manacorda proposes an intellectual struggle against both natural-
istic determinism and individualism. His opposition to naturalistic 
determinism recalls the arguments of the preceding paragraphs; and he 
opposes an individualism that sees education as nothing but the discov-
ery of a pre-existing nature of the self. Both doctrines are inimical 
to Marxist theories of man, labor, and revolution. 
Education is part of the moral order, asserts Manacorda, and it is 
thus related to religious concepts, the family, and the state. Marx 
wanted to change the nature of the family, abolish religion, and create 
a new and higher social ethic. That change demands a revolutionary, 
social education in place of the older family style of education, and it 
31M d II I • 1 1 II 0 anacor a, L uomo onn1 atera e, p. 1 . 
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must be free from the class-oriented ideological influences of the 
(bourgeois) state and the church. 
The instructional content of education, asserts Manacorda, must be 
oriented toward science: the history of science, the relations among 
the sciences, and the relations of science to philosophy. Philosophy, 
in turn, must concentrate on the relations of man and nature and must 
avoid arid metaphysics. Philosophy must provide dialectical and histor-
ical concepts of nature and the social world. u Eventually, Manacorda 
refers to Engels' classification of the sciences (in AntidUhring) as 
evidence of a plan for the study of the sciences; in any case, that 
classification supports the general principles of Marx on the importance 
of technological learning and the study of the sciences. 
Manacorda returns to the theme of omnilaterality and finds it in 
the optimal coincidence of science and productive work, wherein human 
occupations are indefinite and varied. He can allow a reasonable divi-
sian of labor, however, as long as it is conscious and voluntary. 3 3 
Moreover, he suggests that the Marxist disc.ussion of education is not 
necessarily exhausted on matters of productive necessity. Questions of 
human liberty and the relation of work to culture are also mentioned in 
Marx's writings, and have implications for education. For Marx, the 
true realm of freedom lies where the development of human abilities 
becomes an end in itself, beyond the sphere of material production. In 
32 d II I 1 II Manacor a, L uomo onnilatera e, p. 10. Manacorda does not seem 
to consider dialectical theories as metaphysical in any important sense. 
33Manacorda, 11L'uomo onnilaterale, 11 p. 11. 
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that realm beyond economic realities, Manacorda leaves room for a 
"disinterested" human culture, nevertheless resting on the philosophical 
bases previously discussed. 34 
In response to Manacorda 1 s article, three articles appeared in 
subsequent issues of Riforma della scuola. The first, by Armando Plebe, 
is called "Esiste una pedagogia marxista?" ("Does a Marxist Pedagogy 
Exist?"), and it is found in the April 1965 issue of the journal. At 
the time of the article, Plebe was a professor of history of philosophy 
and history of ancient philosophy at the University of Palermo. He was 
the author of several books on ancient history, esthetics, and ancient 
and modern philosophers; and he had edited some of the works of ancient 
philosophers. As of 1965, he had published nothing on education. 
Detailed biographical data on Plebe is not provided in Riforma della 
scuola or the standard biographical sources. 
Plebe raises two questions: whether Marxist pedagogy exists and, 
if so, whether it is a good thing. From the evidence of Manacorda 1 s 
book, he concludes that Marxist pedagogy does in fact exist. He sees it 
as based on the nonbanal roots of an often banalized concept, that of 
alienation. The alienation which Plebe wishes to consider is not triv-
ial alienation, the "alienation of home appliances," but the dilemma of 
contemporary man, ". embattled between the necessity of working in 
order to have an aim and the danger of losing the sense of his own life 
in the mechanicalness in which work thrusts him. 1135 
34 M d "L' '1 1 II 1 anacor a, uomo onn1 atera e, p. 1. 
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Yet the matter is not entirely settled for Plebe. He refers to 
Marx 1 s 1849 essay, "The Misery of Philosophy," in which Marx insists 
that misery demands action and not theorizing. Plebe considers· that 
Marx would have taken a similar approach to education, declaring the 
uselessness of abstract pedagogy. II . (T)he pedagogy of misery 
serves rather to demonstrate the misery of pedagogy." 36 
Plebe agrees with historian Karl L~ith, who said that Marx 1 s 
major revolutionary innovation is not in overturning Hegel and putting 
him, so to speak, on his feet; rather, it is in suppressing the "philo-
sophical" nature of the enterprise. Plebe adds that a similar judgment 
should be made on pedagogy. Modern educators should realize " ... the 
impossibility of a theoretical doctrine of education, and the opportu-
nity of replacing it with empirical directives for educational prac-
tice." 37 While Marxism certainly has theoretical aspects, what is living 
for Plebe is a certain attitude, that of saying " .. pedagogy as a 
science of education no longer exists today, no longer makes sense. " 3 8 
Here Plebe paraphrases Marx: " ... I would say, pedagogy understood as 
a science is constructed to conceal the absurdities that now lie at the 
base of relations between teachers and students." 39 
35 Armando Plebe, "Esiste una pedagogia marxista?" Riforma della 
scuola (April 1965):10. 
36 Plebe 
' 
"Esiste una pedagogia marxista?", p. 10. 
37 
"Esiste pedagogia marxista?"; 10. Plebe, una p. 
38 Plebe, "Esiste una pedagogia marxista?", p. 10. 
39 Plebe, "Esiste una pedagogia marxista?", p. 11. 
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Obviously, Marxist education understood as advocacy of positions 
on contemporary problems of schooling is quite a different thing from 
education as a pedagogical science. What interests Plebe are not theo-
retical questions and the foundations of education, but concrete sugges-
tions for the resolution of problems that may have been debated a 
hundred years ago but are still not resolved. He refers to Engels' 
polemic about "isolated" studies in the debate against Dlihring. For 
Plebe, intellectual isolation is one of the still crucial problems that 
emerges from Manacorda's study. 
Plebe also mentions that Manacorda' s sources, none of which is 
dated after 1923, emphasize the role of history as the final judge. Yet 
in 1922, James Joyce's Ulysses first appeared, and in it was the warn-
ing that history is a nightmare from which we must awaken. The ranks of 
those who no longer trust history have grown, and they threaten even the 
historical-materialist Marxists. Today, contends Plebe, a significant 
number of Marxists are ready to abandon "historiolatry" (Plebe's word). 
Plebe concludes that the texts gathered by Manacorda are classical 
Marxist texts. We modern readers must regard them with respect and 
interest, but we must be aware of their remoteness. Such texts may be 
interpreted as significant in the present day, but the best way to begin 
is by accepting the "frankly Marxist" concept of the misery of pedagogy. 
On that basis, one may search the classics for solutions to particular 
problems of con~emporary schooling. 
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The next response to Manacorda came from Gabriele Giannantoni, a 
professor of ancient philosophy at the University of Rome. His article 
appeared in Riforma della scuola in the May-June issue of 1965. Addi-
tional information on Giannantoni was not available. 
Giannantoni attacks the common contention that Marx and Engels are 
authors whose thought is really limited to politics and economics and 
who have little to offer in extraneous fields such as esthetics or 
education. He states that " . . if Marxism is able to justify itself 
as a determinate and comprehensive 'world view,' then it cannot avoid 
formulating its own esthetic and its own pedagogy. " 4 0 The problem for 
Giannantoni is not whether a Marxist pedagogy exists, but to what extent 
it is stimulated by the writings of Marx and Engels, and how the modern 
Marxist must adjust and correct it in order to develop a scientific 
theory adaptable to practical situations. 
Giannantoni finds Manacorda's book useful because, by his careful 
choice of texts, Manacorda draws the thoughtful reader's attention to 
issues related to education. Many of those issues are theoretical and 
philosophical matters necessary for the creation of a pedagogy: the 
relation of the individual to the environment, education's relation to 
morality, the relation of instruction to work, mass education versus 
individual needs, and others. What is especially important in Manacor-
da's book, in Giannantoni's view, is his emphasis on the Marxist philos-
ophy of man and society. No pedagogy can be formulated without refer-
40 Gabriele Giannantoni, "La pedagogia del marxismo," Riforma della 
scuola (May-June 1965):13. 
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ence to that issue. Furthermore, Manacorda has pointed out the specific 
features that have come to be associated with Marxist education, such as 
compulsory attendance, the union of instruction with productive labor, 
and the entire polytechnical concept of education. 
Giannantoni notes that some of the points in the selected texts 
have meaning for the educational situation today, while others are of 
historical interest only. Among the still meaningful material is 
Engels' charge that an "antidote" is needed for the kind of instruction 
that the bourgeois class allows to the proletariat; the instruction that 
the working class ought to have would satisfy its own productive needs. 
The article by Giannantoni closes with a reflection on the situ-
ation created by the shortening of working hours and the resulting free 
time at the disposal of the working class. Marx envisioned free time as 
an opportunity for cultural and spiritual uplift, but Giannantoni sees 
the worker's free time as a new form of "slavery"--to second jobs, mass 
media and entertainment, advertising, and consumerism. The situation, 
he contends, is as suffocating and alienating as long, tiring hours in 
the factory would be. In fact, Giannantoni thinks that the granting of 
free time presupposes the alienation of the workers, and the only way to 
overcome that alienation is through a new unity of education and work, 
aiming at an education of the spirit that is distinct (in Marx) from 
polytechnical education. Giannantoni thus suggests an area that Marxist 
educators might explore further. 
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The third article in the group generated by Manacorda 1 s book is by 
Giorgio Bini. 41 Bini takes issue with Armando Plebe 1 s question as to 
whether the existence of Marxist pedagogy is a good thing, and with 
Plebe 1 s subsequent suggestion that too much philosophy might stand in 
the way of practical action in the schools. Bini asserts that a pedag-
ogy of Marxist derivation is always a reality, arising from the Marxist 
political program and concept of the world; Lenin, after all, writes of 
the "educational" nature of both the party and the dictatorship of the 
proletariat. Moreover, a Marxist pedagogy based on philosophy need not 
be lost in clouds of obfuscating ideology; Marx reminds us that ideas 
are material forces when the masses are in possession of them; and 
Engels tells us that economic factors are not the sole determinants of 
history, that even philosophers may have an active role in transforming 
the world. Bini reflects: 
In this sense, pedagogy may be considered as a superstructural fact 
that can be utilized in the struggle for emancipation, and (may) 
even have a theoretical component, as long as it is not separated 
from observable practices and thus from the possibility of being an 
interactive force in social confrontations. 42 
Therefore, Bini concludes, if it can provide a critique of actual facts 
and is linked to the practical struggle, a Marxist-inspired pedagogy is 
entirely justified. It is well that it exists. 
41 In general, the lives of Marxist educators are less well-documented 
than those of educators of other schools. Nothing about Bini was found 
in any of the standard biographical reference works, but the card cata-
log at the Biblioteca Nazionale in Rome revealed th~t after 1965, Bini 
published several books on education. 
42Giorgio Bini, "Esistenza e necessita di una pedagogia d 1 ispirazione 
marxista," Riforma della scuola (December 1965):9. 
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Bini turns to the omnilateral concept that ~tanacorda stresses in 
the introduction to his book. Like Manacorda, Bini believes that omni-
laterality is of great importance in the liberation of the ~;o:orker. He 
adds that it is also of great importance in developing a ~Iarxist sense 
of ethics. The present class structure, according to the :·farxists, 
denies the possible emergence of a universal type of man. Analytic 
philosophies that reduce ethics to a description of human group behavior 
have much to offer in that they reveal hypocrisy in the use of value-
laden language. Catechisms, for example, may instruct the young to 
"love their neighbors," but in fact they learn to love only the neigh-
bors who are identifiable as members of their own social group; they 
glory in the harm done to other clans and tribes. Marxists propose to 
liberate man from alienating labor and social situations through omnila-
teral education, thus creating a universal man who transcends tribal 
identity. 
Such revelations create new respect for the classics of Marxism, 
The "scientific" emphasis of Marxism comes to be 
valued, especially because the judicious application of social science--
psychology, sociology, anthropology- -can help one to understand the 
roots of modern alienation. Yet Bini affirms his Marxist conviction 
that, basically, the alienation of man from man and from himself is due 
to the nature of labor in a capitalist society. The worker is simply an 
appendage to the machine and his vocational training suggests nothing 
more. Increasing technical complexity may require a more versatile type 
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of worker, but the real problem is whether workers' consciousness will 
develop to the point at which they are ready to change the basic rela-
tion of workers to managers. Only in that way can the worker liberate 
himself or herself from the "chains" of production. 
Near the close of the article, Bini fires a salvo at Dewey and the 
Deweyans. While Dewey and his followers criticized capitalist society, 
Bini argues, they sought to transform it through education and not by 
the revolutionary means of abolishing the class system that sustains 
capitalism. "They did not understand ... that what is decisive is the 
revolution and the abolition of classes. 114 3 The problems of society 
cannot be resolved within the school; democratic education that is not 
linked to the class struggle in society must fail, asserts Bini. 
Rather, the class struggle must be extended to the classrooms, and with 
that aim in mind, Marxist pedagogy and all contributions to its progress 
are amply justified. 
Marxism and the Scientific Attitude 
The debate in Riforma della Scuola signaled a growing interest in 
pedagogical issues among Marxist thinkers; and the first volume of Mana-
corda' s historical work, published in 1964, set the stage for that 
debate. Nevertheless, there was a slightly earlier book on education by 
a Marxist, which, while not figuring into that 1965 debate, achieved a 
lasting popularity and may well be called a milestone in Italian Marxist 
pedagogy. Its author was Lucio Lombardo-Radice, and the book was L'edu-
43B. . "E . t . II 10 1n1, s1s enza e necess1ta , . 
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cazione della mente (The Education of the Mind), published in 1962 by 
Editori Riuniti of Rome. 
Lucio Lombardo-Radice is the son of a famous father, the idealist 
philosopher Giuseppe Lombardo-Radice. Although the scanty biographical 
sources do not record his date of birth, he was probably born between 
1915 and 1920, as he alludes to events in the early 1920's as having 
taken place in his childhood. (The elder Lombardo-Radice was married in 
1910.) Lucio Lombardo-Radice is a mathematician and, as of 1980, a 
professor of complementary mathematics in the Department of Mathematics, 
Physics, and Natural Sciences of the University of Rome. 44 Despite his 
mathematical background, he has a lively interest in social and histori-
cal matters, and his published titles and personal activities reflect 
that interest over and above his professional expertise. He is the 
senior editor of Riforma della scuola and a member of the Central 
Committee of the Italian Communist party. 45 
In 1960, Lombardo-Radice wrote an introduction to L. Laghezza' s 
Italian translation of Makarenko's The Road to Life. Lombardo-Radice 
published a biographical study of Antonio Gramsci in 1961, and in 1962 
L'educazione della mente appeared, his first really significant contri-
but ion to Italian pedagogy. A second edition followed in 1965, and 
there were later editions as well. A scrap of significance in the title 
is the use of the word mente, a biologist's and psychologist's word for 
44 I I Otto J. Groeg, ed., Who s Who in Italy, 3d ed. (Milan: Who s Who 
in Italy S.r.l., 1980), p. 297. 
45
who's Who in Italy, p. 297. 
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"mind," rather than spirito, the word preferred by philosophers. By 
using the former word, Lombardo-Radice announces his "scientific" orien-
tation. 
Although the text of L' educazione della mente displays certain 
theoretical biases, it does not deal with material of great theoretical 
significance; it is a series of informal essays, full of anecdotes and 
advice for parents and teachers. Evidently, the formula was successful, 
as Lombardo-Radice's book has enjoyed a certain popularity. 
The book is divided into five sections whose themes are suggested 
by their titles: "L'educazione della mente," repeating the title of the 
book itself; "Come vediamo il mondo" ("How We See the World"); "I 
ragazzi e la politica" ("Children and Politics"); "La prima scienza" 
("The First Knowledge"); and "La ragione aperta" ("Open Reason"). While 
the tone of the chapters is often light and conversational, Lombardo-
Radice obviously has serious purposes in addressing parents and teachers 
so directly. In the first (and main) section of the book, Lombardo-Rad-
ice argues for the early, deliberate training of the child's sense of 
reason, against the "animism and artificialism" of the public elementary 
school. He accuses the public school seems of inculcating superstition 
and infantilism. While there is room in the child's life for fantasy 
and imagination, he states, the child must be helped to keep fantasy 
separate from reality and thus to overcome unnecessary fears of the 
supernatural. Explaining realities to children in plain, simple 
language is of great benefit. In fact, Lombardo-Radice advocates that 
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all of a child's intellectual capacities be stimulated quite early, and 
this can be done to great advantage if parents are willing to make the 
effort: "The mother-teacher and the father-teacher are, really, the 
father and the mother who play with the little one; and through play 
they teach grammar, logic, sciences, and arithmetic." 46 
Lombardo-Radice advocates not only early reasoning but also early 
literacy. He divides mankind into "persons with books" and "persons 
without books," and clearly encourages the latter. He wants parents to 
prepare their children for literacy by reading aloud to them and limit-
ing their exposure to television, radio, and films. He admits that some 
media presentations have educational value, but he insists that the 
child needs a literate background in order to comprehend what is being 
presented. That is, the child needs a certain personal "level of 
culture," which is not the mere sum of experience but ". the mental 
organization of experience and knowledge. 114 7 Cultural frameworks, he 
contends, are important in organizing knowledge; thus he recommends the 
use of encyclopedias and maps in the home. Other possible educative 
activities for the home include playing guessing-games and letting the 
child experiment with writing materials and tape recorders. 
46Lucio Lombardo-Radice, L' educazione della mente (Rome: Editori 
Riuniti, 1961;1977), p. 28. Although this sentence is innocuous enough, 
it certainly reveals Lombardo-Radice's opinion as to "what knowledge is 
of most worth." 
47Lombardo-Radice, L'educazione della mente, p. 43. 
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On the matter of planned and systematic learning, Lombardo-Radice 
takes a strong stance. While facts and notions do not create culture, 
he argues, they are its necessary precedents. He takes issue with the 
"extreme activists" who trivialize culture, and here he echoes Gramsci 
to an extent: "Intellectual development, the acquisition of a serious 
and useful cultural heritage, requires a systematic effort: it is 
work. 1148 Diligent study is good for students, he contends, and nothing 
worthwhile can be achieved without it. 
Lombardo-Radice denies the common idea that people who succeed in 
school are drudges who fail in life. It is true, he says, that in our 
unjust capitalist society some incompetent people attain high positions 
because they are "daddy's boys" (they have patronage), but at the same 
time, a failure without connections is still a failure. 
Parents may help the child to correct imbalances in its learning 
and use of talents, Lombardo-Radice suggests. Eventually, too, parents 
may help the adolescent to choose a career intelligently (and not too 
early or for social reasons, as often happens in capitalist societies). 
All of that is done through rational discussions and by knowing the 
young person well. Parents, he says, must also have "educated minds. 1149 
A chapter is devoted to arguing against the sexism of Italian 
culture. Girls are no less intelligent than boys, Lombardo-Radice 
contends, and most succeed if given a chance. Social history, however, 
4~ombardo-Radice, L'educazione della mente, p. 79. 
49tombardo-Radice, L'educazione della mente, p. 79. 
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imposes a burden on women and girls, teaching them ~o "please o~hers" 
and to remain in second place. This inferior condition of girls causes 
young males to behave like "cretins" around them, and thus t:he situation 
is negative for both sexes. Women should demand equal consideration, 
Lombardo-Radice concludes. 
Lombardo-Radice ends the first section of L'educazione della 
~ with praise for the character of Leonardo Da Vinci. For Lombar-
do-Radice, he is the symbol of science in its infancy. observing and 
reflecting on everything, yet without elaborate equipment. we who are 
parents, advises Lombardo-Radice, must ". . . train our children in 
observation, analysis, and scientific reasoning, the first understanding 
of the great visions of modern science."50 That scientific understanding 
must oppose the "magical spirit" of necrology and incantation present in 
the schools. 51 
The struggle against magic and superstition is very much alive in 
Italy, he charges, where even the teachings of the Catholic church have 
become paganized. The real enemy of reason, however, is no~ religion 
but superstition: 
We want to educate rational and efficient persons, who know well 
that in the heaven and earth there exist more problems than any of 
their philosophies might know, but who otherwise know well ~hat man 
knows how to resolve such problems, one by one, with science, work, 
and the force of brotherly concord. 52 
50Lombardo-Radice, L'educazione della mente, p. 93. 
51obvious ly, the use of such terms as .. necrology and incantation" 
(closely paraphrased) is hyperbolic and a rather extreme example of 
Marxist anti-Catholic rhetoric. 
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The second part of L'educazione della mente is concerned with 
worldviews: "Come vediamo il mondo," "How We See the World." At the 
outset, Lombardo-Radice affirms that "It is necessary for our children 
to know, from the time that reason dawns in them, how we, their parents, 
see the world. " 53 Against the tendency of children to simplify experi-
ence and dogmatize about it, Lombardo-Radice wants progressive parents 
to provide an honest, historicist view of the world. 54 We need not fear 
that our lessons in reality will produce skepticism; the study of 
history can provide a new faith in humanity. 
On the subject of religion, Lombardo-Radice charges that the 
religion taught in schools is not true Christianity but idolatrous 
foolishness based on fables. The enlightened (nonbeliever) parent 
should not allow a child to be coerced into religious participation and 
should counter the effect of religious fables by stressing science and 
history at home. Such a parent should explain why he or she has chosen 
to practice no religion. Morality, Lombardo-Radice adds, does not need 
a basis in religion: "Independence does not mean disrespect, nor nega-
tion, of certain great ideas that incubate in positive relig-
ions. 1155 
52 Lombardo-Radice, L'educazione della mente, p. 93. 
53 Lombardo-Radice, L'educazione della mente, p. 97. 
54 Although Lombardo-Radice has not mentioned history before, a histo-
ricist position is an important feature of Marxism. 
55 Lombardo-Radice, L'educazione della mente, p. 107. 
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Nevertheless, Lombardo-Radice continues, parents who expose chil-
dren to their own beliefs must avoid imposing them on the children. It 
is proper for children to learn about religion, for example, but. they 
need not participate in rites in which they have no faith. Among the 
positive features of the public schools is exposure to persons of vari-
ous traditions and the resulting opportunities to consider many ideas. 
Having made this statement of support for pluralism, Lombardo-Radice 
says: II . I am happy if that confession of mine were 'illuminating' 
for someone, and I am even happier if my materialist and Marxist words 
put some comrade of mine on his guard about the danger of a 'materialist 
and Marxist dogmatism' in education .... " 56 What is most important, 
Lombardo-Radice stresses, is that children learn to think rather than 
to believe. Thus they will become mentally open to dialogue. 
Continuing on the theme of religion, Lombardo-Radice laments the 
social pressure to be religious that exists in spite of judicial freedom 
of religion in Italy. The schools, he says, need more faith in the 
individual; and freedom of individual belief is worth defending, and 
would be so even in a Marxist society! Public schools should not be 
"confessional," but should embody common beliefs in justice, democracy, 
and equality. 
It is the duty of parents to live their faith, rather than to 
merely preach it, Lombardo-Radice warns. They must avoid imposing 
fanaticism or intolerance upon their children: "Not to impose our 
56 Lombardo-Radice, L'educazione della mente, p. 111. 
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faith, but to propose it; to be more worried about maturity of choice, 
and to fear nothing so much as premature, ruinous closures of the 
mind." 57 
Returning to an earlier theme, Lombardo-Radice insists that 
II 
. parents must explain to their children how they (the parents) see 
the world, from the time the children are very small, and without fear 
of 'upsetting' them." 58 If opinions are exposed rather than imposed, he 
suggests, the young will develop their own reasons for what they 
believe. 
Lombardo-Radice digresses somewhat to discuss perplexing and 
difficult issues: death, film censorship, sex education, and sexual 
morality. His recipe for achieving equity between the sexes is one of 
the stronger Marxist-inspired statements in the book: 
The boy and girl who are oriented toward a concept of life and the 
world based on a collective and not individual morality, on the 
principles of equality, justice, and the equal worth of every human 
being, and not on postulates of privilege, race, or egoism of class 
or nation, are at the same time oriented toward a sane, complete 
concept, worthy of sexual life and of the relations of love between 
man and woman. 59 
Lombardo-Radice continues on the theme of sexual morality, 
suggesting that Western views of either extreme in behavior (abstinence 
or debauchery) are inadequate. Economic and legal systems are needed 
that permit early marriage and convenient divorce, as in the U.S.S.R. 
57 Lombardo-Radice, L'educazione della mente, p. 120. 
58 Lombardo-Radice, L'educazione della mente, p. 122. 
59 Lombardo-Radice, L'educazione della mente, p. 136. 
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Only through such a system can the sexual instinct be integrated into 
the whole life of the person. 
In the third part of L'educazione della mente, Lombardo-Radice 
turns to the subject of "Youth and Politics." He divides the human race 
again (although he will eventually deplore those divisions), separating 
those who think in terms of general principles from those who think only 
of their own interests. Politics is a matter of general principles, 
Lombardo-Radice affirms, and political awareness grows out of family 
table talk. In the home, parents should avoid discussing local issues 
and concentrate on global matters such as antifascism and the liberation 
of colonial peoples. 60 
On the subject of political understanding, Lombardo-Radice points 
out that children's stories take place in fantasy kingdoms, never in 
republics; children have little native understanding of modern govern-
ment and economics. The subtleties of parliaments, social classes, and 
political parties elude them. He notes that there are child prodigies 
in music, mathematics, and fine arts, but never in political science. 
That is because a child's judgment is quite individual; the understand-
ing of social situations requires considerable experience. Children 
ought not to be forced to parrot adults' political opinions or to make 
premature political identifications. Parents, rather, may prepare their 
60 Lombardo-Radice reports that, as a small child in 1924, he over-
heard his parents discussing the Matteotti political murder. Today, he 
suggests, children are or ought to be interested in such matters as the 
martyrdom of Patrice Lumumba or events in China. See L'educazione della 
mente, p. 152. 
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children for political thinking by discussing global social ideas with 
their children. Gradually, the state and its functions may be explained 
to them. 
Expanding on the virtues of tolerance, Lombardo-Radice states that 
parents cannot make all choices for their children. They must be 
allowed to be themselves. The process of social growth should be guided 
by a principle drawn from religion: Love your neighbor as yourself. In 
that way, Lombardo-Radice suggests, children may be spared from the 
evils of mankind--fascism, racism, colonialism, imperialism, ethnocen-
trism, and the maintenance of aristocracies and hierarchies, all of 
which are transgressions against that commandment. 61 Antifascism, 
Lombardo-Radice insists, is an essential part of the moral education of 
children. History and geography lessons must be imbued with remem-
brances of the evils of Fascism, and the young must appreciate the Ital-
ian constitution as an antifascist document. The worst attitudes to 
impart to children are indifference and self-centeredness--the "mind 
your own business" syndrome. Rather, the young must have ". . the 
knowledge that individual destiny is also always collective destiny and 
vice versa ... 1162 Parents and teachers must set good examples for the 
young, teaching them to value liberty, democracy, justice, and peace. 
61 Lombardo-Radice, L' educazione della mente, pp. 160-162. Although 
Lombardo-Radice calls it the "first commandment," in the Gospels it is 
the second great commandment. 
62 Lombardo-Radice, L'educazione della mente, p. 163. 
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The ideal of political education is to produce young people who 
are neither apathetic nor fanatical, Lombardo-Radice says. Of the two, 
however, fanaticism is preferable to apathy, as passion is preferable to 
no feeling at all. The adolescent who has never experienced generous 
impulses is poor and dull. The young should not be taught to stay away 
from politics as though it were a dirty business. Certainly, politics 
can be corrupted, but the political process is not inherently corrupt. 
Through political activity, the individual can learn to be aware of 
civic duties and the public good. The parent whose child goes to polit-
ical meetings should not worry, as that is a part of developing politi-
cal maturity. The only real danger is that the young person will become 
closed in a narrow political sect. Against that kind of sectarianism, 
Lombardo-Radice recommends the broad exposure that young people have in 
the public schools. 
The fourth section of L'educazione della mente is called "La 
prima scienza," "First Knowledge" or "First Science," a deliberate play 
on the ambiguity of the word scienza. Lombardo-Radice deplores contem-
porary (early 1960's) science instruction in the Italian schools prima-
rily because it is almost entirely nature study and is hence unsuited to 
the needs of urban children who are interested in their man-made envi-
ronment of industry and machinery. Moreover, the science taught in the 
middle schools presents natural adaptation as purposeful. This error, 
he contends, is the product of a hidden Catholic agenda for teaching 
children to contemplate the creation with awe and wonder. For Lombardo-
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Radice, there is poetry in science, but it speaks of reason rather than 
of mystery. Scientific instruction must place the child firmly on earth 
in both time and space. That observation leads to another critique of 
Deweyan activism, which, according to Lombardo-Radice, fails to give the 
child an appropriate sense of time (conceived as history). 63 
Lombardo-Radice points out that the Italian attitude toward 
science instruction changed greatly from 1923 to 1963. In the age of 
the Gentile Reform, science was not admitted to be an authentic form of 
knowledge; hence it was relegated to an inferior position in the 
schools. By 1963, science had come to be accepted as a genuine form of 
knowledge having humane value. For that development, Lombardo-Radice 
gives much credit to Antonio Banfi and his disciples, Ludovico Geymonat, 
Enzo Paci, and Remo Cantoni. 64 A factor that now favors science instruc-
tion in the schools is its increasing currency in society at large: 
individuals use scientific terminology in their speech, and they train 
for scientific/technical careers. Social change has weakened the manop-
oly of traditional, rhetorical education. Lombardo-Radice sees a new 
standard of scientific education emerging. At the same time, he finds 
opposition to it among conservative Catholics. According to Lombardo-
Radice, they want dogmatic, ritualistic, and bigoted schools. 
63 Lombardo-Radice, L'educazione della mente, p. 182. 
64 The pedagogy of Banfi is discussed in Chapter V of this study. 
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One fault that Lombardo-Radice finds with scientific education is 
its episodic, unsystematic character. Human beings, he says, must 
organize experience as it occurs, and for that purpose they require a 
worldview; the appropriate worldview for children is scientific. The 
school has a duty to introduce scientific concepts from the outset. As 
science instruction builds up a worldview over time, it has the added 
virtue of having a historical character. Children should be introduced 
to the great scientific concepts, Lombardo-Radice insists, and that 
instruction can be active and not bookish. He criticizes the narrowness 
and the oversimplified nature study of the middle school science curric-
ulum, and concludes that bold new ideas must be assimilated into science 
teaching. 
Lombardo-Radice takes a look at the historical dimension of 
science teaching and finds that what were complex, difficult ideas a few 
decades ago are commonplaces of the present. But the process of change 
continues, and teachers now need more training in up-to-date mathematics 
and science; moreover, new methods and curricula must be developed to 
teach these new concepts. Inevitably, he reflects, there will be oppo-
sition as new ideas are introduced, but children who do not have rigid 
mindsets will learn them. Above all, scientific ideas must not be 
"aristocratized," taught only to a select few. 
science needs the support of the masses. 
To advance properly, 
The final section of L' educazione della mente is "La ragione 
aperta," "Open Reason," meaning something close to open-mindedness. It 
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elaborates on one of the major themes of the book. Lombardo-Radice says 
that he has advocated giving children a modern education, and he has 
attempted to define "modern," not directly, but through illustrative 
instances. He admits that the discourse could continue, covering more 
fields or defining the concept more systematically, but he would rather 
turn to a different problem. 
The question that Lombardo-Radice raises is this: How will we 
succeed in modernizing the young? He answers that it must be done by 
keeping their minds open and by teaching science as a revolutionary 
process that both renews and destroys in a process of confrontation. 65 
Lombardo-Radice alludes to an old saw to the effect that our education 
is what we remember after we have forgotten everything else. What we 
remember will depend to a large extent on what was emphasized in our 
education, and how it was presented. Children must be taught the high 
points of culture: their learning cannot be flattened out into a series 
of lines and rules. Lombardo-Radice attacks the "global" (whole-word) 
method of reading instruction as a technique that ignores important 
principles of literacy and thus does not truly educate the mind. He 
contrasts its feeble educative potency to a story by Rudyard Kipling 
about the origins of literacy. Similarly, certain mathematical ideas 
are advocated for their great educative value. 
65The Marxist-dialectical inspiration of the statement is apparent. 
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Lombardo-Radice insists that "open reason" is a democratic ideal. 
The learner's mind must not be allowed to crystallize; the nature of 
work is changing and now requires intelligence and flexibility. With 
new technologies liberating man from servile work, it is less important 
for the worker to possess specific skills than to have the capacity to 
learn new skills. Furthermore, revolutions are creating new classes, 
new nations, and a new era in history, as old dogmas and hierarchies 
break down despite the protests of the privileged classes. Lombardo-
Radice quotes liberally from Bertolt Brecht's play The Life of Galileo 
to illustrate the possibilities of a new rapport between science and the 
common people. He concludes with Brecht that all men of reason belong 
to one group no matter what their class origins. 
Reason is an irresistible force, Lombardo-Radice believes, but 
only when it is the vehicle of those who are disinterested. Defenders 
of privilege, hierarchies, and class egoism are impermeable to reason. 
The basis of a solid personal morality and dynamic open reason is educa-
tion for disinterest. 66 
It is impossible to retain old dogmas and discover new facts, 
Lombardo-Radice asserts. "Interest in conservation" is a major obstacle 
to new discovery, while discovery itself requires great courage; over-
coming a mental obstacle takes more audacity than crossing a new conti-
nent. 
66 Lombardo-Radice, L'educazione della mente, p. 223. 
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Lombardo-Radice also suggests that there is a class dimension to 
discovery and progress. There are those, he says, who have everything 
to gain from progress, and those who have everything to lose; and they 
are roughly equivalent to those who work and those who live on the work 
of others. Again Lombardo-Radice divides humanity: one person likes to 
work, another works to achieve position; one talks about serious things, 
and another only chatters. It is not only the mind but also the charac-
ter that is formed through sacrifice and intellectual courage. 
There are those who object to open reason, saying that children 
need absolute principles to avoid becoming skeptics and opportunists. 
Lombardo-Radice replies that absolute principles are not prerequisites 
of morality. Many have fought for noble causes without believing in 
divine beings and absolutes. Moreover, the danger in absolutism is that 
if one belief falls, the entire structure is threatened. Lombardo-Rad-
ice suggests that there can be a dynamic, historicist faith that opposes 
the dogmatic mentality: 
The man of faith, in the modern sense, is the man who has profound 
and passionate convictions, however derived from open reasoning and 
liberal judgment, and not from a tradition or a revelation from 
above. He is the man who knows well that the convictions or ideals 
for which he is willing to sacrifice even his individual life have a 
historic value as transient and not eternal, and will be overcome 
and absorbed by other convictions, by other ideals responding to new 
historical necessities. 67 
67 Lombardo-Radice, L'educazione della mente, p. 228. Lombardo-Rad-
ice's Marxist historicism as expressed here is clearly far from the 
historicism of Croce. 
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So Lombardo-Radice describes the champion of faith for what he 
perceives to be a new era, a person whose faith is in human reason. The 
rational,i.ty to which the philosopher alludes is not any form of ·human 
reason whatsoever, but a rationality constrained by certain social 
beliefs or premises which he defines as "modern." Throughout the book, 
be has insinuated that a modern outlook is one in which great value is 
placed on science, and that no modern thinker may admit the legitimacy 
of the capitalist class structure or the validity of conservative relig-
ions, those bugbears of all Marxist thinkers. It appears that only 
those with a scientific-materialist-historicist-proletarian worldview 
may be fully rational and modern, but Lombardo-Radice suggests this with 
less stridency than other Marxist writers. 
According to Lombardo-Radice, a person with a modern worldview has 
in effect found a new faith, a set of convictions worthy of sacrifices 
similar to those made for charismatic religion, only with a difference: 
the rational faith promises no eternal paradise o Rather, this new 
believer is aware of the transiency of present conditions, and believes 
that his or her actions have value only as part of a historical process 
(understood dialectically) • ' 1 The philosopher does not specify 
which actions or convictions will be changed by the dialectical process 
(insofar as the rhetoric of "new historical necessities" is used by 
Marxist thinkers, it might also be used against them). Nevertheless, 
Lombardo-Radice insists that open reason as he understands it is a 
68aere Lombardo-Radice's vision of history is quite Hegelian. 
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dynamic faith that develops and transforms the life and mind of man. He 
closes the book with these words: 
We have already said it, and we repeat it yet again: we are 
convinced that such faith and such reason can and must become char-
acteristic of all mankind. We fight bitterly against a lack of 
faith in humanity, in whatever form, and the subdivision of the 
human race into learned and ignorant, into "philosophers and simple-
tons," into aristocracies and masses. We believe with passion and 
with shining reason in the possibility of giving everyone a positive 
intellectual and moral education from earliest childhood, founded on 
earthly commitment and an intelligent, disinterested, creative 
participation in the effort toward human progress in a determinate 
historical epoch. We believe that one ought to educate the child 
into an open, active, happy adult who discovers and builds with 
disinterested joy; a person who knows well that the houses he has 
built are ephemeral, but who is glad that they allow this generation 
to live more securely than the preceding one; a person who is 
perfectly aware of the brief life of his ideas and works, but is 
joyously sure of their value and indispensability for those who will 
come after and go beyond. 69 
Here more details of the new rational faith are provided. It is a 
faith that can become "characteristic" of humanity, although Lombardo-
Radice does not detail the mechanism by which this might occur; inevi-
tably, education will play a major role. He returns to the theme of 
faith in humanity (rather than in supernatural agencies, for example), 
and in humanity as a whole rather than in any distinct group or class. 
The great vehicle of this faith must be education provided for everyone, 
based on the principles of earthly commitment and creative effort toward 
human (social) progress. He does not mention that such a general educa-
tion of mankind is impossible in the world as we know it, and that it is 
really a goal for education in a socialist world utopia; but his state-
ment is one of belief (with "passion" and "shining reason"), and there-
69 Lombardo-Radice, L'educazione della mente, p. 229. 
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fore it is strongly normative. Evidently, Lombardo-Radice simply 
believes that all humanity may be so educated, but he leaves the when 
and how to the workings of history and the dialectical process. 
Finally, he closes with the extended metaphor of the active, happy adult 
who is a builder of houses. Unlike the Biblical parable of the builder 
upon the rock and the builder upon the sand, Lombardo-Radice tells of 
the builder who is happy to build upon the sand of temporality, mani-
festly aware of the utility of building for future generations; it is a 
plea reminiscent of Communist exhortations to sacrifice and build for 
the future. 
Afterword: Education in Upheaval 
Neither the theoretical debate over Manacorda's interpretation of 
the history of Marxist education nor Lucio Lombardo-Radice's rather 
restrained advice to parents and teachers really heralds the upheavals 
in Italian education that occurred between 1967 and 1969. Marxists were 
involved in that turmoil, but perhaps in ways that neither Manacorda nor 
Lombardo-Radice foresaw. Politically motivated students at the univer-
sity and secondary level went on strike, rioted, and occupied class-
rooms. Herbert Marcuse visited Italy and was lionized by leftist 
student intellectuals; leaders of terrorist groups were popular heroes. 
The Italian government, in an effort to quell the disturbances by 
appeasement, considered several reform measures for the state universi-
ties and secondary schools. Debates over those reforms filled the pages 
of pedagogical journals representing all opinions. 
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When calm returned, some changes had transpired, but the structure 
of Italian schooling remained essentially the same. What had really 
changed was the establishment of a strong Marxist presence in educa-
tional affairs. The existence of Marxist pedagogy, a matter that the 
scholars of 1963-1965 were trying to establish, was a fact that no one 
could doubt five or ten years later. Numbers, too, may be some indica-
tion: despite continued political control of the schools by Christian 
Democrat and center-left governments, by the early 1980's the largest 
political force among teachers in Italian state schools was the Marxist-
sponsored teachers' union. 
CHAPTER VIII 
EDUCATION AND THE CATHOLIC FAITH 
There was no major institution in Italian public life that went 
unmarked through the trying period of the 1920 1 s and 1930 1 s and the 
anguish of World War II. Of all Italian institutions, however, the one 
that emerged with minimal scars was the Roman Catholic church. While 
the church 1 s critics have accused it of complicity with the Fascists, 
principally because of the signing of the Lateran Agreements of 1929, 
those agreements assured it of a place in Mussolini 1 s Italy and served 
to ward off some of the political scrutiny that plagued other organiza-
tions. The signing of the Lateran Agreements by no means committed the 
church to Fascism or to a philosophy of actual idealism; rather, it 
allowed the traditions of the church to be respected and to survive the 
totalitarianism of the Fascist era. At the end of World War II, the 
church was both alive and ready to take on increased importance in Ital-
ian society. 
The Church in the Fascist Era 
When Pope Pius IX rejected the guarantees of the Italian state in 
1871 and declared himself a "prisoner of the Vatican," a long period of 
mutual nonrecognition and bitterness ensued. In 1926, Pope Pius XI, 
seeking to establish relations between the church and the Italian state, 
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communicated to Mussolini' s government through an intermediary that he 
was willing to negotiate toward an understanding. The Fascists, already 
under fire from the left, considered it opportune to placate the church 
by healing the old rift, thus increasing the likelihood of obtaining 
support from at least some elements in the church. There were obstacles 
to the agreement, and certain conditions had to be met on both sides; 
but lengthy negotiations led to the signing of the Lateran Agreements in 
February 1929. Essentially, the agre~ments provided for the creation of 
the Vatican State, papal recognition of the kingdom of Italy, and full 
liberty of the church in spiritual (but not political) matters. 
Although Pius XI has been criticized for conciliatory behavior 
toward the Fascists, it is recorded that during the Fascist period he 
spoke out with "courageous Christian frankness" on such issues as state 
education, racism, and exaggerated nationalism. 1 The Vatican newspaper, 
the Osservatore Romano, often spoke out against Fascist misdeeds in the 
1930's; but the paper could not be distributed to ordinary Italians. 
Historians note that some church leaders of the period showed a spirit 
of servility to Fascism and adulation for Mussolini. The worst that can 
be said is that the church's position regarding Fascism was unclear; but 
in any case, it would be gross exaggeration to say that the Lateran 
Agreements created a Fascist Catholic church. 
1 H. Hearder and D. P. Waley, A Short History of Italy, (Cambridge, 
England: Cambridge University Press, 1963), p. 213. Pius XI (Ambrogio 
Ratti) was elected to the papacy on February 6, 1922; he died in Febru-
ary 1939. 
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Philosophically and ideologically, the Catholic church had defi-
nite roots of its own. Obviously, the church was nineteen centuries 
older than the Fascist state and had a rich tradition on which to draw. 
In the 1920's it was undergoing an important philosophical renewal 
through the neoscholastic movement. 2 
Neothomism provided a certain metaphysical basis for Catholic 
philosophers in twentieth-century Italy, and its leading spokesman, 
Father Agostino Gemelli, was an educator who had expressed his particu-
lar views on education. Yet for all its significance, Neothomism was 
not the sole influence upon the development of Catholic educational 
thought. Catholic philosophers of education from the early 1900's 
onward found valuable sources among the European Christian philosophies 
that were considered part of the "Christian spiritualist" tradition. 
Christian spiritualism itself was not so much a philosophical system as 
an approach to philosophy, but it yielded much of value. Seeking to 
affirm a new and vital Catholic position on education, some Italian 
scholars searched the spiritualist tradition and found personalism, a 
doctrine which they imported from France and elaborated upon. 
2 Th f II h 1 t . . II d "N th . II 11 . e use o neosc o as 1c1sm an eo om1sm as genera y 1nter-
changeable terms is owed to the historian De Wulf, who studied the medi-
eval scholastics (including Aquinas) and concluded that they all 
professed essentially the same perennial philosophy. That philosophy, 
purged of some embarrassing archaic elements, became the neoscholasti-
cism or Neothomism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Although 
De Wulf's views were later challenged by Gilson, Maritain, and others, 
the common use of the two terms continued. See the New Catholic Ency-
clopedia, 1967 ed., s.v. "Neoscholasticism and Neothomism," by J. A. 
Weisheipl. Further discussion of neoscholasticism in Italy is provided 
in Chapter II of this study. 
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Personalism was not identical to Neothomism, but it was not 
intended as a challenge to Neothomism; rather, the Italian personalists 
who developed their philosophies in the 1920's and thereafter tended to 
work closely with Father Gemelli and various neoscholastic organiza-
tions, surely assuming that the Christian philosophy of personhood which 
they were developing extended and complemented the teachings of the 
neoscholastics. 3 Jacques Maritain, who combined personalist and Neotho-
mist traditions in his work, undoul;>tedly strengthened the Italians' 
opinion that there is no contradiction between personalism and Neotho-
mism, even though they draw inspiration from different sources. 
Meaning and Origins of Personalism 
The Encyclopedia of Philosophy suggests several features that are 
peculiar to personalism (which the editors also call "personal ideal-
ism.") Those features are summarized as follows: 
It (personalism) is idealistic: all reality is personal. It is 
pluralistic: reality is a society of persons. It is theistic: God 
is the ultimate person and, as such, is the ground of all being and 
the creator of finite persons. 4 
Apparently, the term "personalism" was first used by the French 
philosopher Charles Renouvier (1815-1903) in a book published in 1903, 
Le Personnalisme. That early version of personalism was a philosophy of 
3 Father Carlo Nanni, a professor of pedagogy at the Pontifical Sale-
sian University of Rome, explained in an interview on April 1, 1982, 
that Christian spiritualist philosophers have tended to be Neothomists 
on metaphysical questions but personalists on matters of direct human 
impact such as ethics and education. 
4 Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1967 ed., s. v. "Personalism," by John H. 
Lavely. 
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nineteenth century inspiration that harmonized with the vitalism of 
Bergson and proposed" ... the concept of the will as the expression of 
1 b . 115 persona e1ng. 
Contemporary Italian personalism, however, is more closely related 
to the principles announced by Emmanuel Meunier (1905-1950), the French 
philosopher who published the journal Esprit (Spirit) from 1932 to 1941, 
and again from 1945 to 1950. Meunier's personalism, although related in 
some ways to existentialism and Marxism, is a strongly Christian philos-
ophy that stresses the duty of the individual to seek communication 
among others while recognizing their uniqueness; its aim is universal 
understanding. The person as conceived in Meunier's philosophy is 
different from the political individual of the laic state theorists. 
While that individual is simply an abstract legal entity, the person in 
the Christian sense is also a spiritual being. From that belief, Moun-
ier derives certain human values and rights that lead to a vision of 
human society as a community of "free men" who are neither individual-
ists nor collectivists. Neither Renouvier nor Meunier provides a well-
articulated philosophy of education, but there is much in their writings 
that has led others to pursue personalist education. 
Scholars in several European countries--notably France, Spain, 
Poland, and Italy--have created national and individual versions of 
personalism. In the case of Italy, some pedagogical statements by 
5 Sira Serenella Macchietti, Pedagogia del personalismo italiano 
(Rome: Cittg Nuova Editrice, 1982), p. 13. Evidently, Macchietti is 
quoting an earlier source. 
338 
personalist philosophers we. re available as early as 1931. Before World 
war II, however, the Catholic scholars in Italy had to be circumspect in 
publishing what might be taken as criticism of the reigning Gentilian 
idealism. They tended to publish studies on particular historical 
themes or specific aspects of teaching, and their criticisms of actual 
idealism were likely to be veiled or implicit. Still, it is important 
to realize that personalist philosophers worked in Italy through the 
l920' s and 1930's toward -the development of that pedagogy which they 
strongly endorsed after World War II. 
In the postwar era, I>ersonalism attained a new position in Italian 
culture as one of the alternative philosophies of education vying to 
succeed the idealism that ~ost-Fascist governments were discouraging in 
the universities, teachers' colleges, and schools. Several developments 
furthered the course of personalism in postwar Italy. Jacques Maritain, 
whose philosophical work ce>mbines the traditions of Thomism with person-
alism, served as French ambassador to the Holy See from 1945 to 1948. 
His presence in Rome was 811 encouragement to Catholic philosophers in 
Italy. Moreover, in the l~te 1940's the Catholic church was emerging as 
a political force in Italy; the Christian Democrats, supported by the 
church, won a majority in the parliamentary election of April 18, 1948. 
Political strength assured the church that its voice would be heard in 
parliamentary debates and at cabinet meetings and gave Catholic educa-
tors new opportunities to influence the course of events in state 
schools. A new freedom of action in that era led Catholic educators and 
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philosophers to see their individual differences of op{nion as harmful 
to a greater cause, and they began to seek mutually agreeable formula-
tions of Christian pedagogy. In that interest, a group of Catholic 
university professors in the early 1950's formed a group called Schol~ 
and founded a Catholic center for pedagogical studies. 6 
The Schol~ group held a conference on Christian pedagogy from 
September 9 to September 11, 1954. In retrospect, that date is consid-
ered the true birthdate of Italian personalist pedagogy as a discrete, 
identifiable movement. 7 Several basic principles of Christian pedagogy 
were proposed at that meeting; what emerged was the outline of a program 
of epistemological study and educational activity. One of the key 
participants, M. Agosti, affirmed that the aim of Christian education is 
"integrality," meaning the whole, harmonious development of the individ-
ual, taking into account the physical, expressive, rational, economic, 
moral, and religious dimensions of humanity. Integrality, he suggested, 
leads to a maturity in ethical character, religious belief, and sense of 
vocation.• 
6 "Schol~" is derived from the Greek word for "school" or "place of 
discussion." In the s&"'Ie period, a group of young Catholic teachers 
formed an organization after a meeting in the town of Pietralba; that 
organization also furthered the cause of Christian pedagogy. See 
Macchietti, Pedagogia del personalismo italiano, p. 19. 
7 Macchietti, Pedagogia del personalismo italiano, p. 19. 
8 Macchietti, Pedagogia del personalismo italiano, p. 27. The term 
"Christian" in these statements is understood as synonymous with "Catho-
lic," as there were no non-Catholic Christians in the Schole group. 
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Agosti elaborated on certain metaphysical points. The corner-
stones of the Christian concept of the person, he said, are 
... substantiality, individuality, rationality, and supernatural-" 
ity. " 9 The purpose of pedagogy as theoretical inquiry is to elaborate 
upon the concept of education in light of the concept of person. The 
idea of the person as individual substance (cf. Aristotle) offers a 
counter to idealist and materialist reductionisms. Individuality allows 
the person to have originality and opens the possibility of an I-thou 
dialogue with another--specifically, with God. Rationality permits the 
person to discover values and to glimpse pure ideas out of the frag-
mented jumble of reality. Finally, supernaturality is the fundamental 
truth which guides personalist pedagogy, an affirmation that the human 
being is a creature of God. Agosti further delineated the metaphysical 
bases of Christian pedagogy: Man is aware of himself and his vocation, 
and also of his time; he is his own master; he is capable of self-
discipline and self-instruction, and he is capable of engaging his 
talents in a field of action; he is capable of finding union with God 
through meditation, prayer, and introspection. 10 Agosti concluded that 
the personalist educator has the duty of promoting the perfectibility of 
the person through education, and this duty is distinct from the task of 
civilizing people. 
1Macchietti, Pedagogia del personalismo italiano, p. 27. 
1CMacchietti, Pedagogia del Personalismo Italiano, p. 28. Here the 
grammar of gender inflection in the Italian language creates a masculine 
bias that is probably not intended. 
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The ascent to perfection, if attempted, requires action on a prac-
tical level. The course of that action was suggested at the 1954 
conference by Aldo Agazzi. Education, he said, requires theory for 
specific historical and social situations, not presented abstractly. 
Like the pedagogies that address the contemporary situation in terms of 
technology, work, and society in the empirical sense, Christian pedagogy 
is called upon to express itself as a theory oriented to the practical. 
In the actual world, the activity of educators has individual, histori-
cal, and existential determinants. Unlike other pedagogies, Christian 
pedagogy recognizes the essence behind empirical multiplicity and its 
differentiations. It proposes an absolute sense of spirituality and 
values and gives those absolutes a concreteness in the person. 
The pedagogy of which Agazzi spoke is continually developing, 
aimed at increased understanding of existence through contact with human 
knowledge, ideologies, theologies, and worldviews. Its duty is to 
interpret human existence through study of what is historically deter-
mined, and to suggest modes of action in that realm. Christian pedagogy 
thus demands an interpretive understanding of human history, culture, 
philosophy, society, and education. Moreover, it provides a clear 
understanding of what Christian education is, and that is a vision that 
the secular sciences cannot offer. 
The Christian character of education may be understood in various 
ways. Examples are education as vocation, in which the teacher is a 
minister of God; or education that is inspired and elevated by Christian 
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sensibilities. Agazzi recommended a ". . . general education of man 
according to the Christian concept of man, of the world, of culture, of 
civilization, and of existence." 11 Finally, he suggested that through 
Christian pedagogy, education can reawaken human beings 1 consciousness 
of their own free, creative, and unique work in the construction of self 
and history; and their reawakening may occur in spite of human frail-
ty--a frailty that is overcome by will and grace. 
There were other elaborations qn the nature of Catholic pedagogy 
at the 1954 Schol~ conference, but it is unnecessary to summarize them 
here. The existence of the organization and its subsequent activities 
did much to strengthen Christian personalism as a pedagogical movement 
in the 1950 1 s and 1960 1 s. No upheavals occurred in the movement, but 
rather there was a gradual shift away from purely metaphysical specula-
tion and toward a concern with ethical, social, and practical issues. 
Eventually, some personalists attempted to find points of contact with 
scientists and scientifically-oriented educators. The evolution of 
personalism from a speculative, theological philosophy of education to a 
school of educators involved in practical affairs may be illustrated by 
examining two important figures within the movement: 
and Aldo Agazzi. 
Luigi Stefanini 
11 Quoted in Macchietti, Pedagogia del personalismo italiano, p. 30. 
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Stefanini, Founder of Italian Personalism 
"Being is personal, and all that which is not personal in being 
belongs to the productivity of the person, as a means of personal 
expression and of communication between persons." 12 Those words are the 
central dictum of Luigi Stefanini, and they have been quoted in several 
texts. Although Stefanini was not the oldest of the personalists, he is 
generally given more credit than his peers for building the movement. 
More persuasive than flamboyant, he was a respected philosopher, a 
beloved teacher, and a man of profound faith. 
Luigi Stefanini was born in the northern Italian city of Treviso 
in 1891. He studied at the University of Padua, where he received 
degrees in philosophy and literature; his thesis in philosophy was on 
the French vitalist Blonde!. After military service in World War I, 
Stefanini turned to a scholarly life. He taught in senior high schools 
in Padua and Mantua, and was awarded a university instructor's license 
in 1925. Shortly thereafter, he was selected for a chair in theoretical 
philosophy at the University of Messina in southern Italy. 
In 1937, Stefanini returned to Padua to teach at the university, 
first in pedagogy and later in the history of philosophy. His interests 
were always broad; as a historian of philosophy, he conducted research 
in several areas and taught occasional courses in pedagogy and esthet-
ics. 
12 
Luigi Stefanini, Il personalismo sociale (Rome: Studium, 1952), 
p. 11. 
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After the Second World War, Stefanini's interests in pedagogy and 
the reconstruction of Italian schools led him to accept responsible 
positions in the state Council for Public Instruction, the National 
Consultancy on Teaching, and the National Center for Secondary School 
Instruction. In the years immediately following the war, Stefanini was 
also a leading member of the Italian Philosophical Society, one who 
contributed much to its reconstruction and encouraged its members to 
discuss pedagogical issues. In addition, he participated in the efforts 
of the Center for Christian Philosophical Studies in Gallarate, an 
important center of Neothomistic thought. 
Stefanini always urged Catholic thinkers to look beyond their 
immediate situations and to work with "adversaries" whenever possible in 
facing the major problems of contemporary life. 13 His interest in 
dialogue with non-Catholic thinkers may have arisen from his difficul-
ties as a Catholic professor in state universities during the Fascist 
era, when he found himself in a position between the laic idealist 
philosophers and the traditionalist church. In the course of his 
academic career, Stefanini developed contacts and personal friendships 
among philosophers of various schools, from Blondel and Gabriel Marcel 
to Giovanni Gentile. While his thought was fundamentally consistent 
with that of Plato and St. Augustine, his mature inspiration was derived 
from nineteenth- and twentieth-century personalism, and he is given 
13 Mauro Laeng, I contemporanei (Florence: Giunti Barbera, 1979), p. 
881. 
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credit for establishing a particularly Italian school of personalism. 14 
Stefanini published numerous philosophical works in his lifetime, 
but his more significant efforts in philosophy of education include: La 
pedagogia dell' idealismo giudicata da un cattolico (The Pedagogy of 
Idealism Evaluated by a Catholic), published in 1926; Il rapporto educa-
tivo. Proemio alla scienza dell' educazione (The Educative Link: 
Preface to the Science of Education), 1932; ~M~e~n~s~c~o~r~d~1~·s~=----~g~i~u=d=i=z=i=o 
sull' attivismo moderno (The Heart's Reason: An Evaluation of Modern 
Active Education), 1933; Il memento dell'educazione. Giudizio sull'esi-
tenzialismo (The Moment of Education: An Evaluation of Existential-
ism), 1938; Educazione estetica ed artistica (Esthetic and Artistic 
Education), 1954; and Personalismo educative (Personalism in Education), 
1955. Implications for education may also be derived from Stefanini's 
general philosophy, but Stefanini was aware of those implications and 
elaborated upon them in his pedagogical writings. 
The Personalist Perspective 
In 1950, Luigi Stefanini outlined his philosophy for a pamphlet in 
a series then being prepared by Editrice Liviana of Padua. The 
pamphlet, Lamia prospettiva filosofica (My Philosophical Perspective), 
begins abruptly with Stefanini's dictum on the personal nature of being, 
whose truth the philosopher proposes to demonstrate. He states that the 
point of departure for such a demonstration is found in the experience 
14 Unsigned review of new edition, Personalismo sociale, by Luigi 
Stefanini, in Italian Books and Periodicals, July/September 1979, pp. 
360-361. 
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that the subject has of itself: "The I is the primordial and central 
fact of experience." 15 The central point of experience, he argues, is 
not somewhere before the individual, but rather in the person 1 s head. 
Both subject and predicate belong to a personal act that links them. 16 
In spite of the Copernican view of the universe, there remains a Ptole-
maic element which is the individual participant and observer at the 
center of all experience: "There is no cosmic, social, or metaphysical 
participation that does not have to b~ mediated by psychological partie-
ipation. " 17 
In experience, the "I" manifests itself as a unity and an iden-
tity. It projects that unity/identity in space and time, yet all the 
multiplicities of space and time do not manage to shatter the experienc-
ing I at the center. The nature of that I is psychospiritual, and it 
asserts its primacy over the empirical and corporeal nature of reality. 
If the primacy of mind over the empirical is lost, Stefanini states, it 
cannot be recovered: "No metaphysic can be constructed if its first 
chapter is not psychological." 11 
15 L .. S f ' . u1g1 te an1n1, 
Liviana, 1950), p.l. 
La mia prospettiva filosofica (Padua: Editrice 
16 Note the similarity here to Gentile 1 s "thought as pure act." For 
elaboration, see Chapter IV of this study. 
17 Stefanini, Prospettiva, p. 2. 
18 Stefanini, Prospettiva, p. 5. 
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The various fragments of experience are related in the "connective 
unity" of consciousness. Moreover, perception is not exhausted in imme-
diate experience but becomes the subject of discourse and mental 
process. It is part of a chain of reason; Stefanini posits reason as 
the psychological core of the person, and not as an anonymous or deper-
sonalizing addendum to experience. He asserts that "free," "rational," 
and "personal" are equivalent attributes in that ". . . reason is the 
activity that, overcoming the moment of pure spontaneity and conquering 
the particularity of the impression, the emotion, or the impulse, allows 
the I to be itself in all that it thinks and wills and does." 19 
Stefanini insists that "reason" is not simply a matter of imper-
sonal logic. To be "rational," he says, does not mean to be "cerebral." 
The realm of rationality is political rather than despotic; while reason 
implies disciplined and orderly thought that avoids destructive contra-
dictions, rationality itself must accommodate the entire life of the 
person. On the other hand, Stefanini defines irrationality as a loss of 
personality, hence a loss of being. He conceives of a Person-Vernunft 
(person-reason), a personified sort of reason that is both active and 
watchful at once. That kind of reason protects the person from dissolu-
tion in negation, weakness, bestiality, or ephemerality. Its watchful-
ness also has a moral quality; it preserves us and edifies us through 
the first principles of philosophy, the categories and axiomatic truths. 
19 St f . . P tt. 7 e an1n1, rospe 1va, p. . 
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It appears that Stefanini is invoking a Platonic or Kantian system 
here, but he agrees with Rosmini that the single true category is being. 
For Stefanini, being is not indeterminate, but rather the being of 
personal experience, whose principles are identity and noncontradiction: 
the existential algebra20 is "I= I; not I= not I." The self, he means 
to say, is indivisible and undeniable. 
Having argued for the unity of personal experience, Stefanini now 
considers its uniqueness. The I is ~nrepeatable, unmistakable, has no 
exact equivalent in another, and cannot be substituted. There are many 
selves in the world, but for each individual there is only one "me." 
The personal sense of individuality cannot be inferred from the empiri-
cal determination of the individual, nor can traditional philosophy 
explain individuality by hypothesizing any individual whatsoever. 
Stefanini derives his understanding of the individual from religious 
teaching and intuition. If God became incarnate in one person, he 
reasons, then human existence must have infinite value and dignity. 
Individual value and uniqueness gives one the right to aspire to immor-
tality; for how can a being of such value be utterly destroyed without a 
(cosmic) loss of that value and its potential? Stefanini writes, "A 
kind of ontological argument of love lies at the base of my aspiration 
to immortality." 21 
20 St f . ' P . 9 e an1n1, rospett1va, p. . 
21 s f . . p . 11 te an1n1, rospett1va, p. . 
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In declaring the individual unique, Stefanini does not wish to 
support a solipsistic position. His psychospiritual monad is "all doors 
and windows," and in its self-definition it must account for all social 
and historical conditions to which it is linked. In the act of thinking 
(logos), the self recognizes others preceding and surrounding it. Every 
mental act is a new creation, and to that extent it imitates the 
creative activity of God. 
similar as possible to Him. 
He has made men and women free beings as 
Unlike the Gentilians, Stefanini is careful to avoid asserting man 
as the world's creator. To say that thought is a creative act for the 
individual is different from saying that the individual creates the 
world. The world exists before us and impinges upon us; impression is 
different from expression. The individual produces images and models of 
reality that comprehend surrounding matter without imprisoning it. A 
thing remains a thing in itself (and an expression of God's creative 
power) even when it is partly fathomed by human thought. 
Each human being is preceded by society and history, says Stefan-
ini, and is enriched by connections with others. What is universal is 
interpersonal and can be mastered by anyone. Paradoxically, Stefanini 
asserts individuality as a universal principle. All beings are self-i-
den tical, but in that fact lies their similarity. "The category of 
human communion is similarity," 22 Stefanini observes. Similarity allows 
human beings to understand one another, and also to join forces. 
22 Stefanini, Prospettiva, p. 13. 
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For Stefanini, the sense of an individual "in-itself" precedes 
individual action. It is the inner self that demands mastery and 
expresses itself in the act of self-edification. Thus, Stefanini argues 
against Gentile that the I is not constituted purely by its actions. No 
human being is pure activity, for such a creature might well be unlim-
ited in space and time (i.e., supernatural). Human finitude intrudes 
upon the acts of will, and no conscious activity can sustain the person 
indefinitely. Nevertheless, one peq;ists and continues, sustained by 
the "giving gesture" of God. One becomes aware of personal finitude in 
contrast with a transcendent absolute: "I cannot reveal the depths of 
my being without including some sense of that God to whom I am somehow 
joined, and who, one might say, causally extends himself in me." 23 
Man's task, writes Stefanini, is to be the primary vehicle of 
God's manifestation; yet to manifest God requires self-mastery first of 
all. That self-mastery includes coming to love both God and man; then 
all of the powers of the individual become instruments of religious 
elevation. Stefanini inveighs against hermeticism and existential nihi-
lism. The God of faith is complemented by a God of reason, and ,divine 
transcendence hints at another (supernatural) order that human philoso-
phy cannot penetrate. 
For Stefanini, the human personality is both rational and moral. 
There is a sense of moral duty that arises from the ordinary problems of 
our existence: we feel that we ought to find good solutions. We then 
23 s f . . p . 14 te an1n1, rospett1va, p. . 
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find that we can will what we should not. Every individual is a free 
spirit who " must conquer his place energetically and sometimes 
bloodily." 2 " 
Stefanini contends that evil and error arise from a halt in the 
process of self-mastery. He takes issue with the Hegelian "dialectical" 
view of good and evil and says that living thought does not require a 
constant juxtaposition of the two forces: there is enough variety in 
positive thought to satisfy the active mind. To the dialectic of oppo-
sites, Stefanini counterposes a dialectic of diversity: not either/or, 
but also/and. 
For Stefanini, values arise out of personal experience, and the 
very fact of being is true, good, and splendid insofar as the living 
being affirms itself, desires itself, and loves itself. Those acts 
confirm it as a person. The activity which brings value to light is the 
confrontation between the permanent (identical) self and the contingent 
variety of acts and situations. Truth is realized in those situations 
through disclosure and adequation. 
Stefanini stresses the personal nature of acts and relationships 
in which value is realized. The relationship of man to God must be 
understood, he says, as the relationship of one person to another 
(divine) Person. The relationship of educator to educand exists as the 
gift of one person (a teacher) to another (a student) in the form of a 
solicitation to the student toward self-realization and self-mastery. 25 
24 Stefanini, Prospettiva, p. 17. 
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Stefanini emphasizes the importance of education, law, and morality in 
human society in raising it above the status of a herd or flock, leading 
it little by little to the recognition of personal dignity in individu-
als. He proposes a legal system based on personal rights and the coun-
terposition of what is personally useful to what is personally wasteful. 
Speaking of his own development as a philosopher, Stefanini 
insists that he underwent no dramatic changes or conversions: "I have 
always gone in the same direction, s~arting not from the pneumatic void 
but from an embryo. " 2 6 He attacks the Cartes ian fiction of "methodical 
doubts" and insists, instead, on a "method of integration" in which the 
philosophic embryo encounters experiences of thought and life which 
enrich it and test its resistance. In his own case, the germ of Stefan-
ini's thought survived and he sought no other system. For that he gives 
thanks to his "knowledgeable and industrious" mother, and to his pred-
ecessors in philosophy from Plato to Blondel. He compares his reasoning 
process to that of Saint Augustine--a process of partial discovery open 
to an infinite perfectibility of knowledge. Stefanini condemns the 
"philosophic idolatry" of those who believe they have touched the core 
of being through concepts, leaving nothing to clarify. For Stefanini, 
the only philosophical dogma is that of the I validating all knowledge 
and revealing the perspective of all others who say "I" of themselves. 
Within that one dogma, change and innovation are always possible. 
25 Stefanini, Prospettiva, p. 19. 
26 Stefanini, Prospettiva, p. 20. 
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Applying Personalism to Education 
Luigi Stefanini' s most definitive statements on education appear 
in a book, Personalismo educativo (Personalism in Education), published 
in 1955 near the end of his life. It begins with encouraging words for 
those who would philosophize about education: 
I am far from believing that pedagogy is a type of inferior philoso-
phy. Rather, I hold that it (pedagogy) is the test which the 
philosopher must undergo to avoid losing contact with humanity at 
the point at which he tends to express human values ideally. 27 
Stefanini states his desire to define a concept of personhood that 
is valid for the aims of human education, and to delineate some of the 
themes of Christian pedagogy. In the latter regard, however, ". . . it 
is not intended to confine the horizon within a confessional environ-
ment, but to indicate summarily how one might derive some features of 
educational knowledge from the teachings of Jesus, valid even outside 
the 'divine institutions' of humanity." 28 
In the beginning of Personalismo educativo, Stefanini outlines the 
main points of his pedagogy in a few pages before going on to expand and 
elaborate upon his ideas. His introductory summary provides a succinct 
and convenient introduction to his pedagogy, and a translation of the 
entire chapter is provided below: 
One may quickly state the reasons by which the concept of the 
person must become central in educational theory and praxis--a 
concept whose speculative value may be restored, providing an exact 
distinction between the empirical concept of individuality and the 
27 Luigi Stefanini, Personalismo educativo 
Editore, 1955), p. 5. 
28 Stefanini, Personalismo educativo, p. 5. 
(Rome: Fratelli Bocca 
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psychospiritual concept of personality. The command "Personalize 
the schools!" does not exclude other efforts intended to spiritual-
ize, idealize, humanize, socialize, or activize the schools; but in 
each of those terms something indeterminate and ambiguous -would 
remain if the concepts of mind, humanity, sociality, and activity 
did not pass through the concept of personhood and find their bases 
and concreteness in the person. 
For whoever takes the teacher's point of view, educational 
personalism has value for both its subjects and its objects: that 
is, on one hand it affects intentions turned to each of the students 
in the school community, and on the other hand it has to do with the 
qualities that the teacher must typify and the form of his instruc-
tion. 
For the objects (educands), educational personalism can be summa-
rized in the following statements: 
(1) The object of the enterprise of education is not an "aver-
age student" to whom one may distribute knowledge in a schematic 29 
and impersonal form, but a "truly individual being" (Eigensein) 
for whom knowledge must be appropriate and by whom knowledge must 
be expressed in an autonomous process. Knowledge is not communi-
cated by transmission, but it is aroused by appeal. Heteroeduca-
tion has value only insofar as it promotes autoeducation. 
(2) The "truly individual being" is an "end in itself" or an 
unalterable dignity, to be observed and nurtured with definite 
interest and religious care. A linkage of souls is the foundation 
of the intellectual relations of the school order. 
(3) The psychological reduction of humanity into "types" or 
"categories" defined by common characterological impressions has 
value in removing us from the anonymity of the "genus" or the 
"species" and in bringing us closer to the true being of the 
person: it has no value in replacing that ultimate consideration. 
(4) The lack of a social sense in the pupil (asociality) 
derives from an excess of individualism or from a defect of 
personality. The "inferiority complex" makes the child unsociable 
(Adler); nevertheless the proportion between personal self-exami-
nation and social circulation is not inverse but direct. 
29 The original word is nozionistica and has no exact English 
equivalent. It is an adjective used pejoratively to describe a form 
of instruction that is highly verbal and abstract, requiring students 
to learn summaries, outlines, charts and the like, but allowing little 
opportunity to relate information to lived experience. 
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(5) Personal value and internal regulation are not the results 
of the social group (or of the school group); on the contrary, 
they are its condition. Scholastic teams must not reduce personal 
responsibility to the product of collective reactions, nor should 
"moral will" be reduced to the "general will" of the social group, 
sacrificing what is more profound and divine in the individual. 
(6) Personalized education demands a social conscience and 
organization favorable to the rise of the capable and worthy to 
the superior levels of society, denying that school destiny be 
decided only on the bases of privileges of blood and wealth. 
(7) Differentiated schools that are specialized for the 
retarded, the learning disabled, and the emotionally disturbed 
must obey the law of the protection of the person and have the 
almost religious value of preserving the divine that is in every 
person, even one who is morally or physically debilitated. 
With regard to the 
personalist pedagogy can 
of the following tenor: 
subjects (educators), the principles of 
be summarily reduced to several expressions 
(1) The level that best contains the universality of instruc-
tional value is the most personal. 
(2) To make the pupil active, the teacher's activity must be 
incremented to the maximum rather than suspended. To maximize the 
student, it is necessary to maximize the teacher. Human values 
are not mutually exclusive like physical bodies. In the realm of 
moral values, wills cannot be suppressed, nor are they neutral-
ized, but they interpenetrate. Consequently, authority as a mani-
festation of moral eminence does not suppress liberty but supports 
it. 
(3) The teacher is not a neutral transmitter of knowledge. It 
is didactically inefficient for ice-cold mentalities to convey 
knowledge as if it did not belong to them, or as if they feared 
contaminating it by adding a tone of excitement and personal 
emphasis to it. On the contrary, the universal has no educative 
efficacy if it does not pass through the individual and if it does 
not come to light through the effort of personal study and the joy 
of mastery. 
(4) Human experience in the person of the teacher is the 
indispensable basis of the educational enterprise, and to it all 
other experience must be subordinated (that of nature, or in 
books, or of instructional and scientific apparatus). Recent 
psychoanalysis has ascertained that one of the principal causes of 
neurosis in the modern world is the depersonalization of the 
social environment. 
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(5) "Extroversion" does not characterize the educator's ideal 
type if it is not combined with "introversion." The transitive 
process is in direct proportion to the reflective process, disse-
mination with concentration. "Teacher, educate yourself, if you 
want to educate!" (Giuseppe Lombardo-Radice). 
(6) "The divine Teacher is superior to doctrine" (Kierke-
gaard). This principle of evangelical teaching is the regulative 
term by which human instruction must be directed. In school, the 
teacher who is beloved is one who demonstrates that the knowledge, 
methods, and abilities of which he is the bearer and administrator 
do not constitute his entire personality. Rather, he is an 
instrument at the service of humanity, who knows how to manifest 
his own fullne~s of moral character without undergoing a "profes-
sional debilitation." The h1,1man being, in school, must be 
superior to the material that he teaches, as in life, to the 
profession that he exercises. 3 ~ 
In the preceding material, Stefanini' s pedagogical goal is 
clearly stated at the outset: to make " . the concept of the 
person . . . become central in educational theory and praxis. 11 More-
over, he wants to establish a philosophical concept of the person, 
which is why he refers to the "speculative value" of the concept. To 
do so, he will distinguish between the empirical concept of individu-
ality--roughly, the commonsense notion of each individual being some-
how different from all others--and the concept of personality within a 
psychospiritual order. That claim recalls his dictum: "Being is 
personal . . . ", which suggests that personality is a transcendental 
concept coextensive with being itself. 31 
30Stefanini, Personalismo educativo, pp. 9-12. 
3ls f .. te an1.n1., Il personalismo sociale, p. 11. 
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Infusing schools with a personalist sense of being does not, in 
Stefanini' s opinion, exclude other programs intended to reform and 
improve s choo 1 ing. Rather, the personalist concept may provide a 
sound basis for such endeavors, and in any case it may complement 
those efforts. 
Stefanini makes a distinction between the "objects" and 
"subjects" of education, meaning the students in the first case and 
the teachers in the second. The distinction suggests that both terms 
are complementary, and in this way Stefanini argues against the ideal-
ists' fatuous and insincere concept of self-education. 
For Stefanini, the object of education is an individual being 
and not a statistic. Of course, this is a challenge to the "scien-
tific" educators who rely on tests and measurements rather than 
personal judgments based on acquaintance. Stefanini makes a peculiar 
claim about knowledge that has echoes of Plato: knowledge is not 
transmitted but elicited; it is part of an autonomous learning 
process, and therefore self-education in this sense is a reality. 
Stefanini partly avoids contradicting himself by saying that the 
teacher's function is to promote self-education, encourage expressions 
of knowledge, and judge the appropriateness of what is attempted. 
The child in the classroom is to be "observed and nurtured" with 
"interest and religious care." The valuing of students as persons, or 
as ends in themselves (as in Kant), leads to Stefanini's recommenda-
tion that teachers take a strong personal interest in their students. 
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This is more of a moral than an instructional necessity, but Stefanini 
does not cleanly separate the two. 
Stefanini takes a middle ground on the application of the social 
sciences to education. According to him, psychological typology at 
least forces us to recognize human distinctions that are more subtle 
than the merely biological judgments of genus and species. That is, 
psychology deprives us of any pretext that human beings are all iden-
tical; but it does not go far enc?ugh for Stefanini. It brings us 
closer to understanding individual being, but it does not explain all 
human differences. 
On the matter of personality development, Stefanini borrows from 
and reinterprets Adlerian psychology. If a child is introverted and 
asocial, it must be the result of excessive individualism (preoccupa-
tion with the self) or a failure to learn to value other persons. An 
inferiority complex makes the child withdrawn and asocial, but the 
proper relation of personal growth to sociability is directly proper-
tional and complementary. Stefanini' s remarks on this matter are 
telegraphic and cryptic at first glance, but in fact they refer to the 
Adlerian concept of neurosis and the compenetration of social interest 
and individual development. 
In contrast to the social determinists, Stefanini argues that 
personal value and individual control are not matters that rest in the 
social group; rather, individuals constitute the social group, so they 
condition its values and controls. Importantly, "moral will" must not 
be attributed to the general (social) will, an error of the Fascists. 
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On the question of who shall be educated and for what, Stefanini 
takes a position reminiscent of Plato in The Republic, and perhaps of 
Thomas Jefferson as well. The "capable and worthy" must be helped to 
"superior levels" of study, regardless of wealth or rank. Clearly, 
Stefanini does not define worthiness along class lines, but he does 
not specify what is to be done for those who are less worthy, nor does 
he state how capabilities will be assessed and how distinctions will 
be made. Inasmuch as he is skeptical of psychometric procedures, 
capability and worthiness are probably to be assessed by teachers; and 
if they truly respect their students as individuals, they are morally 
obligated to assist all students maximally. One may object that 
Stefanini, while attacking social elitism, is really advocating an 
intellectual elite; yet even that runs counter to the sense of his 
teaching. 
In his following statements, Stefanini is solicitous of the 
retarded and handicapped to the extent of desiring special schools for 
them, a reform badly needed in Italy in the 1950's, as schooling was 
inadequate for such persons when it was extended to them at all. The 
problem of "ghettoization" had not occurred to him at that time, but 
on the positive side his remarks are tempered by his injunction to 
educators to perceive the divinely given personhood in everyone, no 
matter how flawed the individual might be. 
The "subjects" of education (the teachers, ones who educate) 
must realize first of all that the most general value of instruction 
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lies in its application to the personal. Here Stefanini amplifies his 
own principle that personality is the most general (universal) fact. 
Stefanini attacks pseudo-Deweyan and "activist" educators who 
believe in curtailing teacher activity so that the children may do as 
they will. His countersuggestion is that a high level of teacher 
involvement is necessary to maximize student activity. In a social 
situation (a classroom), individuals must interact physically and 
morally, and failure to act on e~ther side is detrimental to the 
exchange. One person's moral will does not neutralize another's, but 
rather interpenetrates with it. Stefanini makes another point: those 
who would exercise authority based on supposed moral preeminence 
(teachers, priests, rulers) cannot suppress individual liberty without 
suppressing the interactions of moral will. (This position can only 
be sustained by one who believes in the benignity of individual moral 
will; Stefanini makes no suggestion as to what authorities should do 
when individual will becomes immoral or amoral.) 
The myth of "neutral" knowledge is assailed next. No teacher is 
a neutral transmitter of knowledge, Stefanini says, and the attempt to 
be one results in impoverished teaching. Whatever is general or 
universal in education must pass through the individual educator to 
the individual learner. Study and achievement are products of 
personal effort. All instruction, Stefanini asserts, ultimately 
depends on personal experience. It is the experience of the teacher 
that enables him or her to relate curricular material to the student. 
Furthermore, Stefanini adds, depersonalization can lead to neurosis. 
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Matters of mental health and personal style depend on a dynamic 
balance between the social and the individual, the outward and the 
inward, argues Stefanini. The ideal teacher is no more "extrovert" 
than "introvert," but is involved in both reflective and communicative 
processes. What the teacher understands affects what he or she 
teaches; hence (recalling a slogan of the elder Lombardo-Radice), the 
teacher is encouraged toward self-education. 
Finally, Stefanini insists that the moral character and inter-
personal efficacy of the teacher are uppermost. The "divine teacher" 
(quoted from Kierkegaard, probably an allusion to Christ) is genuinely 
concerned about serving humanity and in turn is "beloved" by the 
students. Such a teacher is morally above whatever material he or she 
happens to teach and the incidental features of the profession. 
What emerges from Stefanini' s set of statements is a highly 
individualized form of education that yet maintains a strong concern 
for healthy social interaction and is promulgated by teachers who are 
good, wise, well-adjusted, lovable individuals. 
Development and Reflection 
The remainder of Personalismo educative is largely an elaboration on 
the themes that Stefanini has so far announced. A few points deserve 
further attention. 
Reflecting on the aim of education, Stefanini says that it is the 
"s · · d · f " £ h ocratJ.c ml. Wl. ery o t e person, and that any other goals must be 
understood in the personalistic sense, to be reached by mediation 
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through individuals. 32 He compares his concept of the person to that of 
other philosophers and affirms that personhood is a central principle in 
his philosophy; he cannot accept a "generically spiritual philosophy" 
that views the person as an empirical determination of a universal mind 
or spirit (as the idealists did, for example). Even the formal coinci-
dence of human characteristics may be misleading, masking a substantial 
diversity of human intentions and orientations. This philosophy does 
not require a complex metaphysic of personality; any teacher knows that 
a student is neither a puppy nor a colt nor a determination of universal 
Mind nor a confluence of environmental influences nor an epiphenomenon 
of matter. Thus the concept of a personal Socratic midwifery, as 
Stefanini understands it, has more to recommend itself than the abstruse 
rationalizations of metaphysical philosophy. 
Stefanini scrutinizes the positions of his philosophical opponents 
and questions each one. Is the person only a confluence of hereditary 
influences, or does a person also have the power to vary the direction 
of influences and deflect incidental forces in a way not predicted by 
physical, chemical, or biological laws? Is the person a function of 
instinct or the embodiment of a principle that illumines and governs 
instincts, imposing a moral structure upon them? Is the person a func-
tion of the economic bases of society, or an agent able to use the 
economic structure to satisfy essential needs before proceeding to 
higher activities? Is the person trapped in an existential situation, 
32 Stefanini, Personalismo educative, p. 13. 
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or can the person change and qualify a situation through an exercise of 
will? Is the person a function of indiscriminate possibilities, or a 
realizer of possibilities? Is the person the expression of a social 
body, subject to its immutable laws, or the very principle of society 
which has a duty to promote and protect spiritual freedom? In this way, 
Stefanini challenges what he perceives as the various philosophical 
determinisms. 
Wherever there is a determinism, Stefanini argues, the personalist 
style of education is impossible, and it may be pointless to speak of 
education at all. In that situation, the individual is a part being 
prepared for service in a machine. A realistic and scientific attitude 
may well be useful for educators, but they must realize that such an 
attitude defines only the starting point of education, not its place of 
ultimate arrival. An evil of modern times that Stefanini laments is the 
widespread loss of a sense of dignity and personal responsibility. Many 
of our contemporaries, he contends, have abandoned themselves to sensual 
pleasures and tawdry pursuits, having sold their souls, Faust-like, to a 
devil in the guise of functional determinism. The effect of functional-
ism is a shrunken soul, a cheapened sense of the self, ". . . and when 
the soul sells itself it can only sell itself to the devil. " 3 3 One 
cannot sell oneself to God, Stefanini adds; rather, one gives oneself to 
Him. 
33
stefanini, Personalismo educative, p. 20. 
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Stefanini again points out the distinction between the "empirical 
individual" who is "forced to submit to outside influences" and the true 
person who must overcome the obstacle of that kind of individuality: 
The person begins when the tendency experienced as a destiny is 
overturned and becomes a contained and correct direction, employed 
as an element of a vocation. When one passes from the first hill-
side to the second, one passes from animal training to the education 
of man." 34 
For Stefanini, the characteristics of education are quite different from 
those of training; education is revea.led as free, conscious, and purpo-
sive. 
Continuing his philosophical debate, Stefanini attacks the 
vestiges of classical intellectualism in education, whereby man is seen 
as a function of ideas or values. Stefanini introjects Christianity, 
whose God does not search the heavens for ideals to contemplate, nor 
does He appear with transcendent ideals to vaporize the world; rather, 
His ideas are immanent in the Word, and by the Word He creates a world. 
Yet philosophers continue to hypostatize abstract universals, whether as 
Hegel 1 s Logos, Husserl 1 s Wesenschau, or the immutable principles of 
contemporary mathematical logicians. 
Stefanini objects to that classical intellectualism, as it creates 
a dichotomy in which the person is contingent and little more than a 
spectator to a realm of universal ideals, values, and culture. For 
Stefanini, nothing can be universalized except through individual 
conscience and action. Even Aquinas, Stefanini points out, observes 
34stefanini, Personalismo educative, p. 21. 
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that truth cannot be preserved in the absence of an individual 
intellect. A world of things and values is meaningless without the 
beholder and the valuer. (Here Stefanini digresses into esthetic 
theory, wherein he affirms art not as an encounter with an object, but 
as a meeting with the soul that produced it.) Whatever or whomever the 
person loves takes on a personal value; and God's superiority over man 
describes a relationship in which man is loved and therefore valued by 
God. 
Modern value theory, Stefanini maintains, tends to become a form 
of ontology in which values are independently self-sustaining; but he 
observes that the person is the only entity for whom value has meaning. 
Without a clear sense of personal value, and through an uncritical 
belief in the givenness of values, a perverse set of values is easily 
accepted, warns Stefanini. 
In another consideration of the matter of functionalism, Stefanini 
calls it a debate between being and having, and says that either posi-
tion has considerable implications for education. A functional view of 
knowledge, he contends, has led to a corruption of humanism in the 
schools and to such evils as encyclopedism, formalism, and schematic 
rote learning. He accuses that form of schooling of being mechanistic, 
ponderous, obnoxious, and alienating to the young. Education must help 
the student toward self-knowledge: "When the person is alienated from 
himself in knowing and acting, belief becomes superstition, law becomes 
Phariseeism, morality is conformity, labor is abasement, and study is 
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bondage." 35 
Although Stefanini sees the Deweyan-activist reaction as an 
extreme response to the empty formalism of the schools, he concedes that 
the doctrine of interest has some merit and can be understood in a 
personalistic sense: "Interest is the bond of love that links the 
person to the object, inasmuch as in the object he realizes himself 
through his constructive powers, his productivity, or some other form of 
affinity. " 36 Stefanini denies that i~terest is an impersonal force, as 
suggested in certain pronouncements of Herbart. In projecting the 
forces of attraction and repulsion in the world, one must not overlook 
the projector. Ideas, Stefanini contends, are not impersonal forces. 
On axiological matters, Stefanini insists that values may not be 
alienated from the person without suffering discredit. Neither reason 
nor value may be separated from the person, as the person is incarnate 
reason and incarnate value. Stefanini finds it appropriate to say that 
the person does not have value, but is a value. 37 The crisis of values 
in the modern world, as Stefanini sees it, is really a problem of 
faltering rationality, a vendetta against reason as it was once hyposta-
35stefanini, Personalismo educative, p. 27. 
36stefanini, Personalismo educativo, p. 27. 
37Professor Flores D'Arcais understands this statement to mean that 
the person draws·validity from others who affirm his value, and not that 
the person draws validity from himself; certainly the social dimension 
is important in Stefanini's thought, but the value generated by individ-
ual liberty and responsibility should not be overlooked. See Giuseppe 
Flores D'Arcais, "La pedagogia di Luigi Stefanini," in Studi in onore di 
Luigi Stefanini (Padua: Liviana Editrice, 1966), p. 158. 
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tized by the illuminists and intellectualists. There is really no 
conflict between rationality and the person: II . it is necessary to 
choose both, so that both may be something." 38 
To save ourselves from irrationalism, Stefanini recommends that we 
personalize reason; from a position of personalized rationality, we may 
personalize values as well. Stefanini invokes the Christian concept of 
the rational soul that is quodammodo omnia (somehow everything). That 
concept undergirds Stefanini's assertion that the person does not poss-
ess reason but is reason; and by virtue of that rational nature, the 
person is bound to the self and to others. 
Stefanini closes this discussion in Personalismo educative with 
an appeal for a recovery of values through rational, human education: 
The task of education at the present time is the recovery of 
values through the recovery of the person. ~1odern man asked not to 
betray himself in his choice. The interest of the person must be 
restored to a confluence with values, instead of letting values 
appear as inconsistent shams in an empyrean realm of abstractions, 
and thus as extrinsic and hostile. 
Man will be educated when he clings to value as much as he clings 
to his dignity, his freedom, his integrity, and his salvation. 39 
In another chapter of this book, Stefanini lists and elaborates 
upon eighteen themes that he perceives in Christian pedagogy. The 
discussion is thorough and thoughtful, but much of it is based on rather 
esoteric theology, and the chapter adds little major material to what 
has been brought out elsewhere. The second section of Personalismo 
38 stefanini, Personalismo educative, p. 28. 
39 stefanini, Personalismo educative, p. 29. 
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educative provides a critique of teaching methods, while the third 
returns to the theme of the individual in society. 
Stefanini' s death within a year of the publication of this book 
precluded the appearance of any revisions of his pronouncements on 
education. 
Aldo Agazzi: A Modern Catholic Educator 
The pedagogical thought that was first developed by Luigi Stefan-
ini and a few of his contemporaries marked the beginning of a movement 
that grew and evolved during the middle decades of the twentieth 
century. Younger scholars, inspired by Stefanini or by his sources, 
added new dimensions to the "Christian spiritualist" and "personalist" 
(usually synonymous) traditions in philosophy and education. 
One personalist scholar who came to be widely respected among 
secular educators as well as churchmen was Aldo Agazzi. He was born in 
the northern Italian city of Bergamo on September 12, 1906. There were 
educators in his family: his paternal aunts were Rosa and Carolina 
Agazzi, the originators of a system of early childhood education that is 
still the most popular in Italy. 
Agazzi attended the Catholic University of Milan and the Univer-
sity of Turin; from the latter, he received a degree in pedagogy in 
1938. He taught philosophy, pedagogy, and psychology in state training 
schools for elementary teachers until 1952, when he obtained a state 
university lecturer's permit. Agazzi began teaching at the University 
of Padua in 1953, first as a lecturer in education and then as a 
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professor of psychology and history of education. He accepted a posi-
tion at the Catholic University of Milan in 1960, where he taught educa-
tion courses in the Division of Letters and Philosophy until 1968; then 
he became a member of that university's Division of Teacher Training and 
director of an institute program as well. 
Among the large number of professional organizations in which 
Agazzi has been active are the state Higher Council for Public Instruc-
tion; the National Instructional Center for Preschools; the National 
Instructional Center of the Italian National Academy (the "Lincei"); the 
National Council of the Italian Pedagogical Association; the Italian 
Catholic Union of Middle School Teachers; the Schole center of pedagogi-
cal studies for Catholic university professors; the Scientific Council 
of the National Center for Social Protection and Defense; the Interna-
tional Union for Health Education; the Council of Experts of the Insti-
tute of Comparative Education of the University of Barcelona, Spain; the 
Scientific Council of the A. Gemelli Institute for the experimental 
study of social problems; the Italian Commission for UNESCO; the council 
of experts on instructional issues for the teacher-training schools of 
Italy and the Swiss Canton of Ticino; and the World Organization for 
Preschool Education. In addition to his memberships, 40 Agazzi has 
served on the editorial review boards of several professional journals, 
including Scuola materna (The Preschool) and Scuola e didat-
tica (Schooling and Instruction). 
40 This list is drawn in part from Mauro Laeng, I contemporanei 
(Florence: Giunti Barbera, 1979), pp. 919-920. 
370 
Agazzi' s publications are numerous and varied, ranging from a 
study of St. Augustine (1941) to a commentary on the role of testing in 
contemporary European schools (1967). Not surprisingly, he has written 
the definitive work on the teaching methods of his illustrious aunts, Il 
metoda delle sorelle Agazzi per la scuola materna (The Agazzi Sisters' 
Method for the Preschool), published in 1950. Agazzi has produced two 
major studies of education: Problemi e maestri del pensiero e dell'edu-
cazione (Issues and Masters of Thought and Education), 1954, and a 
companion volume, Panorama della pedagogia d'oggi (Panorama of Today's 
Pedagogy), also published in 1954. These are encyclopedic works, 
historical and descriptive in nature, tracing the evolution of educa-
tional thought and outlining influences present in contemporary philoso-
phy of education. Agazzi' s scholarly post-1945 publications include 
Uomo, societa, educazione, e scuola (Man, Society, Education, and 
Schooling), 1949; Problemi, strutture, e programmi d~lla nostra scuola 
(Concerns, Structures, and Programs of Our Schools), 1949; 01 tre la 
scuola attiva (Beyond Active Schooling), 1955; Psicologia del fanciullo 
e della scuola (Psychology of the Child and Schooling), 1957; Il lavoro 
nella pedagogia e nella scuola (Work in Pedagogy and in School), 1958; 
L'attivismo pedagogico dalla protesta all'autocritica (Pedagogical 
Progressivism from Protest to Self-Critique), 1963; La formazione degli 
insegnanti (The Preparation of Teachers), 1964; and Il discorso pedago-
gico, prospettive attuali del personalismo educative (Pedagogical 
Dialogue: Real Perspectives of Personalism in Education), 1965. 
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Education as Science and Love 
Among Agazzi's few writings of a purely reflective and philosophi-
cal nature, an early one stands out: Saggio sulla nat:ura del fatto 
educativo (Essay on the Nature of the Fact of Education), published in 
1951. Agazzi introduces this book by saying that it presents the open-
ing statements of an argument that he intends to expand, explain, and 
complete subsequently (in other books, evidently). 
At the outset, Agazzi sets up a dichotomy between old-fashioned 
"metaphysical" educators who start from given premises about human 
nature, and the newly appearing "systematic" educators who want to 
define education as an "act" or a "fact" and as a phenomenon that is 
either autonomous or relational. Both approaches have borne fruit, 
Agazzi says, but he proposes to determine which is better. Can induc-
tive inquiry define and delimit education, he asks, and moreover, is it 
possible to resolve pedagogy into some other science? Agazzi states his 
hope that he can move from considerations of pedagogical doctrine to a 
true pedagogical science. 
Comparing metaphysicians to scientific investigators, Agazzi finds 
the former limited by their own concepts; he prefers a science derived 
from determinate facts and assertions that may be investigated and medi-
tated upon. He concludes that education must become an autonomous 
science, able to inform its own art and practice. Ultimately, Agazzi 
finds no metaphysical philosophy, axiology, or theology capable of 
fulfilling the role of pedagogy: "To educate, in fact, is not to philo-
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sophize". 41 
Subsequently, Agazzi emphasizes the practical aspects of educa-
tion. No matter what philosophical foundations education rests upon, it 
must begin where philosophy ends, he avers. Education has specific 
tasks to perform in the world of practical matters. Agazzi begins his 
examination of the givens of education with what he considers empirical 
propositions rather than metaphysical ones. 
The first empirical propositio~ that he states is derived from a 
comparison of human beings and animals: "Education is only for man. 
Animals do not have education." 42 Even that statement, he says, requires 
verification, especially in view of the debate between early twentieth-
century behaviorist and humanist psychologists. Thus he calls on 
another fact: "The animal world has no culture, no history, and exhibits 
no themes, accomplishments, or civil progress. " 4 3 The adaptations of 
plant and animal societies cannot compare to the social and techno-
logical progress of humanity, Agazzi insists. The basic difference 
between the two is that between nature and history. The animal exists 
in a state of nature, responding to forces of entropy, thermodynamics, 
and biology. Animal species change, but their slow evolution does not 
constitute historicity. "History," says Agazzi, "is civilization, 
41 Aldo Agazzi, Saggio sulla natura del fatto educative 
Editrice La Scuola, 1951), p. 11. Agazzi's argument is 
directed against the actual idealists of recent memory. 
42 Agazzi, Saggio, p. 15. 
43 Agazzi, Saggio, p. 17. 
(Brescia: 
obviously 
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novelty, and progress, and it is not deducible ... from initial and 
preceding states. " 44 Human history "breaks in upon stasis," he writes, 
and the world of Nature becomes the scene upon which the spectacle of 
human civilization is built. For Agazzi, history is not simply a given, 
but a fact of man's mind and spirit: II . . man is history, civiliza-
tion, and culture insofar as and because he is spirituality. " 45 Educa-
tion is also related to history, culture, and civilization, and is a 
fact of human spirituality. 
Despite his earlier disclaimer of metaphysics, Agazzi proceeds in 
subsequent chapters of Saggio sulla natura del fatto educative to deli-
neate a vision of humanity that certainly has metaphysical aspects. If 
there is to be a science of education, he reasons, it must relate to an 
organic and systematic understanding of the nature of the human being; 
it should begin with a profile of the person, on the assumptions that 
one cannot educate an unknown creature and that nothing human is extra-
neous to education. 
To draw his profile of man, Agazzi begins with the classical 
notion that man is both nature and spirit, and therefore an inseparable 
unity of necessity (body) and liberty (mind). The psychophysical unity 
that Agazzi perceives in humanity lifts it above the purely natural 
order; naturality remains, but it is transformed by the spirit in much 
44 Agazzi, Saggio, p. 19. 
45 A . S . 20 gazz1, agg1o, p. . 
implicit in this conclusion: 
or its works are spiritual. 
The concept of the "rational soul" is 
spirit (or Mind) is rational, and reason 
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the same way as physical matter, if brought to life, becomes "something 
living" and not merely matter-plus-life. 46 
In man, Agazzi sees a creature that is suffused with the presence 
of two natures that are paradoxically united and also mutually intole-
rant. There is a contest between humanity's spirituality and its natu-
rality, and those forces tend to polarize human actions and mankind's 
very being. The irreducibility of the contraries persists in human 
activities, and an important task is .to establish order between the two 
realms. The pure psychospiritual world is that of values, Agazzi 
insists, and by taking nature upon himself, man inherits the task of 
shaping the natural world according to those values. Through that 
effort, man is purified, made worthy, and brought close to the Absolute. 
Eventually, Agazzi draws his scientific (some might say metaphysi-
cal) profile of humanity: naturality of a biological and physiological 
sort joined to a spirituality that appears in the value-laden domains of 
theory, productive work, ethics, sociality, religion, esthetics, and 
education. 47 
Agazzi allows a certain mental or psychic quality in the natural 
creature, but he insists that it not be confused with spirit. Beyond 
sense perceptions and the processes of affect, there must be a "higher 
order" of values and spiritual substance. Agazzi now lists human activ-
ities that he sees as categories of spirit. The "theoretical" category 
46 Agazzi, Saggio, p. 176. 
47 Agazzi, Saggio, p. 177. 
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is first: cognitive thought investigates the "why" of things, leading 
to philosophy, science, and a discovery of values. "Productivity," or 
human labor, is a controversial but necessary category; Agazzi specifies 
labor in a physical sense and not as thought, meditation, or study. 
Labor is the transformation of brute matter through effort and intelli-
gence, hence it is an activity of spirit. These two categories, theo-
reticity and productivity, represent the operations of spirit on objec-
tive existence, but Agazzi adds five more whose function is to 
contribute to the development of the free spiritual being. 
The first developmental category is ethics, wherein the moral law 
becomes immanent and imposes itself on knowledge; knowledge, transformed 
by one's perception of the moral law and a conscious choice to obey it, 
becomes wisdom and virtue. The category of socialit:y is based on 
". . . feeling the other as another self. " 4 8 For Agazzi, society 
provides more than an extension of the ethical attitude; it is an 
"immortal reality in time" that is the bearer of values and the milieu 
in which the person first perceives the law. From man's sense of inade-
quacy toward the Absolute comes the category of religion with its aspi-
ration to eternity and its eagerness for communion with Being. Through 
religion, the individual comes to an awareness of the self as a partici-
pant in another, higher order of being. Agazzi next: lists the category 
of esthetics, a translation into external images of what is first felt 
inwardly about the self and the universe. All human feelings are 
48 Agazzi, Saggio, p. 182. 
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mirrored in art and may be expressed in ways that lead to the beautiful 
and the sublime. 
The last category which Agazzi mentions is education, a function 
by which man ascends and helps others to ascend to a sense of humanity 
as historicity, endurance, and progress. Without education, humanity 
"would always remain at the beginning," and there would be no participa-
tion in the cultural heritage of the ages, no human civilization, and no 
possibility of conceptualizing new ~chievements. Agazzi claims that 
every person is born with a need to learn and an instinct to teach; thus 
education is a hereditary function. While education unites the other 
categories, it is more than their sum; it is really a category of spirit 
in its own right. 
The task that education faces is not only that of unifying the 
forms of spirit, Agazzi suggests, but of unifying human life itself; for 
humanity is one, but often lives a partial or divided life. As a 
specific and unmistakable aspect of human life, education must develop 
its own body of knowledge, its own science, he repeats. That science, 
adds Agazzi, must be pedagogy, a body of thought related to the.entire 
period of human development and not only to childhood (pedology). More-
over, it must build upon a system of subsidiary "pedagogical science" 
that makes useful and necessary (but not sufficient) contributions to 
its lore. The subsidiary sciences (e.g., biology, physiology, psychol-
ogy, sociology) enable education to cultivate the various potentials of 
man; but while education relates to the whole person, it is also a 
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possession of the person (that is, of the spritual person). Education 
becomes an instrument of spiritual humanity in its temporal trials, 
proclaims Agazzi. Its truest function is to provide the individual with 
a universe of values and the principles of civilization. 
For Agazzi, the role of the teacher is that of a transmitter of 
culture, a vehicle by which new generations are elevated into the world 
of civilization. The teacher is the minister of history and the minis-
ter of humanizing nature. Thanks to the work of education, the individ-
ual may enter the world of culture and civilization well-balanced, 
mature, knowledgeable, and active; and the civilization that he enters 
is to be conceived as an immortal community of persons, consciously 
linked by a universal bond of love. 
Agazzi insists that education is purposive or teleological and its 
tasks are noble and essential. Practitioners of education must reflect 
on the humanity of the students before them and on the fact that, with-
out education, there can be no history and no civilization. Education 
is the dynamic condition of civilization, Agazzi contends, and only 
through its work can civilization be born in the individual and cele-
brated in history; thus it fulfills the demands of an infinite nature in 
temporality, preordained for the inexorable development of eternity. 49 
Some chapters in this book are concerned with attacking what Agazzi 
perceives as false or competing positions on education. 50 
49 Agazzi, Saggio, p. 189. 
50 He returns to the same task in Oltre la scuola attiva, 1955, an 
entire volume devoted to evaluating the positive points and criticizing 
378 
Aldo Agazzi has been a most prolific writer on education. His 
subsequent work, though extensive, does not contradict or substantially 
alter his vision of education as presented in Saggio sulla natura del 
fatto educative. 
The theme dwelt upon in the ninth chapter of the book is that of 
the eternal task of love. It is a most significant concept in Agazzi's 
philosophy. "Love," writes Agazzi, "is the essential principle of the 
universe," for it is the sole r~ason for the existence of the 
universe. 51 It is clear in this essay that concern for the individual, a 
theme on which Agazzi writes in other chapters, results in a close bond 
between teacher and student: "There is no education that does not exist 
as an unseverable rapport between teacher and student. " 52 That rapport 
is really a form of love. When we educate a person for his or her good, 
Agazzi suggests, we perform an act of service and love toward that 
person. "The school in which education is integral actualizes the 
centrality of love," 53 Agazzi concludes. At that point he closes what 
has been described as a " Platonic circle of love in his pedagogi-
cal thought." 54 
the inadequacies of the progressive-Deweyan-activist movement in educa-
tion. 
51A . gazzJ., Saggio, p. 153. 
52 Agazzi, Saggio, p. 172. 
53 Agazzi, Saggio, p. 172. 
54 Giovanni Giraldi, Storia della Eedagogia (Rome: Armando Armando 
Editore, 1969), p. 503. 
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The Personalist Movement in Mid-Century 
Several of the older generation of Italian personalists, born 
before 1900, lived through the Second World War and were active into the 
1960's. Another group, born in the 1920's, came into maturity in the 
1940's and inherited the guidance of the 1povement from older philoso-
phers. There were important scholars in both groups. 
A particular noteworthy member of the older generation was Giov-
anni Cal6 (1882-1970). A philosophy graduate of the University of Flor-
ence, Cald was selected for a chair in pedagogy at that university at 
the early age of twenty-four. While retaining his university post, he 
became a deputy in the pre-Fascist Italian parliament in the early 
1920's. In that same decade, he organized an education museum in Flor-
ence that later became the National Center for Study and Documentation 
in Teaching. Cald was involved in international conferences of educa-
tors in the 1930's, and he continued that work into the 1950's. He was 
associated with numerous national and international education bodies, 
including UNESCO and the Italian Cultural Commission for the Brussels 
World's Fair. He also served on the presiding council of the Schole 
center for Catholic studies in Brescia. 
As a philosopher, Cal6 taught that one could not cultivate the 
mind without the systematic and scientific study of the human being in 
all of its complexity. He did not see the individual as solitary in a 
solipsistic or anarchic sense, but rather as a being who is socially 
open and responsible. Cald's view of history and education as cultural 
processes is reminiscent of that of the idealists. 
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Cald was the author of several historical studies of education, 
philosophy, and pedagogical thought. He published a three-volume Corso 
di pedagogia (Course in Pedagogy) for university students in the 
1946-1949 period. His other activities in publishing included founding 
and editing journals in education and editing pedagogical reference 
works and sections of the Enciclopedia filosofica (Philosophical Ency-
clopedia) published by the neoscholastic Gallarate Center for Philoso-
phy. He made few original contributtons to the literature on Catholic 
philosophy and education; rather, his faith motivated him to action in 
the form of participation in organizations where education was 
discussed. 55 By the time of his death, Cal6 had received awards and 
honors from the Italian government, the French government, the Catholic 
church, and other bodies. 
A Christian spiritualist who came out of the idealist tradition 
was Mario Casotti (1896-1975), who is considered a pioneer in neospiri-
tualist pedagogy. Casotti, a former student of Gentile, had taught in 
Pisa and Turin; around 1923 or 1924 he underwent a religious conversion, 
and in 1924 Father Gemelli called him to the chair of pedagogy at the 
Catholic University of Milan. Casotti remained there for over four 
decades. He first produced critiques of idealism from a neoscholastic 
point of view. Eventually, he began a systematic study of pedagogy 
divided into three parts: teleology (aims of education); anthropology 
(study of the educand); and methodology. In his "anthropological" writ-
SSLaeng, I contemporanei, p. 872. 
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ings Casotti defends Christian personalism against idealism and 
materialism. He was a contributor to and editor of the church-oriented 
education journal Scuola italiana moderna (Modern Italian Schooling). 
At the Catholic University of ~1ilan, he encouraged systematic child 
study in a way that later became more widespread among Italian educa-
tors. 
Certainly one of the most devout of the Catholic educators was 
Gesualdo Nosengo (1906-1968). A graduate of the Catholic University of 
Milan, Nosengo devoted his life to the building of Christian awareness 
in schools and among young people. Nosengo began his career as a 
teacher of religion in high schools, and in later years he taught pedag-
ogy at the Pontificio Ateneo Urbaniano, a papal institute of higher 
learning. He was a promoter of Catholic scouting and of Catholic youth 
groups. He was one of the founders of the professional union of Catho-
lic teachers, and he was also a key member of several Catholic study 
organizations. Nosengo' s voice was even heard in postwar government 
circles as one of the professional educators who helped to publicize the 
1962 plan to create a single middle school in Italy. 
Nosengo studied and wrote extensively in the area of moral and 
religious education. Among his publications are Formazione cristocen-
trica (Christ-Centered Education), 1940; La vita religiosa dell'adoles-
cente (The Religious Life of the Adolescent), 1944; La pedagogia di 
Ges~ (The Pedagogy of Jesus), 1947; La morale professionale dell'inseg-
nante (The Professional Morality of the Teacher), 1947; La persona 
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umana e l'educazione (The Human Person and Education), 1948; La spirit-
~alita professionale (The Professional's Spirituality), 1954; L'educa-
zione morale del giovane (The Moral Education of Youth), 1955; I 1 
£?store buono e l'insegnante (The Good Shepherd and the Teacher), 1962; 
and L'educazione sociale dei giovani (The Social Education of Youth), 
1964. In La pedagogia di Ges~, a unique work, Nosengo urges his readers 
to " . . pay more attention to the Gospel, to the teaching activity of 
Jesus the Teacher. 56 Nosengo develop~ pedagogical principles based on 
the teaching activities of Jesus in the Gospels; he concludes that 
Christian education requires serene human relationships and cannot be 
based on coercion. 
One of the more scholarly Catholic educators is Giuseppe Flores 
D'Arcais (b. 1908). He is a graduate of the University of Padua who was 
employed by that university through his teaching career. At various 
times, Flores D 'Arcais was a professor of pedagogy, director of the 
university's Institute of Pedagogy, and head of the university's Divi-
sion of Teaching. In his pedagogy, the fundamental principle of 
personal individuality is the source of values for civilization and 
culture, and it is also an ultimately spiritual fact and the basis of 
pedagogical discourse. Flores D'Arcais has turned much of his attention 
to analyzing modern social and cultural phenomena, and to engaging in 
pedagogical discussions with scholars of other persuasions. His publi-
cations include Lineamenti di storia della pedagogia (Outlines of the 
56 Gesualdo Nosengo, La pedagogia di Ges,l 
Editrice, 1947), p. 7. 
(Rome: Anonima Veritas 
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History of Pedagogy), 1948; Introduzione ad una teoria della scuola 
(Introduction to a Theory of Schooling), 1951; La pedagogia nel pensiero 
classico, la pedagogia nel pensiero cristiano (Pedagogy in Classical 
Thought, Pedagogy in Christian Thought), 1954; La pedagogia oggi 
(Pedagogy Today), 1955-1957; La scuola per la persona (Schooling for 
the Person), 1960; and many journal articles and course materials in 
education. 
An unusual position among the personalists is that taken by 
Giuseppe Catalfamo. Born in Sicily in 1921, Catalfamo obtained degrees 
in pedagogy and political science from the University of Messina. He 
became an instructor in pedagogy at that university in 1950, and in 1962 
he attained the rank of professor. In 1963, he was given charge of the 
university's Institute of Pedagogy. He is a member of two scholarly 
academies and the presiding council of the Italian Pedagogical Associa-
tion. In addition, Catalfamo is on the editorial boards of several 
collections of pedagogical studies, and he edits the journal Prospettive 
pedagogiche (Pedagogical Perspectives). 
Catalfamo is considered a "critical personalist." His principal 
objectives are to synthesize a philosophically based pedagogy from the 
sciences auxiliary to education, and to use personalism to critique 
pedagogies of materialist, pragmatic, or experimentalist varieties while 
acknowledging their positive contributions. The basis of pedagogy, 
Catalfamo contends, cannot be an applied or social science, because each 
has a limited view of experience; a science can provide valuable infer-
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mat ion, but it cannot pretend to have absolute solutions. Scientific 
knowledge must be synthesized in a philosophical pedagogy based on an 
adequate concept of experience, accounting for multiplicity and uriity. 
The unifying center of the variety of real experiences is the person, 
Catalfamo argues; the person is the point of departure, the mediating 
term, and the point of arrival for education. Values are given, Catal-
famo teaches, and reveal transcendent Being as their source; as the 
person becomes endowed with values th!ough education, he or she becomes 
aware of the historical and cultural process through which those values 
are objectified. These arguments are elaborated upon in Catalfamo's 
writings, including L'educazione fondamentale (Fundamental Education), 
1964, and I fondamenti del personalismo pedagogico (The Foundations of 
Pedagogical Personalism), 1966. 
A thorough study of the personalists would reveal other scholars 
whose contributions are worth noting. At the very least, such a list 
might include Armando Carlini (1878-1959), a philosopher of spiritual 
liberty and explorer of the various approaches to Catholic epistemology, 
morals, and religious teaching; Raffaele Resta (1876-1961), who had 
strong interests in philosophy of religion and philosophy as related to 
school legislation and administrative law; Michele Federico Sciacca 
(1908-1975), an encyclopedist of pedagogy, religion, and esthetics, 
author of textbooks, and organizer of conferences; Gaetano Santomauro 
(1923-1967), who sought a synthesis of religion and life through the 
establishment of teaching and cultural centers; Marcello Peretti (b. 
385 
1920), whose early interest in instructional methodologies gave way to 
intensive study of education and religion as related to family life; and 
Roberto Zavalloni (b. 1920), a Franciscan priest and pscyhologist with 
credentials from the universities of Louvain (Belgium) and Chicago, who 
has published in Italian and English and is considered a fine writer on 
moral and esthetic education. 
The Place of Personalism 
The personalist movement was and is a significant (but not domi-
nant) force in Italian educational thought. After the demise of ideal-
ism, personalism remained as the most viable spiritualist philosophy to 
oppose the materialist philosophies of the laic schools. The developers 
and sustainers of personalism were Catholics, but it would be wrong to 
conclude that the personalist philosophers were heard only within insti-
tutions of the church. There were personalist philosophers teaching in 
state universities and serving in state education councils from the end 
of World War II through the 1960's. With an overwhelmingly Catholic 
population and a strong Christian Democrat party in power, Italy could 
not have afforded a separation of church and state to the degree of 
excluding such scholars from state organizations. Therefore, while 
commanding attention within the church, the personalists were like their 
opponents of Deweyan, Marxist, or problematicist tendencies in contrib-
uting to the debates on education and the mixture of approaches that 
characterized Italian schooling and Italian public life in that era. 
CHAPTER IX 
ADDENDA, REFLECTIONS, CONCLUSIONS 
Any attempt to summarize educational thought or activity in a 
recent period of a given country's history is fated to be incomplete. 
Education, after all, is a major enterprise in modern countries. From 
its complexity emerges the likelihood that some educators or some educa-
tional activities will have escaped the investigator's attention. The 
constraints of time and space, moreover, will force the investigator to 
eliminate some available material, to condense it, or to focus on 
certain facts and persons while virtually ignoring others. 
The purpose of this study has been to examine Italian philosophers 
of education and their work in a twenty-year period between 1945 and 
1965. Its plan has been to devote one chapter to each of the major 
trends (the filoni, or "strands") that were influential in that period, 
focusing on the major efforts of two or three representatives of each 
group. The name of other important figures have been listed in the text 
for those who may wish to carry on the work of studying them. There is 
much more that could be done in Italy alone, and beyond Italy there are 
other countries whose contributions to contemporary education are under-
researched and are not well represented on the library shelves of Ameri-
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can universities. 1 
Several tasks are reserved for this chapter. One is to outline 
the contributions of some of the pr()minent Italian educators of the 
post-1945 period who are not easily placed within the major schools or 
tendencies. Another is to demonstrate that Italian philosophy of educa-
tion, while properly Italian in many aspects, has not been carried on in 
an environment of intellectual isolation; rather, Italian philosophers 
and educators have been well aware of the contributions of foreign 
scholars and have referred to them frequently in their writings. 
Clearly, Italian philosophy of education belongs to the general culture 
of the West. 
After an examination of Italian scholars and their views on educa-
tion, the reader may wish for a summary of the central concerns that 
unite the Italian pedagogisti and of the unique positions they take on 
many issues; both aspects of their work will receive further attention. 
Finally, it will be pointed out again that education as a social enter-
prise does not operate in a cultural or historical vacuum. Major 
historical movements and events of the 1945-1965 period created echoes 
within the schools and universities of Italy; in return, the philoso-
phers and educators contributed in various ways to the history of their 
time. It is difficult to specify the role of academics in bringing 
1 on a pleasure trip to Yugoslavia, the investigator discovered a fine 
pedagogical museum in downtown Belgrade. Obviously, a tradition and a 
literature of education exist in that country. What is now required is 
an American scholar, capable of reading Slavic languages, who would be 
interested in undertaking the research. 
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about the events that mark the close of the period; nevertheless, it is 
evident that those events led to major reassessments of education in 
Italy. 
School Reformers and Utopians 
The preceding chapters have been constructed to provide a useful 
"road map" 2 of Italian educational thought. The clearest roads led 
through the universities, where pedagogia is a philosophical subject 
provided in the coursework for teacher trainees (in the teacher training 
institutes) or for those aspiring to various positions in the school 
hierarchy. In the universities, pedagogy is systematically ordered and 
an accessible subject. Professors of various philosophical tendencies 
present their views in the lecture halls or in frequently held academic 
conferences, and they publish articles in scholarly journals. Because 
of the accessibility of information, the university is an excellent 
starting place for the investigation of educational thought. 
All educational thinkers are not university professors, however, 
nor do all of them fall into a few neat conceptual categories. There 
are significant variations within the field of education, in Italy as 
elsewhere. 
2 Father Nanni of the Pontifical Salesian University suggested the 
term "road map" to describe a survey of this sort that deals in sketches 
and generalities and allows others to fill in detail as they are so 
inclined. Interview, April 1, 1982. 
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Some of Italy's important educators who have made theoretical as 
well as practical contributions to the science have been practitioners 
involved in teaching children. For example, if reasonably well-read 
Americans are asked to name an outstanding Italian educator, the name 
that will usually spring to their lips is that of Montessori, whose 
fame as a schoolmistress is international. 
The facts of Maria Montessori's life are often repeated in educa-
tion classes. She was born in Chiaravalle (Ancona province) in 1870, 
and was the first woman to obtain a medical degree from the University 
of Rome. Working in the psychiatric department of a Rome hospital, she 
became interested in educating retarded children. She searched the 
literature on educating the mentally handicapped and discovered the 
pioneering work of the French psychologists J. M. Itard and E. Seguin. 
In 1898, she expressed her interest to a pedagogical congress held in 
Turin; as a result, she was offered the directorship of an institute for 
training teachers of the retarded. Much of the training was laboratory 
oriented, and to further it the institute brought in retarded children 
who did not attend public schools; some had been committed to the Rome 
insane asylum. Montessori and her teacher trainees enjoyed remarkable 
success with these children. 
Soon, Montessori reasoned that if her methods helped retarded 
children to attain a degree of normal functioning, they might have 
unlimited possibilities for normal children. 3 She studied philosophy and 
3
other Italian educators found this a highly insulting idea. 
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pedagogy at the University of Rome, and then, with the aid of certain 
supporters, she instituted the Case dei Bambini (Children's Houses) in 
Rome and Milan. A Montessori Committee for the dissemination of her 
methods was formed in Italy, and various Montessori groups were soon 
formed abroad. In 1909, she published her first major work: Il metodo 
della pedagogia scientifica (The Method of Scientific Pedagogy). It 
was followed by many other publications and a lifetime of study and 
travel on behalf of her system of instruction. Montessori found partie-
ularly fertile ground for her theories in England, Holland, and the 
United States, even as her success in Italy waned. She was not loved by 
the Mussolini regime, and she spent many years living abroad. Montes-
sori died in Holland in 1951. 
It is clear that Montessori's main interest was in the teaching of 
children. Her studies in philosophy and pedagogy allowed her to find 
some philosophical justification for her activities, but little of what 
she wrote was philosophical in nature. The basic principles of Montes-
sorian education are these: pedagogy must be derived from the study of 
individual children; the educator must have the spirit of a scientist, 
not in the sense of regarding children as laboratory specimens, but in 
the sense of wanting to understand nature; if schools are to base their 
teaching on the individual, they must not stifle the child's individual 
expressions with authoritarianism. 4 
4 M. L. Leces s e, ed. :.:M=o=n:..::t:..::e:..::s:..::s:..::o:..::r:..::i:...::;____:E::..:d::..:u::..:c::..:a=z=-1=-· o=n=e_a=l=l=a_..:..v.=i:..::t~a 
Editori Laterza, 1975), pp. 27-38. 
(Rome: 
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~1ontessori saw her form of teaching as more than a matter of 
"method"; she characterized it as II an aid whereby the human 
personality may acquire its independence , a means of liberating it 
(personality) from the oppression of ancient prejudices about educa-
tion. . . " 5 Many Italian educators invoked "liberation" or "freedom" 
in their rhetoric, but Montessori's style of liberation found too few 
devoted supporters in Italy. The format of the Case dei Bambini was 
adopted by relatively few infant schools in Italy, but it fared better 
elsewhere. Because her teaching methods involved devising special 
materials and exercises for children and minimizing obstacles found in 
the adult world, Italian educators criticized Montessori's system as 
artificial and apstract; and because her methodology was clearly speci-
fied and graduated, she was accused of deterministic rigidity. Her 
dependence on science and natural observation earned her such epitb.~ts 
11 
't' • t' II II t • )' t' II II h • t' II d II • 'f' 11 as pos~ 1.v~s .~c, rna er~a .~s 1c, mec an1s 1c, an sc1ent1 1ca y 
dogmatic. " 6 There is also a suggestion in the critical literature that 
the opposition to Montessori was at least partly political. As a promi-
nent scholar has written: 
She tended to upset the relations of power. Education and children 
were no longer to be at the service of society, of power groups, of 
nationalism, of armies, of wealth, of adults; but society, econom-
ics, politics, culture, science, and reason were to be the concur-
rent forces in "experiencing and measuring the creative energiesn of 
children. 1 
5 Lecesse, Montessori, p. 5. 
6 E B. ' L' d' ' d 11 d ' (M '1 rnesto 1gnam1, esame 1 stor1a e a pe agog1a 1 an: Edizioni 
Bignami, 1977) 3:237 et passim. 
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The system of early childhood education that enjoys the most popu-
larity among the Italians is that of the Agazzi sisters, Rosa 
(1866-1951) and Carolina (1870-1945). Of the two, Rosa (the elder) was 
the originator of the approach, and she was aided by the unfailing 
efforts of her sister. Rosa began her career as an innovative preschool 
teacher whose work came to the attention of the director-general of 
education in Brescia province. Experimental schools were soon opened 
following her model, and Rosa turne<:i her attention to clarifying her 
principles and trying to perfect her methods. She was interested in the 
Froebelian system of education but sought to reinterpret Froebel in an 
open manner, free of the rigidity of that approach. She avoided 
announcing philosophical principles of either a scientific or spiritual-
istic type. In her later years, Rosa Agazzi was an untiring organizer 
of conferences and in-service courses for teachers. 
The premise of the Agazzi schools is simple: the school must 
follow the model of life in the (idealized) family. Agazzi schools are 
called scuole materne (maternal schools) because of their homelike 
atmosphere and emphasis on nurturing child care. Here no concessions 
are made to the small child in terms of special equipment or downsized 
furniture. The Agazzi schools have full-size furniture in order to 
teach children to cope with the adult world; and teaching materials for 
crafts, science, or arithmetic exercises are ordinary objects that chil-
dren find or parents donate. Each child is encouraged to keep a collec-
7 Remo Fornaca, Pedagogia italiana del novecento (Rome: Armando 
Armando Editore, 1978), p. 41. 
393 
tion of cianfrusaglie--literally "bits of junk," such as pebbles, match 
sticks, and bottle tops. What has probably endeared the Agazzi system 
to the conservative, family-loving Italians is its adherence to middle 
class values: 
... the correct use of the Italian language; hygiene; tidiness; 
order and commitment to work; social conduct; correct nutrition; 
sensitivity to music, poetry, and theater; thrift; love for simple 
things; the habits of observation, reflection, and religiosity; love 
of country and respect for authority; and all of this in a social 
and cultural cohesiveness aimed at avoiding social class disruptions 
and confrontations."• 
Still another approach to early childhood and elementary education 
was pioneered by Maria Boschetti Alberti (1884-1951). Boschetti Alberti 
was not a native Italian, despite her family origins. She was born in 
Montevideo, Uruguay, and spent most of her life in the Italian-speaking 
Swiss Canton of Ticino. She attended a teacher-training school in 
Locarno, Switzerland, and began teaching at the age of fourteen. In 
1916, Boschetti Alberti went to Italy to meet educators and observe 
their activities; she discovered a Montessorian school in Muzzano and 
remained there for a year, keeping a diary which she later published. 
When she returned to Switzerland, she was assigned to a school in the 
town of Agno which she organized on modified Montessorian principles. 
The hallmark of Boschetti Alberti's school was ·an atmosphere of beauty, 
tranquility, and high moral ideals, which she summed up in the phrase 
scuola serena (the serene school). Although she began with third-grade 
children, her school eventually came to include older children through 
8 Fornaca, Pedagogia italiana del novecento, p. 32. 
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the age of fifteen. Among those who admired her work and corresponded 
with her were Giuseppe Lombardo-Radice and Adolphe FerriE!re. Maria 
Boschetti Alberti was an active teacher for thirty-one years; illness 
eventually forced her into retirement, but her notebooks and diaries 
served to inspire other teachers. 
The education of the poor was a special concern of Don Lorenzo 
Milani, who was born to a cultured Florentine family in 1923. He was 
educated at the University of Milan and seemed destined for an academic 
career, but the force of a religious conversion led him to ~repare for 
the priesthood. Assigned to the parish of San Andrea in Barbiana, rural 
Tuscany, he opened a school for the peasant boys who had finished 
elementary school and had few prospects for further education. Don 
Milani's approach to teaching was unconventional and politically unor-
thodox. When he published a book about his teaching experiences in 
1958, the book was quickly withdrawn by the Holy Office because of the 
controversial nature of its contents. In 1965, Don Milani became 
embroiled in a controversy over conscientious objection to the Italian 
draft laws. There was a court hearing that provided much indirect 
publicity for the school at Barbiana, but it did not endear Don Milani 
to the conservative clergy. He died prematurely in 1967. A book of 
letters by Don Milani's students has been translated into several 
languages and distributed widely. 
A particular concern of some Italian educators has been for the 
extension of educational facilities and opportunities in impoverished 
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areas, particularly the South. In the cause of schooling for the 
Mezziogiorno (the entire area south of Rome), no name stands out more 
than that of Gaetano Salvemini (1873-1957), a native of Bari province. 
Educated as a historian, Salvemini became a professor of history at the 
University of Messina in 1901. He was a radical democrat in politics, 
an admirer of Mazzini, and an opponent of the conservative clerics who 
influenced Italian schooling in the South. Sal vemini was one of the 
founders of the National Federation of Middle School Teachers, a group 
with a laic orientation. He was a frequent contributor to socialist 
journals and a colleague of Rodolfo Mondolfo, the radical academic. In 
1925, after the Fascist takeover, Salvemini founded a clandestine polit-
ical journal; in 1929, he and other opponents of Mussolini formed an 
underground group. Between 1934 and 1946, Salvemini was in exile in the 
United States, holding the chair of History of Italian Civilization at 
Harvard University. He returned to Italy after World War II and 
accepted a teaching position at the University of Florence in 1949. 
Throughout his career, Salvemini devoted much attention to the social, 
political, and economic problems of southern Italy. A posthumous book 
of writings on education, Scritti sulla scuola (Writings About School), 
was edited by Lamberto Borghi and published in 1966. 
Up to this point, the educators mentioned as being outside of 
conventional academic groupings have been those with specific practical 
or political concerns. Among the university professors of education, 
however, two stand out because of their unorthodox thought about the 
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nature and purposes of education: they are Aldo Capitini and Carmela 
Metelli di Lalla, sometimes regarded as the "new utopians." 9 
Aldo Capitini was born in Perugia in 1899. As an instructor in a 
teacher-training school in 1933, he refused to join the Fascist party 
and was dismissed for his obvious dis loyalty. He associated himself 
with the liberal-socialist movement and the major underground group of 
the anti-Mussolini Partito d'Azione (Action party). After World War II, 
Capitini helped to found the Centri di Orientamento Sociale (Centers for 
Social Orientation), an organization dedicated to peaceful revolution, 
local autonomy, self-management and nonviolence. Increasingly, he 
became attracted to the cause of peace and nonviolence; he developed an 
admiration for Mahatma Gandhi and, in later years, for Martin Luther 
King. From his postwar chair in pedagogy at the University of Perugia, 
he advocated social and educational renewal based on principles of civil 
and religious liberty and a strong but nonconfessional moral code. 
Among his more important publications are Nuova socialita e riforma 
religiosa (The New Sociality and Religious Reform), 1950; Il fanciullo 
nella liberazione dell'uomo (The Child in the Liberation of Humanity), 
1953; La non violenza oggi (Nonviolence Today), 1962; In cammino per la 
pace (On the Road to Peace), 1962; and Democrazia e autonomia nella 
scuola e nella vita sociale (Democracy and Autonomy in School and in 
Social Life), 1964. Capitini died in 1968. 
%auro Laeng, I contemporanei (Florence: Giunti Barbera, 1979) pp. 
749-750 et passim. 
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A somewhat more unusual personality was that of Carmela Hetelli di 
Lalla (1914-1978?). She received a degree in philosophy at the Univer-
sity of Florence in 1936 and was soon employed as a teacher of philoso-
phy in state teacher-training institutions. In 1959, she became an 
instructor at the University of Padua; between 1965 and 1971 she taught 
at the universities of Hilan and Trieste, and in 1971 she returned to 
Padua where she remained until her death. A careful study of the 
language of education led Hetelli di Lalla to the conclusion that most 
educators intend to modify human conduct for some future social purpose, 
according to an ideal of a future society; hence they are implicit 
utopians. This discovery led her to study explicit utopian thinkers 
from Rousseau and Tolstoy to B. F. Skinner and Aldous Huxley. She 
analyzed their premises and presuppositions, and she subjected them to a 
philosophical critique, pointing out their strengths and faults and the 
common values they express. Metelli di Lalla came to believe that the 
common aspirations of utopian thinkers could be evaluated and distilled 
into a better formulation, and she suggested that the true utopia might 
be a type of anarchy (intended in a nonvulgar sense), a society neither 
punitive nor libertine in practice. 
anarchism was cut short by her death. 
Her development of pedagogical 
The individuals referred to in the preceding pages are but a few 
of the many who have contributed to the body of Italian educational 
thought, either as philosophers of education or as innovative educators. 
Only a few are known at all outside of Italy, and their existence and 
variety presents opportunities for further scholarship. 
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Voices from Abroad 
In the earlier chapters of this study, there is abundant evidence 
that neither Italian philosophy nor Italian educational thought devel-
oped without reference to the work of foreign scholars. Italian philos-
ophers of education, while aware of the unique concerns of Italian 
history, culture, and education, have been eager to place their thought 
within the larger cultural context of Western European civilization; and 
in their research, they have found . sources of inspiration among the 
philosophers and educators of Europe and America. 
Some obvious presences in Italian philosophy and pedagogy are 
those of the classical Greco-Roman philosophers and of European philoso-
phers of the Renaissance, enlightenment, and romantic periods; the names 
of Kant and Hegel frequently appear. The "classical" European educators 
are also invoked, particularly Rousseau, Pestalozzi, Froebel, and 
Herbart. 
Within the well-defined movements in Italian pedagogy, there are 
tendencies to refer to particular foreign educators and philosophers. 
There is a naturally strong international cast to the Deweyan "active 
education" movement, wherein the principal foreign influence, of course, 
is Dewey himself. 10 The Deweyan activists point out their close ties to 
the New Education Fellowship and often refer to northern Europeans who 
1°According to Jo Ann Boydston and Robert L. Andresen, John Dewey: A 
Checklist of Translations (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University 
Press, 1969), there have been nineteen Italian translations of books or 
major articles by Dewey. Many are still in print and are available in 
the bookshops that serve university students. 
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were involved in that movement or admired by its partisans. Among the 
most prominent are Clapar~de, Decroly, Demolins, Ferri ere, Freinet, 
Cousinet, Lietz, Geheeb, Kerschensteiner, Reddie, and Badley. Some 
translations of their works are available in Italian libraries and book-
shops. The Deweyans also recognize (and translate) the contributions of 
Americans whose work is close to that of Dewey, particularly W. H. 
Kilpatrick, Ellen Parkhurst, and Carleton Washburne. In recent years, 
there has been increasing interest in Jerome Bruner, whose structuralism 
is sometimes seen as a corrective for the overnaturalistic emphases of 
the Deweyans. 11 
Marxist educators have been sufficiently interested in the works 
of Marx, Engels, and Lenin to trans late selections from those writers 
and prepare commentaries on their writings. In the field of education, 
works by Krupskaya, Makarenko, and other Soviet educators have attracted 
the attention of Italian Marxists, and they have become widely known 
among scholars in education. Among the Eastern European educators whose 
views were heard after 1965 were Bogdan Suchodolski, a Polish scholar 
whose Socialist Pedagogy appeared in Italy in 1967, and Stanko Gogola, a 
Yugoslav philosopher who participated in educators' conferences in 
Italy. 
The Italian personalists have derived considerable inspiration 
from French personalists (Renouvier, Meunier, Maritain) and from other 
religiously-oriented French philosphers (Pascal, Bergson, Blondel). Not 
11Mario Santagata, Storia della pedagogia, 3 vols. (Seregno, Milan: 
Editrice Ciranna e Ferrara, 1979), 3:191. 
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all of their sources are French, however; in their publications they 
allude to a wide variety of foreign educators and philosophers: Kierke-
gaard, Heidegger, Husser!, Marx, and Dewey are a few of the names that 
appear, as well as the psychologists Thorndike, Pavlov, Watson, Adler, 
and Kehler. 
The point of the preceding discussion is that Italian pedagogy is 
not, and has never been, monolithically Italian. From Galluppi's 
discovery of Kant to contemporary tra~slations of British, American, and 
Sovie~ educators, the Italians have sought to learn from foreign think-
ers &~d to integrate their work into the international body of litera-
ture on philosophy and education. 
Common TI1emes and Differences 
The attempt to designate thinkers as members of certain "schools" 
or ~raditions is useful but may inadvertently obscure basic simjlaritles 
of concern even while carefully delineating positional differences. In 
order to understand the pedagogy of a nation it is well to acknowledge 
unifying commonalities as well as the individual and ideological pecul-
iarities that have arisen in actual historical circumstances. 
Obviously, all Italian philosophers of education are educated 
Italians in spite of differences in preparation. \\'hat the foreigner 
first notices among them is a conventional style of academic writing 
that is the earmark of Italian scholars. Respectability virtually 
demands such rhetorical features as lengthy sentences, a vocabulary of 
rare and elevated words, syntactic complexity that sometimes approaches 
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opacity, a penchant for extravagant figures of speech, and frequent 
allusions to classical, Renaissance, and enlightment personalities. 
Only the more iconoclastic (Ugo Spirito, for example, or Lucio Lombardo-
Radice) may dare to write in a more direct, journalistic style, but even 
they sometimes reveal their academic origins. A cynical foreigner might 
be tempted to dismiss Italian scholarship as a body of merely pompous 
rhetoric were it not for the suspicion that there is something involved 
in the enterprise that is not immediately apparent; probably, it is the 
force of tradition in the Italian mind. 
In Italy, schools and teachers do an active job of convincing the 
young that they are part of a cultural and intellectual tradition. The 
emphasis was probably strongest in the Mussolini era during which most 
of the postwar philosophers of education were youths or young adults, 
but it has never been entirely absent from the schools since the time of 
national unity and the first true state schools. It is likely, then, 
that Italian scholars have internalized the ideal of a cultural and 
intellectual tradition to uphold, and to do any less would be unseemly. 
A less charitable view of Italian intellectuals is that presented by the 
historian and social critic, Giorgio Bocca: 
For the Italian, the true intellectual is one who occupies himself 
with ideologies, transcendence, systems, grand hypotheses, and 
utopias; and who meanwhile spends his life begging powerful barons 
for endowed chairs or seeking cooperative projects, commissions, 
literary prizes, and fellowships with the meanness and shrewdness of 
a famished servant. 12 
12Giorgio Bocca, In che cosa credono gli italiani? (Milan: Longa-
nesi & C., 1982), p. 27. 
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However one wishes to interpret the phenomenon, the Italian 
scholar is wedded to a style that may sometimes stand in the way of 
lucid exposition. Occasionally the scholar fails to notice some of the 
possible interpretations of his rhetoric, as may have been the case with 
Giovanni Gentile, who seemed to understand neither the political uses 
made of his pronouncements nor the actual intentions of the regime that 
he so avidly supported. As pointed out in the introduction to the pres-
ent study, one of the hazards of working in the Italian language is that 
of dealing with frequent and deliberate ambiguities. 
Closely allied to Italian scholarship's respect for tradition is 
its emphasis on sustaining and improving a living Italian culture and 
integrating new facts and ideas within the boundaries of that culture. 13 
The business of paying homage to the collective entities of culture and 
society is engaged in by all educators and philosophers. It is particu-
larly noticeable among the historicists and idealists, but others are 
required to acknowledge the power of collective society. Borghi, for 
example, must argue vigorously for the social nature of morality in 
Dewey's system; 111 the Marxist Lombardo-Radice asserts 
". . . individual destiny is also always collective destiny . . 
that 
tt. 15 
' 
13Even the most outspoken social reformers find much that is worth-
while in Italian culture; the Marxists and Deweyans, for example, have 
sought to find points of social resonance for their essentially foreign 
ideologies. 
14Lamberto Borghi, L' ideale educative di John Dewey (Florence: La 
Nuova Italia Editrice, 1955), pp. 23-29. 
15Lucio Lombardo-Radice, L'educazione della mente (Rome: Editori 
Riuniti, 1961; 1977), p. 168. This is not an unusual position for a 
403 
Agazzi, a Christian philosopher, posits sociality as a category of spir-
itual activity. 16 Clearly, radical individualism is not an option for 
these thinkers. For the Italian, the individual is an entity of less 
importance than society (and its primary unit, the family). The words 
"individual" and "individualism" tend to be used in pejorative contexts, 
or with apologetic or explanatory phrases attached. In no case does the 
Italian philosopher or educator see the individual as having potentiali-
ties equal to or surpassing those of the collective; rather, the indi-
vidual must be educated for the sake of society. 
Despite their admiration for collective phenomena, however, Ital-
ian philosophers of education of the 1945-1965 period agree that society 
and its schools are in a deplorable state. To a large extent, they 
point to the schools' formalism, aridity, and lack of pupil engagement 
as evidence of a variety of social and pedagogical ills. Their diagno-
ses and recommended cures differ considerably. It is interesting, but 
not surprising, that most of the educators' remedies are directed at 
schooling; for while no philosopher defines education as exactly equiva-
lent to schooling, the only formal structure that performs educative 
functions and can be analyzed and reconstructed in a deliberate way is 
the school. They perceive that in any institution there is room for 
improvement; and the offered improvements range from better concepts of 
Marxist to take; but it illustrates a concern shared with more conserva-
tive philosophers. 
16 Aldo Agazzi, Saggio sulla natura del fatto educativo (Brescia: 
Editrice La Scuola, 1951), p. 182. 
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history or morality or freedom to entire systems of instruction based 
upon social, political, or ideological concerns. Metelli di Lallo may 
be correct when she intuits that there is something utopian in every 
social philosopher, that each has his or her own vision of the ideal 
society. The contending schools and variety of opinions may also illus-
trate the spirit of free expression that pervaded Italy in the post-Fas-
cist era, or even the discontent of scholars of particular convictions 
with the often unsatisfying comprom~ses that were necessary (and are 
still necessary) to keep Italian institutions functioning. 
Some Common Premises 
Similarities among Italian philosophers of education go beyond 
mere matters of style and favorite targets of rhetorical attack. It 
would be shallow to suggest that the tendency of various scholars to 
discuss the same or similar issues is only the result of a certain 
fashionability of those issues. There is a loose but discernible struc-
ture in the pedagogical arguments presented by most of these thinkers, 
and it is based on common assumptions and on questions that almost 
inevitably arise from the nature of the material being discussed. 
Most Italian educators agree, for example, that in order to 
develop a pedagogy one must have a general view of humanity and human 
society. Education is first of all a human activity (and one may recall 
Agazzi's insistence that only human beings are educated). It is also a 
particularly social activity, no matter how much autonomy is imputed to 
the educand; the presence of others (including teachers) is understood 
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as a necessary feature of the educational process. Accepting these 
points, the philosopher of education must deal with questions about the 
nature of the individual human being and his or her actual or ideal 
relationship to general human society. At the human level, all must 
deal with the ancient problem of the one and the many. Having rejected 
the idealists' identification of the individual with society, the 
thinker must find new and more adequate social formulations. The effort 
to understand education in a social context leads to questions of moral-
ity that are likely to arise whenever two or more people (actually or 
hypothetically) interact. Other questions that arise involve defini-
tions of freedom and authority. Such considerations often lead to a 
vision of the ideal society. For the Italians, philosophy of education 
is and has always been inseparable from social and moral philosophy. 
The concept of education implies a learning process, and to a 
limited extent, Italian philosophers of education have considered the 
meaning and implications of human learning. Those lines of investiga-
tion, however, are usually tangential to examinations of the social 
functions of education; the mechanisms of learning are left to psycholo-
gists, who (as De Bartolomeis argues vigorously in La pedagogia come 
scienza) are best equipped to develop those more scientific aspects of 
education. The philosopher, in fact, is more interested in what is 
learned than in how it is learned. The content of learning is of espe-
cial importance when it is seen as a body of knowledge mediated through 
the social milieu; then the philosopher defines it as "culture." The 
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education process, for most Italian scholars, is one of enculturation--
of coming into a culture. How the cultural material is to be under-
stood or whether the culture itself is in need of transformation is a 
matter for scholarly debate. Beyond that point, questions of content 
learning resolve into matters of curriculum and methodology on which the 
philosophers of education offer only broad observations. That fin~l 
area is no longer the proper province of pedagogia. Its concerns are 
best dealt with by those in the alli~d field of didattica (which never-
theless should be firmly based on pedagogical principles.) 
Variations in Formulation 
On every essential point in education there are differences not 
only from philosopher to philosopher, but especially among the larger 
groupings of philosophers. If these differences (in the Itali~~ 
context) have not yet become obvious, a few examples may help to illus-
trate them. 
For the idealist, man and society are properly determinations of 
culture, which is the process of transcendent universal Mind in history; 
society is the present historical reality that embodies culture, and it 
is that in which man must exist. In such a worldview, the individual 
becomes a function of society, worthy and meaningful only in the pursuit 
of social goals. (The term "individual," in fact, has little meaning 
for the idealist, for in that system it is impossible to separate the 
individual from society.) Thus, what the individual learns must be 
''cultural" in nature and must socialize the learner; any other program 
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is unthinkable. Morality is the will of society toward its own good, 
and it is a morality that the individual must internalize completely. 
Under such a concept of morality, freedom can be little other than doing 
one's duty gladly and voluntarily; this means willingly obeying the 
authority of the state and striving to overcome one's individualistic 
tendencies. Idealists favor a humanistic curriculum (as the most 
historically valid), and they are tolerant but skeptical of methodologi-
cal innovations, accepting only those that contribute to social learning 
as they understand it. 
The problematicist rejects transcendental entities and sees soci-
ety as an ever-present reality, always in the process of change and 
usually in need of reform. The principal philosophical function of the 
individual is to criticize the social organism (to say "but," as Ugo 
Spirito remarks). Education, in order to contribute to the reform of 
society, must be critical in nature and free of dogmas. Of course, all 
"metaphysical" views of humanity and society are rejected as dogmatic. 
Banfi's description of the social origins of education is naturalistic 
and similar to Dewey's. Morality, for the problematicist, is in a state 
of flux and evolution, and is a matter for constant reexamination. 
While the outcomes of education are necessarily social, society is not a 
monolithic authority external to the individual. The freedom to criti-
cize allows individuals, groups, and social classes to challenge author-
ities and old doctrines and to reconstruct society as contemporary 
conditions require. For the problematicist, the curriculum must be 
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modernized and as broad as possible. Science and the social sciences 
are favored, but the humanities are allowed in modified forms for 
reasons having to do with social and historical perspectives (without 
the tedious and anachronistic recitation of Greek verbs). ~1ethodology 
is subject to criticism and change, but it must never become captive to 
dogmas, old or new. 
Deweyans are even more inclined than problematicists to accept 
science and naturalistic explanations. They are also more tolerant of 
system building. They accept that education is social, but the doctrine 
of interests also allows a considerable degree of individual learning 
within the social (e.g., classroom) context. One of the basic Deweyan 
doctrines is that all learning is essentially self-teaching (a doctrine 
that was strangely perverted by the idealists), but the notion of self-
teaching never excludes the possibilities of benign influences being 
exercised by others (teachers and schoolmates). The presence of others 
is especially important in the development of an adequate morality, as 
Lamberto Borghi argues. Freedom, as understood by Laporta, is the 
possibility of expending energy without unnecessary societal 
constraints. Morality, however, dictates that free energy is not to be 
used irresponsibly; the Deweyans tend to posit freedom as a condition of 
social undertakings. For Deweyan educators, the curriculum is heavily 
scientific in emphasis, and they encourage experimental methods of 
teaching according to scientific precepts. 
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The Marxists, like the problematicists and Deweyans, are social 
reconstructionists, but with a very particular vision of the ideal soci-
ety. While attacking the dogmas of religions and right-wing philoso-
phies, Marxists generally fail to notice the dogmatic nature of their 
own doctrines. Their view of man and society is obviously that provided 
by dialectical materialism (more accurately characterized as dialectical 
historicism); similarly, there are definite doctrines of Marxist moral-
ity that stress social responsibility and economic and class equality. 
The Marxist position on authority is ambiguous because it is revolution-
ary; the Marxist student must resist the ethos of the (evil) bourgeois 
authority, while seeking to implement a social ethos that is coopera-
tive, communitarian, and egalitarian. That ethos describes the "good" 
society, if it were to exist, and such a society would be the benign 
authority whose dictates it would be foolish and backward to resist. 
Freedom is a social and economic goal (freedom from poverty, unemploy-
ment, class oppression), but hardly an individual goal (freedom to do as 
one pleases or to disregard the demands of others). What is to be 
learned in school is first of all ideological and then overwhelmingly 
scientific and technological, for science and technology must be used to 
serve humanity and the revolution. Probably as a result of the disas-
trous methodological experiments conducted in the U.S.S.R. in the 
1920's, Marxists tend to advocate traditional methodologies and a 
strict, authoritarian classroom atmosphere. 
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The Catholic personalists 1 view of humanity is dependent upon 
theological understandings: human beings are the erring but beloved 
creatures of a transcendent God. Human destiny is eternal, and humani-
ty 1 s goal is not merely an improved version of human society; social 
life must be a preparation for the heavenly life to come. For the 
personalists, the concept of "individual" is replaced by that of the 
person who exists within society but is not totally identical with it. 
Each human being is a value in his or her own right; social relation-
ships (including those in the classroom) must be based on a profound 
respect for the worth and dignity of the person as a creature of God. 
Morality is derived from religious principles laid down for the preser-
vation and protection of persons and for the maintenance of the special 
relationship of man and God. That ethos must permeate Christian educa-
tion. Freedom is primarily a spiritual concept for the personalists. 
It is in the mind (equivalent to spirit) that persons are free to seek 
their own dignity, integrity, and salvation, or even their liberty from 
earthly impediments. The enculturating function of the school is impor-
tant (as Agazzi suggests), but the absorption of human culture by the 
young has an ulterior purpose: it is a step in the development of spir-
itual beings. While authority may be given to some, it is unjust for 
them to abuse it; educators must not oppress the young. In curriculum, 
neither science nor the humanities are to be despised, but all learning 
activities must be pursued within a larger context of human culture, 
history, and civilization. Teachers, out of concern for the mental and 
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spiritual growth of their charges, must abandon arid and authoritarian 
methodologies and adopt those that are more humane and experiential. 
A Matter of Influence 
Whatever philosophies and ideologies may have motivated the peda-
gogisti to offer solutions for the problems of Italian schooling (and 
by extension, of Italian society), it is important to realize that these 
were the schemae and systems offered from the lecterns of Italian 
universities and teacher-training institutions. The opportunity to 
influence young philosophers and future teachers was not missed; it is 
especially evident, for example, in the activities of the Dewey-inspired 
School of Florence. Nevertheless, any philosophy or ideology that moves 
into the schoolroom must confront the moderating factors of legislation 
and (political) administration. Important dec is ions regarding what is 
taught, who teaches it, and by what method, are made at the legislative 
and administrative levels; they are political decisions, especially in a 
nation with a centralized system of public schooling. Ironically, while 
those decisions reflect the ideological or philosophical viewpoints of 
legislators and administrators, there is never a clear pipeline from the 
university professor through the teacher to the child. If one raises 
the question of "influence," then, it appears to be just that: a matter 
of relative influence rather than of absolute control, to degrees that 
are difficult to measure because of the peculiar dynamics of the state 
political and educational machinery. All that can be safely concluded 
is that philosophers of education intended to influence their students, 
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and through them the schools. 17 At the very least, it is evident that 
some pedagogical tendencies (e.g. Deweyan and Marxist) enjoyed greater 
popularity than others (e.g. historicist and idealist) in the post-World 
War II era. 
The Historical Dimension 
The period between the end of World War II and the mid-1960's was 
a time of great cultural and political adjustments for Italy. The 
Mussolini regime, for all its shortcomings, had lasted for twenty-three 
years, and, thanks to its totalitarian fervor, it had created a stable 
frame of reference for a generation of Italians. Whether they were 
active Fascists or not, Italians of the 1920's, 1930's, and early 1940's 
knew the ideology and the peculiar dynamics of their society. At the 
end of the war, the Fascist establishment was swept away: the Duce was 
gone, the Fascist party was dissolved, and the former German allies were 
now called war criminals. 
The postwar political changes certainly affected Italian intellec-
tuals in general: artists and academics of all sorts, including philos-
ophers and educators. Fortunately, few philosophers had been whole-
hearted supporters of Mussolini. Even Gentile, martyred for the Fascist 
cause, had sometimes harbored doubts. The academics' participation in 
17 The possibility of applying philosophical concepts to education is 
always more easily pursued within the context of private or confessional 
schools, where experimentation is less hampered by bureaucratic inter-
ference than in state schools. Whether church schools in Italy have 
been eager to implement the suggestions of the personalists is a matter 
not investigated in the course of this study, but it offers an intri-
guing avenue of research. 
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Fascist "cultural" activities seems, in retrospect, to have been a sham 
endured for the purpose of retaining academic appointments. To such 
persons one might impute selfish motivations or moral cowardice, but not 
a will to do evil. There were some complicitous Italians as well as 
complicitous Germans, but Italian professors were not Fascist thugs. 
Professor Bottai, for example, Mussolini 1 s last peacetime minister of 
education, refrained from indulging in the propagandistic bullying and 
zealous excesses typical of Party l;)ecretary Starace; after the war, 
Bottai enjoyed a quiet retirement. Philosophers such as Ernesto Codig-
nola and Ugo Spirito who had supported the regime up to the eve of the 
war energetically repudiated their former political sympathies, perhaps 
only to maintain their academic credibility. 
For Italians, the result of the Allied victory was a political and 
ideological pluralism for which many were ill prepared. The need of 
those who abandoned Fascism and actual idealism was to find suitable new 
systems of belief; most intellectuals succeeded. 18 The practical effect 
of the abandonment of actual idealism, which for many had been a reac-
tion to positivism, was to put idealism in the analogous position of 
being reacted against. Aldo Agazzi therefore characterizes the post-
World War II period as the "double reaction" against both positivism and 
idealism. 19 
18It should be recalled that the actual idealists retained some 
academic importance into the 1960 1 s (about the time of Codignola 1 s 
death), but they enjoyed much less prestige than before the war, and 
representatives of other schools had been gaining favor since the end of 
the hostilities. 
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The options available in the fields of philosophy and education in 
the immediate postwar era mirrored those in the political field. (Ital-
ians instinctively recognize the political character of education.) Of 
Italian politics, it is commonly said that there are three camps to 
which one might belong: Catholic, Marxist, or laic. While that is true 
in general terms, it fails to account for the subtle differences that 
exist within those groups, and it incompletely describes the politics 
associated with the academic world. There were complex considerations 
that affected the group identifications of scholars in the postwar 
years. 
The Catholics, for example, represented an established force that 
had been present in the Fascist era, although in those days it had been 
subjected to much state interference. Indeed, one of the political 
upheavals of the post-1945 period was the changed role of Catholics from 
social critics to the dominant political group (through the Christian 
Democrats) . In intellectual matters, however, their influence fell 
short. Many of the younger scholars, disillusioned by the realities of 
the war, found it unfashionable to be "dogmatic" and "metaphysical." If 
Fascist dogma had been responsible for Italy's recent woes, then all 
dogma was suspect. Was there much difference, some asked, between 
obedience to a Pope and a monolithic church and obedience to the Duce 
and a monolithic Fascist party? Moreover, the Christian Democrats in 
power behaved as a disappointingly conservative group. For the reform-
19Aldo Agazzi, Panorama della pedagogia oggi (Brescia: La Scuola 
Editrice, 1953), p. 166 ff. 
415 
minded intellectual, they were unappealing, especially as they proposed 
no sweeping social changes. Their philosophy was essentially of two 
closely allied varieties, Neothomism and personalism, and no other 
choice was readily offered. Christian radicalism was not a noticeable 
force until the 1960's, when Don Hilani publicized his fight against 
critics. In brief, the Italian intellectual who might be baptized, 
married, or eventually buried by the church was not always likely to 
seek its guidance in political or philosophical matters. 
For those who had been inspired by the wartime anti-Fascist under-
ground and by the examples of such leaders as Gramsci and Togliatti, 
Marxism was an attractive option. Harxism had always drawn a following 
of socially alienated intellectuals, and it continued to do so in the 
postwar years. What the Harxist academics lacked was a tradition of 
sound Marxist-oriented scholarship. They were mathematicians or histo-
rians or philosophers, trained in their disciplines by older, more 
conservative scholars. The Marxists' ideological fervor motivated them 
to engage in political activities, but not until the 1960's did they 
seriously begin to employ their scholarly expertise upon academic ques-
tions of some political import. 20 The Marxists' turn to "committed" 
scholarship contributed to their visibility in the universities during 
the volatile times of the late 1960's. 
20see, for example, the debate over the existence 
occasioned by Hanacorda's historical investigations. 
is provided in Chapter VII of the present study. 
of Harxist pedagogy 
Further discussion 
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For those academics who wished to express radical or reformist 
opinions without labeling themselves as orthodox Marxists, there were 
other options in the postwar era. Within the "problematicist" group, 
two curiously leftist figures served as examples: Antonio Banfi, who 
was a staunch member of the Communist party but not a doctrinaire 
dialectical materialist; and Ugo Spirito, an ex-Fascist who professed 
admiration for the U.S.S.R. and the People's Republic of China while 
claiming to loathe dogma of any kind. Some of the Deweyans (e.g., De 
Bartolomeis, Broccoli, and Rugiu) chose to criticize Italian society and 
education from a leftist standpoint, but at the same time they sought to 
retain "new" or "activist" education in their formulations. 
The peculiarities of the third group, the laics, are many. 
Although nominal supporters of the anticlerical and non-Communist left 
(socialists and social democrats), their philosophical directions must 
be described in a more diverse manner. For many, especially those 
attracted by the early postwar vitality of the New Education Fellowship, 
a Deweyan or activist philosophy of education seemed promising, although 
it was always more palatable if synthesized with some of the essential 
features of the Italian cultural tradition. So Borghi, Laporta, and 
Visalberghi, for example, worked on integrating Dewey with Italian views 
on morality, law, and psychology. 21 Despite the vigor of the Deweyans, 
21To every proposed innovation in technology or the social sciences, 
some conservative Italian pundit is likely to intone "Questa per noi e 
assurdo"--"This is absurd for us," implying that it might be well enough 
for lesser peoples. Surely the Italian Deweyans had to labor under the 
dread of hearing that charge. 
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other kinds of laics have existed in Italian university circles. One 
might name problematicists, utopians, and in recent years, language 
analysts. There was even an Italian attempt at existentialism, repre-
sented boldly by Abbagnano, but that essentially Franco-German movement 
had little resonance in Italy; Abbagnano found his closest allies among 
the laic pragmatist Deweyans. 
There is probably considerable merit to the notion that the Ital-
ians, having first abandoned posi~ivism and then idealism, were 
compelled to react publicly against both; it is evident in their publi-
cations. Every school of pedagogical thought presents its particular 
arguments against actual idealism. The salvoes fired at the idealists 
are particularly loud in the early postwar years; by the 1960's, ideal-
ism had become something of a straw man, but it was still permissible 
for Deweyans, Marxists, and others to attack the idealists' errors. Yet 
the characterization given by Agazzi, while insightful, provides only a 
broad generalization about the philosophical and pedagogical activities 
of the 1950's and 1960's in Italy. 
The philosophers and educators of that period were acutely aware 
of, and therefore in reaction to, one another. The postwar removal of 
Fascist personnel from the universities and the gradual retirement of 
the idealists left positions open in academia. It was a time of oppor-
tunity, but also of uncertainties. Who would predominate in the univer-
sity chairs? It behooved scholars struggling to establish their creden-
tials to read what the others were writing, and to present their own 
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positions in the strongest possible light. The political struggles in 
the Italian parliament were to some degree repeated in the universities. 
Every book and most articles published in that period contain references 
to mistaken positions taken by philosophical opponents. The Deweyans 
and problematicists, for example, lost no opportunities to criticize 
those of a more dogmatic nature, a criticism that might apply to ideal-
ists, but also to Catholics and Marxists if not indicated by name. On 
their own part, the historicists, Ma~xists, and Catholics were quick to 
point out the shortcomings of "naturalistic" and "active" education, 
referring to the Deweyans. 
There were no clear-cut victors in the struggle for academic 
eminence, but a combination of favorable historical and political 
factors created opportunities for the Deweyans to predominate in a 
number of major universities. There were other universities that were 
bulwarks of Catholicism (especially in the far Northeast and the South) 
or occasionally of other tendencies. By and large, the Marxists were 
the latecomers, having entered other fields before they ventured into 
pedagogy. Whether the rhetoric was strident or refined, the process of 
scholarly dialectic was basically genteel and conducted according to the 
time-honored principles of academic debate. Professors of opposing 
tendencies attended conferences, presented papers on issues of common 
concern, and sometimes served on committees together. It seems as 
though few were prepared for the disturbances that swept through the 
universities in 1967 and 1968, and for the demands made upon educators 
and politicians to reform or revolutionize Italian society. 
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After the New Left 
The upheavals of the late 1960's changed the balance of academic 
and intellectual power more than they changed the political structure of 
Italy. The protests, occupations, and riots took place in universities 
and secondary schools for the most part. Marxists and persons with 
allied opinions were catapulted into national prominence, and even 
conservatively-oriented journals in education entered into the intricate 
and tiresome debates on educational reform. Some of the laic academics, 
sensing the changing tide of public (or student) opinion, expressed 
increasingly radical ideas. The old idealists virtually vanished; and 
the more conservative of the Catholics engaged in defending church 
tradition were less audible than newcomers such as Don Milani who advo-
cated "liberation" theologies. Traditionalists who faced the new world 
bravely sometimes found themselves speaking to small audiences. 
How the actions of Italian educators after the 1960's will be 
interpreted by scholars is so far a matter for speculation. The 
attempts of those scholars to cope with newer political realities is 
outside the scope of this study. It is subject matter worthy of another 
research effort. The possibility of such an investigation is attrac-
tive, however, and its outcomes could be interesting in their own right. 
Whatever has to do with Italy cannot be uninteresting. 
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